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In August 2010 I was working in a multi-national environment, had nice col-
leagues, and was fortunate to work in all of ‘my’ three languages. I had just 
received my first working contract for a full-time position. And yet, I felt 
that something was missing. I did not feel strongly connected to the content 
of my work. I don’t consider myself as an academic per se but as someone 
who likes reading, reflecting, writing and identifying connections between 
seemingly unrelated things. In a way, I had a feeling of estrangement. How-
ever, working in an inspiring and dynamic environment had turned out to 
be impossible at that time.
Changes often occur unexpectedly, though. Six months later the great 
opportunity arose to study a really fascinating topic in-depth: the role of dis-
cretion in EU negotiations and national transposition processes regarding 
European directives and the link between discretion and the legitimacy of 
these directives in national law. Transposition and the problem of non-com-
pliance in this area has been a topic of lasting academic interest. In this dis-
sertation deficient transposition certainly is a relevant part of the story but 
it remains a sub-plot. The spotlight is on discretion which has everything an 
intriguing research puzzle needs, involving tensions (discretion and law /
legitimacy) as well as seeming contradictions (discretion impeding but 
apparently also facilitating the transposition of directives into national law). 
In short, discretion is a topic that in a number of respects matters, not least 
in the light of the alleged (democratic) legitimacy deficit of the European 
Union. But apparently research on discretion had left gaps and I was happy 
to be entrusted with the task to try filling a few of them.
Since then five years have passed. In retrospect, being a PhD candidate 
was demanding. This was not only due to the content of the job. It was also 
challenging to work as a ‘non-Dutch’, ‘non-lawyer’, ‘non-Leiden alumni’ 
in an environment with people mostly sharing one (professional) identity. 
Looking back, the situation I was then in appears funny to me now. Sure, 
my personal and academic background was different from many of those 
around me, which explains why I was considered the ‘vreemde eend in de 
bijt’ (= ‘the odd one out’). On the other hand, though, I felt a strong connec-
tion with my topic. Just like discretion I could not readily be labelled.
Studying discretion was exciting. I liked the polyphony of voices which 
emerged from academic debates and the interviews I conducted. I liked 
catchy descriptions of discretion, such as the ‘beauty of vagueness’ – though, 
in my eyes, discretion turned out to be more than just the implication of a 
vague or broad concept. My dissertation seeks to underline that its ‘beauty’ 
exists, namely in the way it enables Member States to integrate EU rules into 
their own legal framework without necessarily breaking off traditionally 
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‘Courage is to have fear but to do it anyway.’ 
(B. S., 2013)
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grown structures. Less easy but nevertheless interesting, was tracing dis-
cretion in directives’ texts. Like a babushka doll, discretion can take many 
forms therein.
The PhD-period has a special place in my personal biography. It was a 
privilege to have the means to set up and conduct my own research project 
for which I am very grateful. I have learned a lot about myself and the world 
around me. I fully agree that a dissertation is no comfort zone as one of my 
supervisors once put it – and it should not be one. But every now and then 
also discomfort can be eased by the help of others. In this respect, I’d like to 
thank my supervisors, Wim and Bernard, not only for their effort, time, input 
and flexibility but especially for supporting me in taking postgraduate cours-
es and involving me in research projects. Organising and conducting the field 
work would not have been possible without the help of Josien Stoop, from 
the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, who spared no effort in 
providing me with relevant documents, valuable contacts and knowledge. 
I am very grateful to all my respondents for sharing their time and expertise 
with me. Here, I like to thank in particular Rob Duba, working at the Min-
istry of Infrastructure and the Environment and Bert Jan Clement as well as 
Melanie van Vugt from the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports who were 
very approachable and cooperative.
Other bright and kind people have supported me in one way or the 
other, by joining me on this journey. My special thanks go to my sister Jack, 
for proofreading parts of the book, despite her tight schedule: I am very 
proud of you! Tom for offering so generously your help from a distance: 
there should be many more of you in academia. Nathalie, for helping me 
with tricky layout questions, and joining me in what we both love doing in 
order to relax: dancing! Additionally, I am very thankful to my colleagues: 
Hans-Martien for our inspiring conversations in earlier stages of the project, 
Claar for your continuous involvement in it and belief in me: I still hear you 
saying: ‘Josy, you are going to make it. I know it!’ I am very grateful to you, 
Elly, for supporting me morally: I enjoyed our weekly laughter and chats 
about the most important thing in life: family; and Marga: you have inspired 
me and I admire your diligence and will power. Furthermore, I appreci-
ate every input and support of colleagues that took a sincere interest in my 
research project and me as a person. Finally, I am greatly indebted to my 
dear friends, close by or far away: friendship does not know any distance! 
Thank you for enriching my life! Apart from this group I warmly thank 
Michel for his patience and understanding, and Niek for regularly dropping 
a line to ask how I am. Last but not least, I am particularly grateful for the 
support of my mother. Without your daily encouragements and unshaken 
belief that your ‘little’ daughter can do it, I wouldn’t have made it. You are 
right, ‘the road is tough, but the driver is tougher!’
Preface VII
I like to dedicate this book two my father and stepfather. Both of them 
passed away unexpectedly while I was working on it, and very sadly, can-
not share this special moment with me. Nevertheless, in their very own way, 
they contributed to this work.
With every ending comes a new beginning. Now I am open for new chal-
lenges and the best period (s) of my life still to come!
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In the introduction to the dissertation, discretion in European Union (EU)1 
directives is presented as the focus of the study. The context in which discre-
tion comes into play is addressed and the legal and political implications 
it is assumed to have are mapped out. The debate on discretion has pro-
vided input for the research and given rise to questions which are intro-
duced together with the envisaged approach to address them. Discretion 
is approached within a European as well as a national legal context. The 
discussion below therefore alternates between these two levels and revolves 
around three major subject matters that are interlinked in this context: dis-
cretion, implementation and legitimacy. Whereas discretion is addressed at 
length at a later stage, the concepts of implementation and legitimacy are 
further elaborated in the subsequent sections.
1.2 Discretion
EU law strives to unify or harmonise national laws. However, looking at 
directives, one of the EU’s main legislative instruments, their provisions 
regularly provide Member States with the possibility to depart from EU 
rules. For instance, the EU aims to establish a common market for pyrotech-
nic articles meaning the free circulation of fireworks and other pyrotechnic 
products. And yet, despite the aim of one single market for pyrotechnic arti-
cles throughout the EU, Member States are allowed to restrict the posses-
sion, use, and / or the sale to the general public of specific categories of fire-
works and other pyrotechnic articles.2 In another case, not dealing with the 
market access of goods but with the access of non-EU third country nation-
als to Member States’ territories for the purpose of highly-skilled employ-
ment, harmonisation at a minimum level leaves the possibility for Member 
States to continue applying their own national rules alongside European 
ones.3 The flexibility that Member States apparently have in implement-
ing EU rules, and which is a fundamental characteristic of European Union 
(EU) directives, is known as discretion. Discretion takes centre stage in this 
1 For the sake of clarity as well as consistency the term European Union (EU) is used 
throughout the dissertation, even if this includes reference to instruments of the legal 
framework of the former European Community (EC).
2 See Article 6(2) of Directive 2007/23/EC, in short: Pyrotechnic Articles Directive.
3 See Article 3(4) and 4(2) of Directive 2009/50/EC, in short: Blue Card Directive.
1 Unifying diversity
4 Part 1  Introduction and theoretical background
book. Discretion does, however, not only flow from the directive text. Direc-
tives grant discretion by design in accordance with the EU treaty: directives 
prescribe the result that Member States have to achieve; how they do so, i.e. 
by means of which forms and methods, is up to them.4
With a view to the general legal context discretion has, in fact, been 
defined in various ways and found difficult to frame in a ‘conclusive defini-
tion’ (Brand, 2008: 218; see also Gil Ibañez, 1999: 199; Handler, 1992: 331). In 
the context of implementation it can be understood as providing a range of 
options to the authority in charge, all of them being compatible with the law 
to be implemented (see e.g. Calvert et al., 1989; Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 
2000; Franchino, 2004; Thomson, 2010). But views on discretion differ in 
legal as well as political studies, especially with respect to the relevance and 
role it is supposed to have not only within an EU context but for legal sys-
tems more generally. This makes discretion a challenging concept but also 
one which is worthy of closer examination. This study particularly seeks 
to explore the role and effects of discretion within the context of EU and 
national decision-making processes regarding European directives. In doing 
so, it also takes into account insights from the study of discretion in broader 
national legal contexts.
The delegation of discretion from the legislature to the executive branch 
of government, meaning the administrative apparatus of the state, has to be 
seen in the light of modern legal systems that seek to cope with the amount 
of tasks they have to fulfil. To this end, legislatures do not produce detailed 
legislation but leave the elaboration of rules to the administration that has 
to apply them in practice. Hence, the importance of discretion for both leg-
islature and administration: while the former grants discretion to achieve 
swift and efficient law-making, the latter needs flexibility for the implemen-
tation of generally formulated rules into specific contexts (e.g. Bakker and 
Van Waarden, 1999). The delegation of discretion from the legislature to the 
administration is not only evident from the development of the liberal con-
stitutional state to the social welfare state. It is also evident at the EU level. 
The history of the EU has also been marked by a growth of competencies 
and scope of new policies which both have been described as ‘one of the 
most striking features in the development of Western European Politics in 
the last 15 years’ (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000: 202).This development 
has progressed further ever since. Growing economic and monetary inte-
gration affecting also other fields (e.g. consumer protection, health care) has 
led to an increasing reliance on administration. Some therefore conceive the 
EU to be a regulatory state (Majone 1997; 2002; 2005), while others refer to it 
as a system of multi-level jurisdictions or multi-level governance (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2001) where besides public actors, unelected actors are also 
involved in the preparation and application of EU rules (Vibert, 2007: 129-
143; Corkin, 2013). The role of independent (unelected) regulatory authori-
4 Article 288 TFEU, formerly Article 249 TEC.
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ties and the administration in particular, has been described with regard 
to both national and EU contexts, as boiling down to a ‘fourth branch of 
government’ (Vibert, 2007: 2; Corkin, 2013: 642). Leaving aside whether or 
not this is an apt description of reality, it does in any case make clear that 
administrative (discretionary) rule-making is an integral part of modern 
legal systems, which contributes to ensuring the latter’s proper functioning.
1.2.1 Discretion in implementation
The strong reliance of the EU on its own as well as Member States’ adminis-
trations in particular is well exemplified by the preparation and application 
of EU law. EU directives are a case in point. While they are prepared and 
adopted at the EU level, their (formal) implementation (and thus also the 
use of the flexibility and hence discretion they include) is however, largely 
left to Member States’ administrations and occasionally, where implemen-
tation concerns for instance technical issues, to the European Commission 
(hereafter also Commission).5 In contrast to regulations, however, direc-
tives are not directly applicable but have to be put into effect, meaning that 
Member States have to incorporate their provisions into national law in line 
with the principle of sincere cooperation.6 It is at this stage where discretion 
comes into play, being linked up with the concept of delegation. The EU 
legislature delegates decision-making competences, including discretion, to 
national actors for the purpose of the implementation and application of its 
rules.
In this dissertation the national implementation of EU directives is con-
ceived to be a three-stage process: formal or legal implementation often 
referred to as transposition is followed by the practical application and 
enforcement of the directives’ requirements (Prechal, 2005; Mastenbroek, 
2007). Transposition, the focus of the present study, in several Member 
States rests primarily with the administration, usually national ministries 
(Falkner et al., 2005: 324; Steunenberg and Voermans, 2006; Vandamme, 
2008). They are in charge of drafting transposition legislation, secondary 
and tertiary legal acts. In other words, transposition is largely dealt with 
as an administrative matter. In the Netherlands, nearly 90% of transposi-
tion legislation comes into being without the involvement of national Par-
liament (Bovens and Yesilkagit, 2010). In Member States such as Denmark, 
France, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Austria, so-called delegated or sec-
ondary legislation is used as a primary means to transpose EU directives.7 
5 According to the principal of conferral Article 5(2) TEU and, as concerns the role of the 
European Commission in implementation, Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). See Hofmann et al., 2011, pp. 239-241.
6 Cf. Article 4(3) TEU. See Van der Burg and Voermans (2015), pp. 71-72.
7 This is refl ected by the following fi gures indicating the percentage share of delegated 
legislation in the overall number of transposition legislation: for Denmark (85%), Spain 
(84%), United Kingdom (80-90%) and France (60%), see Steunenberg and Voermans, 
2005, and for Austria (around 60%), see Müller et al. (2010).
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This implies a marginal role of national parliaments (Steunenberg and Voer-
mans, 2005; 2006; Müller et al., 2010).
As mentioned in passing, the implementation of EU directives can, 
alongside the Member States, involve unelected bodies, most notably the 
European Commission. From a constitutional law perspective, vesting con-
siderable discretionary powers in the executive (administration) – be it at 
the EU or national levels – may give cause for concern. The prevalence of 
administrative rule-making instead of legislative decision-making for trans-
position purposes appears to be in conflict with the concept of separation 
of powers applicable in the context of nation-states and its equivalent at the 
EU level, the principle of institutional balance of powers.8 Both depart from 
the basic idea that branches of government and EU institutions respectively, 
have to act within the limits of their competences. In other words, with a 
view to the present context, while laws are made by the legislature, the role 
of the executive is confined to the application and execution of these laws.9
Regarding the EU, Jacqué has noted that ‘the distribution of the powers 
between the EU institutions reflects the place that the authors of the treaties 
wanted to grant to each one of them in the exercise of the missions that they 
entrusted to the Community’ (2004: 384).10 That being said, the principle 
of institutional balance of powers may be upset, where broad discretion is 
given to the European Commission and, above all, other bodies than those 
established by the EU Treaties. The principle of institutional balance has 
been established and endorsed by the European Court of Justice in a range 
of judgments (Meroni, Romano and ESMA judgments).11 While these judg-
ments do not reflect the Court’s resistance to delegation, they do show its 
attempts to limit especially broad delegation. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, 
this is also reflected in the attempt to more clearly circumscribe the Com-
mission’s spheres of competences by means of a new delegation regime 
(Voermans, 2011; Hardacre and Kaeding, 2013).
Turning to the national level, in light of the concept of separation of 
powers, at least two aspects seem to be at odds with it. To begin with, both 
national and EU law include legally-binding norms that may essentially 
affect those that have to obey them. If considerable discretion is available to 
administrative actors for the application of legal norms, it is just a short step 
from administrative rule-making to quasi-legislative rule-making (Koch, 
1986: 483-484; Möllers, 2013: 84). As noted by Corkin, the detailed imple-
mentation of (discretionary) EU law, such as directives, is no mere admin-
8 According to Hofmann et al. a stringent separation of powers does not apply to the insti-
tutional structure of the EU. But the idea of a balance between decision-making institu-
tions is implied by the principle of institutional balance of powers which takes the role 
of a part-substitute or an ‘EU version’ of the separation of powers concept. See Hofmann 
et al., 2011, p. 149 and 197.
9 The judiciary, as a third power, checks the legislature and interprets the law.
10 See in this context Article 7(1) TEC, now 13(1) TFEU.
11 Mere mentioning of these judgments shall suffi ce here, as they are addressed in the next 
chapter.
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istrative or executive task (Corkin, 2013: 645). Hence, the strong reliance 
on state administration and its uses of discretion in decision-making seem 
to be in disharmony with a neat or well-balanced division of competences 
between the legislative and executive branches of government. Furthermore, 
discretion vested in the hands of actors without direct democratic mandate, 
does not seem to be in keeping with other principles upon which modern 
democratic states are based such as the rule of law, legality, legal certainty 
and justice. It may for instance be feared that subjective elements creep into 
administrative decision-making processes leading to arbitrary rule-making, 
administrative misconduct and eventually the deficient application of law. 
In other words, discretion may have negative implications for the legitimacy 
of administrative decision-making and outcomes. Second, and with specific 
regard to the transposition of EU directives, the lack of a more prominent 
role of the national parliament in the creation of transposition legislation and 
the use of discretion available to this end can be seen as being problematic 
for legitimacy and the separation of powers. This is especially the case where 
EU directives address more fundamental issues that affect citizens at large 
and that therefore require greater involvement of Parliament. In the Nether-
lands, being one of the Member States where the principle of supremacy of 
the legislature is enshrined in the national constitution, ideas about a more 
far-reaching use of secondary legislation and hence broad delegation from 
the legislature to the administration (ministries), was found by the Dutch 
Parliament to be difficult to reconcile with the legislature’s supremacy. A 
corresponding proposal had been made by the Dutch Government with 
the aim of speeding up the transposition of EU directives. Due to resistance 
from Parliament, these plans, however, did not materialise (Steunenberg and 
Voermans, 2006: 15-18; Clement, 2007; Vandamme and Prechal, 2007: 44-48).
In view of the above, it becomes evident that the application of law and 
the transposition of EU directives in particular, raise vital legal and con-
stitutional questions that focus on the exercise of decision-making powers 
and the discretion thereby available. Above all, the use of discretion triggers 
questions of legitimacy. For instance, questions such as how to implement 
a directive and whether or not and how to use discretionary provisions 
should not be left only to administrative actors but also national parliament, 
in any case where EU directives have crucial implications for those they 
address.
The link between discretion and legitimacy is evident in yet another 
way. In the last couple of years, the implementation of EU law has trig-
gered political and academic debate. While legislative output has been 
high, implementation has been deficient in various fields, including the 
environment (Jordan, 1999; Börzel, 2006; Lenschow, 2010) and transport 
policy (Héritier et al., 2001; Kaeding, 2007). The transposition of EU direc-
tives by Member States needs to be correct, complete and timely (Eijlander 
and Voermans, 2000: 267-268). Due to its limited resources, the European 
Commission focuses on the timeliness of transposition which appears to be 
a problem in various Member States (Kaeding, 2007; König and Luetgert, 
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2008). Deficits in implementation are not confined to economically weaker 
Member States that lack administrative capacity or (for other reasons) fail 
to properly fulfil their implementation obligation. Also the founding Mem-
ber States of what is nowadays the European Union have shown to suffer 
from implementation problems in forms of transposition delay – such as 
the Netherlands which can reasonably be assumed to have available the 
necessary resources and capacities and, additionally, has the image of being 
a rather progressive Member State in shaping and implementing EU law 
(Steunenberg and Voermans, 2006: 15-23; Mastenbroek 2003; 2007). Prob-
lematic and deficient implementation, for instance in the area of the inter-
nal market, consumer law or the environment, has been associated with 
the instrument of the directive (Jordan, 1999; Thomson, 2007; Steunenberg 
and Rhinard, 2010; Twigg-Flesner, 2011, 2012). Thomson notes that ‘[w]
here directives are intended to eradicate differences in market rules across 
Europe, failures and delays in compliance cause uncertainty and transac-
tion costs for market participants’ (Thomson, 2007: 987). Participants in the 
political and academic debate have been at pains to explain the reasons for 
deficient transposition (Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 31498, no. 1-2; Kaed-
ing, 2006; Mastenbroek, 2003; 2007; Steunenberg, 2006). Discretion in this 
context has been identified as one factor that affects transposition (see for 
instance Kaeding, 2008; Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009). While a few schol-
ars believe that in providing flexibility, discretion may facilitate transposi-
tion and therefore compliance with EU directives (e.g. Knill and Lenschow, 
1998; Thomson, 2007; Zhelazykova and Torenvliet, 2011), others take the 
view that discretion impedes this process (Kaeding, 2007, 2008; Thomson et 
al., 2007).
Interestingly, both negative and positive effects have been ascribed to 
directives with higher margins of discretion. What’s more, empirical results 
have shown that discretion contributes to transposition delay and therefore 
non-compliance (Thomson et al., 2007; Steunenberg and Kaeding, 2009). 
While the causes are manifold, it is opined that deficient transposition 
can put the whole implementation of EU law at risk (Mastenbroek, 2007; 
Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009; Steunenberg and Rhinard, 2010). Steunen-
berg and Rhinard bring the discussion to a point: ‘[A] directive will not be 
fully integrated into the national legal order, and the acquis communautaire 
risks becoming fragmented and unevenly applied’ (2010: 495). What’s more, 
not putting EU directives correctly into effect also undermines the legiti-
macy of EU directives within national law (Haverland et al., 2011: 266).
1.3 EU legitimacy debate
One way to understand the consequences of the implementation deficit in 
terms of legitimacy is to view the EU’s legitimacy as having an input and 
output side (Scharpf, 1999). If EU law is not properly implemented this can 
be seen to undermine the legitimacy of the EU because it reduces both input 
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and output legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy, including the two output 
and input dimensions, is addressed in more detail below and a brief expla-
nation may therefore suffice at this stage. From the output side perspective, 
deficient implementation of EU law minimises the EU’s overall effective-
ness and problem-solving capacity. After all, the point of departure of EU 
action is to find a common solution for policy issues that Member States 
have to face but cannot tackle on their own. If solutions are, however, not 
properly applied, the principle of uniform application is undermined and 
therefore the EU’s overall objective of aligning national legal orders with 
the EU’s acquis in the area of the internal market but also others. This may 
have negative consequences not only in economic but also legal terms, dam-
aging Member States as well as individual citizens: market disruptions as 
well as the exclusion of citizens from rights to which they are, according to 
EU law, actually entitled (Van der Burg and Voermans, 2015: 153-154). As a 
consequence, output legitimacy is at stake.
Moreover, implementation deficits also indicate that there are problems 
on the input side of legitimacy. For EU law to be complied with, more is 
needed than legitimation through the approval of Member States’ govern-
ments in the Council of Ministers (hereafter also Council). In other words, 
more is needed to legitimise EU law than indirect legitimacy derived from 
the legitimacy of the national governments (Beetham and Lord, 1998, Lord 
and Beetham, 2001; Lord and Magnette, 2004). At the national levels various 
actors have to apply, enforce and supervise EU rules in practice. But if these 
actors have only insufficiently been involved, they may feel detached from 
EU decision-making outcomes and therefore obstruct the proper applica-
tion of EU rules. This makes evident that justifying EU rules in terms of 
indirect legitimacy or technocratic legitimacy does not suffice. Technocratic 
legitimacy puts emphasis on government performance and therefore on 
the output side, the source of legitimation of political authority lying in 
the expertise of unelected office-holders and professionals involved in EU 
decision-making (Beetham and Lord, 1998; Lord and Magnette, 2004). This 
source of legitimation proves, however, particularly insufficient where EU 
decision-making outcomes have not merely a regulatory but also a redis-
tributive character, meaning that EU law implies the reallocation of bene-
fits and burdens (Beetham and Lord, 2001). In other words, next to advan-
tages, EU law may also bring disadvantages which affect the wider public 
and therefore necessitate democratic legitimation from the input side, i.e. 
through national parliaments, stakeholders, and citizen groups.
In fact, all these aspects can be linked up with the EU’s output and 
input legitimacy problems on a much wider scale, being clearly illustrated 
by the recent challenges faced by the EU. These relate to the ‘no’ votes of 
the French and Dutch to the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, and the 2008 
Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty (Curtin, 2009: 294-296; Schmidt, 2009: 18) 
and Euroscepticism more generally, which seems to suggest that national 
citizens feel inadequately represented in supranational decision-making. 
Furthermore, the recent Euro and refugee crises make problems on the 
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output side of these processes obvious. Lacking understanding of how EU 
institutions work and what the common objectives and implications of EU 
law-making are also seem to play a role. These may render it difficult for 
national citizens to become politically more attached to the EU and rep-
resent a hurdle for the development of an EU identity based on a shared 
interest and set of values (Scharpf, 1997; Beetham and Lord, 1998: 33-58). 
This identity is, however, a crucial prerequisite for citizens’ acceptance of 
political decisions taken at the EU level by majority rule. The missing EU 
identity and bond that is hence lacking between EU and national citizens 
is a shortcoming on the input side (Scharpf, 1997; 1999). It is also conceived 
to be a problem of the EU’s social legitimacy which in contrast to its formal 
(legal) legitimacy, established by rules and procedures that are accepted by 
democratically legitimated Member States’ governments, is far more fragile 
(Curtin, 2009: 283-284). Furthermore, EU policy processes and institutions 
are by no means a copy of the national democratic policy process, institu-
tions and principles. Hence, if judged by these democratic standards, the 
EU does not score very well (Lord and Beetham, 1998; 2001; Thomassen and 
Schmitt, 2004; Føllesdal and Hix 2006). Both the Council of Ministers and 
the European Commission are not democratically elected bodies. The Com-
mission, as ‘guardian of the treaty’ is an executive body which, however, 
also has legislative tasks by initiating proposals for EU law (Beetham and 
Lord, 1998; Føllesdal and Hix, 2006). As to EU decision-making in the Coun-
cil, it has been criticised for its secrecy and even if the European Parliament 
has steadily gained more decision-making powers, compromises between 
Council and Parliament are at times struck in informal meetings (trilogues). 
This adds to doubts about the democratic credentials of EU legislation and 
decision-making, and emphasises, instead, the lacking access, transparency 
and accountability (Häge, 2007, 2013; Stie, 2013; Curtin, 2014).
It has been argued that EU law and policies do not derive their dem-
ocratic legitimation from one prevalent legitimacy source as offered for 
instance through parliamentary legitimation. Instead, and in line with a 
pluralist view on democracy that arguably better matches the multi-level / 
multi-juris dictional system embodied by the EU, democratic legitimation of 
its law and policies is based on elements built into the structural and proce-
dural arrangements of the EU (Héritier, 1999). This is ideally complemented 
by the idea that legitimacy of the EU – its institutions and decision-making 
processes – rest on more than one legitimacy principle (Lord and Beetham, 
1998; Lord and Magnette, 2004). Lord and Magnette (2004) identify four of 
these principles: indirect, parliamentary, technocratic and procedural legiti-
macy to which they refer as ‘vectors’ that should be understood as not being 
mutually exclusive but rather complementary.
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Figure 1: Perspectives on EU legitimacy (dimensions and vectors)
While the output and input dimension of legitimacy – to which, as shown 
below, a throughput dimension can be added – are used to describe per-
spectives on legitimacy and its content on a more abstract level, the vec-
tor model addresses the content of the concept in more concrete terms. 
Conceiving legitimacy principles to be vectors which, additionally, can be 
described individually in terms of input and output legitimacy, the authors 
attempt to define EU legitimacy in greater detail and to distinguish the 
various perspectives on legitimacy which emphasise different vectors and 
dimensions. Figure 1 visualises the different perspectives on the legitimacy 
of the EU.
1.4 Research puzzle and questions
Bringing discretion back into play, it has been identified as a factor which is 
relevant to EU decision-making and the national transposition of EU direc-
tives, but also raises questions of legitimacy if vested in the hands of admin-
istrative decision-makers in charge of adopting national legislation intended 
to incorporate a directive into national law. This makes evident the connec-
tion between discretion and legitimacy. Ironically enough, scholars that look 
into the role of discretion in the implementation of EU directives hardly 
seem to pay attention to it. Nor does legitimacy itself loom large in imple-
mentation studies – besides a few exceptions (Mastenbroek, 2007; Rhinard 
and Rhinard, 2010; Börzel et al., 2012). On the whole, legitimacy seems to be 
rather missing in the literature on the implementation of European direc-
tives (Sverdrup, 2007). This is a striking fact considering that there has been 
a longstanding, persistent debate on the purported legitimacy deficit of 
the European Union to which transposition deficits apparently contribute.
While discretion is alleged to have negative implications for the trans-
position of EU directives and seems to be at odds with the principles of 
democratic legitimacy, the fact remains, that it is a fundamental character-
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istic of directives. What’s more, directives in some policy areas are the leg-
islative instrument which is most frequently used by the EU to achieve its 
goals. Hence, there may be valuable reasons to think that discretion can play 
an important and positive role in the context at hand. Looking at discretion 
from the bright side, delegating discretion for the purpose of the application 
of law relieves legislatures from detailed law-making and provides imple-
menting actors with the necessary flexibility to apply law in practice. With 
regard to the legal implementation of EU directives, the delegated imple-
mentation from the EU to national administrations as well as transposition 
by means of delegated legislation within domestic contexts appears to be 
necessary for both EU and national legislatures to cope properly with the 
large volume of tasks that negotiation and implementation processes of 
directives entail. In addition to that, it seems justified to ask how a more 
abstract-general directive provision should otherwise be applied in the vari-
ous Member States with their specific and distinct legal-administrative con-
texts, if not by using available discretion to develop tailor-made decisions.
From the foregoing discussion, discretion emerges as a multi-facetted 
phenomenon which has triggered various reactions from scholars with 
regard to its role in the making and application of law. As aptly put by 
Brand when referring to debates in the legal studies: ‘The concept of discre-
tion is controversial, provoking passionate discourse in which it is either 
extolled or vigorously condemned’ (2008: 218). Moreover, regarding the EU 
context, while discretion seems to be granted for good reasons, the national 
transposition of EU directives is found to potentially jeopardise this process. 
Thus, all in all, the role of discretion is not clear.
Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, one thing, however, is for certain: 
The diverging views on discretion are as puzzling as they are intriguing. 
What’s more, the different interpretations of the role of discretion in legal 
systems, and in particular for the implementation of EU law, motivate fur-
ther research on discretion within the context of the transposition of EU 
directives and their legitimacy within national law. In a nutshell, the study 
seeks to explain why and under what circumstances discretion is granted 
by the EU legislature and with what implications for both negotiations 
and national transposition processes of directives. With specific regard to 
national transposition, its aim is to clarify the circumstances under which 
discretion has facilitating or impeding effects on the process.
To this end my study focusses on the following research questions and 
subsequent questions.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1)  What is the role of discretion in legislative decision-making and in the 
national transposition of European Union (EU) directives?
2)  What is the relationship between discretion and legitimacy in the na-
tional transposition of EU directives?
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SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS
EU LEVEL
a)  Under what circumstances is discretion granted from the EU legislature 
to national transposition actors?
b)  How does discretion affect legislative decision-making on directives?
SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS
NATIONAL LEVEL
a)  How is discretion used in the national transposition of EU directives?
b)  How does discretion affect the Dutch national transposition of EU direc-
tives?
Some of the questions relating to discretion that are presented here are not 
entirely new. They have been raised in similar ways within the context of 
national decision-making processes. In this regard, attempts have been 
made to explain why decision-making powers take discretionary forms and 
how discretionary power is exercised within state administration (Ringe-
ling, 1978; Galligan, 1990). With respect to the national transposition of EU 
directives, however, these questions have not yet been addressed in the way 
I set out to do in this dissertation. In addition, the link between discretion 
and legitimacy within the context of the implementation of EU directives 
has to date been largely absent from academic debate. Therefore this study 
seeks to fill this gap.
Due to the various interpretations of the concept of legitimacy, one is 
indeed well-advised to clarify the content of the concept (dimensions, ele-
ments, principles) right from the start (Bokhorst, 2014: 22). Legitimacy is 
first and foremost conceived of as democratic legitimacy: EU and national 
decision-making regarding directives is legitimised by EU Member States 
which define themselves as liberal, representative democratic entities. 
Besides, the EU subscribes itself to the principles of representative and par-
ticipatory democracy.12 The object of legitimacy must also be made clear. 
Here, the focus is on the legitimacy of EU directives within national law. 
Transposition can be considered as legitimate if Member States meet their 
implementation obligations – i.e. timely and legally correct transposition. 
But there is more to the content of the concept and therefore it is addressed 
in more detail hereafter. In this regard, two remarks shall suffice. First, legit-
imacy is considered to be a multi-dimensional concept that has substantial 
and procedural aspects (Beetham, 1991; Majone, 1997: 159-163; Beetham and 
Lord, 1998; Lord and Magnette, 2004). Second, the discussion on legitimacy 
stands apart from the case study analyses in which the role of discretion 
12 Article 10 and 11 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) which aim to make the EU 
more accessible to citizens and achieve greater citizen participation in EU decision-mak-
ing processes.
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is empirically analysed. In other words, the aim is not to assess the legiti-
macy of the transposition cases addressed. Instead, a very modest approach 
is taken to legitimacy by focusing on the legitimacy of EU directives within 
national law more generally. The study thus reflects upon the legitimacy of 
process and outcome of national transposition, with a particular view to an 
alleged relationship between discretion and legitimacy. Examples from the 
case studies may, however, prove useful to illustrate points in this discus-
sion.
This study furthermore shares the view of others (Bokhorst, 2014; 
Voermans et al., 2013) that the legitimacy of a political system or decision-
making process cannot be expressed in quantitative terms. There seems 
little point in noting that the procedural legitimacy of the Dutch transposi-
tion of the EU Blue Card Directive was a legitimate process to the extent of 
65%. Legitimacy can nevertheless be considered as a matter of degree. The 
degree of legitimacy can be assessed in both normative and empirical terms 
(Muntean, 2000). As is shown below, scholars have described legitimacy in 
qualitative terms by using approaches, models, and perspectives that are 
deemed suitable to assess legitimacy in a particular research context. This 
approach is also taken in this dissertation. The intention, however, is not to 
touch upon the big legitimacy issues that have been ascribed to individual 
EU bodies and decision-making processes in general or to offer solutions to 
legitimacy problems of the EU. After all, the dissertation’s main concern is 
with the role of discretion in the national transposition of European direc-
tives. Regarding legitimacy, attention is instead paid to specific issues and 
implications for the political legitimacy of directives and related decision-
making processes that result from the overall analysis.
Like Galligan (1990), my major concern is not only with the exercise 
of discretion in the implementation of law. By looking into the role of dis-
cretion, the objective is to find out for what reason it is incorporated into 
directives. As a consequence, the EU decision-making process on direc-
tives is also examined. Flexibility in the application of law is one argu-
ment presented in this regard but there may be others. For instance, it is 
reasonable to assume that besides a long-term function with regard to 
national implementation discretion has a more immediate function with 
regard to the negotiations on the directive under consideration. In addi-
tion, the study seeks to transcend the theoretical discussion on discretion 
by means of an empirical analysis (case study analysis) in which the role 
of discretion is assessed in order to substantiate theoretical claims about it.
Examining the role of discretion in both negotiations and formal imple-
mentation (transposition) of EU directives takes account of the latter’s ‘life 
cycle’ which includes a range of activities that are carried out at both EU 
and national levels (Falkner et al., 2005; Kaeding, 2007). Or put in another 
way: national implementation constitutes part of a larger decision-making 
process (Falkner et al., 2005: 5-10; Kaeding, 2007; Voermans and Steunen-
berg, 2006), starting at the EU level with the preparation and formulation of 
the directive before it is incorporated into national law and applied in prac-
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tice, enforced and supervised (Steunenberg Voermans, 2006: 8-10; Kaeding, 
2007: 3-4). What’s more, paying attention to both EU and national levels 
is in line with other implementation studies and other research on Euro-
peanisation that looks into the question of how EU law and policies affect 
Member States.13 EU negotiations and the national transposition of direc-
tives are thought to take place in mutually distinct decision-making arenas. 
These two arenas are characterised by their own dynamics, processes and 
actors which pursue different interests. Nevertheless, from a legal as well 
as political point of view both the EU and national systems are interrelated 
(Schwarze, 2001: 12; Corkin, 2013: 647). In this connection, it is argued with 
specific regard to EU negotiations, that these are shaped by Member States 
with a view to their own legal-administrative contexts into which a direc-
tive shall be implemented (Thomson, 2007, 2010, 2011; Thomson et al. 2007). 
Taking this aspect into account is vital in reflecting upon the legitimacy of 
EU directives in national law – and its link with discretion. The following 
aspects give impetus to this debate.
1.5 Legitimacy
Legitimacy is a concept which has been discussed widely and these debates 
reflect various ideas about the concept. On a more general note, legitimacy 
can be understood as an umbrella term for a variety of notions that are 
linked to the exercise of decision-making power and the reactions of those 
that have to obey the decisions made. As such legitimacy brings together 
substantive and procedural aspects. Procedural aspects for instance are 
linked to the transparency and fairness of decision-making procedures, and 
the accountability of decision-makers. Substantive aspects refer, for exam-
ple, to the compatibility between decision-making outcomes on the one 
hand and interests and preferences of those affected by these outcomes on 
the other hand, but can also boil down to more basic notions of recognition, 
acceptance and support of decision-making power. From a legal point of 
view, for decision-making power to be legitimate and obeyed, legal princi-
ples such as the rule of law, legality and the separation of powers have to be 
followed when power is exercised. In addition, the exercise of power must 
respect fundamental rights and it must be possible to subject it to judicial 
review (Burkens et al., 2006: 16).
13 According to the more general understanding of the concept, Europeanisation refers to 
the EU’s impact on politics and policy-making as well as its effects on processes, policies 
and institutions (assessed along the dimensions of policy, polity, and politics). See Börzel 
and Risse, 2003, Graziano and Vink, 2007 and Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009. In this 
study, the concept of Europeanisation is used to describe, and characterise the relation-
ship between the EU and its Member States without, however, examining convergence 
of national law under the infl uence of EU law and policies.
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Scholars of legitimacy have sought to bring more order into the debate 
by identifying different elements, levels, dimensions and vectors to describe 
the concept in a national as well as an EU-context (Beetham, 1991; Beetham 
and Lord, 1998; Majone; 1999; Lord and Magnette, 2004; Scharpf, 1999). 
One way to do so is the principles / vectors model proposed by Lord and 
Magnette (2004) that was mentioned above. Another way is suggested by 
Beetham and Lord (1998) who also discuss legitimacy with specific regard 
to the political system of the European Union. At the heart of their concept 
of legitimacy lie three elements: legality, normative justifiability and legiti-
mation. The condition of legality is met if the acquisition and exercise of 
decision-making power within a political system is based on established 
rules. Normative justifiability deals with the political context of these 
rules. For rules to be accepted by those subjected to them they have to be 
justifiable on the basis of socially accepted beliefs about what is the right-
ful source of authority, and the proper objectives and means of governing. 
In other words, for a political system to be normatively justifiable, its sub-
ordinates must accept how rules are imposed to what ends and by what 
levels of authority. Hence, they should feel that decision-making power 
is exercised according to the right ends and procedures. Finally, legitima-
tion entails that a decision-making authority is accepted with the explicit 
approval and confirmation of its subordinates and is recognised by other 
legitimate authorities (Beetham and Lord, 1998: 3-11). Alongside these ele-
ments, Beetham and Lord introduce three dimensions of legitimacy: democ-
racy, identification and performance. Democracy pertains to structural 
aspects in the exercise of decision-making power like representation of the 
population and the separation of powers; identification points to the recog-
nition by the people of the exertion of power but also relates to issues such 
as identity and citizenship. Performance, as a third dimension, finally refers 
to the question of whether the exercise of decision-making power serves 
the ends and purposes of a political system and reflects the effectiveness 
of its decision-making procedures (Beetham and Lord, 1998: 22-30; see also 
Beetham, 1991).
The merit of Beetham’s and Lord’s study is that they illustrate the multi-
facetted and multi-dimensional character of the concept of legitimacy. It is 
felt however, that for the purposes of this study, to conceptualise and exam-
ine legitimacy, the focus should be narrowed down from the legitimacy 
of a political system to the decision-making processes taking place within 
its framework. To this end, the concept of input, throughput and output 
legitimacy which has been introduced in system theory (Maytnz, 2010) and 
meanwhile further developed and applied (Scharpf, 1999; Schmidt, 2012; 
Curtin, 2009) is just as suitable. What’s more, this concept is deemed par-
ticularly appropriate to show the link between discretion and legitimacy 
and to illustrate that discretion, contrary to expectations, can enhance the 
legitimacy of EU directives in national law.
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1.5.1 Discretion and legitimacy
This concept of legitimacy takes into account that legitimacy can be 
described in substantial and procedural terms. Substantial aspects relate to 
output legitimacy and procedural aspects to throughput legitimacy. Input 
legitimacy largely addresses substantive aspects but is closely related to 
throughput legitimacy. Formulated in more catchy phrases, referring to 
Lincoln’s idea of democracy, input legitimacy refers to ‘government by the 
people’; output-oriented legitimacy refers to ‘government for the people’ 
(Scharpf, 1999; Curtin, 2009: 285; Mayntz, 2010; Schmidt, 2013). Along these 
lines, throughput legitimacy, finally, is connected to the idea of ‘government 
with the people’ (Schmidt, 2013: 2). If linked to Beetham’s and Lord’s con-
cept, the input and throughput dimensions, in fact, tie in well with the level 
of identification and the output dimension with the level of performance. 
Democracy then represents the top level, being strengthened through deci-
sion-making that encompasses all three (input, throughput and output) 
dimensions.
Output, input and throughput dimensions can be used to describe and 
assess the legitimacy of law-making processes and their outcomes. Output 
legitimacy relates to the effectiveness of law-making, understood as the 
‘effectiveness for the people’, in other words, how well law reflects the inter-
est of the public at large and serves to solve a commonly identified problem. 
How can discretion be linked up with output legitimacy? Given the nature 
and content of an EU directive, Member States can meet EU requirements in 
whatever way they see fit (as long as they stay within the parameters of the 
directive). In other words, due to discretion Member States are enabled to 
incorporate EU rules while achieving the best possible fit with their domes-
tic legal frameworks. Thus, since discretion embodies the necessary flexibil-
ity to apply law on the ground, it is assumed to enhance the effectiveness 
and problem-solving capacity of EU directives. This may boost legitimacy on 
the output side. Besides, as ‘functional flexibility’, discretion allows transpo-
sition actors to respond to sudden changes or unforeseen circumstances and 
therefore to transpose directives even in dynamic environments (Prechal and 
Van Roermund, 2008). Input legitimacy refers to the ‘input participation by 
the people’, indicating to what extent the public at large has been involved 
in the making of law done to reflect their interests (Scharpf, 1999). Partici-
pation is closely related to aspects of procedures. Thus, finally, throughput 
legitimacy refers to governance processes with the people, analysed in terms 
of their efficacy, accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and openness to 
interest consultation (Schmidt, 2012; Van Schooten, 1998; Voermans, 2011b). 
In this context, discretion can be a valuable tool in strengthening the ‘com-
municative discourse’, which is found to be lacking at the national level 
(Schmidt, 2004: 991-992). This kind of public discourse about EU law and 
its implications is seen as important in legitimising law (Van Schooten, 1998; 
Schmidt, 2004; Bovens; 2005; Scharpf, 2010; Voermans 2011b) and could be 
used to enhance both its input and throughput legitimacy.
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The input and output dimensions of legitimacy, within the context of 
the EU, have received quite some attention from scholars in the fields of 
political science and public administration (Føllesdal, 2004; Thomassen 
and Schmitt 2004; Schmidt, 2012). They are thus particularly interested 
in aspects of public involvement and participation in decision-making as 
well as government capacity to properly address public concerns, in short, 
aspects of performance. Alongside these two dimensions, the throughput 
dimension of EU legitimacy has been given increasingly closer attention in 
academic debates (Curtain, 2009; Wimmel, 2009; Schmidt, 2012). This is pos-
sibly due, amongst other things, to politics and practice in Brussels and the 
European Commission’s efforts in particular, which in accordance with EU 
Treaty objectives are targeted at strengthening transparency and account-
ability mechanisms through relevant initiatives, consultation and dialogue 
with organised civil society and representative associations within EU deci-
sion-making processes (European Commission, 2001; Héritier, 1999; Cur-
tain, 2009: 287-289).
Figure 2: Legitimacy and discretion in the context of transposition 
Legitimacy Discretion
Output legitimacy: efficient decision-
making for citizens
Contributing to the effectiveness and 
problem-solving capacity of 
EU directives in Member States
Input/throughput legitimacy:
decision-making by citizens and
just procedures with citizens
Contributing to the acceptance and 
support of the formal and practical 
implementation of EU directives in 
Member States
Legal scholars are also in particular concerned with procedural aspects of 
rule-making (Tyler, 1988; 1990) and therefore throughput legitimacy (Cur-
tain, 2009: 287-300). In this respect, Tyler’s work is particularly interesting 
from a compliance perspective. Looking into the question of why people 
obey the law he analyses legal procedures using the concept of ‘procedural 
justice’ as a touchstone for (throughput) legitimacy, assessing these proce-
dures from a citizen point of view on the basis of procedural criteria such 
as the representation of parties affected by legal decision-making, impar-
tiality of the decision-making authority and accuracy, to mention but a few 
(Tyler, 1988: 110-113). In this way Tyler seeks to substantiate the claim that 
people accept even unfavourable outcomes as long as they perceive the 
way these came into being as fair (Tyler, 1988). This has also been empha-
sised by scholars that suggest participatory and deliberative approaches to 
(administrative) rule-making in the implementation of (EU) law to enhance 
its democratic legitimacy (Lord and Beetham, 2001: 452-453; Hunold and 
Peters, 2004; Schmidt, 2004). Figure 2 visually summarises how discretion 
can contribute to increase the output, input and throughput legitimacy of 
EU law in the context of transposition.
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1.6 Approach and research design
This book presents the outcome of a research project that is part of an inter-
disciplinary profile area which addresses questions on political legitimacy 
in different research contexts. In the present study a multidisciplinary as 
well as interdisciplinary approach is applied.
In the theoretical as well as methodological chapters an eclectic use is 
made of insights from political and legal studies while at the same time, 
these insights are combined to develop the analytical framework and 
research design to tackle the research questions of the study. The analytical 
framework is composed of sets of expectations which are used to assess the 
role of discretion in the negotiation and transposition processes of EU direc-
tives. Transposition deficits have more than one reason. Therefore a few 
other factors are taken into account, derived from literature study, which 
besides discretion may affect the incorporation of directives into national 
law. It has been emphasised in implementation research that the national 
implementation of EU directives should not be studied in isolation from the 
political context (Jordan, 1999; Falkner et al., 2005; Mastenbroek 2005; 2007; 
Toshkov, 2008). Mastenbroek for instance points out that implementation 
scholars have meanwhile shifted their attention from legal and administra-
tive factors to domestic politics in explaining Member States’ (non-) com-
pliance (Mastenbroek, 2007: 6-7). This view is also adopted in this study. 
Hence, implementation and discretion are conceived of as phenomena that 
are much better understood if approached from both legal and political-
institutional perspectives. Hence, the literature study informing the theo-
retical part of the book covers strands of both disciplines. Legal research 
includes socio-legal studies as well as constitutional, (Dutch) administrative 
and European law studies. As for the socio-legal perspectives discussed use 
was made of Anglo-American literature on discretion which has consider-
ably contributed to the treatment of the concept.
They were reviewed alongside political science and public administra-
tion research, and above all studies on legislative decision-making processes 
and implementation of EU law. Hence, an attempt is made to build a bridge 
between these areas of literature in the study of discretion offered here. In 
my view insights from both legal and political studies taken together can 
make a valuable contribution to a better understanding of the role of discre-
tion in this particular context.
The analytical framework which emerges from the theoretical discus-
sion is subsequently applied in the empirical analysis including six direc-
tives which address different policy areas and issues and vary regarding 
their margins of discretion. These directives are analysed with regard to the 
process of EU decision-making that brought them into being and the subse-
quent national transposition processes carried out in the Netherlands with 
the ultimate aim to elucidate the role of discretion in each of these processes. 
The six individual cases are complemented by three paired comparisons. 
Each comparison includes a pair of directives that grant discretion by differ-
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ent degrees (small versus large). Variation of margins of discretion is neces-
sary to take into account the fact that discretion is found to affect transposi-
tion differently and that different effects are ascribed mainly to directives 
that have a higher discretion margin. Another useful variation which is con-
sidered in shedding light on the relationship between discretion and trans-
position outcome pertains to the policy areas addressed including consumer 
protection, the environment and justice and home affairs with migration as 
a specific sub-domain. In short, variation in this respect stems from the idea 
that the relevance and role of discretion differ among policy areas depend-
ing on the scope of supranational (EU) versus intergovernmental (Member 
State) influence in a particular area. This is explained with a view to compe-
tence distribution according to the EU’s pillar structure.14As a consequence, 
consumer protection and environmental directives are expected to imply 
higher harmonisation levels, therefore leaving Member States with less dis-
cretion for implementation. This is in contrast to directives of the area of 
migration where EU influence is not yet as advanced. For the purpose of 
case (directive) selection and conducting the case study analyses, several 
other methods and techniques were applied. With the application of content 
analysis and the presentation of a codebook, this study offers a first albeit 
preliminary attempt to describe discretion in directives more thoroughly 
than has hitherto been the case.
Discretion has certainly received some academic attention but its role 
in the context of this study is not clear and the same applies to its link with 
legitimacy. Therefore the dissertation aims to provide a more in-depth 
approach to discretion to further extend knowledge on it and contribute to 
the proper assessment of its role. The approach adopted in the dissertation 
is qualitative in nature in that it seeks to provide a thorough understand-
ing of discretion and the contexts where it comes into play: why is discre-
tion used, under what circumstances and with what effects for the transpo-
sition and legitimacy of EU directives at Member State level. In line with 
qualitative research, the empirical analysis is based on a smaller number 
of transposition cases. In addition to this, data gathering is carried out to 
provide a detailed and comprehensive view of the cases analysed, applying 
flexible methods and techniques such as semi-structured expert interviews, 
besides literature review and the analysis of political and legal documents. 
The study is exploratory in the sense that it also seeks to look into discre-
tion from a different perspective than has so far been applied. As pointed 
out above, discretion is not necessarily negative for legal systems. It is, as 
rightly pointed out by Möllers, a result of a democratic decision-making 
process (Möllers, 2013: 100). And as argued in this book, discretion may 
14 The Treaty of Maastricht (1993) divided the areas of EU legal activities into three pillars 
characterised by a different distribution of competences between the EU and its Member 
States. With the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) the pillar structure was abolished. A threefold 
division of competences into exclusive, shared and supporting competences came in its 
place, laid down in Articles 3, 4 and 6 of the TFEU.
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positively affect both negotiations and transposition processes regarding 
directives and contribute to their legitimacy within national law. In other 
words, in this study an attempt is made to do more justice to the beneficial 
role which discretion is considered to play in modern legal systems, while 
nevertheless still taking a nuanced approach to the subject.
In the methodological chapters of the book the components of the 
research design shall be further elaborated. Developing a research design, 
however, requires choices to be made and these need some further explana-
tion.
1.7 Scope of the study
Certain choices have been made pertaining to the time frame, country and 
policy areas covered by the empirical analysis. To allow for better compari-
son, the six directives addressed here all originate in the same period, 2007 
to 2009; i.e. the period prior to the Treaty of Lisbon entering into force. Con-
sequently, the EU legal context against which the directives emerged and 
had to be implemented formally was the same in all cases. From a prag-
matic point of view, dealing with more recently adopted directives made it 
also more likely that the relevant transposition actors would still be avail-
able for interviews.
The book presents a single-country study. The negotiation and transposi-
tion analyses focus on the Netherlands. There are several reasons to examine 
the processes from the viewpoint of the Netherlands. First, the Netherlands 
provides an environment which brings together factors that are relevant 
for the research context at hand. The Dutch transposition performance has 
suffered from deficits despite the Netherlands’ more general reputation as 
a frontrunner in some policy areas such as the environment and its overall 
good record in influencing and applying EU law. Second, unlike for instance 
Germany, the Dutch constitutional and administrative legal system does not 
seek to keep the use of discretion in administrative decision-making pro-
cesses to a minimum but is relatively open towards both delegation and dis-
cretion. This is a relevant given if the use of discretion in transposition is 
to be looked into. Finally, even though directives are mostly transposed by 
state administrations, the Netherlands is one of those Member States where 
transposition may also involve national Parliament. This makes it possible to 
take into account a broader political-administrative context when address-
ing not only the effects of discretion on transposition but also its link with 
legitimacy.
Last, but not least, certain considerations have motivated the choice for 
the policy areas from which the six directives analysed are derived: con-
sumer protection, environment and justice and home affairs / migration. 
If further divided by topic, these directives address the areas of product 
safety, waste and air pollution as well as legal and irregular migration. In 
contrast to other policy domains such as agriculture, all three policy areas 
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represent realms of EU activity where directives are the primary regulatory 
instruments as opposed to regulations. Hence, directives are not sporadi-
cally used but consistently play a relevant role as legislative instruments in 
these areas. This allows for more systematic findings to explain the link dis-
cretion has with each of the policy areas. What’s more, as mentioned above, 
the three areas have been subjected to different degrees of EU influence. As 
shall be argued, this is a relevant aspect in examining the role of discretion 
in EU negotiation processes regarding directives. Moreover, in address-
ing six cases, I seek to ensure that the empirical analysis covers all relevant 
dimensions of the key factors of interest: directives with different margins 
of discretion (smaller vs. larger), cases of deficient and proper transposi-
tion, policy areas showing different scopes of EU impact. Finally, in examin-
ing two instead of only one directive from each policy area, I have sought 
to increase the reliability of my findings: the veracity of the alleged link 
between discretion and compliance (legitimacy) can be established beyond 
one transposition case.
1.8 Outline of the book
The book is organised along the following structure. The remainder of it is 
divided into a theoretical, methodological, empirical and concluding part. 
The theory chapter deals with the notion of discretion and how it has been 
addressed in legal and political scholarship. From these debates insights 
are derived that are considered relevant for the study of discretion within 
the context of EU negotiation and national implementation processes of 
directives. These insights inform the analytical framework which is devel-
oped to examine both EU negotiations and the national transposition pro-
cesses regarding directives. How these processes are analysed empirically 
is explained in the methodological chapters that set out the main methods 
and techniques used in the book: content analysis and codebook application 
for case selection purposes as well as case study methodology and research 
including literature review, document research and expert interviews. The 
empirical part of the study comprises six individual case studies, each of 
them including the EU negotiation and national (Dutch) transposition pro-
cesses regarding directives. This is followed by a paired comparison of 
negotiation and transposition cases to shed further light on the role of dis-
cretion. In the concluding chapter the research findings are summarised and 
discussed with regard to the research questions. In addition, outcomes are 
assessed in terms of their academic contribution and possible future lines of 
research are proposed.
2.1 Introduction
In this and the following chapters theoretical insights into the concept of 
discretion and its role in administrative and legislative decision-making 
processes are provided. It is argued that both legal and political science 
research provide perspectives and findings that are pertinent for the study 
of discretion in EU legislative decision-making and national implementa-
tion processes. How can discretion be identified in legislation and how is it 
perceived by legal scholars and political scientists? These are the relevant 
questions addressed in the subsequent sections. To this end, I examined dif-
ferent strands of legal literature, including administrative and constitutional 
law as well as the sociology of law. It should be noted that the resulting 
discussion draws for some part on the Anglo-American literature since this 
body of literature has strongly informed the discussion on discretion. At the 
same time, however, discretion is also discussed in this chapter with regard 
to the European and Dutch context to take into account those aspects that 
are pertinent for an understanding of the role of discretion in these settings.1
As for the study of discretion in the political sciences, in particular the 
literature on legislative decision-making processes in the EU and national 
contexts as well as research on the national implementation of European 
directives, transposition in particular, was reviewed. The discussion on dis-
cretion from the legal science perspectives aims to elaborate on the concept 
and presents different perceptions of it with the aim of contributing to a 
more general understanding of discretion. Insights into the study of discre-
tion from the political science perspectives are used to derive expectations 
for the case study analyses in which the role of discretion within processes 
at the EU and national level regarding directives is examined.
2.2 The notion of discretion
This chapter commences by defining the term discretion in the general con-
text of law as well as with regard to the Dutch and European law contexts. 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on the legal discourse on discretion to 
highlight specific features which are deemed important for the later empiri-
cal analyses of discretion.
1 For the same reason and due to the case studies’ focus on the Netherlands, the use of 
discretion within the Dutch legal context is addressed in more detail in chapter 5.
2 Discretion in the legal sciences
24 Part 1  Introduction and theoretical background
Unlike political scientists who are mainly interested in quantifying dis-
cretion (in legislation) and its effects taking into account the political and 
institutional circumstances under which it is granted, reflecting upon the 
meaning of discretion is a major concern for legal scholars. The resulting 
plethora of definitions, in the legal sciences, seems to indicate the difficulty 
that has been ascribed to this exercise (Hawkins, 1992; Gil Ibá ñ ez, 1999; 
Brand, 2008). One reason is, as Prechal suggests, that discretion is ‘always 
subject to interpretation’ (2005: 248). The various interpretations suggested 
by scholars, however, overlap each other to some extent which makes it 
possible to arrive at an overall idea of what discretion means.
In constitutional theory, democratic legal systems like states are gov-
erned by the rule of law and the principle of legality, which is closely con-
nected with it. Taken together, they shall guarantee that government action 
does not interfere with the freedom of the individual. The rule of law 
addresses government and citizens alike: both shall not violate the law. Fur-
thermore the principle implies that the government is not above the law but 
bound by it. The principle of legality requires that the exercise of govern-
mental powers has an explicit legal basis (Van Ommeren, 2010). Another 
fundamental element in democratic theory is the concept of separation of 
powers which is based on the idea of the trias politica2: the clear separa-
tion of the three basic functions of government, the legislative, judicial, and 
executive shall preclude the arbitrary exercise of power and ensure neutral-
ity and impartiality of the government vis-à-vis its citizens (Burkens et al., 
2006: 16-19). The understanding of the role of the administration as well 
as discretion is influenced by this context. Consequently, discretion is con-
ceived as part of a legal competence which is delegated from the legislature 
to administrative authorities. The legal competence may also be delegated 
from one legislative body to another one such as in the case of EU direc-
tives where the EU legislature transfers decision-making powers to Mem-
ber States for the purposes of formal and practical implementation. In a 
national context such as in Dutch legal doctrine these possibilities appear 
as follows: Next to the legislative competence which includes the making of 
law addressed to a wider public, the delegated legal competence may also 
imply that an administrative authority has the competence to make rules 
that either apply in general or individual cases (Eijlander and Voermans, 
2000).3
Being conceived as part of a legal competence, discretion does not seem 
to be problematic for the principle of legality. After all, the delegation of 
discretionary decision-making powers to administrative actors is legally 
grounded and results from a democratic decision-making process (Möllers, 
2 The idea of the trias politica was decisively shaped by Locke in his Two Treaties of Gov-
ernment (1690) and Montesquieu in De l’esprit des lois (1748).
3 The corresponding distinction in Dutch law is made between ‘besluit’ and ‘beschikking’, 
the former pertaining to an administrative decision applying in general cases, the latter 
representing an administrative decision having individual application.
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2013: 100). Administrative discretion may, however, be in tension with the 
concept of separation of powers, especially where administrative rule-mak-
ing has taken on an important role, turning in fact, into quasi-legislative 
rule-making. This may happen in today’s national welfare states where gov-
ernments, in carrying out the multitude of public policy tasks, rely on vari-
ous actors. Above all, this concerns the administration which, additionally, 
may be linked up to other public institutions and private actors in decision-
making. Strong reliance on the administration and the delegation of (broad) 
discretionary competences4 to corresponding actors is thus necessary for the 
government to remain capable of acting. In this way, however, the admin-
istration gets increasingly involved in the interpretation and application of 
substantial parts of law (legal norms) which, in principle, should be the pri-
mary task of the legislator. Put differently, legislative and executive activi-
ties get intermeshed. Seen in this light, discretion vested in the adminis-
tration is not easily reconcilable with a neat division of the legislative and 
executive branches of government as implied by the concept of separation 
of powers. This has been identified as problematic for the legitimacy of 
democratic states (Burkens et al., 2006: 32-33). In parallel to that, at the EU 
level, regulatory processes may tie actors from within the EU administra-
tion as well as independent regulatory agencies into discretionary decision-
making. These discretionary decision-making processes can exceed mere 
technical subject matters and touch upon more fundamental issues that in 
line with democratic standards should be addressed by the legislature. Also 
here it becomes evident that the delegation of discretionary competences 
to actors without direct democratic mandate and non-majoritarian institu-
tions5 does not sit happily with the classical separation-of-powers-doctrine 
and raises questions of legitimacy due to lacking accountability and insuf-
ficient interest representation (Majone, 1997; 1998; 1999; Scharpf, 1997; Lord 
and Beetham, 2001).
Turning to attempts to define discretion, it becomes evident that discre-
tion is not only embedded in legal systems but also constrained by them. 
Discretion is for instance defined as ‘the room for choice left to the decision-
maker by some higher ranking source or authority’ (Carranta, 2008) or ‘as 
the space, as it were, between legal rules in which legal actors may exer-
cise choice’ (Hawkins, 1992: 11). With regard to European directives, discre-
tion is taken to denote ‘the latitude on the part of the Member States to act 
according to their own judgment, leaving them a number of choices as to 
what they will do, while it is lawful to choose any of them’ (Prechal, 2005: 
4 The terms ‘discretionary (decision-making) competences’ and ‘discretionary powers’ are 
used interchangeably.
5 Majone (1997) considers two concepts of democracy: majoritarian and non-majoritarian 
democracy. The former emphasises decision-making and control by majority, where-
as according to the latter non-majoritarian concept the rule of the majority is limited 
because decision-making powers are conferred upon offi cials with only little account-
ability to those affected by their decisions.
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313). This particular leeway granted by EU directives is understood, in this 
study, by the term ‘legislative discretion’.
Socio-legal scholars do not necessarily question the definition of discre-
tion as part of a legal competence. However, they think of discretion rather 
as part of decision-making. In their view discretionary decision-making is 
characterised by choice and (personal) interpretation or judgment of the 
decision-maker. Galligan’s notion of discretion provides a good example. 
He describes discretion as having ‘a sphere of autonomy within which one’s 
decisions are in some degree a matter of personal judgment and assessment’ 
(Galligan, 1990: 8). Moreover, socio-legal scholars think about the relevance 
of discretion for the law believing that it has certain functions to fulfil in 
legal systems. At the same time they also argue that discretion should not 
only be studied in a legal but also in relation to its social context (Galligan, 
1990; 1997; Hawkins, 1992; Lacey, 1992).
What the various views have in common is to think about discretion in 
terms of restrictions – be it legal or, as socio-legal scholars like to emphasise, 
social ones. Hence, there should be no absolute discretion. Rather, discretion 
is considered as being granted in relative terms in decision-making contexts 
– that is in relationship to the constraints imposed on it (Hawkins, 1992). 
In this regard, Hofmann et al. use the notion of a spectrum in arguing that 
legal competences are neither completely bound nor pre-determined nor do 
they provide unrestricted decision-making competence. Legal competences 
grant discretion by various degrees (Hofmann et al., 2011: 492-493). As will 
be shown below, European directives are a case in point in this regard. With 
specific regard to the EU context, discretionary powers, implied by a legal 
competence, need to be based on a delegation granted by provisions of 
primary or secondary legislation (EU treaties, directives). Even seemingly 
open-ended and broad delegations are subjected to limitations by a legal 
framework of substantive and procedural principles and rules (Hofmann et 
al., 2011: 492). The case law of the European Court of Justice had a decisive 
influence on approaches to the delegation of discretionary competences in 
EU legislative decision-making procedures. Accommodating the necessity 
of delegation for regulatory purposes has gone hand in hand with attempts 
to control the exercise of it. Most prominently, the Meroni-doctrine of non-
delegation6 implied that the conferral of broad discretionary powers on a 
body other than the EC Commission was incompatible with the treaty, put-
ting the institutional balance of power at stake. The delegation of discre-
tionary powers should therefore be confined to technical details and was 
restricted by further criteria. The Court’s strict approach, also becoming evi-
dent in his Romano judgment,7 has meanwhile been tempered as shown in 
6 This doctrine is named after the 1958 Meroni-judgments of the Court of Justice: CJEC 13 
June 1958 C-9/56 [1958] ECR 133 (Meroni I) and CJEC 13 June 1958 C-10/56 [1958] ECR 
157 (Meroni II).
7 See case 98/80, Romano v Institut National d’ Assurance Maladie-Invalidité [1981] ECR 
1241.
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its recent ESMA judgment.8 From this judgment it follows that the delega-
tion of discretionary competences for the purpose of taking legally binding 
decisions to other bodies than the EU Commission is possible under specific 
conditions, and in any case if tasks are precisely and narrowly defined (Van 
der Burg and Voermans, 2015: 45-48).
The foregoing aspects do not change the fact that the conferral of discre-
tionary powers upon non-elected actors within legislative decision-making 
processes is not something that stands apart from law but is rooted and 
takes shape within the context of a legal system. For the purposes of the 
present study the notion of discretion within the Dutch and particularly 
European Union legal context are of high relevance.
2.2.1 Sources and terminology
In the next sections discretion is addressed in specific contexts by dealing 
first with discretion in the Dutch legal setting. It then turns to the role of 
discretion within the context of EU law. The discussion shall serve to intro-
duce the legal sources of discretion and terminology used to describe it with 
regard to both national and EU levels.
2.2.1.1 Discretion in Dutch law
In Dutch administrative law competences delegated from the legislature 
to the administration for the purpose of rule-making to elaborate legisla-
tion can be bound or unbound depending on the way they are established 
by law. The delegation of these competences has a legal foundation which 
is provided by the Dutch Constitution or parliamentary acts.9 Relatively 
unbound competences are discretionary competences. In Dutch administra-
tive law there is, however, no term used that uniquely relates to adminis-
trative leeway implied by discretionary competences. Instead, in referring 
to it, inconsistent use is made of the two terms ‘free discretion’ – meaning 
‘freedom to decide what policy shall be pursued – and ‘scope for appraisal’ 
8 See case C-270/12, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council (ESMA case). Judgment 
of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 January 2014.
9 For the sake of precision, whereas the transfer of competences based on parliamentary 
acts other than the Constitution, is denoted as ‘delegation’, the transfer of competences 
based on the Dutch constitution is referred to as ‘attribution’ (in Dutch: attributie). The 
transfer of competences follows along the lines of the principle of supremacy of the leg-
islature. With regard to the transposition of EU directives into Dutch law this means that 
essential elements of the EU measure (such as rules on its scope or key legal norms that 
a European directive entails) shall be incorporated by means of formal law and must not 
be transposed at lower government levels. Cf. Eijlander and Voermans, 2000, pp. 277-
278; see also Van der Burg and Voermans, 2015, pp. 45-48.
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(Schwarze, 2006: 291).10 A distinction, however, is made in practice and 
relates to two different aspects that concern the use of competences dele-
gated from the legislature to the administration (see table 1).
Table 1: Discretion in Dutch administrative law
Scope of appraisal and freedom of assessment
whether or not a legal competence is applied, decision on 
circumstances of application
Freedom to decide what policy should be addressed
how to use the legal competence, decision on
content of competence
First, the term ‘scope for appraisal’ addresses the situation in which the 
administrative authority has to make a decision and is free to assess if the 
conditions for making this decision, which are provided by law, are ful-
filled. Hence, the ‘scope for appraisal’ centres on the ‘whether or not’ ques-
tion. The scope for appraisal may be wide or narrow, depending on how 
precise the conditions are determined by law. A wider scope for appraisal 
is available and therefore more discretionary leeway for the administration 
in assessing whether or not the conditions are fulfilled if these conditions 
are rather unspecified. In this case the legislator may have acted deliber-
ately: deliberate discretion in assessing conditions of applicability of a legal 
competence is then captured by the term ‘freedom of assessment’.11 Since 
the legislator is supposed to have acted intentionally, the scope of judicial 
review of the administrative decision can only be limited (Van Wijk et al., 
2008: 149-150).
In a second step, hence once the question relating to the applicability 
of the competence has been cleared up, the issue of how to use the legal 
competence becomes relevant (De Haan et.al, 1996: 246): this centres on the 
‘how’- question and is related to the content of the legal competence. If del-
egation is broad because the content of the competence are not prescribed in 
detail, ‘free discretion’ is provided. The limited scope of judicial review of 
administrative decisions applies also in this case (Van Wijk et al., 2008: 148). 
10 ‘Free discretion’ should be understood as equivalent of the Dutch terms ‘beleidsvrijheid’ 
or ‘beleidsruimte’ and ‘scope for appraisal’ as equivalent of ‘beoordelingsruimte ’. In 
this regard, it is interesting to note that inconsistent use in terminology that refers to 
discretion does also occur at the European level where the European Court of Justice 
uses ‘discretion’ alongside other expressions such as ‘margin of appreciation’ or ‘liberty 
to decide’ to refer to the same phenomenon. Cf. Brand, 2008, pp. 218-219. Also Prechal 
points out that there is no consistent use of terms. Cf. Prechal, 2005, p. 313. In Van Roer-
mund’s view discretion functions as an umbrella term under which even different phe-
nomena are gathered. Cf. Van Roermund, 2008, pp. 316-320.
11 Hence, the authority’s scope for appraisal (‘beoordelingsruimte’) is identical with ‘free-
dom of assessment’ (‘beoordelingsvrijheid’).
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Schwarze points out that discretionary decision-making can, however, be 
limited (2006: 291-293). For instance, even if a legal concept is not further 
specified but it can nevertheless be assumed that it is clear to the adminis-
trative authority what it entails; hardly any discretion will be available to 
the latter. A different situation applies, on the other hand, if undefined legal 
concepts require the weighing of interests of the parties involved. Admin-
istrative discretion may then be exercised. By means of example, Schwarze 
refers to the Dutch housing legislation which uses the notion of ‘general 
needs’. It requires from the administration an interest consideration, and 
hence the use of discretion. Schwarze furthermore notes that administra-
tive actors like majors are provided with discretion more explicitly through 
permissions, indicated in national legislation by ‘may-clauses’ or by explicit 
conferral of decision-making competences upon these actors (‘to be deter-
mined by x’). In case that a legal competence is delegated without any fur-
ther conditions limiting its scope, it is considered to leave both ‘freedom 
of assessment’ (beoordelingsvrijheid) and ‘free discretion’ (beleidsvrijheid) 
– hence, the two coincide (Van Wijk et al., 2008).12 However, this does not 
imply that discretionary leeway is absolute. It is, in fact, bound by the 
implementing rules and general principles of sound administration.13 In 
addition, and in line with the so-called prohibition against détournement 
de pouvoir and the principle of motivation, administrative actors have to 
ensure that discretion is not used for other purposes than those laid down 
by the law. Moreover, they have to motivate their decisions (Schwarze, 2006: 
292).
This short outline of the way the concept of discretion is expressed in 
Dutch administrative law hints at the fact that discretion varies among 
pieces of legislation and that taking a closer look at how legislation is for-
mulated may serve to assess if more or less discretion is provided. It gives, 
thus, a little foretaste of the approach taken in this dissertation to determine 
margins of discretion in European directives. From a constitutional law per-
spective, it should finally be noted that national legal systems have differ-
ent approaches to discretion exercised by administrative authorities. This is 
a relevant point since it suggests that the national legal context matters in 
determining how discretion is used and therefore also how much discretion 
may be exercised.
In dealing with the question of how administrative conduct and discre-
tion are treated within national legal systems, scholars point first and fore-
most to legal constraints such as judicial review (Schwarze, 2006; Brand, 
12 Translations, however, differ. In Prechal and Van Roermund, for instance, the terms 
‘power of appraisal’ and ‘discretionary power’ are mentioned as equivalents of 
‘beoordelingsvrijheid and ‘beleidsvrijheid’. See Prechal and Van Roermund, 2008, p. 13.
13 The term used in the Dutch legal system is ‘beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur’. Exam-
ples refer to the statement of reasons for an administration decision, and, from the view-
point of the public, the right to be heard and the right to access the fi le that is relevant to 
their case, to mention a few. See Schwarze (2006).
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2008; Caranta, 2008; Möllers, 2013). Brand makes in this regard the relevant 
observation that ‘[t]he differences in the views on the desirability and scope 
of administrative freedom […] can be traced back to the constitutional out-
line of a legal system’ (2008: 226). In this connection, discretion has been 
linked to the concept of separation of powers (Vibert, 2007; Carolan, 2009; 
Hofmann et al., 2011; Möllers, 2013). The idea which connects the two con-
cepts is that decisions informed by non-legal expertise should be made by 
institutions that have the competence as well as the mandate to take these 
decisions (Hofmann et al., 2011: 495). In democratic legal systems, it is com-
mon to have a constitutional outline that gets its shape from a nationally 
distinct interpretation of the concept of separation of powers that deals 
with the relationship between the three branches of government, to wit the 
executive, legislative and judiciary. For instance, and with specific regard to 
judicial review, an assertive judiciary will likely reduce the scope of admin-
istrative action, and hence discretion. The contrary will most likely hold for 
legal systems where judicial self-restraint is exercised in reviewing admin-
istrative discretion (Brand, 2008). To illustrate this point, the United King-
dom’s legal system knows a strong executive and courts appear reluctant in 
assessing administrative discretionary decision-making (Caranta, 2008: 193-
195).14 Following from this is a higher bandwidth of discretion left to the 
executive. In Germany, on the other hand, where the legal system has been 
heavily influenced by recent history – the Nazi’s fascist totalitarian regime 
in which executives took an inglorious role within the state apparatus – the 
legal doctrine implies that stringent judicial review seeks to keep adminis-
trative discretion to a minimum (Brand, 2008: 223-224; Caranta, 2008: 187-
188). As to the Dutch context which was addressed above, it seems to take 
a middle position when it comes to the use of discretion by administrative 
authorities. National legislation provides for legal provisions allowing for 
delegated legislation which is illustrated by the case studies presented later 
on. In other words, the Netherlands has a legal system that is relatively 
open to the delegation of discretionary legal competences and hence adop-
tion of secondary legislation as long as it is ensured that delegation can be 
traced back to a legal basis of domestic law (Müller et al., 2010: 81). Never-
theless and with regard to the transposition of European directives, Dutch 
transposition authorities, usually national ministries, act within certain 
boundaries which are set not only by the Directive but by national legal-
administrative factors. Provisions of Dutch administrative law15 as well as 
the Instructions for drafting legislation (Aanwijzijngen voor de regelgeving) 
14 In this context Caranta (2008) and also Möllers (2013) point out that there is a lack of spe-
cialised courts and a lack of a clear and structured approach in the British judicial review 
of discretion.
15 Cf. Articles 1.7 and 1.8 of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene Wet Bestu-
ursrecht). These articles were introduced with the aim of simplifying and speeding up 
transposition in order to achieve timely compliance with EU directives. See W. Voer-
mans and B. Steunenberg, 2005, pp. 205-217.
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prescribe the procedure of preparing transposition legislation (Parliamentary 
Papers II 2007/08, 31 498, no. 498, p. 53). These factors can also determine the 
use of discretion in transposition. For instance, instruction no. 331 requires 
that transposition measures only incorporate the Directive’s rule and no 
other national extras in order to avoid lengthy procedures resulting in trans-
position delay.16 Next to observing legal-administrative instructions and 
guidelines, national ministries have to consider European case law while 
transposing EU directives. All these factors may further reduce the scope of 
discretion. With regard to discretionary provisions concerning sanctioning 
systems (Gil Ibá ñ ez, 1999: 213-215; Prechal, 2005: 88),17 the interpretations 
of the European Court of Justice have further reduced discretion. Moreover, 
judicial review has sought, albeit inconsistently, to determine the scope of 
discretion flowing from discretionary concepts such as ‘public policy’ and 
‘public order’ (Kessedijan, 2007; Brand, 2008: 226-230; Lindhal, 2008) that 
are sometimes used in directives to allow Member State departure from EU 
rules.18 Having addressed discretion within the Dutch transposition setting, 
the focus will now shift to discretion within the context of EU law.
2.2.1.2 EU law
The European Union has a set of legal instruments of which alongside reg-
ulations, European directives are the most commonly used to achieve the 
objectives set out in the treaties. European directives have specific features, 
pertaining to their structure, sort, length and complexity. Discretion, how-
ever, is a key characteristic of European directives, since it lies at the very 
heart of the instrument distinguishing it from others: Member States are 
bound to the directive’s objective, while they may choose how to achieve 
this objective. This describes the discretionary latitude for own judgment 
and choice within legal boundaries and ties in well with the definitions 
mentioned above. In granting discretion, directives essentially differ from 
16 In the Dutch context, this is known as the debate on ‘nationale koppen’. Cf. J. Stoop 
(2012) ‘Nationale koppen op EU-regelgeving; een relevante discussie?’, Nederlandse Tijd-
schrift voor Europees Recht 6: 229-237.
17 Directives that entail the obligation of introducing a sanctioning system used to offer 
Member States the (discretionary) choice to decide on the legal type of sanctions – 
whether to base these on provisions of public law or private law (administrative law or 
civil law) when legally implementing corresponding EU rules. This changed when the 
requirement became that sanctioning has to be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’, 
a standard clause introduced by the European Commission in the 1990s. These are con-
ditions that have meanwhile been specifi ed by case law. See Prechal, 2005, p. 88 and Gil 
Ibá ñ ez, 1999, pp. 213-215.
18 See for instance case C-363/89 Roux [1991] ECRI-00273 and case C-277/02 EU-Wood-
Trading [2004] ECR I-11957 referring to the application of EU secondary law (directives). 
In these cases the European Court of Justice, by invoking the principle of cooperation, 
sought to put constraints on Member States’ option to derogate from EU rules on the 
free movement of goods, persons, and services (Article 30 TEC now Article 36 TFEU). 
See Kessedijan, 2007, pp. 33-35.
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regulations which hardly leave any discretion as they are entirely binding 
and directly applicable in the Member States.19
Legislative discretion, hence discretion granted by directives, flows 
from two legal sources, EU primary law being one of them. Article 288 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) stipulates that:
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to 
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and 
methods.
The second source from which legislative discretion derives is EU second-
ary law, more precisely, from the directive text, its content and wording. 
Since the content of directives differs, the scope of discretion varies among 
them. It is certainly so that directives entail above all obligations for Mem-
ber States. However, the rules laid down in directives, do not exclusively 
prescribe what Member States have to do (‘shall’ do). Rules can also be for-
mulated as permissions (‘may’ do) and therefore entail discretionary lee-
way. In fact, as argued in this study, legislative discretion may take different 
forms in directives. What’s more, these instances of discretion provide dis-
cretion to different degrees. Whereas studies addressing legislative discre-
tion usually do not take into account the different forms discretion can take, 
the current study addresses them explicitly further below.
The distinction between discretion flowing from EU primary law on 
the one hand and EU secondary law on the other hand is also made by 
Veltkamp (1998) in her study on the implementation of EU environmental 
directives. It is one of the few legal studies that address discretion in this 
particular context. In a different manner than described in this disserta-
tion, Veltkamp applies the term ‘discretion’ more restrictively, to denote the 
leeway granted by the directive text whereas discretion flowing from the 
Treaty (Article 288) is referred to as ‘leeway in implementation’ (1998: 20).20 
The latter term, however, lacks precision because discretion based on the 
Treaty is intended to be used for transposition while the term ‘implementa-
tion’ extends beyond that stage.21 But there is a more important reason not 
to use the distinction suggested by Veltkamp. Alongside the fact that it is 
19 Legislative discretion is, hence, what distinguishes directives from regulations. At the 
same time, in practice EU directives may be very detailed, boiling down to quasi-regu-
lations. Regulations, on the other hand, may appear to be less detailed. They may, thus, 
require Member State enforcement which is usually only required in the case of direc-
tives. See Van der Burg and Voermans, 2015, p. 139.
20 The Dutch equivalent is ‘implementatievrijheid’.
21 It should, however, be pointed out that Veltkamp elsewhere in her study does recognise 
that implementation is a multi-stage process. See Veltkamp, 1998, pp. 7-8.
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difficult to disentangle the two types of discretion she identifies,22 in view 
of the present study, more analytical clarity is provided by distinguishing 
between legislative discretion and administrative discretion. To establish the 
difference between the two types has the advantage that discretion is cap-
tured with regard to the formal implementation (transposition) process as 
a whole. Such a distinction takes account of the specific nature of the direc-
tive as a ‘two-tier legal act’ encompassing the directive proper as issued by 
the European institutions and national transposition legislation by means 
of which the directive’s rules become part of Member States’ legal systems. 
In other words, I believe that instead of different legislative sources, a more 
appropriate ground on which to make a conceptual distinction is to differ-
entiate between EU-level discretion or ‘discretion-in-legislation’ (legislative 
discretion), and national-level discretion or ‘discretion-in-implementation 
(administrative discretion). Furthermore, it considers the possibility that 
discretion granted to Member States within the legislative decision-making 
process differs, in terms of amount, from discretion available to national 
implementing actors once the directive has to be transposed into national 
law due to differences between the EU and national settings. It is possi-
ble, for instance, that legislative discretion decreases once it is exposed to 
national legal-administrative settings like it has been suggested in imple-
mentation research (Steunenberg, 2006).23 The relevance of the national 
legal systems regarding the use of discretion by administrative authorities 
has also been highlighted in constitutional law. I shall return to this point in 
a moment.
From my perspective, an adequate way of taking the foregoing aspects 
into consideration is proposed by Schwarze’s definition of ‘legislative dis-
cretion’ and ‘executive discretion’. Schwarze is one of few (legal) scholars 
who acknowledge the difference between the two types. In his definitions 
emphasis is put on the authority that exercises discretion vis-à-vis and 
22 In my view, EU primary and secondary law are very much intertwined and directives 
provide a good example of this. Being secondary law, directives are made under the 
terms set out in the EU treaties and give expression to the legal principles established by 
them. For instance, the principle of institutional autonomy, which in this study is consid-
ered to be an instance of discretion, is explicitly laid down in EU directives. A directive 
provision may, for instance, allow Member States to confer implementing tasks upon 
national authorities they consider to be suitable to carry out these tasks. At the same 
time, the principle of autonomy directly fl ows from the EU treaties, in particular from 
Article 4(2) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) establishing that the Union shall 
respect the ‘territorial integrity’ of Member States and the aforementioned Article 288 
TFEU: Member States are free in choosing how to implement a directive, i.e. they decide 
on which national authorities will carry out this task.
23 Steunenberg, for example, pays particular attention to the difference in degree between 
EU-level and national-level discretion to which he refers as ‘higher-level discretion’ and 
‘lower-level discretion’. He shows that national coordination mechanisms can reduce the 
scope of the former, higher-level type of discretion, which results in less discretion being 
granted for the purpose of implementation than initially was the case. See Steunenberg 
(2006).
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under recognition of the other two functions of government. Whereas leg-
islative discretion denotes the ‘freedom of drafting employed by the law-
maker under the constitution’, executive discretion is considered to refer 
to ‘the freedom of the executive under the law and vis-à-vis the courts’ 
(Schwarze, 2006: 298). For the purposes of this study and with specific 
regard to the EU context, I slightly adapt Schwarze’s terminology (see box 
1). I distinguish between legislative discretion and administrative24 discre-
tion which are defined as follows:
Box 1: Defining discretion 
Legislative discretion
The term denotes the latitude based on both primary and secondary EU law 
(Article 288 TFEU and the directive text) granted by the EU legislator to Member 
States for transposing a directive.
Administrative discretion
 The term refers to the actual discretionary latitude left to national implementing 
actors, once factors that further determine the use of legislative discretion at the 
national level have been taken into account.
In my view, it is important to show that there is a conceptual difference 
between discretion at the EU level and discretion at the national level in 
order to gain a sound understanding of the concept within the context it is 
studied. However, it is not my intention to make an analytical distinction 
and to differentiate between the two types of discretion in the case stud-
ies that follow. While in subsequent chapters discretion in directives takes 
centre stage from a methodological point of view and is therefore referred 
to as ‘legislative discretion’ (as a synonym of ‘discretion’), I stick to the term 
‘discretion’ in the empirical analysis where the focus is on discretion within 
a broader, EU- and national-level decision-making context.
So far the discussion serves to filter out relevant aspects and facts that 
are important for a conceptual understanding of discretion. In the next 
sections my approach is slightly different. I try to discuss the legal science 
discourse from a bird’s-eye view, paying specific attention to how scholars 
from administrative, constitutional and the sociology of law have thought 
and written about discretion. My intention is to highlight certain aspects of 
the debate that I deem important for the study of discretion in the national 
transposition of European directives. In doing so, I also aim to show that 
24 The term ‘administrative discretion’ is not only used in the context of EU administra-
tive law but also in connection with administrative law in the United States where it is 
often referred to as ‘executive discretion’. To clearly distinguish the present context from 
the latter one, I decided to use the term ‘administrative’ instead of ‘executive’ discretion 
throughout the dissertation.
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discretion’s potentials have long been overshadowed by a prevalent nega-
tive image of it in the legal sciences.
To sum up the discussion, discretion in democratic legal systems is a 
topic of interest for scholars from administrative, constitutional and the 
sociology of law. The former two view it as part of a legal competence, the 
latter as part of decision-making determined not only by rules but also the 
social context. The rules-based impact on the use and scope of discretion has 
been illustrated by referring to discretion’s place in national legal systems, 
Dutch administrative law in particular. Definitions relating to the general as 
well as EU legal context show that choice, interpretation and judgment are 
considered to be central elements of the notion of discretion. Discretion is a 
key feature of European directives and determined by both EU and national 
settings. To account for this fact and for the sake of clarity, legislative discre-
tion is distinguished from administrative discretion.
2.3 Bird eye’s view on legal discourse
By showing how discretion has been described, a specific attitude that legal 
scholars have taken towards discretion can be revealed. In the subsequent 
discussion reference is made to studies that have tackled questions concern-
ing discretion within a national and European Union legal framework as 
well as in the legal Anglo-American context. My main concern is with the 
relationship between discretion and rules. This relationship appears to be of 
vital importance to legal scholars from all legal disciplines addressed here. 
What’s more, in presenting how these scholars have thought about discre-
tion, a perspective takes shape that serves to explain why discretion has 
been described in a particular way, of which it is thought here, that it does 
not do justice to the potential discretion is considered to have for the mak-
ing and application of rules.
2.3.1 Discretion in context
The ubiquity and importance of discretion for state administration, which 
seems to be reflected by its place within regulatory welfare states, has not 
gone unnoticed among scholars. In fact, it has attracted attention to dis-
cretionary decision-making in various administrative contexts: discretion, 
usually referred to as administrative discretion,25 has been addressed with 
regard to police and prosecution services (Davis, 1969; Fletcher, 1984), the 
administration of justice (Shapiro, 1983; 1985) as well as, more generally, in 
the context of public and welfare policies (Goodin, 1986; Bell, 1992; Han-
25 The term ‘administrative discretion’ is used by various authors in their contributions on 
discretion. Their defi nitions of the term at best overlap with the defi nition of the term 
applied in the dissertation where administrative discretion is dinstinguished from legis-
lative discretion in the context of the transposition of EU directives.
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dler, 1992). But also beyond the national context, in the area of European 
law, scholars have looked into discretion (Prechal and Van Roermund, 2008; 
Hofmann et al., 2011; Weber, 2013). What becomes apparent in the differ-
ent studies is the emphasis on discretion as being constraint by rules, but 
also the difference between discretion and rules as expressed by laws, legal 
principles or case law is highlighted. This idea about the difference between 
discretion and rules is well reflected by Dworkin’s metaphor of a doughnut 
(1977). Dworkin was a prominent scholar of legal philosophy and it there-
fore may not come as a surprise that his view on discretion has invited oth-
ers to reflect upon the role of discretion in the legal sphere, including state 
administration (Goodin, 1986; Galligan, 1990; Hawkins, 1992). To Dworkin, 
discretion is ‘like the hole in a doughnut [which] does not exist except as an 
area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction’ (1977: 31). In fact, Dwor-
kin’s shorthand description of discretion implies that discretion is not only 
restricted by rules but also separated from them. As Galligan points out, 
Dworkin implies that discretion is a ‘distinct species of legal power’ (1990: 
20). Others believe that Dworkin treats discretion as a residual notion to 
marginalise it from the world of rules (Goodin, 1986; Lacey, 1992). Be it as it 
may, Dworkin’s idea and that of others (Fletcher, 1984; Goodin, 1986; Koch, 
1986) seems to imply that discretion and rules are opposites. The purported 
advantages of rules are contrasted with the purported disadvantages of dis-
cretion: whereas rules are seemingly clear and open to the public as they are 
established by law (legislative processes), administrative decision-making 
and the use of discretion herein remains obscure and inaccessible to a wider 
audience (Hawkins, 1992). And, as Lacey notes, if exercised in the public 
sphere, discretion is considered as problematic from an individual rights 
perspective that constitutional scholars emphasise (1992: 370).
Next to describing discretion – in contrasting it with rules – Dworkin 
identifies three different types of discretion when analysing decision-mak-
ing by actors in the military service: two ‘weak senses’ of discretion along-
side a ‘strong’ one. A strong sense of discretion entails that standards are 
missing which are otherwise set by a legal authority. The absence of stan-
dards then leaves a lot of leeway for decision-making by sergeants even 
though principles such as rationality, fairness, and effectiveness preclude 
absolute (unbound) discretion. Discretion in the presence of standards 
is supposed to be weak and comes in two forms: discretion is weak if the 
standards require interpretation and judgment, or if discretionary decision-
making is not subject of final supervision or reversal (Dworkin, 1977: 31-9; 
68-71; see also Galligan, 1990: 14). In a nutshell, weak discretion involves 
interpreting a standard of rules already set by another authority, whereas 
strong discretion brings with it freedom in setting up own standards.
Dworkin is not the only one who tries to describe and structure discre-
tion. Others have followed suit in distinguishing between types of discre-
tion within the administration (Goodin, 1986; Koch, 1986; Shapiro, 1983; 
1985) or situations in which discretionary decision-making manifests itself 
in different ways (Lacey, 1992; Galligan, 1997; Gil Ibá ñ ez, 1999). Koch, for 
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example, distinguishes between types of discretion that are reviewable 
(individualising discretion, executing discretion and policymaking discre-
tion) and types of discretion that are not reviewable by the courts (unbri-
dled discretion and numinous discretion).26 Galligan maintains that there 
are three applications of discretion: discretion in finding facts, in settling 
standards, and in applying the standards to the facts (1997: 16). With regard 
to the implementation of EU law, Gil Ibá ñ ez points to different stages of 
decision-making in which discretion comes into play: decision-implementa-
tion, decision-application, supervision and enforcement (1999: 199).
Koch’s division into reviewable and unreviewable types of discretion 
already hints at the fact that administrative discretion is of major concern to 
legal scholars that discuss administrative conduct in the context of jurisdic-
tion. The question that preoccupies them in particular is how judges, law-
yers and other legal actors within law courts shall treat and assess discretion 
(Wright, 1971; Goodin, 1986; Shapiro, 1983; 1985).27 Furthermore, they seem 
to be concerned with the effects that discretion exercised by the executive 
may have for constitutional democratic states. In this regard, scholars look 
particularly into the question of how discretion relates to fundamental legal 
principles such as the rule of law, the balance of power, legality as well as 
the legal doctrines of direct effect and effective judicial protection – not only 
within a national but also a European context (Prechal and Van Roermund, 
2008; Hofmann et al., 2011).
2.3.2 From opposite to threat
The attention dedicated by legal scholars to questions on discretion in 
thinking about its causes and consequences can be seen as an attempt to 
better understand discretion and its meaning for modern legal systems. It 
can, however, and with a view to the attention that has been paid to the 
judicial review of different forms of discretion, also be seen as an attempt 
to ‘get a grip on discretion’ and to put it under control by means of law. 
26 These examples are mentioned for the purpose of mere illustration and are therefore not 
further discussed. It is interesting to note, however, that Koch’s executing discretion and 
policymaking discretion types come close to what I refer to as administrative discretion. 
Whereas according to Koch executing discretion boils down to extending legislation or 
fi lling in details, thereby following a defi ned path, ‘policymaking discretion’ allows the 
administrative decision-maker to defi ne the path itself in exercising decision-making 
competences. Cf. Koch, 1986, pp. 479-491. It is conceivable that the transposition of Euro-
pean directives entails both of these activities, depending on how much discretion is 
available for the incorporation of EU rules into national law. In choosing implementa-
tion forms and methods, national actors may decide upon the path of transposition and 
elaborate further on (discretionary) EU rules.
27 Even though legal discretion is not the focus here, it is interesting to note, with reference 
to Brand, that judicial review of administrative discretion may in itself be considered as 
a discretionary act because judges act on their own judgment in applying established 
legal standards to scrutinise discretion. Cf. Brand (2008).
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Hawkins’ (1992) reading of various legal writings on discretion points in the 
same direction.
Having said this, it becomes clear that discretion and rules are not 
merely perceived as opposites. To put it starkly, a central theme in the legal 
discourse seems to be the tension between discretion and rules as epito-
mised by the antithesis between the rule of men (discretion as ‘unbridled’ 
power) and the rule of law (rules as ‘legal’ power). This view on discretion 
exhibits a certain degree of suspicion, which is also immanent in the work of 
Dicey, the 19th century British constitutional scholar and lawyer. Being not 
entirely opposed to the idea of administrative discretion in general Dicey, 
however, was a strong proponent of the rule of law. His works have been 
interpreted as showing disapproval of the conferral of wide amounts of dis-
cretion upon the administration because he seemed to consider it likely that 
discretion would be used in an arbitrary fashion, undermining the rule of 
law (Galligan, 1990; Gil Ibá ñ ez, 1999: 202; Carolan, 2009: 49). But it is not 
only the rule of law that seems to be at stake. From the perspective of con-
stitutional theory, it is also the concept of separation of powers, and there-
fore the neat division between the executive, the legislative and the judicial 
branches that might get undermined (Waldron, 1999; 2013). Making discre-
tion available to unelected officials within state administration whose task 
is to put law into practice may exceed regulatory rule-making and include 
taking quasi-legislative measures. This may foster the intermeshing of the 
executive and legislative functions of government.
Going back to the notion of arbitrary decision-making, it re-appears in 
a somewhat different way in Davis’ Discretionary Justice (1969) centring on 
discretionary decision-making in the administration of justice, police and 
prosecutors in particular. Davis, in fact, is a historian but a common refer-
ence point of legal scholars and one of the first contemporary scholars to 
have analysed intensively discretion in state administration (Fletcher, 1984: 
274). According to Davis, a public official has discretion whenever ‘the 
effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among pos-
sible courses of action or inaction’ (1969: 4). Davis, however, also introduces 
the notion of ‘unnecessary discretion’ which implies that he concedes that 
some discretion is ‘necessary’. The idea of ‘necessary’ discretion is based 
on the consideration that in exercising their tasks police officers need some 
flexibility to apply abstract rules in specific individual situations. The jus-
tification for discretion is often the need for individualised justice. None-
theless, Davis is also convinced that there is ‘unnecessary’ or ‘undesirable’ 
discretion which is likely to lead to illegal discretionary action and therefore 
to the improper application of rules. It is considered a consequence of lack-
ing control by legal authorities, and hence, too much room for the police 
officer for own interpretation, judgment and choice (1969: 1-14). In the eyes 
of Handler who focuses on social and not legal justice, administrative action 
as described by Davis leads to ‘subjective justice’ (1986: 169). That discretion 
can be misused, is a present topic in constitutional law. The legal doctrine 
of ‘acting ultra vires’ addresses exactly the fact that in exceeding their legal 
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competences, administrative actors act outside the lawful powers that have 
been conferred upon them (Hofmann, et al., 2011; Möllers, 2013).
At the same time, discretion is also thought of as being inevitable and as 
having a certain function within legal systems. Hence, it is not only rejected 
but also accepted. According to Goodin, ‘[i]t is widely agreed that a certain 
amount of discretion will inevitably prove necessary’ (1986: 237). Referring 
to the implementation of welfare state programmes and the provision of 
social assistance in particular,28 he points out that there is a ‘need to leave 
officials with discretionary powers to make extraordinary payments to 
people in truly exceptional circumstances, such as fire or flood’ (1986: 237). 
Again discretion is recognised as useful, namely in making general rules 
work in practice. On the other hand, Goodin dedicates a considerable part 
of his article to discuss the downsides of officials’ discretionary decision-
making in the distribution of welfare state resources. Next to arbitrariness, 
Goodin argues that discretion can have other negative consequences for 
the system of law and therefore also for those this system is expected to 
protect. According to him, these downsides are manipulation, exploitation, 
uncertainty, insecurity, privacy and intrusiveness. All of these phenomena 
suggest that officials may (mis)use discretion in assigning the resources to 
be distributed, by imposing high demands on those in need. Furthermore, 
discretionary decision-making may make those asking for support subject 
to the official’s arbitrary will. As a consequence, the position they are put 
in is characterised by legal uncertainty and insecurity as well as a dispro-
portionate encroachment on their privacy in having to prove their entitle-
ment to receive social welfare benefits (1986: 239-250). In contrast to other 
scholars, Goodin does not believe that rules are a solution to these alleged 
problems of discretion being exercised. Rules merely provide justifications 
for the decisions that officials make. Therefore, Goodin comes up with a 
more radical solution by suggesting that dilemmas can be alleviated only 
by removing discretion from officials. Interestingly enough, Goodin does 
not consider the dilemmas mentioned as being inherent to discretion. In his 
view, discretion is not the root of the problem. It is the practice of discretion 
which is beset with problems (1986: 258).
In considering the foregoing, the prevalent view emerging from the 
legal debate seems to be that discretion is in one way or the other prob-
lematic for legal systems. Opposite arguments, underpinning that discre-
tion may also be conducive to legal systems, appear to be largely absent. 
Instead, discretion is associated with arbitrary decision-making and a num-
ber of negative effects expected to follow from its use. Seen in this light, the 
exercise of discretion by the administration is to the detriment of legal prin-
ciples that are at the core of democratic legal systems. To mention a few but 
nevertheless key ones: the rule of law, legality and legal certainty, as well as 
the separation of powers. In fact, criticism of discretion is not confined to 
28 Goodin applies the term ‘offi cial’ which is in the Anglo-American context used to denote 
an offi ce-holder within public administration and government.
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its role within national settings. Also regarding administrative rule-making 
in the context of the European Union, discretion is ‘blamed’ for it is consid-
ered to undermine the legal protection of individuals, above all in the area 
of asylum and migration law. In this regard, legislative discretion granted 
by directives is characterised as being a counterpart to legal harmonisa-
tion and the principle of uniform application which implies that EU rules 
are interpreted and applied in the same way by the Member States. With 
a view to EU asylum and migration law, discretion is criticised for allow-
ing Member States to implement minimal standards of protection where 
higher standards are deemed necessary as argued by scholars in the debate 
on immigration from non-EU countries. The implications that discretion is 
considered to have are found incompatible with human rights (Guild, 1999; 
Baldaccini, 2009; 2010; Strik, 2011; Eisele, 2013).
In sum, the above discussion of legal scholars’ views on discretion 
being exercised by administrative actors within a national or European 
setting seems to reveal a rather negative attitude towards it. This is not 
least because of discretion’s alleged negative legal implications which also 
appear to raise questions of legitimacy. After all, the principles discretion is 
supposed to undermine (the rule of law, legality, legal certainty, the sepa-
ration of powers, amongst others) can be understood as basic pillars upon 
which democratic and legal systems are founded and preserved.
And yet, among the voices of criticism, there are also those that point to 
the necessity of discretion for the application of rules. Then again, discretion 
does not exist without rules. Hence and as very well reflected by Dworkin’s 
metaphor of a doughnut mentioned above: discretion and rules are closely 
related to each other (Hawkins, 1992: 13). After all, only with the hole (dis-
cretion) the doughnut (rules) can exist.
2.3.3 Discretion re-visited
Interestingly enough, the sceptical, if not critical attitude towards discre-
tion has itself become a subject of the debate. Lacey, for instance, takes issue 
with the prevalent negative viewpoint on discretion resulting from, as she 
views it, a dogmatic approach adopted within the legal sciences, in particu-
lar in the Anglo-American legal studies. According to her this approach is 
characterised, by a specific paradigm that she considers to be rooted in a 
distinct ‘liberal legal theory’:
This kind of jurisprudential approach to judicial discretion flows in part from the central-
ity of courts in jurists’ conception and in part from association of the rule-of-law ideal 
with the value of formal justice (treat like cases alike) and with the protection of indi-
vidual rights (1992: 369).
Apparently the approach and paradigm Lacey describes here, rest on the 
idea that discretion is in fundamental conflict with the rule of law – at least 
if the rule of law is, as pointed out by Galligan – narrowly conceptualised 
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as ‘the rule of rules’ – and the values associated with it (1997: 18). Galligan 
argues in a similar vein as Lacey, when he contends that criticism of discre-
tion from within the legal studies is voiced by those exponents of constitu-
tional theory that take a legalistic approach to the rule of law and share the 
belief that the administrative government should be organised according 
to a set of general, legal standards (1997: 11-14). Discretion in such a set-
ting is viewed as an ultimate challenge to established rules and to the ideal 
concept that supporters of a concept like the liberal legal paradigm have in 
mind: the application of general standards to all legal activities for both sub-
stantial and procedural grounds (Lacey, 1992: 369).
Lacey’s reflections on discretion make part of the volume The uses of dis-
cretion (1992).29 This collection of essays written by socio-legal scholars and 
legal practitioners seems to reflect a change of attitude towards discretion 
and a possible paradigm shift within the legal discourse on the subject as 
a result. As outlined in the introduction to the volume, the authors depart 
from a common starting point. They challenge the idea that discretion and 
rules are opposites and consider the traditional legal approach as being too 
limited in explaining discretion by merely contrasting it with rules. Discre-
tion, in their view, makes part of decision-making on how to apply rules. 
Therefore, they strongly suggest analysing discretion not in isolation but in 
connection with the wider social context in which it is embedded. To this 
end, a more adequate approach is, as they put it, a ‘pluralist’ one which 
combines insights from the legal and social studies to take into account the 
impact of organisational structures such as norms on the way administra-
tive discretion is exercised (Lacey, 1992: 363; Schneider, 1992: 79-88). Legal 
scholars are therefore well-advised to make use of empirical and analyti-
cal approaches applied in the social sciences (Lacey, 1992: 365). Further-
more, the dogmatic view is questioned that discretion and rules are two 
separated phenomena as expressed in the work of Dicey and his students 
(Bell, 1992; Hawkins, 1992; Lacey, 1992; Galligan, 1997). It is argued to the 
contrary, namely that discretion is immanent to rules, flowing for instance 
from vague parts of legislation (Schneider, 1992). In this regard, the inter-
esting observation is made that in formulating law, the legislature chooses 
between different combinations of rules and discretion implying that discre-
tion varies amongst pieces of legislation (Schneider, 1992: 49).
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that next to the fear of discretion’s poten-
tially negative effects on legal systems (and their legitimacy), other argu-
ments have been put forward that reflect a more positive view on discre-
tion. In more recent debates, discretion is not associated anymore with 
disadvantages it is believed to entail for the rule of law. Galligan (1997), for 
instance, rejects the idea of many of his colleagues that discretion is incom-
patible with legal values featuring prominently in rule of law systems. He 
makes the interesting case that scepticism and negativity towards discretion 
29 Keith Hawkins (ed.) (1992) The uses of discretion. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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result from the fact that only legal standards are used as a benchmark for 
assessing if discretion is ‘legitimacy-proof’. Once it is realised that there are, 
alongside rules, also normative standards generated within administrations 
which can be used to make judgments about discretion, ‘discretionary pow-
ers may be brought within acceptable notions of legitimate authority’ (1997: 
15). He even takes this point further in arguing that discretion can be a form 
of legitimate authority (1997: 35).
Galligan’s account provides a good example of the part of legal schol-
arship that seeks to integrate empirical insights into the legal analysis of 
discretion. His writings (1990; 1997) also exemplify that legal scholars have 
not only focussed on the purported dilemmas posed by discretion but that 
attention has been shifted to the advantages that discretion can have for 
legal systems in general and legislative and administrative decision-mak-
ing (processes) in particular. It is emphasised that discretion facilitates the 
application of rules under particular circumstances. Additionally, in provid-
ing flexibility, discretion is considered to help reconciling different interests 
and reaching agreement in administrative contexts (Lacey, 1992: 361). Legal 
scholars as well as legal practitioners do not consider discretion to be nec-
essarily problematic for legal systems (Prechal and Van Roermund, 2008: 
18). Carolan, for instance, opines that discretion should not be treated as a 
problem but as an ‘institutional opportunity’ (2009: 131). Like other authors 
that stress the relevance of interest representation and deliberation in deci-
sion-making processes (see for instance Hunold and Peters, 2004), Carolan 
suggests that administrative discretion should be used to let citizens be 
involved and contribute to accurate decision-making by which they them-
selves are affected. Thus, in his view the conferral of discretion on admin-
istrative actors is well-reasoned (Carolan, 2009: 130-134). In the same vein, 
Möllers (2013) highlights the advantages of discretion vested in the admin-
istration, which he considers to have a mediating role in exercising state 
authority that affects citizens. He takes the opinion that discretion helps 
to fulfil this function since it facilitates the application of abstract laws to 
concrete situations. What’s more, through discretion, administrative actors 
are made sensitive to the circumstances of a specific situation and in this 
context, discretion may be used to protect individual freedoms and rights 
(2013: 100; 143).
Very important for the present context are the arguments that have 
been put forward regarding the role of discretion in EU law. In this context, 
the notion of vagueness becomes relevant. Vagueness, however, alongside 
ambiguity, has been considered as negative for the implementation of law. 
The argument goes that vagueness might contribute to the misinterpreta-
tion and misapplication of EU rules in the Member States (Falkner et al., 
2005; Beijen, 2011). However, representatives of legal scholarship on the 
EU argue to the contrary. Discretion is positively acknowledged, precisely 
because it provides vagueness. This vagueness is considered as ‘construc-
tive ambiguity’ and therefore as valuable leeway that can facilitate striking 
a compromise in decision-making and reaching a decision outcome (such 
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as the adoption of a directive) (Prechal, 2005: 33). Likewise, ambiguity is 
not considered as being negative for the (formal) implementation of Euro-
pean law (directives) by Member States. As an instance of ‘conceptual diver-
gence’, discretion is regarded to carry the valuable potential to facilitate 
translating EU rules into the various national legal orders, exactly because it 
leaves room for more than one interpretation (Prechal and Van Roermund, 
2008). This ties in well with the observation that a directive, due to the dis-
cretion that it grants, represents a compromise among Member States, uni-
fying national laws to a certain extent while additionally taking into account 
national particularities (Härtel, 2006: 173). As Twigg-Flesner notes, Member 
States have some choice in deciding how to achieve the outcomes required 
by a directive, using suitable legal concepts and terminology in transposing 
EU rules while regulations imply the use of terminology and concepts dis-
tinct from national ones (2012: 8-9).
A number of relevant points have been mentioned in the above sections. 
Taken together, they indicate a second line of reasoning regarding legal 
scholars’ approach to discretion. In legal thinking the tendency has become 
apparent to positively embrace discretion by emphasising its potentials. In 
contrast to those that have seemingly been caught up in fear, suspicion and 
prejudice, being reflected in their views of discretion, there are other legal 
scholars that are more concerned with discretion’s virtues instead of its pur-
ported vices. It, thus, seems that the idea is increasingly endorsed that dis-
cretion has an important function to fulfil within democratic legal systems: 
it can be beneficial for both, the making and application of law. Further-
more, taking a closer look at the whole debate, pertinent aspects have been 
touched upon which show some connection between discretion and legiti-
macy. Insights as provided by Prechal and Van Roermund (2008) as well 
as Galligan (1990; 1997) indicate that there is a link valuable to be explored 
further.
The previous sections have brought to light a number of aspects that are 
considered vital for understanding the concept of discretion within the con-
text of this study. The next chapter continues on this path. It zooms in fur-
ther on discretion within the context of legislative decision-making and law 
implementation processes. This debate has mainly been shaped by political 
scientists. From their writings pertinent findings can be derived for a more 
complex understanding of discretion which further informs the theoretical 
assessment framework of the dissertation.
2.4 Conclusion
How does the foregoing characterisation of discretion link with the present 
context of this study? I believe that the legal debate provides a number of 
insights that are of particular relevance for the analysis of discretion as it is 
envisaged here.
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To begin with, the idea voiced in the legal debate and embraced in the 
dissertation is that discretion is inherent to rules (laws) and that it is pro-
vided by different degrees. These are precisely the two key characteris-
tics of European directives. Second, analysing discretion in a wider social 
context, taking into account ‘social forces’ instead of rules alone, is consis-
tent with the approach taken in this study where discretion is analysed in 
a political, institutional setting, namely in EU legislative decision-making 
and national implementation processes regarding directives. In this respect, 
also the observation that the legislature consciously decides to grant dis-
cretion to certain amounts plays a significant role. Third, to differentiate 
between the notion of discretion including its potentials for legal systems 
on the one hand and, on the other hand, how discretion is used including 
the possible, improper use or misuse of it is deemed relevant. It may serve 
to show a more nuanced picture of discretion which is not biased towards 
discretion’s purported negative effects but takes into account the difference 
between normative ideas about discretion – how it should be used – and 
empirical examples which may illustrate its actual (mis-)use. In that context, 
it is important to understand that the misuse of discretion does not lie in 
the concept of discretion but is linked to how it is used by administrative 
actors. Hence, it seems necessary to have a closer look at how actors use 
discretion when transposing EU directives. Fourth, as was finally brought 
to light, discretion may entail advantages for actors in decision-making pro-
cesses – such as the flexibility it provides in applying rules. Thus, as argued 
in the dissertation, discretion can play an important role in legal systems, 
especially within the context of EU- and national-level decision-making 
processes concerning directives. Here it shows that reviewing the Anglo-
Amercian literature on discretion makes it possible to identify different 
perspectives on discretion: both negative and positive ones. What’s more, 
it becomes apparent that legal approaches of the concept of discretion dif-
fer among each other. This part of the legal theory on discretion was used 
to put into perspective, first, the idea that legal theory is mainly negative 
about the role of discretion in rule-making – there are views that do not 
emphasise the downsides of discretion but, by contrast, seek to highlight its 
advantages for decision-making processes related to the making and imple-
mentation of rules – and, second, to put into perspective the view that rules 
and discretion do not go well together.
Finally, also the traditional approach towards discretion is found to 
have an important merit with its emphasis on the tension between discre-
tion and rules. In fact, it is this part of the legal discourse, in which impor-
tant questions as to the impact of administrative discretion on democratic 
legal systems arise, including questions that have been touched upon in the 
introduction to the dissertation. It can be considered as a prelude to the later 
debate on the relationship between discretion and legitimacy within the 
context of the transposition of EU directives. This debate will follow after 
the presentation of the empirical case studies.
3.1 Introduction
Next to legal scholars, also political scientists1 have taken a vested interest 
in the relevance of discretion for processes of legislative decision-making 
and law implementation. In analysing these processes they shed light on 
aspects that are pertinent for the present study of discretion. This chapter 
starts out with some general remarks concerning discretion in implementa-
tion research. Hereafter more specific aspects are addressed: the reasons for 
delegation and discretion in the context of legislative decision-making are 
dealt with, as well as the conditions under which discretion is made avail-
able for the purpose of implementing law. Findings derived from the anal-
ysis of legislative decision-making and the transposition of EU directives 
finally serve to formulate a set of expectations for the empirical analysis.
3.2 Discretion in implementation research
Discretion has been addressed in a number of implementation or compli-
ance studies that largely centre on Member States’ transposition of European 
directives.2 Implementation is a domain of political scientists; apart from a 
few exceptions in the legal studies (Veltkamp 1998, Beijen, 2010; De Boer 
et al., 2010; Strik 2011). Implementation scholars address various questions. 
For instance, they take a closer look at Member States’ non-compliance with 
EU law by investigating the reasons for failure of legally correct and timely 
transposition (e.g. Kaeding, 2007b; 2008; Mastenbroek, 2007; Thomson, 
2010). Some of them aim to identify implementation patterns from which 
they derive distinct approaches to compliance applied by old as well as new 
EU Member States (Falkner et al., 2005; Toshkov, 2007; 2008). Others are 
interested in the development of compliance over time and in compliance 
with EU law in particular policy areas (Kaeding, 2007b; Haverland et al., 
2011). Specific attention has also been paid to the variation of compliance 
(Haverland and Romeijn, 2007; Thomson, 2007; Börzel et al., 2012) and, in 
1 The term political science is used broadly, and hence, understood as including the sci-
ence of public administration.
2 Few exceptions are Carroll (2014) who looks into the post-transposition implementa-
tion of EU directives in the area of animal welfare and Versluis (2007) who addresses all 
stages of the national implementation of the Safety Data Sheets Directive. Both focus on 
implementation across EU Member States.
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particular, timeliness in the national transposition of EU directives (Thom-
son, 2009; Haverland et al., 2011), including the question why some Member 
States outperform others in transposing directives (Börzel et al., 2010).
In these implementation studies the notion of discretion is usually 
explained in brief. Explanations refer to the fact that discretion offers room 
in transposing directive provisions into national law. Discretion is thus 
understood as providing a range of policy options which are all supposed 
to be compatible with the piece of law to be implemented (Kaeding, 2007b; 
Thomson, 2007; Zhelazykova and Torrenvliet, 2011).3 Discretion has been 
identified, amongst many others (Sverdrup, 2007; Toshkov et al., 2010),4 as a 
factor assumed to affect the transposition of EU directives into national law. 
Accordingly, delay in transposition is considered to be caused by a combi-
nation of different factors, instead of being regarded as a mono-causal prob-
lem (Falkner et al., 2005: 22-26). Factors, which potentially impact transpo-
sition, are organised into three categories (Kaeding, 2007b; Mastenbroek, 
2007). The first category comprises specific characteristics of a directive 
(directive features); the second category includes features of the legislative 
decision-making stage, i.e. EU negotiations concerning a directive, and the 
third category pertains to characteristics of the domestic context into which 
a directive is implemented (referred to as national-level characteristics or 
state-based explanations). Discretion is a prominent but, apparently, not the 
only directive feature that potentially affects the timeliness of transposition. 
The type of directive (new directive or amendment), its length, its level of 
complexity, its legislative quality, and the time allotted for implementation 
as well as the policy sector the directive addresses are further factors that 
possibly have an effect on transposition. As for EU-level features, the posi-
tion or preference of Member States towards the directive proposal (being 
for or against it) may provide some hints as to their later transposition 
performance. Finally, state-based explanations refer to the administrative 
culture of a Member State and the socio-political structure of its society, in 
other words, they refer to whether a Member State is a federal or unitary 
state, whether interest intermediation at the national level follows a corpo-
ratist or pluralist model. This list is certainly not exhaustive but gives an 
idea of ‘where’ to look for causes of impacts on transposition alongside dis-
3 These largely quantitative studies are usually more preoccupied with the question of 
how to measure discretion granted by EU law. See also in this respect the recent study by 
Carroll focussing on the effects of discretion in the post-transposition application of EU 
directives. Cf. Carroll, 2014, pp. 153-154.
4 A comprehensive overview of implementation studies and therefore factors that have 
been examined in their relation to the national implementation of EU directives can be 
obtained from the online database of quantitative and qualitative studies of transposi-
tion, implementation and compliance with EU law. See: D. Toshkov, (n.d.) Implementa-
tion of EU Law: An Online Database of Existing Research, in cooperation with the Insti-
tute for European Integration Research at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, available 
at: www.eif.oeaw.ac.at/implementation and http://www.eif.oeaw.ac.at/compliance/ 
(accessed 1 December 2015).
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cretion. Taking one step back, however, how does discretion relate to legis-
lative decision-making processes?
3.3 Discretion in legislative decision-making
The discussion sheds light on three specific aspects: the reasons for the 
transfer of discretionary decision-making powers for the purpose of trans-
position from the (EU) legislature to (national) state administration, the cir-
cumstances under which more or less discretion is granted, and discretion’s 
potential effects on legislative decision-making and national transposition. 
In the political science literature discretion is addressed in close connection 
with the concept of delegation. Addressing the question of why discretion-
ary powers are granted is therefore intrinsically linked with the question of 
why delegation from the legislature to the executive occurs in the first place.
3.3.1 Why delegate, why discretion?
The concept of delegation within the political decision-making context of 
the EU and the United States has drawn attention of numerous scholars 
(Epstein and O’Halloran, 1997; Pollack, 1997; Majone, 1999; 2002; Huber and 
Shiphan, 2002; Talberg, 2002; Thomson, 2011). Delegation implies a share of 
decision-making powers between the legislative and executive branches of 
government and therefore links up both, the law-making and implementa-
tion stages. As Thomson points out, ‘[i]n most political systems, decision 
makers delegate at least some discretionary power to implementers’ that 
are, however, also seen as political actors in their own right (Thomson, 2011: 
222; 258). The idea underlying the use of delegation is based on the assump-
tion that lacking legislative capacity motivates the legislature to transfer, 
for the sake of implementation, discretionary decision-making powers to 
the executive (state administration). To explain the reasons for the delega-
tion of discretion, scholars make use of the principle-agent and transaction 
cost models applied in the field of political science and economics (Epstein 
and O’Halloran, 1997; Huber and Shiphan, 2002). These explanatory mod-
els emphasise the importance of efficiency and propose cost-effective solu-
tions for problems of decision-making such as lacking legislative capacity. 
Together with the concept of delegation they are used to explain the motiva-
tion which underlies EU integration, i.e. the transfer of national decision-
making powers to the institutions of the EU (Pollack, 1997; Majone, 1999; 
2002). Another explanation for delegation has been linked to the notion of 
‘blame avoidance’ (Majone, 1999; Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002). In this 
context, delegation is considered to be motivated by the wish of those prin-
cipally in charge of decision-making to shift the responsibility for unpopu-
lar decisions or policy failures to others in order to insulate themselves from 
political responsibility and accountability and to avoid loss of legitimacy. 
Delegation, however, may also be seen as an attempt of the legislature to 
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achieve credible policy commitments, above all in cases where decision-
makers such as Member States in the EU Council agree to decision out-
comes that, actually, differ from their preferred policy. To enhance credibil-
ity in the subsequent implementation of this policy by Member States, also 
the European Commission is given an active part in this process. For this 
purpose, the EU legislature delegates implementing powers to the Commis-
sion (Majone, 1999: 4; Talberg, 2002: 26; Thomson, 2011: 259-60).5
Regarding the delegation of decision-making powers from the EU leg-
islature to national administrations, there are various reasons for the trans-
fer of these powers which are addressed in the next sections. Recourse is 
thereby taken to arguments derived from the so-called principle-agent and 
transaction cost models as well as related approaches. What seems to link 
the various explanations is that they revolve around two themes: informa-
tion asymmetries between the law-making and application stages, and, con-
sequently, the legislature’s attempt to seek expertise for the implementation 
of legislative acts as a result.
3.3.1.1 Information asymmetry
The principle-agent model rests on the assumption of information asym-
metry between the legislature (the principle) and the implementing author-
ity (the agent). This asymmetry results from differences in time and space 
between the processes of law-making and implementation of the law. This 
is well exemplified by EU legislative decision-making regarding directives 
which on average takes a good two years before Member States can imple-
ment them. What’s more, decision-making takes place within two different 
settings: negotiations at EU level and transposition of the directive at the 
national level.
Law-making usually occurs with a distance to the actual situation in 
which the law concerned needs to be applied and it therefore cannot antici-
pate on changes that may spontaneously occur ‘on the ground’. According 
to the incomplete contracting theory of multilateral agreements, members 
of a community are unable to construct complete agreements due to the 
complexity of real-world phenomena and their unpredictability (Gil Ibá ñ ez, 
1999: 202; see also Pollack, 2010: 32). Hence, the assumption that principal 
decision-makers have only limited knowledge of the policy issue a pro-
posal under negotiation addresses and are therefore unable to make very 
detailed legislation. What’s more, knowledge gaps on the part of the legis-
lature may not only concern the content of the law to be implemented but 
also pertain to the circumstances under which implementation shall be car-
ried out and the consequences resulting from it (Calvert et al., 1989; Epstein 
and O’Halloran, 1994; Franchino, 2004). This can also constitute a reason for 
5 These are the implementing powers - formerly addressed in the context of Article 202 
and 211 TEC – which, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, became Articles 
290 and 291 entailing the delegation of power to adopt delegated and implementing 
acts. See for instance Hofmann et al., 2011, p. 491.
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the legislature to refrain from spelling out the details of legislation and to 
leave the elaboration of a new piece of law to implementing actors, which 
are often situated within state administration and supposed to make more 
informed decisions. Delegation has, as a result, that institutional stalemate 
is avoided: the legislature remains capable to act even with regard to highly 
unknown situations. Interestingly, since it refers to the idea of legislative 
discretion granted by EU directives, Epstein and O’Halloran argue that due 
to the lack of legislative capacity and existing uncertainty characterising 
legislative decision-making, implementing actors will, by default, receive at 
least a ‘minimum amount of discretion’ to implement legislation. In their 
view each piece of legislation contains such a minimum or ‘discretionary 
floor’ (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1994: 702).
3.3.1.2 Seeking expertise
Where the settings in which law-making and implementation take place dif-
fer, like in the case of EU law that has to be implemented on a national level, 
facing information gaps may not only impede informed decision-making 
but also make it too costly for the legislature – in terms of times and other 
resources – to come up with detailed legislation (Epstein and O’Halloran, 
1997: 36-42). That being said, a possible solution for the legislature is to seek 
expertise from (national) implementing actors, especially when it comes 
to assessing the effectiveness of different policies. For this reason, the leg-
islature formulates discretionary rules that enable implementing actors to 
choose from a range of possibilities what they perceive as the most effec-
tive measure (Thomson, 2011: 275). The transaction cost perspective has 
been applied in studies on legislative decision-making and the delegation 
of discretion, in particular, within the context of the political system of the 
United States (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1997; Huber and Shiphan, 2002). 
These studies have provided the basis for later research on legislative deci-
sion-making in the European Union, including the delegation of discretion 
(Franchino, 2004; Thomson, 2007; Thomson et al., 2007; Thomson, 2011). 
In this context, relying on national expertise by engaging domestic actors 
in the implementation of EU law is assumed to lower the costs of aligning 
national laws with, for instance, EU directives. Drawing on the particular 
usage of Epstein and O’Halloran and what they term the ‘transaction cost 
politics approach’, the idea is that the legislature trades off ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ production costs in the making of legislation in order to arrive at 
a solution that guarantees relatively low costs. In other words, the (in-) effi-
ciencies of both legislative rule-making and administrative rule-making (for 
the sake of implementation) are weighed up against each other (Epstein and 
O’Halloran, 1997: 7-9).
With a view to the above, delegation and discretion can be considered 
as resulting from strategically calculated acts of the legislature who seeks 
to keep law-making costs low while trying to ensure that law is properly 
implemented by those actors to whom implementation has been assigned. 
This view ties in well with Thomson’s (2007; 2011) observation regarding 
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EU negotiations on directives. Thomson points to the relevant fact that 
Member States take a double role in the negotiation process because they 
are principally involved in both the legislative decision-making and the 
implementation of directives. In transaction cost theory they are considered 
to be both political actors and implementers (2011: 256). In this double role 
and as argued by Thomson, Member States, negotiating a directive, antic-
ipate the need for flexibility, i.e. discretion for implementation ‘at home’. 
In ensuring the availability of this flexibility, they seek to keep transaction 
costs to a minimum: flexible arrangements ensure that implementation 
can be shaped according to their preferences. Resulting from these consid-
erations is the incorporation of discretion into a directive (Thomson, 2007: 
1004; Thomson, 2011: 253-254).
3.3.2 Discretion as a normative choice
A further explanation for the transfer of discretionary powers from one actor 
to another has been provided by the consensus-building perspective on the 
delegation of decision-making powers to EU Member States (Dimitrova and 
Steunenberg, 2000; Thomson et al., 2007; Thomson, 2011). With regard to EU 
legislative decision-making, it is argued that Member States formulate dis-
cretionary decision outcomes to resolve mutual disagreement – an approach 
to conflict settlement which has been applied with even higher frequency 
since the 2004 EU enlargement (Thomson, 2011: 277). Discretion is consid-
ered important in this context, not only because it apparently facilitates a 
compromise between Member States. Its relevant role is ascribed to the fact 
that it provides Member States with the prospect of not having to change too 
much of their national legal orders. As Thomson puts it, ‘[d]ecision outcomes 
that delegate discretionary power to Member States allow states to keep 
their national arrangements to at least some extent’ – also in case that they 
are afforded only a narrow scope of discretion (Thomson, 2011: 260; 262).6 
This argument can be linked to ideas about discretion as a normative choice.
Reflecting upon the reasons for the delegation and the function of dis-
cretion is important. It allows concluding that discretion is not merely a 
coincidence or side-effect of decision-making. This view on discretion, sup-
ported in this dissertation, ties in well with the notion of ‘deliberate dis-
cretion’ (Huber and Shipan, 2002) which has been coined in studies on 
legislative decision-making in the United States but also regarding deci-
sion-making processes on EU law (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000). The 
notion of ‘deliberate discretion’ emphasises that the legislature consciously 
chooses to delegate discretion for the purpose of law implementation, for 
the reasons discussed above. This aspect of intentionally granting discre-
tion, however, can also be connected with a more normative idea about how 
6 Moreover, I shall return to this point below when addressing in more detail the circum-
stances, degrees and effects pertaining to the delegation of discretion in the context of 
EU negotiations on directives.
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EU law should be made to ensure that it is implemented and applied at 
the national level. At the same time, by deliberately granting discretion, the 
EU legislature accepts a certain level of legal diversity resulting from the 
national implementation of EU rules (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000).
To understand this ‘normative’ idea, as it is referred to here, it is neces-
sary to take recourse to EU primary law. In the pre-Lisbon period, the use of 
directives or regulations as regulatory instruments was determined, at least 
for a number of particular policy issues, by the relevant legal base in the EU 
treaties (Prechal and Vandamme, 2007: 13). Thus, EU primary law provides 
further insights into why the EU legislature makes use of directives and 
hence delegates discretionary decision-making power for implementation 
purposes to the Member States.
3.3.2.1 Discretion – Subsidiarity – Proportionality
In the context of EU law-making discretion relates to the principles of sub-
sidiarity and proportionality. All three are concerned with the distribution 
of competences between the EU and national levels. The principles of sub-
sidiarity7 and proportionality are laid down in Article 5(3) and 5(4) TEU 
respectively. Together they regulate the exercise of decision-making powers 
by the European Union, by aiming to ensure that the EU acts within the lim-
its conferred upon it by the treaties and the objectives they establish. More 
concrete, the principle of subsidiarity takes due account of the basic idea of 
democracy that decisions in the Union are taken as close as possible to citi-
zens. The key question that the principle of subsidiarity addresses is there-
fore whether EU action is justified in terms of effectiveness if it is compared 
to decision-making at the national, regional or local levels. The principle of 
subsidiarity is closely bound up with the principle of proportionality which 
requires that any action by the Union should not go beyond what is neces-
sary to achieve the objectives of the treaties. Put differently, the principle of 
proportionality emphasises that actions by EU institutions must be carried 
out within clear boundaries. Regarding their content and form those actions 
must be in keeping with the goals envisaged by the EU legislature.
Next to these two fundamental principles of EU law-making, discre-
tion being granted to Member States shall also ensure – albeit in a differ-
ent way – that EU rules do not encroach upon national law and respect the 
sovereignty of the Member States. As shown by the example of the Nether-
lands, national assessments of EU legislative proposals for directives pay 
due consideration to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, par-
ticularly in view of the question whether or not EU action and its scope are 
7 From the viewpoint of legitimacy, it is interesting to note that the principle of subsidiar-
ity has gained in importance in the post-Lisbon period. Being fi rst introduced by the 
Treaty of Maastricht (1993), the principle of subsidiarity has to be respected by all Com-
mission legislative proposals. It was strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty giving national 
parliaments the task to ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity through so-
called ‘subsidiarity checks’ (Protocol 2 of the Lisbon Treaty).
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justified. In the Dutch transposition context, corresponding assessments are 
carried out by a ministerial working group, including the ministry that is 
chiefly involved in the negotiations and transposition of a directive. Unlike 
subsidiarity and proportionality, discretion, however, is not a principle. 
It is, in fact, the central component of a directive which by design – pre-
cisely because it grants discretion – reflects the respect of the EU legisla-
ture towards the sovereignty of the Member States (Mastenbroek, 2007: 17). 
While the principle of subsidiarity promotes decentralised decision-mak-
ing and therefore prevents power monopolisation at the EU level, discre-
tion implies decision-making power to shape these decentralised decisions 
at the national and sub-national levels. The implementation of European 
directives illustrates this well: Member States have to meet the aims set out 
in directives but are free to decide how to do so since the decision on imple-
mentation forms and methods is left up to them.
The use of directives and therefore discretion is interpreted as a reac-
tion of the EU legislature to national perceptions of EU integration. Accord-
ingly, Member States view European legal integration as a challenge to their 
national legal orders, fearing that EU law with its supremacy over national 
constitutions could interfere too much into traditional frameworks to the 
detriment of national sovereignty, culture and identity. In this respect, 
Haverland et al. note:
The European legal instrument of ‘directive’ is meant to be a response to this challenge. It 
unifies legislation across Europe, but leaves the different Member States some discretion 
in choosing means and instruments, hence mediating between unity and diversity (2011: 
265-266).
This response of the EU legislature, in other words, its motives for using 
directives and granting discretion with a view to Member States’ legal iden-
tities, are firmly rooted in the EU treaties. Two examples shall illustrate this. 
The first one pertains to the provision on national identities which is now 
to be found within Article 4(2) of the Treaty of European Union (TEU). It 
stipulates that:
The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the treaties as well as their 
national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, 
inclusive of regional and local self-government.
The second example is taken from Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) which sets out the conditions for establish-
ing an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice:
The Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for funda-
mental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States.8
8 Cf. Article 67(1) TFEU. Likewise Article 141 of the Euratom Treaty. See also Vandamme, 
2008, p. 275.
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In its legislative proposals the European Commission takes recourse to the 
idea that directives, owing to the discretion they imply, carry the potential 
to preserve national legal structures while at the same time EU law seeks 
to harmonise national laws. For instance, in its proposal for a directive on 
waste management the Commission explains the choice for a directive by 
arguing that:
A less flexible legal measure would be disproportionate, given the need to allow for 
national differences in the management of waste as well as cultural and geographical dif-
ferences.9
Hence, among the legal instruments that the EU legislature has at its dis-
posal, directives seem to be the most appropriate to give effect to the Trea-
ty’s objective of respecting and protecting national identities reflected in the 
fundamental political and constitutional structures of the Member States, 
precisely because they typically grant discretion. Against this background, 
directives have been characterised as an instrument with an ingrained 
respect for not only the sovereignty but also legal diversity of the Member 
States, used by the EU legislature to safeguard national identities (Van-
damme 2008: 275).
As a consequence, the importance of discretion results from the fact that 
it enables Member States to take account of national particularities, while 
having to transpose the content of European directives into their own leg-
islation. Additionally, with regard to Article 288 TFEU, discretion enables 
Member States to involve national actors in decisions on the form and meth-
ods of transposition. This gives a hint as to how discretion is linked to the 
legitimacy of EU directives within national law. Conceiving of legitimacy 
as having an input, throughput and output side, it can be argued that dis-
cretion can enhance all three dimensions: in offering sufficient flexibility to 
address national peculiarities discretion can strengthen the directive’s effec-
tiveness at the national level, while allowing national actors to participate in 
the implementation of the directive may increase the throughput and input 
legitimacy of EU rules in national law. These are points that I shall argue 
more fully at a later stage of the dissertation.
9 Example taken from the European Commission’s proposal for a revised Waste Frame-
work Directive, see COM(2005) 667 fi nal. This is, however, not to ignore that the Euro-
pean Commission, in striving for harmonisation of national law, is known for prefering 
regulations over directives since regulations, due to their direct applicability, guarantee 
the achievement of this objective. See for instance, Gil Ibáñez, 1999, p. 207. However, the 
question is if regulations are politically feasible since they reduce national sovereignty 
more than directives. See in this context Twigg-Flesner (2014) who discusses this ques-
tion with a view to EU Consumer Law. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
this issue has gained additional signifi cance. Unlike before, when this was determined 
by the EU Treaty, the EU legislature may now choose, in most cases, the legal instrument 
to be used for the implementation of EU policies. See Van der Burg and Voermans, 2015, 
p. 44.
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In summing up the previous sections, it can be noted that the delegation 
of discretion from the (EU) legislature to (national) transposition actors is 
motivated by considerations of cost-efficiency, legislative quality as well as 
normative reasoning relating to the legal foundations and principles of the 
EU. In the remainder of this chapter, I shall concentrate more on the political 
and institutional context of legislative decision-making with specific regard 
to the EU legislative process in order to address the questions under which 
circumstances, to what extent and with what implications for decision-
making the EU legislature grants discretion to (national) administrative 
actors for the purpose of the implementation of law. The expectations for 
the assessment framework used in the empirical analysis are thereby devel-
oped.
3.3.3 Delegation of discretion – circumstances, degrees and effect
Next to the reasons for granting discretion, scholars of legislative decision-
making processes have also looked into the circumstances under which 
discretion is delegated and to what extent. In this respect, Huber and Shi-
pan (2002) provide insightful ideas in their study on legislative decision-
making in the United States. They argue that varying degrees of discre-
tion can be explained by the fact that the legislature, in order to preclude 
bureaucratic drift, seeks to control the use of discretion by implementing 
authorities. Whereas delegation may be intended to curb decision-making 
costs and seek expertise, it is apparently not without risks (Majone, 2001: 
103; Thomson, 2011: 252). The concept of bureaucratic drift, arguably similar 
to the notion of subjective justice used by legal scholars to describe arbitrary 
decision-making, refers to a purported negative effect of the delegation of 
discretion, namely the ‘ability of the agent [implementing actor, added] to 
enact outcomes different from the policies preferred by those who origi-
nally delegated powers [the legislature, added]’ (McCubbins et al., 1987; see 
also Epstein and O’Halloran, 1994). The varying degrees of discretion result 
from different needs for control: if more control is needed, legislation will be 
rather detailed and long whereas, if less control is necessary, more discre-
tion is left to implementing actors. The latter is indicated by vague and rela-
tively short legislation (Huber and Shipan, 2002: 2). It is interesting to note 
that, with respect to European directives, Kaeding (2007a) also refers to the 
level of detail from which he derives that directives grant larger or smaller 
margins of discretion. The idea is that discretion margins are indicated by 
the number of recitals in a directive’s preamble. The higher the number of 
recitals, the more the margin of discretion decreases. Recitals, which are not 
legally binding, indicate the purpose of the directive and describe its provi-
sions. Their high number can be regarded as resulting from attempts by both 
Member States and European Commission to insert preferences they have 
failed to get into the main, legally binding part of the directive (Kaeding, 
2008: 29).
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With regard to legislative decision-making, Franchino (2004) offers a 
good starting point to take a closer look at the role of discretion. Franchino 
departs from the assumption that there is a pattern with regard to the del-
egation of discretion to Member States as well as the European Commis-
sion which according to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU can likewise be involved 
in implementation.10 Based on an examination of 158 EC legislative acts, 
including directives, he arrives at the conclusion that more discretion is del-
egated from the EU legislature to Member State institutions, in cases where 
implementation requires further specialisation and technical knowledge or 
when a directive is adopted at unanimity in the Council. The adoption of a 
directive by qualified majority, as well as the need for general managerial 
skills, result by contrast, into the delegation of discretion to the European 
Commission (Franchino, 2004: 291-293).
Franchino’s findings may not only serve to predict whether discretion 
is delegated to national administrations or the European Commission. They 
also shed light on the circumstances under which smaller or larger amounts 
of discretion are delegated to the national level. Less discretion is granted 
to the European Commission, and therefore more of it to national actors, 
whenever profound knowledge is required regarding the policy issue the 
directive addresses. This is an interesting observation which shows a con-
nection between the scope of discretion incorporated into directives and the 
policy issue they deal with. More concrete, it links up well with the idea 
that in issue areas where the EU does not yet play a prominent role, hence 
where Member States’ influence prevails, higher margins of discretion are 
granted to national administrations for the purpose of transposition. This 
holds especially for issue areas such as asylum and migration law where 
EU law has much less influence if compared to other policy areas where 
supranational cooperation beween Member States is more advanced. Where 
this firm influence is lacking, the EU still interferes with Member States’ 
national sovereignty, in other words their ultimate decision-making pow-
ers (Koukoudakis, 2014). For this reason, corresponding directives usually 
grant larger margins of discretion to Member States. In short, discretion 
amounts incorporated into directives vary amongst policy domains and 
issue areas (Thomson, 2007).
10 Formerly, the decision-making competences of the European Commission were estab-
lished by Article 202 TEC and the Comitology Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 
which was amended by Council Decision 2006/512/ EC of 18 July 2006. The Treaty of 
Lisbon has further specifi ed the conditions of the delegation of these powers to the Com-
mission by introducing the distinction between delegated and implementing acts (Arti-
cles 290 and 291 TFEU). With delegated acts (Article 290) the Commission is granted the 
power to supplement or amend the non-essential elements of the basic act. Article 291 
on implementing acts implies that the Commission (and the Council in specifi c circum-
stances) is granted the power to implement the legislative act. See Hardacre and Kaeding 
(2013).
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In this regard the distribution of competences between EU and national 
levels is another relevant aspect to consider. In the context of EU decision-
making, competence distribution is based on the principle of conferral: EU 
action in a policy area is justified as long as it is in line with the compe-
tence conferred upon it by the Member States (Article 5 TEU, ex Article 5 
TEC) (Van der Burg and Voermans, 2015: 63-67). While the Treaty of Maas-
tricht (1993) established a three pillar structure, distinguishing between one 
area of high EU influence (supranational pillar) and two intergovernmental 
pillars, and therefore areas where Member States’ interests prevailed, the 
Treaty of Lisbon (2009) abolished this structure. It maintained, however, 
a threefold classification of competences by dividing them into exclu-
sive, shared and supporting competences which implies a corresponding 
increase of discretion afforded to Member States.11 In other words, Mem-
ber States are afforded hardly any discretion if the EU has exclusive compe-
tence but have larger margins of discretion at their disposal in areas where 
competences are shared depending on the policy issue in question. In areas 
where the EU merely exercises supporting competences, Member States are 
likely to have considerable discretion in the implementation of EU legal 
acts. With a particular view to the three policy areas addressed in the dis-
sertation – consumer protection, environment and migration – they all fall 
in the area of shared competences of the EU and its Member States. On the 
face of it, this may suggest that competence distribution, and hence also the 
conferral of discretion, is similar for all three areas. But the matter is more 
complex. This shall be illustrated briefly by referring to two directives that 
are addressed in the case studies presented later on. The Toy Safety Direc-
tive is a consumer protection directive and the Return Directive originates 
from the area of justice and home affairs, addressing irregular migration in 
particular. In the case of consumer protection, however, legislative harmoni-
sation is more advanced and with regard to the Toy Safety Directive, the EU 
has meanwhile gained exclusive competences with respect to the revision of 
safety requirements for toys and conditions of their placing on the market. 
Having exclusive competence in this regard was used by the Commission 
to justify its corresponding proposal,12 whereas the Return Directive was 
proposed in acknowledging that competences are shared with the Member 
States and compliance with the subsidiarity principle has to be ensured.13 
Hence, both Directives imply different levels of harmonisation and there-
fore variation in margins of discretion: in case of the Toy Safety Directive a 
considerable degree of harmonisation leads to a small scope of discretion. 
The Return Directive, by contrast, implies a low level of harmonisation and, 
hence, has a wide scope of discretion.
11 See Title I of Part I of the TFEU‘Categories and Areas of Union Competence’ (Articles 2 
to 6).
12 See Article 95 TEC (now 114 TFEU).
13 See Article 63(3) TEC (now Article 79 TFEU). In addition to that, in the area of migration 
specifi c legal arrangements applied which shall be addressed in the case study analyses.
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The foregoing examples suggest that it is worth taking a closer look at 
the link between discretion and policy area which a directive addresses. As 
pointed out in the introduction to the dissertation, the legislative impact 
exerted by the EU on its Member States is considered as one aspect of the 
notion of Europeanisation which is furthermore understood in terms of EU 
institutional development, including non-legal activities in a policy area. 
Hence, the more Europeanised a policy area is – meaning the more it is 
characterised by EU institutional and legal involvement – the less discretion 
is granted to Member States.
The foregoing considerations inform the first expectation of the analyti-
cal framework, which is referred to as the policy area expectation.
Discretion and Policy Area
The less a policy area is influenced by the EU in institutional and legal terms, the more
discretion is granted to Member States.
From studies of legislative decision-making it has emerged that if a law 
under negotiation (e.g. an EU directive) addresses an issue of ‘saliency’ 
(Epstein and O’Halloran, 1994: 710), i.e. an issue of vital importance to those 
involved in legislative decision-making, or an otherwise politically sensitive 
issue, disagreement is likely to arise between the negotiating parties. In this 
connection, discretion is associated with political controversy (Thomson et 
al., 2007). With specific regard to EU negotiations on directives, the granting 
of more or less discretion is explained by referring to the position of Mem-
ber States on the European Commission’s legislative proposals for direc-
tives (Thomson, 2007; Thomson et al., 2007; Zhelazykova and Torenvliet, 
2011). Thomson (2007; 2010) claims that discretionary amounts are higher 
in cases where the preferences of the negotiating parties differ (see also 
Steunenberg, 2006). Preference divergence can relate to the fact that Mem-
ber States have different ideas about the directive to be adopted – a scenario 
that is not very unlikely in the case of the EU where meanwhile twenty-
eight Member States with diverse legal-administrative but also cultural, 
economic, and social structures have to reach an agreement. Member States 
may be in disagreement with a proposed directive because they consider it 
as encroaching too much upon their ultimate decision-making powers and 
therefore national sovereignty.14 In particular fields, mostly those that are 
of vital policy importance to their citizens, they may prefer to stay in the 
driver’s seat and therefore be reluctant to cede too readily crucial decision-
making competences to the EU level. Hence, where politically delicate mat-
ters are discussed and preferences of Member States diverge, it is likely that 
14 In the implementation literature incompatibility is also referred to as ‘misfi t’. See T. A. 
Börzel, ‘Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to Europeanisation 
in Germany and Spain’, Journal of Common Market Studies 1999, vol. 37, pp. 573-596.
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controversy arises. Controversy, however, makes it difficult for Member 
States to find a compromise, impeding the general progress in the negotia-
tions. Member States may then seek to increase the directive’s scope of dis-
cretion to ensure that with sufficient flexibility potential problems related to 
political sensitive issues arising from a directive’s content can be eradicated 
during implementation. Thus, in order to avoid legislative deadlock and 
delay of negotiations, higher levels of discretion are incorporated into the 
directive to increase flexibility for transposition (Thomson et al., 2007). The 
foregoing makes two things clear. First, the granting of discretion is linked 
to the political sensitivity of a directive and political controversy triggered 
by it. Second, Member States’ position on the proposed directive is influ-
enced by domestic considerations (Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Falkner et al., 
2005; Kaeding, 2007b; Mastenbroek, 2007).
It becomes evident that discretion can facilitate decision-making among 
actors with different preferences, in particular if compromises have to be 
made on contentious issues (Franchino, 2004: 292). Compromises are made 
feasible by giving Member States the prospect of having a range of options 
available to transpose the directive in whatever way they see fit – as long 
as implementation stays within the limits of the legislative act. This point 
links up with the aforementioned consensus-building approach to decision-
making processes which presents discretion as a solution to conflicts in the 
EU Council. But it also ties in well with the observation of socio-legal schol-
ars previously mentioned, that discretion can mediate between different 
interests and lead to conflict settlement (see section 2.3.3). In any case, it 
should be noted that discretion can affect EU decision-making on directives 
in a positive way. The granting of discretion can serve to reconcile differ-
ent Member States’ positions and facilitate reaching a common agreement, 
exemplified by the adoption of a directive.
In the light of this knowledge the next expectation is formulated. The 
political sensitivity expectation takes account of the link between discretion 
and the political sensitivity of the directive negotiated.
Discretion and Political Sensitivity 
The more politically sensitive the directive’s policy issue is, the more
discretion is incorporated into the directive.
Picking up on the aspect that Member States’ perception of a directive pro-
posal is affected by domestic considerations, their disagreement with the 
requirements of a directive may be based on the reasoning that these are 
incompatible with their national legal-administrative frameworks (Thom-
son, 2007). In the research on Europeanisation15 of which the implementa-
15 As pointed out in the introduction to the dissertation, Europeanisation research deals 
with the impact of EU-law-making and policies on Member States’ politics, institutions 
and policies.
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tion of EU law represents one strand (Jordan and Liefferink, 2004: 4; Sver-
drup, 2007), considerations about the (in)compatibility between EU and 
national arrangements have been referred to as the ‘goodness-of-fit’ or 
‘(mis)fit’ argument (see for instance Börzel and Risse, 2003). Meanwhile var-
ious kinds of misfits have been identified by scholars, ranging from institu-
tional, legal, normative to policy misfit – to mention a few (Toshkov et al., 
2010: 19; see also Carroll, 2014: 46-53). The central argument is that so-called 
‘policy-shapers’, roughly put, Member States with sufficient resources 
(e.g. administrative, economic), seek to export or ‘upload’ national legal 
arrangements to the EU level. ‘Policy takers’, on the contrary, i.e. Member 
States that are economically rather weak and have only limited capacity to 
act, rather download EU arrangements. Getting own legal arrangements 
incorporated into a directive has the aim to minimise the incompatibility 
between EU and national legal arrangements because it reduces the costs 
incurred by adapting to EU law (Börzel, 2005). In other words, the rela-
tionship between the EU and its Member States is conceived as having a 
vertical, ‘top-down’ dimension (Ladrech, 1994) as well as a ‘bottom-up’ 
dimension (Börzel, 2005; 2007) which are both reflected in the life cycle of a 
directive: the EU legislature adopts a directive that has to be implemented 
by the Member States (top-down dimension). But during the negotiations 
Member States may seek to upload own legal arrangements into the direc-
tive (bottom-up dimension).
Having said this, in my view, two strategies can be identified that are 
used by Member States to assert their preferences during the Council nego-
tiations with the aim of securing a better match between EU and national 
rules. One strategy is to upload own national legal arrangements, i.e. to 
translate them into the directive text. The other is seeking to increase the 
amount of discretion of the directive under negotiation. In reflecting upon 
the chances of success of each of the two strategies, I expect that where 
national systems highly diverge, seeking more discretion and getting it 
incorporated into the directive is more feasible than uploading own national 
legal arrangements. The latter is not only more difficult for a Member State 
acting alone. Preference divergence also precludes coalition-building among 
Member States which may otherwise facilitate that shared preferences are 
uploaded to the EU level. The foregoing considerations lend substance to 
the compatibility expectation:
Discretion and Compatibility 
The less compatible the EU directive and already existing national legislation are,
the more likely that discretion is incorporated into the directive.
So far the discussion has been confined to the Member States in the Council 
which are key actors in EU decision-making as well as to the question of 
how they influence the scope of discretion eventually being granted for the 
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national implementation of directives. However, being also involved in leg-
islative decision-making, the position of the European Parliament has to be 
taken into consideration.
3.3.3.1 European Parliament
Depending on the applicable legislative procedure, other actors may be 
involved in the decision-making process on directives – above all the Euro-
pean Parliament.16,17 The main concern here is with the scope of legisla-
tive discretion granted by a directive. Therefore the aim is to take a closer 
look at the European Parliament’s position on the Commission proposal. 
In this respect it becomes a vital question whether or not the European Par-
liament supports the granting of more or less discretion to Member States. 
To this end, either its non-binding opinion – in case that the consultation 
procedure applies or, if it is involved as co-legislator, its legislative resolu-
tion on the relevant Commission proposal may provide information that 
serves to answer this question. Like Member States, the European Parlia-
ment has certain preferences concerning the policy issue addressed by the 
directive. In this regard, it is relevant to note that empirical research of the 
European Parliament’s policy position on various Commission proposals 
throughout three legislative periods (from 1999-2009, thus including the 
time frame under study here) has shown that, on the whole, the median 
Member of Parliament favours harmonisation and strong regulation of free 
markets (Thomson, 2011: 130). This observation has been found to apply in 
spite of the existence of ‘national groups’ within the ‘political groups’ of the 
European Parliament inclined to adhere to national interests when voting 
on a policy issue (Thomson, 2011: 104). With regard to EU environmental 
law-making, for instance, it is conceivable that, due to the European Par-
liament’s traditionally ‘green’ (meaning favourable) attitude towards the 
environment, it will support legislative proposals that promote high envi-
ronmental standards. In my view, it makes sense to assume that the same 
applies in case that both the health and protection of consumers or, human 
rights issues, featuring prominently in the area of migration, are at stake. 
All this leads me to expect that the European Parliament in promoting leg-
islative harmonisation will disapprove EU directives that confer consider-
able discretion for national-level implementation – in any case if its prefer-
ences diverge from those of the Member States in the Council. It may then 
seek to reduce Member States’ discretion (Franchino, 2005). Next to that, 
16 Depending on the legislative procedure applied, advisory bodies, like the Committee 
of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee may additionally be 
involved in the negotiation process. However, their role is a rather passive one as the 
opinions they deliver are non-binding and in contrast to the European Parliament, they 
generally have a far less prominent role to play. This is why their view has largely been 
left out in the analyses presented in this dissertation.
17 But also the role of the European Commission shall be addressed in the case studies, in 
particular its legislative proposals which provide the starting point for the negotiations 
on directives in the Council of Ministers.
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and as convincingly argued by Selck and Steunenberg (2004), to have influ-
ence on the content of a legislative proposal (and therefore on the amount 
of discretion incorporated) preferences need to be asserted, and to this end 
decision-making rights are indispensable (see also Young, 2010: 61). Due to 
different legislative procedures, the European Parliament’s decision-making 
rights vary among policy areas (Wallace, 2010: 84). Considering the period 
under study (2007-2009), its influence is not negligible under the consul-
tation procedure but without doubt, the European Parliament will have 
greater chances in asserting its preferences, if it acts as co-legislator18 and if 
qualified majority voting applies in the Council (Thomson, 2011). In deliver-
ing an opinion under the consultation procedure and unanimity voting, by 
contrast, it stands only little chance to influence the final decision outcome, 
especially where controversial issues need to be settled such as matters 
related to the area of justice and home affairs (Hosli and Thomson, 2006: 
414).19 From the foregoing insights and considerations another expectation 
is deduced that seeks to describe the European Parliament’s influence on 
the scope of discretion which is finally made available to the Member States 
once a directive is adopted: the European-Parliament-matters expectation.
Discretion and European Parliament 
The greater the role of the European Parliament in the legislative process,
the less discretion is granted to Member States.
To sum it up, features that pertain to the EU-level (decision-making process) 
and the directive (policy issue) shape the conditions for the delegation of 
discretion to Member States. The perspective adopted in the dissertation, 
which links EU- and national-level processes, furthermore casts light on not 
only how the granting of discretion can affect EU negotiations on directives. 
It also gives a preliminary idea of how transposition may play out if discre-
tion is made available to Member States for the implementation of direc-
tives into national law.
In the next chapter, the analytical framework for the discussion of the 
national transposition process is presented. It provides a review of the rel-
evant literature on the (formal) implementation of directives, taking due 
account of the role of discretion in transposition. Moreover, it takes a closer 
look at the wider national context in order to consider the relevance of fac-
tors other than discretion that are posited to affect transposition.
18 That means if it acts under the co-decision procedure, which with the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon became the ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 289 TFEU).
19 Interestingly, however, they also contend that under the consultation procedure the 
European Parliament may have some leverage on the content of the law to be decided, 
namely if consultation is accompanied by the qualifi ed majority procedure. Cf. Thomson 
and Hosli, 2006, p. 414.
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3.4 Conclusion
Discretion is granted in EU decision-making on directives under particular 
circumstances which influence the extent to which it is incorporated into a 
directive. Variation may be explained by at least the following reasons: the 
need perceived by the EU legislature for efficient decision-making as well 
as more national expertise in the later implementation to compensate for 
information asymmetries between the law-making and application stages. 
Furthermore, the need for conflict settlement in case of disagreement result-
ing from Member States’ attempts to assert own preferences in the Council 
of Ministers. In addition, the granting of discretion follows from the inten-
tion of the EU legislator to make legislation which respects traditionally 
grown structures and firmly established national legal identities. Moreover, 
insights relating to both EU decision-making and the directive negotiated 
are important and have been used to formulate a number of expectations 
regarding the reasons for discretion and the circumstances under which 
it is granted. These expectations make part of the assessment framework 
that shall be applied in the empirical analysis. Finally, looking into the 
reasons for why discretion is granted for the implementation of directives 
into national law has shed light on the effect and advantages of discretion. 
In this respect, discretion has been found to facilitate decision-making on 
directives.
4.1 Introduction
It has just been established that the granting of discretion to Member States 
may facilitate EU decision-making on directives. In the following sec-
tions, the implementation literature is addressed with the aim of providing 
insights into the potential effects of discretion on the national transposition 
of EU directives. The implementation literature gives a rather mixed picture 
in this respect which is examined more closely. Further up, the discussion 
of views on discretion in the legal sciences has brought to light a number of 
disadvantages associated with the granting of discretion to administrative 
actors for the implementation of legislation. In the context of the EU, one 
of the perceived disadvantages is that discretion contributes to legal diver-
sity. This is considered to undermine the principle of uniform application 
leading to an increase in legal uncertainty. Viewed like this, discretion can 
only be incompatible with the objectives of a directive, harming the latter’s 
effectiveness which is supposed to unfold once EU rules make part of the 
national legal framework. National transposition, however, is a complex 
process, which requires an approach that takes a closer look at the national 
setting, by taking into account actors and factors that shape the incorpora-
tion of EU rules into national law. In this regard implementation research 
provides a number of insights that shed light on the national transposition 
of directives and the role that discretion can play therein.
4.2 The purported effects of discretion
Most studies that look into the effects of discretion on the national trans-
position of EU directives are quantitatively orientated, meaning that they 
examine a large number of directives in contrast to the analysis of a hand-
ful of directives such as it is envisaged in this dissertation. Some scholars 
suggest that discretion can have a positive impact on the process, in respect 
of especially timely but also legally correct transposition (Knill and Len-
schow, 1998; Thomson, 2007; 2010; Zhelazykova and Torenvliet, 2011; Zhe-
lyazkova, 2013). The common view is that discretion facilitates transposi-
tion. It provides the necessary flexibility to make tailor-made implementing 
legislation that takes account of national circumstances and results into the 
timely transposition of EU rules (Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009: 954). As 
explained by Thomson:
4 Discretion in national transposition
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For directives that grant member states more discretion, broader ranges of policies at the 
national level are consistent with their provisions. For this reason a positive relationship 
between discretion and compliance [transposition success, added] is to be expected (2007: 
995).
Regarding legal correctness, a similar argument is put forward:
[W]hen higher levels of discretion are granted to member states, wider ranges of policy 
performances are compatible with the decision outcomes contained in a policy […]. In 
other words, we expect that the level of discretion decreases the costs of adaptation to 
a specific EU provision and consequently increases the likelihood of compliance (Zhela-
zykova and Torenvliet, 2011: 694).
The reduction of adaptation (transposition) costs is associated here with 
larger margins of discretion. Interestingly, with regard to EU decision-mak-
ing, a similar assumption was previously made: it was shown that discre-
tion can be an option to reduce the incompatibility between a directive and 
national legal arrangements and therefore minimise costs resulting from the 
alignment of national legislation with EU law. Finally, even though national 
transposition takes centre stage in the dissertation, it is worth noting that 
discretion apparently also facilitates the application of EU rules at later 
post-transposition stages as has been demonstrated in the area of animal 
welfare (Carroll, 2014).
And yet, alongside the positive effects that have been ascribed to dis-
cretion and regarding both legal correctness and timeliness, it has also 
been argued that discretion upsets transposition especially in respect to 
timeliness. Opinions on the relationship between discretion and transpo-
sition timeliness can roughly be distinguished into two camps: there are 
those who think that discretion facilitates transposition and contributes to 
the timely finalisation of the process (Héritier, 1996; Knill, 2001; Thomson, 
2010). And then there are others who consider discretion to impede trans-
position since it is expected to contribute to delay (Kaeding, 2007a; 2007b; 
2008; Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009; Thomson et al., 2009). Steunenberg 
and Toshkov provide insights into the pros and cons that have been used 
in assessing how discretion affects the national transposition of directives:
On the one hand, it can be argued that more discretion makes transposing a directive eas-
ier since the domestic policy actor can adapt the European requirements to national or 
regional differences. In addition, discretion is expected to speed up the decision-making 
process since national policy-makers are able to tackle possible national or local concerns 
[…] On the other hand, discretion can also be expected to complicate matters according to 
a more political approach. If a requirement does not provide any leeway to the national 
policy actors, these actors cannot quarrel over the way in which this requirement should 
be interpreted. However, if member states have leeway, national policy-makers may dis-
agree on how to transpose and implement a policy (2009: 954-955).
It should be born in mind that differing outcomes with a view to the effects 
of discretion on transposition may result from differences in research 
designs as has been concluded from the review of various transposition 
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studies (Steunenberg and Rhinard, 2010: 498).1 These differences may have 
crucial implications for drawing inferences from empirical analysis (König, 
2008: 158). But despite different evidence as to the effects of discretion, a 
number of implementation scholars believe that discretion matters for 
transposition. From the various implementation studies, discretion appears 
to impact transposition in basically two ways: it may affect transposition 
directly or in interaction with other factors (Thomson et al., 2007; Steunen-
berg and Toshkov, 2009; Zhelazykova and Torenvliet 2011).
4.2.1 Correctness and timeliness
Regarding the assumed direct relationship between discretion and trans-
position, it is argued that discretion positively affects transposition when 
granted to Member States by larger degrees. Thomson (2010) looks at the 
correctness of transposition with regard to a few labour market directives 
in a handful of Member States. His analysis takes into account features from 
both EU-decision-making and national transposition processes, actors’ pref-
erences in particular, as well as discretion as main characteristic of direc-
tives. He arrives at the conclusion that discretionary provisions which leave 
Member States some flexibility for the formal implementation of directives 
are less likely to be transposed incorrectly than non-discretionary provisions 
(ibid: 590). He attributes this to the fact that in having available discretion, 
implementers get a range of policy alternatives that all can be used because 
they lay within the legal limits set by the directive (ibid: 583). Zhelazykova 
(2013) voices a similar view on the link between discretion and legal cor-
rectness of transposition. Based on her empirical results from the analysis of 
four directives addressing different policy areas she concludes that discre-
tion contributes to correct transposition and therefore facilitates compliance 
(Zhelazykova, 2013: 718).
More has been written about the effects of discretion on the timeliness 
of transposition such as by Thomson (2007) in another study on labour mar-
ket directives,2 According to him European directives with larger margins 
of discretion make timely compliance more likely because they leave Mem-
ber States with wider ranges of policy performances that can be compatible 
with the directive’s requirements (ibid: 995). Said differently, swift transpo-
sition is likely because Member States can adequately fit the directive into 
their national legislation. Acting on these findings, the individual discretion 
effect or discretion-in-national-law expectation is proposed. ‘Better transposi-
tion’ is understood as timely and legally correct transposition.
1 These differences pertain, for instance, to the selection of the (directive) sample, period 
under study, explanatory variables, statistical methods applied, and the operationalisa-
tion and measurement of variables such as discretion, amongst others.
2 Thomson’s 2007 and 2010 studies are extensions – in terms of research design and scope –
of the qualitative implementation analysis of labour market directives provided by 
Falkner et al. (2005).
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Discretion-in-National-Law
The more discretion is available to transposition actors, the better the directive 
is incorporated into national law.
In fact, emerging from the discussion about the positive effects of discretion 
for transposition is the potential of discretion to allow for the incorpora-
tion of EU rules without fundamentally disturbing the structure of national 
legal orders. As previously shown, this is a strength that has been ascribed 
to discretion by legal scholars who identify discretion as an instance of con-
ceptual divergence (see section 2.3.3) but it has also been emphasised in the 
presentation of discretion as a normative choice of the EU legislature (sec-
tion 3.3.2).
Even though it is at the heart of the dissertation to highlight the poten-
tials of discretion for the national transposition process, its purported nega-
tive effects shall not be disregarded. Kaeding (2007b; 2008) and Thomson 
et al. (2007) provide evidence that illustrates the negative effects of discre-
tion on transposition. In examining the role of discretion in Member States’ 
transposition of the EU’s transport acquis,3 Kaeding (2007b: 106) shows 
that discretion has a retarding effect on transposition, leading on average to 
short-term delays. Interestingly, his a priori reading of discretion as a ‘prob-
lem’, illustrated by the hypothesis that ‘[t]he higher the amount of discre-
tion, ceteris paribus,4 the more difficult to settle an agreement on time’ (ibid: 
78), appears to be reminiscent of the earlier-mentioned legal viewpoints that 
stress the downsides of discretion. The empirical findings of Thomson et 
al.’s (2007: 706) additionally corroborate the view that discretion impedes 
rather than that it facilitates Member State transposition. Basing their 
results on an analysis of transposition in various Member States and policy 
sectors,5 the authors draw the conclusion that discretion slows down the 
pace of transposition and leads to delay.
Discretion can also be seen in a negative light from yet another angle. 
Falkner et al. (2005: 286-289) consider problems of misinterpretation and 
misapplication as resulting from the poor legislative quality of directives. 
Their case study analysis of Member States’ compliance with social policy 
directives, offers empirical evidence for the argument that transposition is 
obstructed by directives that are vaguely formulated, unclear and inconsis-
3 The sample of Member States includes the Netherlands alongside Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
4 The ceteris paribus assumption is a particular assumption in research methodology and 
shall be explained together with the case study methodology in chapter 8.
5 In concrete numbers: transposition processes of twenty-four directives in fi fteen Mem-
ber States. Their directive sample spans various policy sectors: internal market (nine 
directives), economic and fi nancial affairs (fi ve directives), agriculture (three directives), 
transport (three directives), justice and home affairs (one directive), employment (one 
directive), energy (one directive), and health (one directive). Cf. Thomson et al. (2007).
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tent (ibid: 286). The same observation has been made for the implementa-
tion of environmental directives (Backes et al., 2006; Beijen, 2010). Backes 
et al. rightly point to the compromise character of directives being a result 
of EU decision-making processes in which different national and inter-
institutional (Council vis-à-vis European Parliament) positions have to be 
reconciled and which may lead to sometimes broad formulations invit-
ing different interpretations (2006: 77). It may be true that these findings 
point to the relevance of the margin of discretion that a directive implies. 
But even though discretion can be expressed by vagueness and ambiguity, 
implementation research does not, to my knowledge, provide a clear and 
immediate link between discretion and poor legislative quality of a direc-
tive. It is interesting to note in this regard that the German implementation 
of the EU Water Framework Directive was rendered difficult due to legal 
inconsistencies in the Directive text. While implementation problems were, 
thus, caused by deficient legislative quality, the Directive’s margin of dis-
cretion was found to be small (Knill and Lenschow, 1998: 604). In other 
words, only little discretion was granted and yet, the directive was of defi-
cient legislative quality. It should finally be recalled from the analysis of the 
legal debates, that discretion, precisely because it offers ambiguity, has been 
regarded as helpful in processes of law formulation and implementation 
(section 2.3.3).
4.2.2 Discretion in interaction with other factors
Discretion can affect national transposition not only individually but also 
in connection with other factors. In this context, Member States’ preferences 
come again into play. The position that a Member State takes on the con-
tent of a directive during the Council negotiations has been linked to the 
subsequent transposition of the directive (Thomson, 2007; Thomson et al., 
2007; Thomson 2010). In the already mentioned study by Thomson et al. a 
Member State’s disagreement with a directive’s requirement together with 
little discretion being available for transposing it are identified as predic-
tors of non-compliance with EU law (Thomson et al., 2007: 700). Discretion 
is, hence, considered relevant, as it is expected to reinforce the relationship 
between disagreement and non-compliance. In the dissertation, non-com-
pliance is referred to as ‘deficient transposition’ meaning that the incorpo-
ration of requirements from a directive is not achieved in a timely and / or 
legally correct fashion. Summarising the previous considerations leads to 
the disagreement interaction expectation which connects the negotiation and 
transposition stages:
Discretion and Disagreement 
Member State disagreement with a directive’s requirement raises the likelihood of
 deficient transposition, and this effect increases as the degree of discretion decreases.
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Next to Member States’ preferences, also the issue of compatibility which 
was already addressed in the context of EU negotiations becomes relevant 
again, this time in theorising about its effects on the national implementa-
tion of EU law. In this regard, Carroll’s study (2014) provides interesting 
insights, even though it does not address the transposition but the post-
transposition of directives in Member States. Carroll takes a closer look 
at another implementation stage, namely the national post-transposition 
application of EU animal welfare legislation including EU directives and 
regulations in twenty-seven Member States. In doing so, he links discretion 
and the notion of compatibility between EU and national legal arrange-
ments. Carroll conceptualises incompatibility in terms of adaptation pres-
sure and degrees. Adaptation pressure denotes the necessity for Member 
States to create, modify, and / or replace existing national legislation and 
that depending on the extent of efforts that this brings with it, pressure is 
regarded as being low, medium or high (ibid: 48-53). His long-term study, 
covering a period of ten years (2000-2010), shows that regarding the post-
transposition application of EU directives discretion is helpful for Mem-
ber States that face high adaptation pressures in implementing directives: 
‘Member states can adjust to the demands of difficult and evolving poli-
cies when they have greater flexibility to do so’ (ibid: 213). If adaptation 
pressure is low discretion appears to have impeding or no effects on imple-
mentation. Hence, discretion is considered to intervene in the relationship 
between adaptation pressure and transposition outcome thereby exerting 
different effects depending on the level of adaptation pressure.
Interaction effects of incompatibility and discretion, have, however, also 
been studied with regard to the transposition of EU directives. In address-
ing the legal correctness of Member States’ transposition of the Framework 
Equality Directive, in the area of EU employment policy, Zhelazykova and 
Torenvliet (2011), studied the effects of discretion in the presence of different 
degrees of ‘technical compatibility’, or as the authors put it ‘technical fit’. 
Technical fit refers to the above-mentioned considerations about the com-
patibility between directives and national legal frameworks and is defined 
by the authors as ‘the legal-administrative costs for public authorities to 
design laws that are both compliant with the EU directive and do not disrupt 
related domestic structures’ (ibid: 693). Their results show that discretion 
facilitates transposition if technical fit is at a medium or high level. In case of 
medium fit or high fit discretion is found to unfold positive effects on trans-
position. Thus, if some national policy or practices already exist that corre-
spond to the directive (medium fit), or in case that hardly any changes have 
to be made to national legislation (high fit), discretion facilitates achieving 
legal correctness of transposition legislation. Like in the case of expectation 5 
(discretion-in-national-law), more discretion is also associated with timeliness.
The above considerations about the link of compatibility and transpo-
sition outcome being reinforced by discretion are reflected in the compat-
ibility interaction expectation. It should be noted that ‘proper transposition’ 
is understood in the dissertation as timely and legally correct transposition.
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Discretion and Compatibility
Compatibility between the EU directive and national rules raises the likelihood of 
proper transposition, and this effect increases as the degree of discretion increases.
Going back to the study of Zhelazykova and Torenvliet the situation of low 
technical fit has not yet been addressed. In the presence of low technical 
fit, meaning that national equivalents in terms of policies and practices are 
lacking, discretion is, however, found to negatively affect transposition. It 
apparently creates ambiguity in transposition, which if actors lack sufficient 
knowledge – the theoretical and practical understanding of how to carry out 
the task including the necessary skills to do so – likely obstructs transposi-
tion (Zhelazykova and Torenvliet, 2011: 703). Hence, the results of the study 
show that discretion’s facilitating effects apply in cases of medium or high, 
i.e. in case of technical and legal compatibility, but not when compatibility 
is low. The authors provide the following reasonable explanation for this 
result:
[V]ery low levels of technical and legal compatibility are associated with lack of vital 
knowledge about the consequences of implementing a particular provision. Granting dis-
cretion implies that member states have different transposition alternatives at their dis-
posal and some knowledge is necessary for national authorities to be able to select an 
appropriate transposition measure (ibid: 703).
Hence, where lacking compatibility between the EU and national legal 
order cannot be compensated for by knowing how to level out existing 
incompatibilities, discretion may disturb transposition further. If knowl-
edge on transposition is poor, room for interpretation and action is likely to 
lead to misinterpretation and misapplication of a directive’s requirements 
(Zhelazykova and Torenvlied, 2011: 702-703). After all, discretionary leeway 
brings with it not only options to act but, above all, the task to decide which 
of the options available is the most suitable to incorporate a directive into 
national law.
In the dissertation, transposition knowledge is understood as one 
dimension of administrative capacity which is linked to the main actor in 
transposing directives, usually one or more national ministries. This dimen-
sion relates to information about the content of the directive and expertise 
within the ministry on the subject matter of the directive. Another dimen-
sion, also referring to a particular feature of the ministry transposing EU 
directives, is ‘intra-ministerial coordination’. It concerns the administrative 
coordination capacity between units within one ministry, in which several 
units might be involved in the preparation as well as the implementation of 
the directive. Typically these are the policy and legal units within ministries, 
but it may include more, depending on the ministry’s organisation struc-
ture as well as working practices. Regarding the implementation of direc-
tives, administrative capacity may be weak where working ties between 
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the preparation and transposition stages, and among the relevant minis-
terial units, in particular, are insufficient. Lacking administrative capacity 
lies then in the fact that collaboration and information sharing between the 
units involved in the negotiations at the EU stage and those involved in the 
formal implementation of the directive at the national stage is insufficient. 
This may contribute to interpretation problems once the directive has to be 
incorporated into national law, rendering transposition more labour and 
time intensive (Mastenbroek, 2007: 38).
Bringing the foregoing findings together leads, thus, to the capacity inter-
action expectation which implies that discretion intervenes in the relationship 
between administrative capacity and transposition outcome in the following 
way:
Discretion and Administrative Capacity
Administrative capacity raises the likelihood of proper transposition, 
but this effect decreases as the degree of discretion increases.
It is worth noting that both the studies by Zhelazykova and Torenvlied 
(2011) and Carroll (2014), addressed above, confirm, as previously noted, 
that discretion can affect implementation processes differently. While the 
former analysis shows that discretion in interaction with lacking adminis-
trative capacity can affect transposition negatively, the latter study by Car-
roll provides evidence that discretion may be positive for the post-transpo-
sition application of EU directives by Member States in case that adaptation 
pressure is high.
Last but not least there is another national-level factor which has been 
posited to affect transposition in interaction with discretion. This brings me 
back to the study by Thomson et al. (2007). In trying to explain why larger 
margins of discretion result in transposition delay, the authors argue that 
if national politics play a decisive role during transposition, the choice of 
policy alternatives offered by discretion may increase controversy instead of 
easing the incorporation of the directive into national legislation. They con-
clude that ‘[i]t seems plausible that highly discretionary directives precede 
more complex and time-consuming national transposition processes’ (ibid: 
708). Also Steunenberg and Rhinard establish a causal link between the 
negotiation and transposition stages in opining that delicate compromises 
may be struck at the EU level but that these compromises have to be carried 
through the implementation phase at the domestic level where earlier con-
flicts can re-emerge (2010: 500). The idea of national controversy with regard 
to transposition has been picked up and related to the participation of more 
actors in transposition. The corresponding claim is that the more actors 
are involved in transposition, the more likely it will be delayed (Kaeding, 
2007b; Mastenbroek, 2007; Kaeding and Steunenberg, 2009; Haverland et al., 
2011). In the Netherlands, transposition is carried out by national ministries 
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in the first place but may also involve Parliament. Involvement of both can 
be problematic for timely transposition, for instance, if common agreement 
on how to transpose a directive is lacking among actors (Haverland and 
Romeijn, 2007; Mastenbroek, 2003; 2007: 39; König and Luetgert, 2008). At 
ministerial level, this last aspect is described as inter-ministerial coordina-
tion problem. The subject matter of a directive may concern the purview of 
more than one ministry but transposition may be hampered (slowed down) 
by lacking communication and possibly conflicts of interests and compe-
tences between ministries. In this context, it is conceivable that with more 
discretion granted by a directive, problems resulting from miscommunica-
tion and collisions of interest may be aggravated: each ministry involved 
may seek to claim for itself a certain interpretation of the directive to be 
implemented and insist on certain uses of discretion.
The foregoing discussion allows deducing the actor interaction expecta-
tion:
Discretion and Transposition Actors
More actors involved in transposition increases the likelihood of deficient transposition, 
and this effect increases as the degree of discretion increases.
The number of transposition actors was a relevant factor in selecting cases 
for the empirical analysis and is therefore taken up again further down.
In summary, the foregoing discussion provides a number of valuable 
insights which have been used to formulate sets of expectations for the 
subsequent empirical analysis of six EU negotiation and transposition pro-
cesses that have been carried out in the Netherlands. These expectations 
take into consideration that discretion may affect transposition differently 
in bringing out positive as well as negative effects. In the dissertation, dis-
cretion, if observed individually, is assumed to facilitate transposition. 
When interacting with other factors stemming mostly from the national 
level, discretion may however, not only facilitate but also impede the formal 
implementation of directives. In these cases, discretion is considered to be 
an ‘intervening’ factor or variable: it mediates the effects of the presumed 
cause (referred to in quantitative analysis as ‘independent variable’) on the 
presumed outcome (referred to in quantitative analysis as ‘dependent vari-
able’). Said differently, discretion strengthens the link between a cause and 
an outcome (Creswell, 2009: 50).
The following overview sums up the expectations that have been 
derived from the previous discussion. These expectations are used in the 
empirical analysis to shed light on the role of discretion in the EU negotia-
tion and national (Dutch) transposition processes regarding directives:
E1. (DISCRETION and POLICY AREA): The less a policy area is influ-
enced by the EU in institutional and legal terms, the more discretion is 
granted to Member States.
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E2. (DISCRETION and POLITICAL SENSITIVITY): The more politically 
sensitive the directive’s policy issue is, the more discretion is incorporated 
into the directive.
E3. (DISCRETION and COMPATIBILITY): The less compatible the EU 
directive and already existing national legislation are, the more likely that 
discretion is incorporated into the directive.
E4. (DISCRETION and EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT): The greater the role 
of the European Parliament in the legislative process, the less discretion is 
granted to Member States.
E5. (DISCRETION-IN-NATIONAL-LAW): The more discretion is avail-
able to transposition actors, the better the directive is incorporated into 
national law.
E6. (DISCRETION and DISAGREEMENT): Member State disagreement 
with a directive’s requirement raises the likelihood of deficient transposi-
tion, and this effect increases as the degree of discretion decreases.
E7. (DISCRETION and COMPATIBILITY): Compatibility between the 
EU directive and national rules raises the likelihood of proper transposition, 
and this effect increases as the degree of discretion increases.
E8. (DISCRETION and ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY): Administrative
capacity raises the likelihood of proper transposition, but this effect decreases 
as the degree of discretion increases.
E9. (DISCRETION and TRANSPOSITION ACTORS): More actors 
involved in transposition increases the likelihood of deficient transposition, 
and this effect increases as the degree of discretion increases.
Up to now the potential effects of discretion on transposition have been 
dealt with. But it should be pointed out that discretion unfolds its effects not 
necessarily through the mere fact that it is present in the context of trans-
position. Discretion is a form of decision-making power which is exercised 
by national actors. Thus, I expect that discretion’s effects on transposition 
are influenced by the way discretion is used in translating a directive into 
national legislation. Taking a closer look at the actual use of discretion may 
therefore provide additional insights that should be taken into account in 
the case study analyses to come.
4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter a review of a number of relevant implementation studies was 
provided with the aim of taking stock of the different effects that discretion 
may have on the national transposition of EU directives. Discretion is found 
to impede and facilitate transposition. The discussion provided insights into 
national transposition contexts. These insights were translated into a set of 
expectations making up the analytical framework applied in this study to 
further examine the role of discretion in transposition. Empirical evidence 
shows that discretion can affect both timeliness and the legal correctness 
of transposition. In addition, discretion comes into play either individu-
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ally or by interacting with other factors which represent characteristics of 
the national transposition setting such as the administrative capacity and 
total number of transposition authorities. Additionally, discretion can affect 
transposition if it interacts with the factor of compatibility, referring to the 
legal fit between the directive and the national legal order into which the 
directive shall be incorporated. Since discretion is expected to interact with 
other factors, it is characterised as an intervening factor which provides a 
causal link between factors stemming from the national level and the final 
transposition outcome: proper or deficient transposition, or in other words, 
national compliance or non-compliance with EU law.

5.1 Introduction
So far it has become clear that discretion is the core feature of EU direc-
tives and that it provides Member States with a more or less limited range 
of policy options from which national actors can choose when transpos-
ing a directive into national law. This is enshrined in Article 288 TFEU and 
reflected by the content and wording of a directive. It was furthermore dis-
cussed how discretion can come into play in national transposition contexts, 
thereby taking into account other, national-level characteristics that are 
deemed relevant, and therefore as having an impact on how the directive is 
converted into national law. What still remains unclear is how discretion is 
used in transposition and with what implications. In this regard, a relevant 
question is how discretion can be used with the result that it has positive 
effects: facilitating timely and legally correct transposition. In order to look 
into this question, the attempt is made to move the discussion on discretion 
in national transposition from a rather abstract to a more concrete level. To 
this end, the discussion zooms in on a few empirical examples from studies 
that have looked into the impact of discretion on (formal) implementation. 
Doing so, may yield valuable insights into how discretion is used by imple-
menting actors in converting EU rules into national law.
5.2 Insights from (formal) implementation cases
To begin with, while there are a number of transposition studies that con-
sider discretion as one relevant factor amongst others when analysing 
national transposition, only very few of them take a closer look at the actual 
use of discretion in this process. Three examples are discussed in brief.
Kaeding (2007b) analyses transposition delay in several Member States. 
His quantitative analysis of the national transposition of transport direc-
tives is complemented by a qualitative approach which addresses four 
transposition cases to shed more light on the impact of various factors such 
as, amongst others, transposition time, the number of transposition actors 
and discretion. The Spanish transposition of a European railway directive 
is particularly interesting for it involves a directive with a ‘relatively high 
level of discretion’ (Kaeding, 2007b: 125).1 The case study findings confirm 
1 This refers to the second case which Kaeding discusses: the Spanish transposition of 
Directive 2001/14/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 February 2001 
on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use 
of railway infrastructure and safety certifi cation, OJ L 75, 15 March 2001, pp. 29-46.
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the results of the quantitative analysis, and thus, Kaeding’s assumption 
that discretion slows down transposition. But how was discretion used by 
the implementing authorities? According to Kaeding, the Spanish authori-
ties took a rather inactive approach to transposition. Although the Spanish 
transport ministry, in collaboration with a railway body, watched and con-
sulted other Member States to see how transposition was carried out there, 
it did not ‘get down to business’ right away but adopted a ‘wait-and-see 
attitude’ (Kaeding, 2007b: 180). Interestingly, Kaeding sees the reason for 
this attitude to lie above all in the directive’s higher level of discretion:
In the end, the Spanish authorities notified the European Commission of six legal 
instruments that would be used to transpose the first railway package, including Direc-
tive 2001/14/EC. The preconditions for a swift transposition process were already null 
because of the high degree of discretion given to the member states. This flexibility 
resulted in a time-consuming ‘wait and see’ situation right after the EU Ministers of Trans-
port had adopted Directive 2001/14/EC (2007b: 130-131).
Kaeding may be right and his thorough transposition analysis seems to 
justify his reading of discretion as a factor that impedes the process. And 
yet, with a view to the preceding discussion on discretion effects, includ-
ing other factors that may affect transposition, another possible explanation 
arises: delay may have been caused by administrative shortcomings and 
discretion, both operating and affecting transposition through interacting 
with each other. After all and as noted above, where implementing actors 
lack transposition knowledge but have a broad range of alternative actions 
available (through discretion), swift decision-making may be obstructed 
rather than facilitated. Given the fact that the Spanish transport ministry 
could not get the process off the ground but ‘watched and consulted’ other 
Member States in order to get transposition running, it does not seem so 
far-fetched to assume that shortage of expertise in combination with high 
levels of discretion caused transposition to fail. While it cannot be said that 
Kaeding’s example provides many concrete insights into the use of discre-
tion in transposition, in my view it does illustrate that it is very relevant to 
open up the black box of discretion and transposition if the aim pursued is 
to find out more about uses of discretion and effects resulting therefrom for 
the formal implementation of EU directives.
Another example offers more insights into the actual use of discretion. 
Veltkamp (1998) provides a case study analysis of the implementation of ten 
environmental directives dealing with air, waste and water. It is a legal anal-
ysis of the overall implementation process as carried out in the Netherlands, 
covering, hence, all three stages: transposition, actual implementation and 
enforcement of EU environmental law. Veltkamp bases her findings on the 
analysis of the texts of directives and the corresponding implementing mea-
sures created for the purposes of incorporating, applying and supervising 
EU rules. The wider political and institutional context within which imple-
mentation is carried out is not taken into account (Veltkamp, 1998: 6). In this 
regard, Veltkamp’s approach differs from the one chosen in this disserta-
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tion which combines insights from both legal and political analyses. Never-
theless, her findings are noteworthy as they reveal that Dutch implement-
ing legislation, on average, grants high levels of discretion, which in some 
cases extends the levels envisaged by the corresponding directive. This is all 
the more interesting, as Veltkamp arrives at the conclusion that the Dutch 
implementation of the environmental directives analysed did not result in 
deficient implementation or even non-compliance noted by the Commis-
sion – as the use of additional discretion going beyond the parameters of the 
directive might suggest. On the contrary, Veltkamp argues that discretion 
made it possible to implement directives in line with the traditional national 
approach and perspective adopted in environmental matters. For instance, 
according to ‘one of the pillars of Dutch environmental law’ central and 
local levels collaborate on environment topics; local actors are built into 
decision-making processes related to implementation and have some flex-
ibility in the application of environmental rules (1998: 360). When imple-
menting EU rules, these national and local patterns were maintained owing 
to the discretion available for carrying out this task:
During the implementation phase it is made sure that these directives fit in with exist-
ing or new national legislation while national wishes and principles, systematics, set up, 
angle, concepts, set of instruments and system of enforcement are preserved (ibid: 360).
Even despite little inaccuracies of Dutch implementing legislation, the bot-
tom-line of Veltkamp’s study is that the Netherlands have achieved an over-
all good implementation record:
It is precisely the use and the preservation of the national system and points of view that 
has enabled Dutch legislation to convert directives that greatly vary in contents, charac-
ter and quality […] The Dutch approach agrees with the aim of the directive instrument: 
harmonization of legislation parallel to the national system and by means of using the 
national system’s specific nature and characteristics (ibid: 364; 365).
Discretion is the central characteristic of directives, and it is the potential of 
discretion to fit in EU rules into the national legal framework by retaining 
existing national law, perspectives and approaches, which is identified here. 
What has been expected so far, regarding the role of discretion, shows in the 
transposition cases that Veltkamp presents in her study: discretion is found 
to be, as I refer to it, a ‘facilitating-fit-factor’ that mediates between EU and 
national law.
Finally, while differing in scope and research design from Veltkamp’s 
study, the more recent legal analysis of De Boer et al. (2010) also addresses 
the Dutch implementation of environmental directives. More concrete, the 
authors examine how three environmental directives, the Water Framework 
Directive, the Birds- and Habitat Directive, and the Nitrate Directive – which 
all differ as to their discretion degrees (large, medium and small respectively) 
– were implemented in England, two German federal states and the Nether-
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lands.2 Comparable to Veltkamp’s study, the role of discretion is addressed 
with regard to the overall implementation process but no in-depth analysis 
of the transposition stages is provided. Nevertheless, the results of this study 
are relevant because they confirm Veltkamp’s view that by having discretion 
available and using it, a ‘national’ translation of EU directives into the domes-
tic legal systems was achieved. According to the authors, implementers 
sought to use discretion mainly in the first phase of implementation (hence 
transposition) with the aim of adopting a country-specific approach to envi-
ronmental issues. It appears that this approach was maintained in the imple-
mentation of EU rules showing in the choice of particular legal-administrative 
instruments (De Boer et al., 2010: 17). Suffice it to mention that (formal) imple-
mentation in the Netherlands was characterised by consultation between 
implementing actors and stakeholders, while in Germany federal rules were 
formulated along the lines of a descriptive and detailed approach. Finally, in 
England implementing legislation foresaw the conferral of practical appli-
cation upon non-governmental organisations (De Boer et al., 2010: 16; 160). 
While Veltkamp concludes that Dutch implementing legislation exceeded the 
margin of discretion originally granted by the EU directive, De Boer et al. 
put it more bluntly in claiming that implementers sought additional discre-
tion – independent of whether or not the relevant directive implied larger 
or smaller margins of discretion. In contrast to Veltkamp’s empirical exam-
ples, making use of illicit discretion let in largely all cases to non-compliance 
with EU law and sanctions imposed by the European Commission as a result 
(De Boer et al., 2010: 159). Searching for more discretion resulted from the 
fact that it was realised only once implementation was under way, that less 
discretion was available to implementers than previously expected. This 
latter aspect seems to allude to the fact that, as previously noted, legisla-
tive and administrative discretion are expected to differ in terms of amount. 
Legislative discretion may be further constrained at the national level by 
factors stemming from the legal-administrative context or already exist-
ing case law prescribing specific interpretations of a directive’s provisions.
To sum up the previous discussion, it follows that discretion was used 
differently in the national implementation of European directives, with the 
result that it had impeding or facilitating effects. The cases presented here 
show that discretion was used, not used or not properly used (misused) for 
the purpose of implementation. Discretion was not used, even if granted 
by larger degrees, as Kaeding’s Spanish transposition case shows. This case 
also illustrates well the complexity of transposition which requires taking 
2 In fact, De Boer et al. address two types of discretion: alongside formal discretion, they 
take a closer look at what they refer to as ‘informal discretion’, meaning discretion fl ow-
ing from the interaction between Member States and the European Union, by means of, 
for instance, bilateral consultations. Cf. De Boer et al., 2010, pp. 21-22. Since the major 
concern of this dissertation is with what the authors consider as ‘formal discretion’, i.e. 
discretion granted by the text of the directive, their ‘informal discretion type’ is not fur-
ther discussed here.
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other factors into account that next to (the use of) discretion or in interac-
tion with it, may impact the process. Discretion was used with regard to 
the implementation of environmental directives as the studies by Veltkamp 
and De Boer et al. show – however, with both compliance and non-compli-
ance as outcomes of implementation. These studies furthermore show that 
discretion was not properly used because national actors sought discretion 
beyond the limits of the directives they had to implement. Nevertheless, it 
is important to note that both studies have also brought out the positive 
aspects ascribed to discretion. These positive aspects have been identified 
in the dissertation as one of the reasons for why discretion is used by the 
EU legislature: discretion can facilitate the incorporation of EU rules into 
national law in that it mediates between these different (EU and national) 
frameworks of legislation. This observation supports the central thesis of 
this study that discretion can play a valuable role for decision-making pro-
cesses regarding directives at both the law formulation and law incorpora-
tion stages.
Next to the transposition examples just discussed, I deem it useful to 
have another, closer look at the Dutch transposition context and the use 
of discretion therein. While it cannot be claimed that uses of discretion by 
administrative actors have entirely slipped from scholars’ attention, the 
research contexts that political scientists and public administration scholars 
address are quite distinct from the present one. Hupe (2013), for instance, 
deals with discretion within the context of policy implementation by focus-
ing, from a theoretical perspective, on discretionary decision-making of 
street-level bureaucrats (public administration employees). More interesting 
in the present context is Ringeling’s study (1978) which includes both a the-
oretical and empirical analysis and focuses on the Dutch policy implemen-
tation context. More concrete, Ringeling looks into administrative discretion 
of state officials in the context of the Dutch policy towards ‘option regret-
ters’3 (in Dutch: spijtoptanten’) in the period 1956 to 1968, and addresses the 
question which circumstances within public administration favour or limit 
the discretion available to officials. While his study and the present one 
share a few characteristics such as the interest in uses and circumstances 
of discretion, the belief in its relevance for the application of law and the 
necessity to study discretion by taking into account the political and institu-
tional context in which discretion comes into play, their parameters are very 
different due to their respective subject matters. Whereas Ringeling deals 
with an entirely national setting – a policy adopted and applied in the Neth-
erlands, the present study, however, deals with discretion in the making of 
EU law (directives) and their application in a national (Dutch) setting. In 
addition to that, discretion is a key characteristic of the policy (EU directive) 
3 Inhabitants of Indonesia of mixed decent who, after initially having opted for the Indo-
nesian nationality during the period that Indonesia became independent, eventually 
turned to the Dutch Government with the request to be admitted to citizenship in the 
Netherlands. Cf. Ringeling, 1978, p. 234.
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itself which already implies terms and conditions that differ from the Dutch 
policy Ringeling looks into. Due to these differences, the approach and find-
ings of Ringeling’s study have not further been used to shape the way the 
present study deals with discretion.
In the last sections of this chapter, the attention is once again turned to 
the Dutch transposition of EU directives, and the exercise of discretionary 
powers to incorporate EU rules into the national legal framework. This is 
done with the aim to achieve a still more comprehensive understanding of 
possible uses of discretion by the actors primarily addressed in this study: 
civil servants working within Dutch ministries.
5.2.1 Discretion in the Dutch transposition context
Summarising what is known so far about discretion within the context of 
transposition, the following can be noted. Discretion is granted by EU pri-
mary legislation, and additionally, by the content and wording of a direc-
tive which implies that national actors can choose those forms and methods 
they consider the most appropriate for translating directive requirements 
into national legislation. The granting of discretion has in the foregoing also 
been described as offering Member States a range of policy options which, 
when being used, all imply compliance with the directive’s objective to be 
realised at the national level. Moreover, it was noted that Member States 
seek discretion to ensure that the incorporation of EU rules into national 
law will leave national legal structures largely untouched. All things con-
sidered, it can thus be noted that the transposition of directives implies that 
national actors take decisions and make choices which are based on certain 
considerations and motivations. Or, as aptly noted by Steunenberg, after 
adoption, directives are not just implemented but further shaped by the 
member states when they are put into national rules (2007: 42).
The Dutch transposition of EU directives bears out this point. First of 
all, it should be noted that in the Netherlands, a special procedure for the 
implementation of EU directives does not exist. Hence, transposition legis-
lation is devised along the same lines than national legislation and regula-
tion (Bovens and Yesilkagit, 2010: 59). Decisions and choices pertain here, as 
in other national transposition contexts, to the forms and methods by means 
of which directives are formally implemented. More concrete, national 
transposition actors, hence ministerial units, determine the level and sort 
of instrument – administrative or parliamentary act / statute – as well as 
the transposition technique (Steunenberg and Voermans, 2006). Their deci-
sions are not totally free, however. As noted earlier, discretion is subject to 
constraints at the national level. In transposing directives, Dutch ministerial 
units have to take account of the national legal-administrative framework: 
provisions of the constitutions, existing legislation and regulation / legal 
and regulatory requirements as well as other ministerial instructions (Par-
liamentary Papers II 2007/08, 31498, no. 1-2, p. 49). This point notwithstand-
ing, research conducted on the Dutch implementation of directives suggests 
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that, national ministries follow certain paths in transposing directives (Par-
liamentary Papers II 2007/08, 31498, no. 1-2; Bovens and Yesilkagit, 2010).
Regarding the three ministries that are addressed in the case studies 
presented in this dissertation, meaning the Ministry of Environment and 
Spatial Planning, the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport as well as the 
Ministry of Security and Justice, the following relevant observations can be 
made.4 For instance, while the Ministry of Security and Justice is known to 
transpose directives mostly by means of parliamentary acts, the Ministry of 
Health, Welfare and Sport usually uses administrative acts such as govern-
ment decrees to incorporate a directive related to its portfolio, into national 
legislation. Also the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning tends 
to give preference to lower-level regulation (government decrees / orders 
in council and ministerial decisions) (Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 31498, 
no. 1-2, p. 50; Bovens and Yesilkagit, 2010: 65). Furthermore, as to the trans-
position technique used, the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, prefers 
applying the method of dynamic referencing5 which appears to be the most 
suitable instrument for transposing amendments that merely update techni-
cal details of previous directives (Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 31498, no. 
1-2, p. 50-51). While from these general observations, conclusions as to com-
pliance in individual transposition case cannot be drawn, it is nevertheless 
interesting to note that the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport has one of 
the best compliance records. Apparently, preferences for specific approaches 
in transposition are motivated by the awareness that they ‘pay off’. In this 
respect it is noteworthy that exercising discretionary competences over time 
can lead to specific routines and styles in the application of rules by admin-
istrations (Bakker and Van Waarden, 1999). It may, thus, not be far-fetched to 
conclude that using discretion can make a contribution to the proper formal 
implementation of directives into Dutch law since thereby routines and styles 
can be developed which lead to the desired objective: compliance with EU 
law.
What does the foregoing imply for the study of uses of discretion in 
transposition and therefore for the subsequent case study analyses? The 
previous observations illustrate that uses of discretion can be derived from 
the way by which transposition is further shaped at the national level. This 
includes decisions on implementation forms and methods that are reflected 
in the transposition activities of ministerial units. These activities may per-
tain to instruments and techniques but they may also reveal additional mea-
sures which are relevant from the viewpoint of legitimacy. While transposi-
tion activities may be targeted at effectively fitting in the directive into the 
national legal order, from the viewpoint of input participation and therefore 
4 Throughout the dissertation the ministries are referred to by their current names.
5 Dynamic referencing denotes a specific way of transposing rules of a directive into 
national law: corresponding transposition legislation consists of a national measure 
which makes reference to the relevant directive provision including its future amend-
ments.
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input and throughput legitimacy, it will, for instance, be interesting to see in 
the empirical analysis if discretion has been used to involve other national 
actors in transposition.
It has been established that using discretion can shape the domestic 
responses to directives. Next to the analysis of the political and institutional 
context in which transposition is carried out, the case study analyses seek to 
provide insights into the choices of Dutch transposition actors including the 
considerations that underlie these choices. Such an approach may provide 
me with findings that explain how and why discretion was used. This way, 
I wish to shed further light on the role of discretion in Dutch transposition 
processes.
5.3 Functions of discretion
It is now time to briefly summarise the insights from the previous three 
chapters in which the analytical framework for the empirical analysis was 
developed. To study the role of discretion in decision-making processes 
regarding directives (law-making and law-transposition processes), sets of 
expectations were derived from the relevant literature. Additionally, it was 
found that the study of discretion for the purposes of the present analysis 
requires looking into how discretion is used by actors that transpose EU 
directives into national law. Hence, analysing transposition through an 
institutional lens taking into account contextual, i.e. national-level factors 
needs to be complemented by an approach that also looks into the decisions 
and considerations of transposition actors. This may provide illuminating 
insights as was shown by means of a brief digression to the Dutch transpo-
sition context. It has been established that discretion can be used, not used 
and also misused in transposition. Overlooking the whole discussion, dis-
tinct functions can be derived that discretion seems to fulfil at both the EU 
and national levels and that reflect its potential for legal systems that it is 
considered to have according to the central thesis of the dissertation. Table 2 
illustrates these functions.
Table 2: Functions of discretion 
 Discretion 
EU level Unites different interests Faciliates decision-making & 
compromise (directive) 
National level Irons out incompatibility 
between EU and national law
Preserves national legislation
Faciliating-fit-function:
Timely and legally correct 
transposition (compliance)
Facilitates incorporation of 
EU rules by leaving intact the 
national legal framework 
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First of all, the potential of discretion at both EU and national levels is that 
it facilitates decision-making processes. Inherent to directives is the discre-
tionary choice of forms and method of implementation. While this already 
provides Member States with leeway as to the question of how to incor-
porate EU rules into the national legal framework, additional discretion 
granted by directive provisions gives them a still wider choice, i.e. a wider 
range of options for transposition that are all compatible with the directive. 
Against this background, discretion, at the EU level, is a solution to differ-
ent national interests that have to be reconciled to find a common approach, 
while at the national level it mediates between distinct bodies of legisla-
tion and helps to iron out legal disparities between EU and national rules. 
The facilitating effects of discretion show in the fact that in negotiations on 
directive proposals discretion contributes to striking compromises in the 
Council of Ministers where different interests and preferences of Member 
States have to be reconciled, especially with regard to politically sensitive 
issues that more readily lead to controversy or where Member States seek 
to achieve a better match between EU rules and own legislation. At the 
national level, discretion provides a range of options from which the most 
suitable one – in legal terms (transposition instrument and technique) and 
as regards costs6 – is chosen. Both, freedom in choosing forms and meth-
ods as well as discretionary leeway flowing from the content and wording 
of the directive furthermore help to embed EU rules into the national legal 
order by keeping the latter largely intact. In other words, discretion medi-
ates here between (levels of) incompatibility of EU and national law. This 
potential of discretion can be captured by the term ‘facilitating-fit-function’ 
and is reflected by EU treaty considerations on the preservation of national 
legal identities.7 The empirical findings of implementation scholars seem to 
suggest that the ‘facilitating-fit-function’ of discretion unfolds its effect on 
transposition when discretion comes into play autonomously and, in par-
ticular, when it is granted by larger degrees. The national context in which 
discretion comes into play is, however, more complex as follows from the 
above review of implementation studies. Having said this, discretion is 
assumed to take on the role of an intervening factor which interacts with 
other factors stemming mostly from the national level. In case that discre-
tion is available and interacts with lacking administrative capacity or more 
actors being involved in transposition, it is expected to impede transposi-
tion. This leads to delay and possibly legal incorrectness. When interacting 
with increasing compatibility between EU directive and relevant national 
law, by contrast, discretion is claimed to contribute to proper transposition.
6 As previously mentioned, a better legal fi t is assumed to preclude high adaptation costs.
7 This is for instance reflected by the above-mentioned Article 4(2) TEU. See section 
3.3.2.1.
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5.4 Conclusion
To conclude, discretion may have facilitating effects on both the EU nego-
tiations and the national transposition of directives. At the national level, 
discretion can, in conjunction with other national-level factors, become an 
intervening factor which facilitates or impedes transposition. It is further-
more assumed that the way discretion is used by national implementing 
actors may additionally impact how discretion affects the national transpo-
sition of EU directives into national law. Alongside the set of expectations 
formulated in the previous two chapters, the functions of discretion identi-
fied in the previous discussion are later on used in the empirical part of the 
dissertation to deal with the findings of the case study as well comparative 
analyses.
 Part 2
 Methodological aspects – 
content analysis and 




This chapter marks the transition from the conceptualisation to the opera-
tionalisation of legislative discretion. Alongside the subsequent chapters its 
main concern is with discretion in European directives. Where does discre-
tion become evident in directives and how can it be operationalised and 
measured? Answering these questions requires having a closer look at the 
structure of directives as well as the structure and types of legal norms. The 
insights gained from this discussion prepare the ground for the subsequent 
presentation of content analysis and the application of the codebook devel-
oped for the purpose of assessing discretion in European directives.
6.2 Legislative discretion
As previously defined, legislative discretion is used in the dissertation to 
denote the ‘latitude based on both EU primary and secondary legislation 
(Article 288 TFEU and the directive text) granted by the EU legislature to 
Member States for transposing a directive’ (see section 2.2.1.2). Whereas the 
directive’s objective(s) are fixed, Member States have discretion in choosing 
implementation forms and methods. Hence, in having to achieve a certain 
result that the directive prescribes, they can follow their preferences regard-
ing the use of transposition techniques and instruments (Steunenberg and 
Voermans, 2006). What constitutes a directive’s ‘result’ is not exactly spec-
ified by the Treaty but can be described as a ‘general legal, economic, or 
social situation or a legal or factual situation which does justice to the Com-
munity interest which, under the Treaty, the directive is to ensure’ (Prechal, 
2005: 40; see also Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, 2003: 238-239).
Alongside EU primary legislation as one source of discretion, the focus 
of this study is on legislative discretion granted by the directive text. It is 
argued that discretion can be derived from a directive’s content and word-
ing. In studies on legislative decision-making and implementation, a direc-
tive provision is considered to be discretionary if its wording indicates room 
for alternatives or choice (e.g. Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000; Thomson, 
2007; Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied, 2011). It is identified as non-discretion-
ary if it is prescriptive (Franchino 2004; Kaeding, 2007b; Thomson, 2007; 
Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009). In the legal literature discretion is linked 
to specific legal concepts reflected in the directive text (e.g. harmonisation, 
derogation) but it is also considered to be implied by broad wording allow-
ing for own interpretation and application (Prechal, 2005: 43-44; see also De 
6 Discretion in European directives
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Boer et al., 2010). Be it as it may, both approaches taken together represent 
valuable sources from which manifestations of discretion are derived. To 
understand how discretion manifests itself in directives requires taking a 
closer look at their structure and content. Therefore attention is dedicated 
in the following sections to those parts of a directive that are relevant for 
measuring legislative discretion, and for the sake of clarity and complete-
ness, to those that are not. In a further step, the structure of a legal norm 
is addressed as it serves to illustrate how discretion manifestations are 
detected in the directive text.
6.3 Structure of directives
To begin with, not all parts of a directive are equally important when it 
comes to detecting discretion in directives. A directive’s preamble, for 
instance, which is not legally binding for the Member States, is composed of 
a number of recitals that state the purpose and describe the main provisions 
of a directive. In doing so, recitals can give some clue as to the discretion 
margin that the directive grants, but more explicit forms of discretion can 
be detected in the directive’s main part which is composed of a number of 
articles. Articles are, in turn, sub-divided into one or more provisions. This 
main part of directives contains the ‘hard core substantive rules’ (Prechal, 
2005: 41), also referred to as ‘enacting terms’ (Joint Practical Guide, 2013: 
15).1 It represents the legally binding part of a directive. These are the sub-
stantive rules that establish the framework for implementation, describe the 
legal and / or factual situation which Member States have to achieve and 
how they have to achieve it. In other words, it is here where those legal 
norms are established that Member States are supposed to realise in imple-
menting a directive (Prechal, 2005: 41-44). Preceding this part is the pre-
amble to the directive which includes a number of recitals.
6.3.1 Preamble and recitals
As a rule, a directive starts with an introduction, called ‘preamble’ which 
contains several numbered recitals reflecting the considerations at the 
beginning of the text of a directive. Recitals usually refer to the legal foun-
dation on which the directive is based and reflect the reasons for adopting 
1 Joint Practical Guide of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission for 
persons involved in the drafting of European Union legislation (2013), Brussels: Offi ce 
for Offi cial Publications of the European Communities. The Guide is a follow-up mea-
sure to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 22 December 1998 between the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission. It establishes common guidelines for the 
improvement of the quality of drafting of Community legislation. Being drawn up by 
the Legal Services of the three main EU institutions, the Guide’s aim is to make acces-
sible and understandable the content of the guidelines to those drafting EU legislation 
by means of comments and examples.
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the directive, setting out also its objectives (Joint Practical Guide, 2013: 19). 
By way of illustration, box 2 presents the preamble of the European direc-
tive on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals (in short the EU’s Return Directive).
Box 2: Extract of the preamble of the Return Directive (2008/115/EC)
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
and in particular Article 63(3)(b) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251 of the Treaty (1),
Whereas:
(1) The Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 1999 established a 
coherent approach in the field of immigration and asylum, dealing together with 
the creation of a common asylum system, a legal immigration policy and the fight 
against illegal immigration.
(2) The Brussels European Council of 4 and 5 November 2004 called for the 
establishment of an effective removal and repatriation policy, based on common 
standards, for persons to be returned in a humane manner and with full respect 
for their fundamental rights and dignity.
(3) On 4 May 2005 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted 
‘Twenty guidelines on forced return’.
(4) Clear, transparent and fair rules need to be fixed to provide for an effective 
return policy as a necessary element of a well managed migration policy.
(5) This Directive should establish a horizontal set of rules, applicable to all third-
country nationals who do not or who no longer fulfil the conditions for entry, stay 
or residence in a Member State.
[…]
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE
Formally speaking, recitals are no components of the legally binding part 
of a directive, and hence do not require to be transposed by the Member 
States. And yet, with regard to discretion, recitals are indirectly relevant. 
The European Court of Justice makes use of them in its interpretation of 
EU law.2 In offering a preview of the content of the directive, they can give 
hints as to the margin of discretion that can be expected from it. Kaeding 
2 This is exemplifi ed by various examples of established case law. See Craig and G. de 
Burca (2015), EU law: text, cases, and materials, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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takes the number of recitals as an indicator of the directive’s level of detail 
which in turn he considers to affect a directive’s discretion margin (Kaed-
ing, 2006; 2007a; 2007b). The more recitals, the higher the directive’s level 
of detail but the smaller the amount of discretion granted to Member States 
(2007a: 29; 2007b: 106). To establish what may be considered a high number 
of recitals, Kaeding takes as a benchmark, the median number of recitals of 
the directive sample he analyses which is 8 recitals. Measured against this 
benchmark, a directive with 22 recitals is considered as indicating a higher 
level of detail. Hence, it is regarded as implying a smaller margin of discre-
tion (2007b: 106; 134). Furthermore, Kaeding associates a high number of 
recitals with delay in transposition by pointing out that in the presence of 
many recitals the interpretation and application of a directive is rendered 
more complex (2007a: 29).
The high number of recitals has been explained differently. It is seen as 
reflecting the attempts by both Member States and European Commission 
to insert preferences they have failed to get into the main, legally binding 
part of the directive during the negotiations (Kaeding, 2007a: 29). In this 
connection, many recitals are considered to hint at the level of controversy 
to which the directive was exposed during the negotiations (Steunenberg 
and Kaeding, 2009: 435). Many recitals are also interpreted as a result of the 
principle of subsidiarity which necessitates the EU legislature to explain in 
more detail why action needs to be taken at the EU instead of the national 
or sub-national levels (Mastenbroek, 2007: 22).
In the dissertation, the number of recitals is only indirectly taken into 
account in describing the margins of discretion of individual directives. 
It does not serve as an indicator of smaller or larger discretion amounts. 
Clear dimensions, sub-categories and indicators can, in my view, at best be 
derived from the directive’s legally binding part of which the legally non-
binding recitals only provide a preview.
6.3.2  Enacting terms
The so-called ‘enacting terms’ follow after the preamble and represent the 
main part of the directive. They cover the substantive rules and are usually 
divided into articles and provisions and, as complexity increases, into chap-
ters and sections (Joint Practical Guide, 2013: 26). From a content perspec-
tive, the enacting terms cover different provision types: the general provi-
sions address the directive’s subject matter or purpose and its scope. Then 
there are provisions which provide definitions of relevant terms that are 
used in the directive. Subsequent provisions contain rights and obligations 
for Member States. There may also be provisions that confer implementing 
powers on the European Commission, other procedural provisions, provi-
sions on implementing measures as well as transitional and final provisions 
(Joint Practical Guide, 2013: 26; see also Prechal, 2005: 41-49).
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The enacting terms can be further divided into two groups, the ‘hard 
core rules’ or substantive provisions (Prechal, 2005: 41-44) on the one hand 
and, on the other hand, the ancillary provisions (ibid: 44-47). The substan-
tive provisions set out the content of the result, i.e. the legal and factual sit-
uation which Member States shall achieve by implementing the directive. 
Hence, they address at the same time how the content of national transpo-
sition legislation which translates directive requirements into national law 
should look like in terms of both substantive national law and procedures 
(Prechal, 2005: 41-44; Mastenbroek, 2007: 22).3 It is especially within the sub-
stantive provisions setting out the directive’s requirements or guidelines 
that different discretion manifestations become apparent. The ancillary pro-
visions complement the hard core rules and address some basic obligations. 
They include requirements which are a standard part of directives. Some of 
the ancillary provisions are elements of the final provisions and relate to the 
transposition deadline, the necessary measures that Member States have to 
take to achieve compliance, the obligation to notify transposition legislation 
to the European Commission, and in some cases, the obligation to submit 
the text of the corresponding national legislation to the European Commis-
sion (Prechal, 2005: 45). Still other ancillary provisions may oblige Member 
States to consult third parties on the content of the implementing legislation 
or to send reports to the European Commission. In a next step, the Commis-
sion is expected to review the implementation of the directive in question 
(ibid: 47).
The enacting terms are mentioned in the main part of the directive text. 
Hence, both substantive provisions and ancillary provisions are legally 
binding. They cover the rights and obligations for Member States and / or 
third parties (citizens and economic operators) as well as the procedural 
provisions. They therefore constitute the normative part of the directive 
(Joint Practical Guide, 2013: 26). The connection between the structure of a 
directive and the structure of legal norms is a crucial one. As shown below, 
by taking a closer look on specific types as well as the individual elements 
of a legal norm, relevant knowledge can be obtained and used for assess-
ing the scope of discretion of individual directives. This knowledge serves 
two objectives: first, to identify discretion manifestations in directives and 
distinguish between those directives that imply larger and those that imply 
smaller amounts of discretion. Second, it offers a clear picture of the struc-
ture of directive provisions on the basis of which the discretion margin 
of individual directives is determined. For this latter purpose also a third 
group of provisions is considered, namely those addressed to the EU insti-
tutions, more specifically, the European Commission. Alongside the Mem-
ber States, the Commission may have to fulfil obligations which can include 
3 Mastenbroek notes in this regard that the distinction made on the basis of Article 288 
TFEU can be blurred: not only the directive’s objective is prescribed by the EU legisla-
ture. To some extent also the choice of implementation forms and methods may be. Cf. 
Mastenbroek, 2007, p. 22.
92 Part 2  Methodological aspects – content analysis and (comparative) case study approach 
implementing tasks. It may for instance be required to elaborate upon direc-
tive provisions, especially on technical requirements, or be obliged, as just 
noted, to draw up implementation reports using information obtained from 
the Member States (Prechal, 2005: 47-49). Box 3 presents the different types 
of provisions. It shows a few examples of the enacting terms of the EU’s 
Return Directive which was adopted with the aim of controlling and regu-
lating irregular migration.4




1. This Directive applies to third-country nationals staying illegally on the 
territory of a Member State.





4. Member States shall ensure that the necessary legal assistance and/or 
representation is granted on request free of charge in accordance with relevant 
national legislation or rules regarding legal aid, and may provide that such free 
legal assistance and/or representation is subject to conditions as set out in Article 
15(3) to (6) of Directive 2005/85/EC.
Provision addressed to EU institution 
Article 19
Reporting
The Commission shall report every three years to the European Parliament and 





1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions necessary to comply with this
Directive by 24 December 2010. In relation to Article 13(4), Member States shall 
bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary 
to comply with this
Directive by 24 December 2011. They shall forthwith communicate to the 
Commission the text of those measures.
4 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Decem-
ber 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally 
staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24 December 2008, pp. 98-107.
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The structure of European directives has been explained. But what about 
discretion itself – how is it identified in directive provisions? Answering this 
question requires, first of all, taking a closer look at types and structure of 
legal norms.
6.4 Legal norms
As stated in the foregoing, Member States are bound by the directive’s 
objective which requires from them to realise a legal and factual situation 
which is determined by the substantive and ancillary provisions. The situ-
ation envisaged by the directive is described in terms of legal norms. Legal 
norms are understood in legal theory as regulating the diverse legal rela-
tionships between legal entities, meaning natural persons (human beings) 
or legal persons (e.g. associations, companies, government institutions) 
(Eijlander and Voermans, 2000: 129). Eijlander and Voermans, who address 
legal norms from the perspective of Dutch legal doctrine,5 note that law is 
composed of a system of interrelated legal norms (2000: 129).
6.4.1 Types of legal norms
These norms can be divided into different types, amongst others: norms of 
conduct, norms of competence, and procedural norms (Eijlander and Voer-
mans, 2000: 132-143). If connected in a logical, systematic way these norms 
ensure that the purpose of the relevant law is expressed in a clear manner 
and made accessible and understandable to those it addresses. Of special 
importance for legal systems are norms of conduct and norms of compe-
tence (see table 3).6 While by means of the former the legislature intends to 
bring about behavioural change, by using the latter institutional change is 
sought. Being the backbone of legal systems norms of conduct and norms 
of competence ensure legal certainty as well as the efficient functioning of 
legal systems, also under dynamic circumstances (Eijlander and Voermans, 
2000: 133).
5 In their discussion Eijlander and Voermans make use of, amongst others, contributions 
by D. W. P. Ruiter who has substantially contributed to the study of legal norms in leg-
islative texts. See for instance: D. W. P. Ruiter (1987) Bestuursrechtelijke wetgevingsleer, 
Assen: Van Gorcum.
6 In Dutch referred to as ‘gedragsnormen’ and ‘bevoegdheidsnormen’ respectively. Cf. 
Eijlander and Voermans, 2000, p. 133. Since the two types of legal norms that are mainly 
addressed in this section - norms of conduct and norms of competence - are basic types 
of norms that exist also in other legal systems (ibid, p. 132) the insights provided here 
are considered to have more general applicability.
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Table 3: Types of legal norms
Norms of conduct (norms on actual behaviour) 
Under which circumstances an actual conduct becomes legal or illegal.
Norms of competence (norms on institutional behaviour)
Whether or not and under which circumstances the subject of the norm is legally 
entitled to act.
There are discretionary and non-discretionary norms of competence.
The distinction between the two types of legal norms is inspired by the con-
cept of law as introduced by H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992), the well-known English 
legal philosopher (Eijlander and Voermans, 2000: 132-133).7 He distinguishes 
between two types of rules: primary and secondary rules. The first type of 
rules – in Hart’s concept the primary legal rules – refers to norms of conduct 
which determine under which circumstances an actual conduct becomes legal 
or illegal. Hart’s secondary rules refer to norms of competence which address 
standards of decision-making. These standards determine whether or not and 
under which circumstances the subject of the norm is legally entitled to act.
6.4.1.1 Sub-types
Still finer distinctions have been made regarding the two types of norms 
(Eijlander and Voermans, 2000: 134-143). Two points should be mentioned 
with a view to the context of legal norms and European directives. First, 
norms of conduct can be further divided into four types of norms that seek 
to establish an obligation, prohibition, permission or exemption. As is fur-
ther shown below, directive provisions frequently entail these modes of con-
duct (Eijlander and Voermans, 2000: 134). The second point refers to norms 
of competence which are conferred upon public authorities. They can be 
further specified in different types: administrative, advisory, judicial, and 
rule-making competences (Eijlander and Voermans, 2000: 138-140). In addi-
tion to that, norms of competence can be described in two ways: as ‘bound’ 
or non-discretionary decision-making competence and ‘discretionary’ deci-
sion-making competence (Eijlander and Voermans, 2000: 140-141; Hofmann 
et al., 2011: 499-500).8 This distinction plays a pivotal role regarding legal 
norms in European directives. It addresses the question of how – meaning 
under what conditions – a legal entity such as an implementing authority, 
7 H. L. A. Hart (1994). Concept of Law, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
8 The equivalent Dutch terms for ‘bound / non-discretionary decision-making compe-
tence’ and ‘discretionary decision-making competence’ are: ‘gebonden bevoegdheid’ en 
‘discretionaire bevoegdheid’.
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shall or may exercise the rule-making competence that has been conferred 
upon it by the directive to be implemented.9
The description of law as being composed of a system of interrelated 
legal norms certainly fits EU legislative acts such as directives. Prechal notes 
in this regard that ‘[t]he ultimate purpose of the rules laid down in a direc-
tive is, just like the purpose of any legal rule, to influence the behaviour of 
legal subjects (natural and legal persons)’ (2005: 52). For the latter purpose, 
decision-making or rule-making competences are conferred upon Member 
States, in particular their national administrations (ministries) that have to 
transpose directive requirements into national law. As just noted, between 
these decision-making competences two types can be distinguished: ‘discre-
tionary’ and ‘non-discretionary’ decision-making competences. A discretion-
ary decision-making competence is delegated to Member States by a state-
ment such as: ‘Member States may consider waste as non-hazardous waste 
in accordance with the list of waste referred to in paragraph 1.’10 A state-
ment, like ‘Member States shall not prohibit, restrict or hinder the placing 
on the market of pyrotechnic articles which satisfy the requirements of this 
Directive’,11 on the contrary, is prescriptive in nature. It indicates that hardly 
any discretion is left for the national implementation of a directive require-
ment. Hence, it points to a non-discretionary decision-making competence.
Put in a nutshell, discretionary directive provisions are those that leave 
Member States the option to choose between alternatives when it comes to 
transposing a directive into national legislation. Non-discretionary provi-
sions, by contrast, lack these alternatives. Instead, they rather include pre-
scriptive requirements which have to be rigorously followed by the Member 
States. Consequently, they reflect that little discretion is available for transpo-
sition.
9 For the sake of completeness, it should be added that next to discretionary and non-
discretionary rule-making competences, there are also facultative or imperative rule-
making competences. These latter competences do not address the way a competence is 
exercised. They rather deal with the question whether or not it is necessary or desirable, 
from the viewpoint of the legislature, that a competence is exercised. Cf. Eijlander and 
Voermans, 2000, pp. 139-140. With a view to discretion in European directives, it should 
furthermore be noted that discretionary and facultative provisions are understood here 
as provisions that leave discretion to Member States whereas non-discretionary and 
imperative directive provisions are understood as leaving no or hardly any discretion 
for national transposition.
10 Cf. Article 7(6) of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, OJ L 312, 22 November 
2008, pp. 3-30.
11 Cf. Article 6(1) of Directive 2007/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 May 2007 on the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles, OJ L 154, 14 June 
2007, pp. 1-21.
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6.4.2 Norm structure
On a first level, a legal norm is composed of two parts, the legal fact and 
legal consequence (Eijlander and Voermans, 2000: 130-131). A legal fact 
refers to a specific situation which is characterised by certain conditions 
under which a legal consequence shall take effect – provided that the situa-
tion occurs. On a second level, the legal consequence can be subdivided into 
three elements: the addressee, object and mode of conduct (see box 4).
Box 4: Structure of legal norm
Legal fact + Legal consequence
• Norm addressee or subject
• Norm object
• Mode of conduct: may (not) and shall (not)
The addressee is also referred to as subject of the norm. The object of the 
norm comes second and represents an action or conduct that is either per-
mitted or required: what may be done and what must be done. Finally, there 
is the mode of conduct, referring to whether the addressee of the norm is 
allowed / not allowed, able / not able or must / must not do something. It 
is this third element of a legal norm which is of specific importance for the 
context at hand. Regarding directive provisions, the mode of conduct can 
serve to identify whether or not a directive provision is discretionary. As 
illustrated by the examples above, may and shall, can be identified in the 
directive text.
It is furthermore important to have a closer look at the mode of con-
duct. How is it worded? Is it worded in the affirmative or in the negative? 
Regarding directives, Prechal points out that Member States’ obligations 
‘can be formulated in a negative way, as prohibitions of particular activities, 
or – more often – in a positive way, prescribing certain conduct’ (2005: 42). 
The sort of conduct which is desired and the way it is worded – either in 
the affirmative or in the negative – indicates whether the norm implies an 
obligation, prohibition, permission or exemption (Eijlander and Voermans, 
2000: 135). The four types of modes of conduct and how they are mutually 
linked are presented by means of the logical square presented in figure 3.12
12 This fi gure is a slightly adapted version of the logical square as provided by Eijlander 
and Voermans, 2000, p. 135.
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Figure 3: Modes of conduct
In considering the above, it should be noted, however, that there is hardly 
any one-to-one relationship between the structure of a legal norm as it is 
presented here, and a legal provision within a legislative text. As Eijlander 
and Voermans note with specific regard to Dutch law, not all elements of a 
legal norm (addressee, object and mode of conduct) show in one and the 
same piece of legislation (2000: 131). To properly interpret and apply legisla-
tion and therefore to get a grasp of the legal norms applicable in a particular 
case, often other regulations have to be consulted that are related to the law 
which has to be implemented. Eijlander and Voermans illustrate this aspect 
by means of the Dutch Environmental Management Act which is composed 
of several implementing regulations (2000: 131).
Also European directives are no legislative acts that entirely stand on 
their own. How they are linked with other related legislative acts usually 
becomes apparent from their recitals. In addition, and as exemplified, for 
instance, by the aforementioned Return Directive, links with other direc-
tives are referred to more explicitly within the substantive provisions 
including Member State obligations. What’s more important, as shown in 
the example of Article 13(4) of the Return Directive (see above box 3), sub-
divisions of an article (i.e. provisions) can be composed of long sentences, 
including clauses and phrases, which comprise more than one mode of con-
duct at the same time (shall and may in the example). This already indicates 
the complexity that some directives display. This complexity becomes all 
the more marked if there is no consistent structure that allows for better 
accessibility and understanding of the directive provisions and legal norms 
contained therein. It also points to the challenges entailed by the attempt to 
assess the margin of discretion of individual directives by means of a code-
book, which is addressed further below.
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From the foregoing aspects two are of particular relevance in the pres-
ent context: the distinction between discretionary and non-discretionary 
decision-making competences appears to be a suitable means to identify 
directive provisions that grant more discretion as opposed to others which 
grant hardly any of it. Furthermore, the presentation of the structure of a 
legal norm, has served to highlight the mode of conduct as a convenient 
instrument that can be used to detect discretionary and non-discretionary 
provisions in the text of a directive.
6.4.2.1 Shall- and may-statements
The mode of conduct is thus taken in the analysis of directives as an indi-
cator of more or less discretion being granted to Member States. In direc-
tives, the mode of conduct is mainly expressed by means of shall- and 
may-statements. They describe two categories by means of which directive 
texts are analysed: the obligatory language and permissive language cat-
egories. Obligatory language and permissive language are terms used by 
Gil Ibá ñ ez (1999) in his study of the European Commission’s discretion in 
enforcing EU law under Article 169 EEC (now Article 258 TFEU). As previ-
ously noted, directives grant discretion by design but (additional) discretion 
can be derived from their wording. Obligatory language is expressed by 
shall-statements implying that hardly any discretion is granted to Member 
States. Permissive language is expressed by may-statements which indicate 
that discretion is made available for the implementation of a directive. More 
concrete examples are offered below.
The idea to distinguish between statements that leave national authori-
ties with a wider or smaller or no choice of options to choose from when 
implementing directives, draws on the distinction between open and closed 
statements that Steunenberg and Toshkov (2009) have introduced in their 
approach to measuring discretion. It should be noted that open and closed 
statements are not necessarily the equivalent to shall- and may-clauses. To 
put it differently, the distinction between shall-clauses and may-clauses is 
not always as clear-cut as it seems and it does not neatly correspond to the 
distinction of open and closed statements. For instance, ‘shall’-clauses may 
not only be indicative of closed statements. They may also express open 
statements as shown in this example: ‘[i]t shall be for the Member States 
to set a minimum sale price from which the sales shall be subject to resale 
right’13 (Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009: 958-959). It is furthermore worth 
noting in this context how Gil Ibá ñ ez (1999) interprets shall-statements. 
Analysing the European Commission’s exercise of discretion with respect 
to instituting infringement proceedings, Gil Ibá ñ ez discusses case law of the 
European Court of Justice and shows that shall-statements are not always 
understood by the Court as expressing obligations for the European Com-
mission. Permissive language on the other hand, indicated by may-state-
13 See Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/84/EC on the resale right for the benefi t of the author, 
OJ L 272, 13 October 2001, pp. 32-36.
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ments, does not always automatically reflect the granting of discretion but 
has to be understood by taking into consideration the presence of other 
conditions which may constrain the Commission’s discretionary action (Gil 
Ibá ñ ez, 1999: 230-231).
Dwelling a bit more on the aspect of conditions, a last point has to be 
mentioned which leads the discussion back to Eijlander and Voermans 
(2000). They note that the difference between discretionary and non-dis-
cretionary decision-making competences shows in the number as well as 
formulation of conditions under which competences are granted. The more 
precise conditions are specified, the more discretion entailed by the relevant 
competence is reduced. Discretion increases, on the other hand, if condi-
tions are less precise and limited in number (2000: 140-143).
Regarding the analysis of directives, it becomes evident that the use of 
shall- and may-clauses as indicators of obligatory and permissive language 
requires a careful reading of the directive analysed in order to properly 
identify discretionary and non-discretionary provisions. Moreover, a thor-
ough reading of directives is expected to make it possible to identify further 
indicators of discretionary and non-discretionary provisions. Finally, paying 
close attention to the conditions under which competences are granted may 
allow for capturing finer details in directive provisions. This way, further 
sub-categories within the two categories of obligatory and permissive lan-
guage may be defined.
In spite of the fact that shall- and may-clauses are not always ‘what they 
seem to be’, to distinguish between these two sorts of clauses is considered 
a useful starting point for developing a more fine-grained approach to dis-
cretion. In addition, when interviewed, civil servants from the Dutch minis-
tries and the European Commission as well as legal scholars with expertise 
in EU law mostly agreed with the distinction of shall- and may- clauses as 
indicators of obligatory language on the one hand (i.e. non-discretionary 
provisions), and permissive language (i.e. discretionary provisions) on the 
other hand.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter the structure of directives was explained to provide a good 
understanding of the directive as one of the most frequently used EU legisla-
tive instruments. This was done specifically to show which parts of a direc-
tive are more and which are less relevant for the analysis of legislative dis-
cretion. Legislative discretion shows in the legally binding or operative part 
of a directive which comprises the enacting terms (substantive and ancillary 
provisions). Discretionary or non-discretionary directive provisions can be 
identified by means of the mode of conduct which is a basic element of legal 
norms. The mode of conduct can be identified by means of may- and shall-
clauses in directive provisions. It is here where the link between the struc-
ture of a legal norm and discretion in EU directives becomes evident.

7.1 Introduction
In this chapter it is explained how legislative discretion is operationalised 
and assessed by means of content analysis, involving the coding of direc-
tives for which a codebook was prepared. The following sections present 
the steps taken in content analysis and codebook preparations, including a 
sketch of the coding and calculation procedures applied to assess margins 
of discretion of individual directives. While the codebook is presented in 
detail in the Appendix to the dissertation, at this stage an outline is pro-
vided of its content and application to directives.
7.2 Content analysis
Classical content analysis has been defined as a research technique ‘for the 
objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication’ (Berelson, 1952: 18; Neuendorf, 2002: 10).1 In this study, a 
qualitative twist is given to this approach for the description of legislative 
discretion cannot be fully objective but involves some interpretation and 
own decision-making in creating categories with which legislative discre-
tion is detected in directives and assessed (see Mayring, 2000).
Discretion is expected to affect the national legal implementation (trans-
position) of European directives. In the dissertation the attempt is made 
to further examine this link. At the same time, it is assumed that the link 
between discretion and transposition is inextricably connected with the rela-
tionship between discretion and the legitimacy of directives in national law. 
These relationships are further examined at a later stage. Suffice it to point 
out that one way to understand the link between discretion, transposition 
and legitimacy is to think of discretion as contributing to a specific trans-
position performance. Discretion either contributes to compliance or non-
compliance, and this can, depending on the final transposition result, be 
conceived as enhancing or reducing the legitimacy of directives in national 
1 For the presentation of content analysis, I largely draw on literature from the fi elds of 
communication research and media analysis where content analysis is rooted. For both 
the starting point and development of content analysis the works of scholars from the 
United States are important, in particular the contributions of Neuendorf (2002) and 
Krippendorf (2004). Further relevant contributions are provided in the German literature 
on the subject, from the fi elds of Communcation Science but also Educational Psychol-
ogy. See for instance Mayring (2000), Bonfadelli (2002), and Kromrey (2009).
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law. The literature review of the previous chapters shows that the effects 
of discretion on transposition, both facilitating and impeding ones, have 
mostly been ascribed to discretionary directives, meaning directives with 
larger margins of discretion. But also little discretion – in combination with 
Member State disagreement – is expected to affect (negatively) the incorpo-
ration of EU requirements into national law. Thus, for a study that focuses 
on the link between discretion and national transposition and the ques-
tion of how the former affects the latter, it is of vital importance to know 
whether individual directives grant smaller or larger margins of discretion 
to Member States. This presupposes an analysis of directives to assess their 
margins of discretion. To this end, and for case selection purposes, content 
analysis is applied. Content analysis implies that directives are subjected to 
a textual analysis and coding exercise. The latter is a technique to facilitate 
the analysis of the directive text by structuring and describing it by means 
of categories (see Neuendorf, 2002; Krippendorff, 2004).
A better understanding of what forms discretion takes in directives, it 
is necessary to identify whether more or less discretion is conferred upon 
Member States. Hence, with this aspect in mind, I conducted a literature 
and document study as well as an exploratory study of directives. The 
literature and document study involved a close reading of implementa-
tion studies, legal literature and manuals regarding the drafting of Euro-
pean legislation as well as manuals assisting Dutch ministry civil servants 
in the legal implementation of EU directives. For the exploratory study, I 
randomly chose directives from different policy areas.2 The analysis was 
exploratory in the sense that I looked at these directives from a somewhat 
different perspective than arguably adopted so far, namely by taking into 
account more details of the legislative texts. The exploratory study gener-
ally served to get more familiar with the structure, wording and content of 
directives. At the same time it was used to detect and understand those dis-
cretion manifestations previously derived from the literature study. More-
over, additional forms of discretion were inductively uncovered, serving to 
specify the basic definitions of discretion so far provided in the literature. 
All in all, the outcomes of the exploratory study provided me with valu-
able input for the codebook which I drew up to assess legislative discretion. 
More concrete, it served to revise and refine the initial coding scheme devel-
oped on the basis of the previous literature and document study. Interviews 
with experts in EU law offered relevant insights which further enhanced my 
understanding of the various discretion manifestations.
2 This study included around 100 directives from the following, randomly chosen policy 
areas: agriculture, consumer protection, environmental policy, health, industrial policy, 
internal market, justice and home affairs, social policy as well as transport policy.
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7.3 Legal concepts
Some of the discretion manifestations give expression to particular legal 
concepts. These legal concepts are mapped out here because they provide 
useful insights into discretionary but also non-discretionary directive pro-
visions, in particular regarding their legal implications for Member States’ 
laws. The presentation refers in turn to different EU harmonisation methods 
as well as the concepts of delegation, derogation and exemption.
7.3.1 Harmonisation
The amount of discretion offered by directives is closely linked to the con-
cept of harmonisation (Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, 2003: 489-492; 
724-725). In seeking to achieve uniformity in laws of Member States and 
to minimise trade distortions, harmonisation has been an important tool 
to create and maintain the internal market (Majone, 2005). At the same 
time, European harmonising measures can imply discretion which enables 
Member States to take into account national peculiarities (Prechal, 2005: 
44). Harmonisation comes in different forms, and more precisely, there are 
harmonisation levels and types (Handleiding Wetgeving en Europa, 2010: 
73-79).3 The two levels of harmonisation are minimum harmonisation and 
maximum harmonisation (also referred to as ‘full’ or ‘total’ harmonisation). 
The former can be considred as an instance of a discretionary provision, the 
latter as an instance of a non-discretionary provision.
7.3.1.1 Maximum harmonisation
With maximum harmonisation the European lawmaker intends to intro-
duce a European standard from which Member States are not allowed to 
deviate. This entails that Member States are neither allowed to establish 
less strict nor stricter provisions. An example hereof is the EU’s Consumer 
Credit Directive which states that: ‘Insofar as this Directive contains har-
monised provisions, Member States may not maintain or introduce in their 
national law provisions diverging from those laid down in this Directive.’4 
3 Handleiding Wetgeving en Europa (which literally translates to ‘Manual Law-making 
and Europe’), is the predecessor of the ‘101 Practical Questions on the Implementation of 
EC Decisions’ which had been reviewed against the background of persistent transposi-
tion defi cits in the Netherlands. Being published by the European Center of Expertise in 
EU law which was founded on the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Man-
ual addresses those involved in the preparation, formulation and implementation of EU 
law. The knowledge it provides shall guarantee consistent treatment of matters of EU law 
by government authorities. Cf. Handleiding Wetgeving en Europa (2010). De voorbere-
iding, totstandkoming en nationale implementatie van Europese regelgeving. Expertise-
centrum Europees Recht, Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie: Den Haag; available at: 
http://www.minbuza.nl/ecer/icer/handleidingen.html (accessed 20 November 2015).
4 Cf. Article 22(1) of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 
87/102/EEC, OJ L 133, 22 May 2008, pp. 66-92.
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Hence, if this level of harmonisation applies, corresponding EU require-
ments leave no discretion to Member States.
7.3.1.2 Minimum harmonisation
Minimum harmonisation requirements, by contrast, offer Member States 
larger margins of discretion. Migration directives are cases in point, as 
exemplified by the Return Directive: ‘This Directive shall be without prej-
udice to the right of the Member States to adopt or maintain provisions 
that are more favourable to persons to whom it applies provided that such 
provisions are compatible with this Directive.’5 Member States are, thus, 
allowed to go beyond what is prescribed by the directive requirement as 
long as implementation activities stay within the limits of the Directive.
7.3.1.3 Optional harmonisation
Optional harmonisation is, like mutual recognition, considered to be a spe-
cific type of harmonisation. Both harmonisation types are usually related to 
EU rules regarding products but not confined to these. Optional harmoni-
sation is addressed at economic operators (producers of goods) who may 
choose between the application of EU harmonised standards or national 
standards. Alternatively, optional harmonisation is addressed at the Mem-
ber States who are then allowed to decide whether or not to implement 
certain directive provisions. The EU’s Stage II Vapour Recovery Directive 
entails this harmonisation type. Article 4 establishes a uniform minimum 
level of petrol vapour recovery at service stations:
Member States shall ensure, with effect from the date on which Stage II petrol vapour 
recovery systems become mandatory pursuant to Article 3, that the petrol vapour capture 
efficiency of such systems is equal to or greater than 85 % as certified by the manufacturer 
in accordance with relevant European technical standards or type approval procedures 
referred to in Article 8 or, if there are no such standards or procedures, with any relevant 
national standard.6
It seems that optional harmonisation grants larger amounts of discretion to 
Member States due to the element of choice.7
5 Cf. Article 4(3) of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for return-
ing illegally staying third-country nationals.
6 Cf. Article 4 of Directive 2009/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
21 October 2009 on Stage II petrol vapour recovery during refuelling of motor vehicles at 
service stations, OJ L 285, 31 October 2009, pp. 36-39.
7 And yet, it should be noted that in the long run the relevant EU requirements could have 
more harmonising effect than expected at fi rst sight. Producers of goods are usually 
not keen on risking losses and could therefore be rather inclined to apply EU standards 
which are applicable throughout the EU. Moreover, following EU standards may reduce 
the risk of implementation failure.
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7.3.1.4 Mutual recognition
Mutual recognition obliges Member States to recognise other Member 
States’ rules and requirements for products and services with the aim of 
contributing to the free movement of goods: ‘Member States shall not pro-
hibit, restrict or hinder the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles 
which satisfy the requirements of this Directive’ as laid down by the EU’s 
Directives on Pyrotechnic Articles.8 This type of harmonisation does not 
imply that European standards have to be implemented. However, approxi-
mation of national laws is nevertheless a result of mutual recognition. 
This is due to the fact that it requires the harmonisation of national legal 
or administrative rules regarding market access of products and services, 
including professional and trade activities of individuals and undertakings. 
Mutual recognition is the core principal of the EU’s new approach to har-
monisation that the EU started to apply by the end of the 1980s, especially 
with respect to technical standardisation of products (Handleiding Wetgev-
ing en Europa, 2009: 75). It was established in Articles 28 and 30 TEC (now 
Articles 34 and 36 TFEU). Directives implying the principle of mutual rec-
ognition usually include the delegation of competences to technical stan-
dardisation bodies that are attached to the European Commission’s Direc-
torate General for Enterprise and Industry. These bodies have the task to 
further elaborate the technical requirements (harmonised standards) which 
can be applied by manufacturers on a voluntary basis.
It appears that mutual recognition and optional harmonisation imply 
more discretion than full harmonisation but less than minimum harmoni-
sation. In general, however, further specifying the amounts of discretion 
requires a detailed look into each and every directive which was beyond 
both the scope and purpose of this study. For the sake of clarity, it should 
be noted here that the purpose of content analysis and coding process, was 
not to provide an exact measurement but instead to indicate a tendency 
towards more or less discretion granted by a directive.
7.3.2 Delegation
Two different forms of delegation in the context of implementation of EU 
directives are distinguished. First, based on EU primary legislation, Mem-
ber States are largely in charge of implementation (Article 4(3) TEU) but the 
European Commission or bodies attached to it may be involved (Article 202 
TEC, now Articles 290 and 291 TFEU). The conferral of these implementing 
powers to the Commission is considered here to reduce Member States’ dis-
cretion in implementation. Second, having the discretionary choice of forms 
and methods, Member States have the possibility to delegate decision-
8 Cf. Article 6(1) of Directive 2007/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 May 2007 on the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles.
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making competences for the purpose of implementation to national bod-
ies. Delegation rests on the principal of institutional autonomy. Institutional 
autonomy or ‘organisational autonomy’ (Gil Ibá ñ ez, 1999: 211-213) pro-
vides Member States with the discretion to decide on organisational and 
procedural issues related to the implementation of directives. With regard 
to transposition, Member States are, for instance, free to choose the legal 
techniques (e.g. ‘gold-plating’ or translation) and instruments (in the Dutch 
transposition context: parliamentary acts, orders in council, ministerial deci-
sions etc.) they deem to fit best with their domestic legal orders and prac-
tices (Handleiding Wetgeving en Europa, 2009: 107). Member States can, 
thus, choose the national bodies they consider to be the most suitable to 
carry out the implementation of directives. Member States are, however, 
not entirely free in this regard. Some directives may include procedural 
specifications that have to be taken into account by the national bodies that 
are in charge of implementation. Additionally, directives can include fur-
ther specifications, such as determining the implementing bodies that shall 
apply the directive on the ground (Gil Ibá ñ ez, 1999: 212-13; Van der Burg 
and Voermans, 2015: 72-73). Notwithstanding these limitations, institutional 
autonomy is associated with the delegation of discretion to Member States 
and therefore considered to be a manifestation of discretion.
7.3.3 Derogation and exemption
Member states are allowed to deviate from EU requirements. This permis-
sion can be related to specific flexible arrangements referred to as deroga-
tions and exemptions.9 As a rule, both are measures that apply under certain 
conditions and may be applicable for only a limited period of time. Never-
theless, they provide Member States with flexibility. Regarding derogation, 
while EU requirements have to be applied, Member States are released from 
the obligation to apply them in the way prescribed by the directive. The 
EU Directive on the minimum health and safety requirements, for instance, 
stipulates that: ‘In compliance with the general principles of health and 
safety protection for workers, Member States may, in the case of sea and air 
transport, derogate from Article 5(3) in duly justified circumstances (…).’10 
Furthermore, Member States can claim exemptions from larger parts of a 
directive, or under justified circumstances, from the directive as a whole, 
meaning that they do not have to apply the relevant EU requirements: 
9 Without wanting to ignore that corresponding arrangements are established by EU pri-
mary legislation, for instance, in the area of the internal market (e.g. derogations within 
Art. 114 TFEU and exemptions related to Art. 101 TFEU), the focus here is limited to 
derogations and exemptions in EU secondary legislation (directives).
10 Cf. Article 10(1) of Directive 2002/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 25 June 2002 on the minimum health and safety requirements regarding the expo-
sure of workers to the risks arising from physical agents (vibration) (sixteenth individual 
Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) – Joint Statement 
by the European Parliament and the Council, OJ L 177, 6 July 2002, pp. 13-20.
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‘Without prejudice to any more stringent requirements in other Commu-
nity legislation, Member States may exempt from the measures required by 
paragraph 1 inputs of pollutants that are:…’.11
Having outlined some discretion manifestations in more detail, the 
focus now shifts to how these manifestations are identified and dealt with 
in content analysis.
7.4 Coding process
Content analysis entails that the group of directives that is examined in 
more detail (defined further below as ‘directive sample’) is subjected to an 
analytical process which is referred to as coding. The overall aim of the cod-
ing process is to assess whether a directive grants larger or smaller margins 
of discretion. Determining the margin of discretion is based, in turn, on the 
analysis of individual directive provisions that are examined to detect discre-
tion manifestations by means of previously defined indicators. To facilitate 
the analysis, codes (in the form of numbers) are used to describe provisions. 
According to the underlying logic of coding rules (Kromrey, 2009: 314), each 
code is used for one sub-category representing a specific discretion mani-
festation. Hence, each discretionary provision manifestation gets a code 
and the same applies to each non-discretionary provision manifestation.
These discretionary or non-discretionary provisions characterise the 
permissive and obligatory language categories, respectively. The coding 
process is geared towards facilitating assessing discretion and calculating it 
in a subsequent step. Table 4 serves to illustrate the steps of the envisaged 
approach which is now addressed in more detail.
Table 4: Assessing discretion in European directives
1 Identifying provisions in directive articles 
2 Identifying sort of provisions: discretionary (may-clause) or non-discretionary 
(shall-clause) 
3 Ascribing relevant codes to directive provisions 
4 Calculating discretion  
5 Reaching an outcome: directive with larger or smaller margin of discretion
11 Cf. Article 6(3) of Directive 2006/118/EC on the protection of groundwater against pol-
lution and deterioration, OJ L 372, 27 December 2006, pp. 19-31. An exemption from the 
entire directive is, for instance, provided by Directive 2014/89/EU establishing a frame-
work for maritime spatial planning, OJ L 257, 28 August 2014, pp. 135-145. See recital 
(27).
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7.4.1 Coding scheme
The coding scheme is the central component of the codebook which is a 
key instrument in content analysis. The codebook, together with the coding 
scheme, lies down the coding rules, and hence specifies which elements of 
the content of a text – usually described in main categories (or dimensions) 
and sub-categories – are coded and how.
Drawing up the codebook required some preparatory work, starting with 
the aforementioned study of literature, manuals and directives. This prepa-
ratory analysis involved the following steps. First, legislative discretion was 
identified by means of obligatory and permissive language which is used to 
give expression to discretionary and non-discretionary directive provisions 
– corresponding indicators being shall- and may-clauses. In this regard, 
using the mode of conduct of legal norms to detect discretion manifesta-
tions proved useful. Second, further discretion manifestations were identi-
fied, classified as discretionary or non-discretionary provisions, and used 
as sub-categories to describe in more detail the permissive or obligatory 
language dimensions. Third, for each sub-category, indicators and examples 
were derived from the texts of directives. In a fourth step, for the proper 
application of the coding scheme, the level of analysis and unit of analysis 
were determined (see Bonfadelli, 2002: 89). Coding is applied at two lev-
els: at the syntax and semantic levels. At the syntax level, sentences or parts 
of sentences are coded as explained and illustrated in the codebook. At the 
semantic level themes are captured: permissions (discretionary provisions) 
and obligations (non-discretionary provisions). The unit of analysis is a sen-
tence or clause, or even a sub-point, depending on the structure of the direc-
tive provision. In implementation studies discretion margins of directives 
have been assessed taking into account the directive as a whole or applying 
a more detailed approach, by taking a closer look at the directive article or 
sub-divisions of an article (provision) (see e.g. Knill and Lenschow, 1998; 
Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009; Thomson, 2010). This latter approach is 
also adopted in the present study. But provisions as established in the code-
book do not necessarily correspond with the common understanding of a 
provision as sub-division of an article (Joint Practical Guide, 2013: 35). A 
provision can be a simple sentence but, based on the fine-grained approach 
applied in this dissertation, comprise less textual information and cover 
smaller parts like clauses within sentences. By introducing a more detailed 
definition of a directive provision I was able to consider both obligations 
(‘shall be issued’) and permissions (‘may be limited’) in the coding process 
despite the fact that they belong to the same provision which usually is con-
sidered to include one discretion manifestation (see box 5). In my view such 
an approach better takes into account the complex wording and structure of 
directives.
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Box 5: Defining directive provision 
Article 12
Form
1. Return decisions and, if issued, entry-ban decisions and decisions on 
removal shall be issued in writing and give reasons in fact and in law as well as 
information about available legal remedies.||  
The information on reasons in fact may be limited where national law allows 
for the right to information to be restricted, in particular in order to safeguard 
national security, defence, public security and for the prevention, investigation, 
detection and prosecution of criminal offences.
To sum up, main categories, sub-categories, indicators and examples make 
up the coding scheme of the codebook which lays down rules and steps of 
the coding process. The coding scheme makes it possible to describe legis-
lative discretion in more detail, especially in terms of amount but also in 
terms of its implications for Member State laws. The latter aspect refers to 
the fact that discretion manifestations may be related to specific legal con-
cepts that imply in what way EU law intends to align national law. Some of 
these concepts were described above.
In the present study, a combination of the previous approaches is 
applied, alongside a more fine-grained analysis, in which a number of dis-
cretion manifestations are identified and explained – arguably more than 
so far mentioned in other studies. In doing so, I seek to cover more compre-
hensively the various discretion manifestations that a directive can entail. 
In my view, such an approach does more justice to the complex nature of 
directives as binding legal instruments among EU secondary legislation.
7.4.1.1 Relevant and standard provisions
Before setting out the coding process in more detail, it is necessary to make 
some preliminary remarks for greater clarity and ease of understanding in 
the approach taken to analyse discretion in directives. To start with, not only 
the distinction between discretionary and non-discretionary provisions is an 
important one in coding directives. Given the focus on discretion granted to 
Member States for the (legal) implementation of directives, it is furthermore 
pertinent to distinguish between what I refer to as ‘standard’ provision, on 
the one hand, and ‘relevant’ provision, on the other hand (examples of both 
are provided in the codebook). To start with the latter, these relevant pro-
visions address the Member States or national authorities acting on their 
behalf when implementing directives. But also a few provisions address-
ing the European Commission are treated as relevant for reasons explained 
below. The relevant provisions fall into the main categories of obligatory 
language or permissive language, meaning that they include either a shall- 
or may-clause. Relevant provisions are used in calculating discretion mar-
gins in contrast to standard provisions. Standard provisions make part of 
nearly every directive and are, from a content perspective, negligible since 
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they do not imply relevant additional discretion (see also Steunenberg and 
Toshkov, 2009: 958). This is not to say that standard provisions are com-
pletely disregarded. After all, coding involves the entire legally binding part 
of a directive (except for the Annexes, see below). However, they are not 
used for calculation purposes. Examples of standard provisions pertain to 
the general and final provisions of a directive: for instance, they describe 
the subject matter and key terms of the directive. They can also include 
provisions referring to EU procedures (e.g. comitology procedures) or con-
cern the applicability of specific parts of directives, stating the transposi-
tion deadline, notification requirements, the date of entry into force, and the 
addresses of the directive (usually the Member States). For the most part 
these provisions do not contain any legal norms in their own right but, 
instead, include so-called ‘meta-norms’ understood as mere descriptions of 
legal norms (Eijlander and Voermans, 2000: 143). To give an example: ‘This 
Directive shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official 
Journal of the European Union.’12 These meta-norms are, formally speaking, 
not legally binding which constitutes another reason to exclude them from 
the analysis.
Provisions setting out the directive’s scope are among the general provi-
sions. And yet, unlike the other provisions just mentioned they are consid-
ered relevant in calculating discretion, since they address the content of the 
legislative act, describing its area of applicability. In addition, they can imply 
discretion as illustrated by the EU’s Blue Card Directive which stipulates 
that ‘[t]his Directive shall be without prejudice to the right of the Member States 
to issue [italics added] residence permits other than an EU Blue Card for any 
purpose of employment. Such residence permits shall not confer the right of 
residence in the other Member States as provided for in this Directive.’13
Other provisions that are next to standard provisions disregarded from 
calculating discretion are those directed at EU-level institutions or third 
parties – besides some exceptions referring to the European Commission. 
An example of a disregarded provision is the following one: ‘[t]he relevant 
economic operator shall ensure that appropriate corrective action is taken 
in respect of toys which that operator has made available on the Com-
munity market.’14 At the same time, provisions concerning implementing 
powers are taken into account in measuring discretion because, as earlier 
mentioned, the conferral of these (discretionary) powers upon the Euro-
pean Commission is considered as affecting (reducing) the scope of discre-
tion granted to Member States. The same applies to the provisions which 
12 This is a standard provision which is usually the penultimate provision of a directive. 
The example is taken from Directive 2009/126/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 21 October 2009 on Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery.
13 See Article 3(4) of Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions 
of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualifi ed 
employment, OJ L 155, 18 June 2009, pp. 17-29.
14 See Article 43(3) of Directive 2009/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 18 June 2009 on the safety of toys, OJ L 170, 30 June 2009, pp. 1-37.
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contain obligations for both Member States and the European Commission 
requiring, for instance, mutual exchange and consultation.
The exploratory study of directives brought into view that provisions 
are not always worded unambiguously (see also Cutts, 2001). Hence, even 
though one of the major principles the European Union institutions have 
themselves committed to, is drafting EU legal acts in a way that is ‘clear, 
easy to understand and unambiguous’ (Joint Practical Guide, 2013: 6), it is 
not always possible to identify provisions clearly as discretionary or non-
discretionary. This shows in the fact that provisions were found to contain 
both may- and shall clauses as illustrated above (box 5), or as in the follow-
ing example: ‘When a market surveillance authority requests the technical 
documentation or a translation of parts thereof from a manufacturer, it may 
fix a deadline for receipt of such file or translation, which shall be 30 days 
(…)’.15 This fact was taken into account by establishing a further group of 
‘relevant’ provisions, referred to as ‘hybrid’ provisions.
Last but not least, it has to be noted that, strictly speaking, not the 
entirely legally binding part of directives is coded, since the Annex to direc-
tives was excluded from content analysis. Annexes are no fixed components 
of directives.16 An Annex is usually provided if directive requirements have 
to be specified and, hence, details of the directive have to be filled in, often 
technical ones. To this end implementing powers are conferred upon the 
European Commission (Prechal, 2005: 48; Joint Practical Guide, 2013: 45). 
The technical details can be quite complex. Due to this reason, the view is 
taken here that the Annex does not lend itself to be used in calculating a 
directive’s discretion margin. However, the very fact that an implementing 
task, such as the addition of technical details, is delegated to the Commis-
sion and its committees (comitology procedure) is taken into account as pre-
viously mentioned.
7.4.2 Coding and calculating margin of discretion
Coding, in the present context, denotes an analytical process in which tex-
tual data embodied by the directive is translated into values and codes. Val-
ues refer to the categories – permissive and obligatory language indicated 
by discretionary and non-discretionary provisions – which are described 
by codes. In other words, the textual information which a provision com-
prises is quantified by ascribing one code to that provision. Thus, each cat-
egory and sub-category has its own code. While one code has to be used 
to describe one discretion manifestation, another code was used to docu-
ment the addressee of the relevant provision. From Article 288 TFEU which 
15 See Article 21(3) of Directive 2009/48/EC.
16 This fact is well refl ected by the group of directives that was subjected to content analy-
sis. From a total of seventeen directives, eight environmental directives and three con-
sumer protection directives had an Annex. None of the asylum and migration directives 
included an Annex.
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defines the legislative instruments that are available to the EU to realise its 
policy objectives, it can be derived that directives are addressed to the Mem-
ber States. This does, however, not remove the fact, that directive provisions 
can be addressed at other actors, such as national authorities (administra-
tive bodies, courts), the European Commission or other EU bodies as well 
as third parties (economic operators, amongst others). National authorities 
which have a role to play in the implementation of the directive in ques-
tion act on behalf of the Member States – and are therefore ascribed to the 
same category (and code). Directives are only binding on the Member States 
and not on individuals (Prechal, 2005: 55). To make this difference clear, it is 
shown in the codebook that a separate code is applied to third party actors 
which are referred to as ‘intermediate addressees’ in contrast to Member 
States which are treated as ‘immediate addressees’ of directives.
Coding directive provisions facilitated measuring discretion which was 
carried out in a subsequent step. Coding each directive was documented 
in a separate coding sheet (excel spreadsheet) in which further directive-
related information was included, considered to be valuable context infor-
mation: the policy and issue area the directive addresses, the total number 
of articles and recitals and whether or not the directive contains an Annex. 
Also the transposition deadline was written down. The complete directive 
text was coded. This means that in each case the numbers of all directive 
articles and sub-articles were documented in the sheet, followed by the 
number of provisions that were identified in a first round using the defini-
tions laid down in the codebook. In a second round, the relevant codes were 
ascribed to each provision. In line with the coding rules established in the 
codebook, I coded every provision according to whether it makes some sort 
of discretion available to Member States for transposition or, due to some 
sort of constraint, it does not grant any or very limited discretion.
Calculating the margin of discretion of each directive represented the 
last step in the coding process. More than one way to calculate discretion 
margins has been suggested in the literature (e.g. Franchino, 2004; Thom-
son, 2007; Thomson et al., 2007; Kaeding, 2008; Steunenberg and Toshkov, 
2009; Zhelazykova, 2013). Franchino (2004) is one of the very few scholars 
who include measures of constraints in the calculation of discretion mar-
gins.17 Most of the other authors take the total number of major provisions 
identified as discretionary and divide these by the total number of (major) 
provisions of the directive. Distinction is thereby made between provisions 
that grant discretion to Member States (coded as 1) and those that do not 
(coded as 0) (see Thomson, 2007: 995; Kaeding, 2008: 129; Zhelazykova, 
2013: 711). However, this method of calculating discretion focuses on discre-
tionary provisions in relation to the total number of directive provisions and 
does not explicitly include non-discretionary provisions. For this reason, it 
17 Franchino identifi es different categories of procedural constraints imposed by the Coun-
cil on discretion delegated to the Commission or the Member States for the purpose of 
implementation. See Franchino, 2004, p. 283.
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was not used in the present study. Instead, use was made of the calcula-
tion method suggested by Steunenberg and Toshkov (2009). The authors 
base their measurement of discretion on an index which describes the ratio 
between the total numbers of open statements and the sum of the total 
numbers of open and closed statements (Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009: 
959). I slightly adapted this index in taking the numbers of discretionary 
and non-discretionary provisions to define the discretion ratio and calcu-
late the margins of discretion in each case. More concrete, for calculating 
discretion margins of individual directives, I used the frequency of discre-
tionary and non-discretionary provisions which indicate permissive (P) and 
obligatory (O) language categories, respectively. Hence, the index used boils 
down to the ratio between the total number of discretionary provisions and 
the sum of the total numbers of discretionary and non-discretionary provi-
sions as shown in box 6:
Box 6: Index for calculating legislative discretion 
Di = Pi / Pi + Oi
Legislative discretion of a directive, Di, based on the total number of permissions 
(discretionary provisions), Pi, divided by the sum of the total numbers of 
permissions and obligations (non-discretionary provisions), Pi + Oi.
It was eventually decided not to further specify the margin of discretion 
granted by each and every discretion instance. First of all and as noted ear-
lier, the primary aim of the codebook is not to offer exact measurements 
but to indicate a tendency towards larger or smaller margins of discretion 
granted by individual directives. Another aim is to show that discretion 
can take more forms than identified so far. What’s more, specification of the 
discretion margins of each sub-category would have required a still more 
detailed analysis of directive texts, including other sources to be taken into 
consideration (e.g. case law). This, however, is neither the aim of the code-
book of this dissertation nor feasible within the scope of this study.
7.5 Codebook criteria
The remaining sections set out a number of criteria which are considered to 
improve the presentation and robustness of the results of both content anal-
ysis and codebook application (see Bonfadelli, 2002: 81; Neuendorf, 2002: 
11-13; Kromrey, 2009: 300-304).
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7.5.1 Intersubjectivity
Objectivity in the description or explanation of a research phenomenon is an 
ideal to which the researcher seeks to live up in order to prevent perception 
bias. Knowing that objectivity can never be fully achieved and subjectivity 
not entirely avoided, intersubjectivity is suggested by way of compromise. 
In the present context intersubjectivity relates to a shared understanding of 
the components of the codebook, above all the dimensions, sub-categories 
and indicators used to capture legislative discretion in directives. While this 
is certainly desirable it is also a very ambitious target. To stay within the 
boundaries of what was practically feasible, a more modest approach was 
chosen. The different discretion manifestations were presented to people 
with expertise in EU law (civil servants from national ministries, Euro-
pean Commission, and academics) who exchanged their views with me on 
this particular matter. They largely agreed with the basic distinction made 
between permissive and obligatory language (may- and shall-clauses).18
7.5.2 Validity
Validity refers in the present context to the major elements of the coding 
scheme, the main categories and particularly sub-categories that were estab-
lished to identify and describe discretion in directives. It was thus impor-
tant to find out whether the two categories of obligatory and permissive 
language can be considered as an appropriate means to capture discretion 
– larger and smaller margins of it conferred upon Member States. In other 
words, the key issue was whether these categories operationalise discre-
tion in a way that matches its theoretical conceptualisation. Thus, the cen-
tral questions arising in this context were: does the codebook function as a 
proper measurement instrument to assess directives’ margins of discretion? 
And does it measure, what it is supposed to measure, namely larger and 
limited margins of discretion? To obtain certainty regarding these issues the 
aforementioned interviews proved valuable.
7.5.3 Suitability, mutual exclusiveness and completeness
Some criteria are closely related to each other, especially those that pertain 
to the way categories were defined. The definitions of categories were based 
on a number of considerations. First of all, it seemed important to clearly 
explain the various categories in order to facilitate the task of identifying 
them in the legislative text. In other words, I had to ensure that the catego-
18 While the input of the interviewees provided further useful insights, also regarding the 
legal concepts discretion is linked with (see section 7.3) all choices concerning the cod-
ing scheme were made by me - but in agreement with the managers of this dissertation 
project. They have a profound knowledge of EU law and politics, being themselves legal 
and political science scholars.
Chapter 7  Operationalising and measuring discretion 115
ries can be derived from the manifest content of the directive. Second, cate-
gories were chosen that could be applied to all directives. For this reason as 
mentioned above, the Annexes to directives were disregarded in the coding 
process. Third, exclusion of discretionary concepts such as ‘public order’ or 
‘public policy’ was motivated by the consideration that too small sub-cate-
gories should be avoided to prevent overlap of categories; otherwise small 
categories would fall within bigger ones). For the same reason, seemingly 
discretionary expressions like ‘if appropriate’ or ‘appropriate measures’ 
(e.g. ‘Member States shall take appropriate measures…’) were not consid-
ered as categories in their own rights. In this regard, the aim was further-
more to ensure the independence of categories. Otherwise the conventional 
rule of using one code for one category to describe one provision regard-
ing its (non-)discretionary nature would have been violated and therefore 
the criterion of strict differentiation (see Bonfadelli, 2002: 90).19 At the same 
time, I sought to ensure that sub-categories were exhaustive in describing 
the relevant aspects of the permissive and obligatory language categories. 
In other words, the ambition was to capture as comprehensive as possible 
the different discretion manifestations.
7.5.4 Reliability
Finally, I sought to ensure the reliability of the codebook. Reliability is 
closely connected to the criterion of intersubjectivity initially mentioned 
and refers to the fact that the measuring procedure – as established in the 
codebook – delivers the same results if trials are repeated (Neuendorf, 2002: 
12; see also Kromrey, 2009: 239-242). At the same time it also implies some 
level of agreement among coders regarding the application of the coding 
scheme to the matter under investigation (directive). While the latter refers 
to inter-coder reliability that involves two or more coders, in this study, 
intra-coder reliability was applied.20 Hence, I repeated coding on a random 
choice of already coded directives to establish the overall consistency of the 
coding instrument (codebook and coding scheme) and the results obtained. 
Repeated trials were carried out at different intervals though, to avoid 
effects from memorising results from previous trials. This was done with 
due care but given the intricate design of directives and the final complex-
ity of the codebook, slight differences of results – with however no bigger 
impact on the selection of directives – could not be avoided. Finally, to add 
to the consistency of the approach, I sought to apply the codebook to the 
various directives in a systematic and uniform way.
19 This criterion is referred to in the German literature as ‘Trennschärfe’ meaning the ‘strict 
differentiation between items’.
20 The decision to code the sample directives by myself was taken due especially to prag-
matic reasons. The codebook turned out to be quite complex in the end which would 
have made involving a group of coders too time-consuming. In addition, coding a sam-
ple of seventeen directives was considered as feasible for one person to manage.
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This list of codebook criteria does not claim to be exhaustive but 
addresses relevant aspects that were considered in drawing up and apply-
ing a codebook for the analysis of European directives (see Appendix).
7.6 Summary
This chapter dealt with the application of content analysis which is used 
in the present study to analyse directives regarding the margins of discre-
tion they grant. Content analysis includes that directives are subjected to 
coding which is used to identify manifestations of discretion in directive 
provisions. These discretion manifestations are described by a codebook 
and coding scheme, laying down rules which guide the analysis of direc-
tives. While the codebook is presented in the Appendix to the dissertation, 
in the previous sections a rough sketch of it was provided as well as the 
criteria explained that were taken into account in developing it. Based on 
the coding process, discretionary and non-discretionary provisions are dis-
tinguished and those provisions which are considered relevant are used 
for assessing the scope of discretion granted to Member States. This way it 
is established whether a directive makes a rather larger or smaller margin 
of discretion available to Member States for the purpose of implementing 
directives.
8.1 Introduction
The theory of this study needs to be connected with the empirical analysis. 
The empirical analysis seeks to assess the expectations concerning the role 
of discretion in the negotiation and transposition of European directives 
and includes the case studies presented later in the book. The first steps in 
connecting the theoretical and empirical parts of this book were taken by 
operationalising discretion which resulted in the introduction of content 
analysis and the codebook instrument. The second major element of the 
methodological approach adopted in this study is the case study method 
which shall be addressed in the subsequent sections. In this context several 
questions arise. How is the analytical framework applied to the empirical 
examples, how are these examples or cases selected, and in what way was 
the empirical research carried out, which methods and techniques were 
used to this end, what kind of data was applied, and how was this data 
generated? In short, in this chapter relevant questions of case study research 
methodology are addressed.
8.2 Case selection strategy
The first topic to be dealt with is the case selection process. The selection of 
cases for the empirical analysis was carried out in a step-wise manner, by 
means of a preliminary selection of directives, followed by the application 
of content analysis as well as the use of a specific case selection strategy. The 
case selection strategy applied required taking into consideration additional 
factors that next to discretion are expected to affect national transposition.
8.2.1 Directives for content analysis
A preliminary selection of directives was carried out to define the directive 
population of this study. The directive population refers, in other words, to 
a large group of directives that represent the main focus of the study. These 
directives share certain common characteristics on the basis of which they 
were chosen. In the present context these characteristics pertain to directive 
and EU-level features. Thus, the selection was made with an eye to the sort 
of directive, the adoption period and policy area. Consequently, the research 
population is a group of directives which represent new legislative acts 
(instead of amendments of already existing directives), were adopted in the 
period 1 January 2007 to 1 December 2009 and address the EU policy area of 
8 Case study approach
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consumer protection, environment, and justice and home affairs (see table 
5). The corresponding directives were obtained by making the relevant que-
ries, using the European Union’s legal database EUR-Lex which provides 
free access to EU law.
Table 5: Selecting directives for content analysis 




1 January 2007 until 
31 December 2009
New legislative acts 
The distribution of directives by policy area yielded the following results: 
twenty-five environmental directives, nine consumer protection directives 
and five directives concerning migration. The prominent representation of 
environmental directives does not come as a surprise. In the area of envi-
ronment the EU has been highly active for decades, and this has resulted 
in a vast amount of legislative output. The small number of directives in 
the field of justice and home affairs, on the other hand, reflects the power 
relationship between the EU and its Member States, which was for a long 
time in favour of the latter and EU decision-making competence therefore 
limited. In relation to these two policy areas, consumer protection seems 
to take a middle position. In any case, it is known as an area where the EU 
has a rather wide competence. The entire group of directives initially also 
comprised modifying or amending directives next to new directives. This 
was in line with the original idea to add to the analysis a further dimension 
in explaining transposition and therefore to have more variation concerning 
the sort of legal act. Modifying directives change already existing ones and 
are assumed to be faster transposed than new directives since they imply 
only little change to national law (Kaeding, 2006; 2007b; Mastenbroek, 2007). 
New directives, by contrast, entail new topics of legislation, and for this rea-
son they are considered more likely to cause disagreement between domes-
tic actors, resulting in delayed transposition (Haverland and Romeijn, 2007). 
The idea to include modifying directives was eventually dropped for rea-
sons of feasibility related, in particular, to the application of the codebook to 
measure discretion margins of individual directives. It turned out that the 
codebook would be more suitably applied to the analysis of new directives 
which do not need to be analysed in conjunction with previous acts. Be it as 
it may, removing the modifications among the directives reduced the total 
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number of directives as did the exclusion of codifications and recasts.1 As 
for these specific types of modifications, the corresponding directives did 
not require transposition into national legislation and were therefore dis-
regarded. This was, in particular, due to two reasons: First, the directives 
introduced technical amendments to be addressed in comitology commit-
tees chaired by the European Commission in the so-called committee proce-
dure. Second, codifying directives, in bringing together already existing leg-
islation and all its amendments in a new single act, do not specify any new 
transposition deadline. The total number of directives finally boiled down 
to seventeen basic legislative acts: ten environmental directives, three con-
sumer protection directives and four directives on migration (see the listing 
of directives in the Appendix).
8.2.2 Directives for case study analysis
In a next step, the seventeen directives were subjected to content analysis 
and the application of the codebook to determine individual discretion 
margins. Since directives with lower and, in particular, higher discretion 
margins are expected to affect transposition differently, I decided to select 
directives with varying discretion margins (small and large) for the case 
study analyses and subsequent comparison of directive pairs. Accordingly, 
the case study approach entails the analysis of six individual cases which 
include three directives that grant more and three directives that grant less 
discretion. These directives make up the directive sample of this study: 
cases that represent the directive population, in other words the ‘immedi-
ate subject’ of the case studies (Gerring, 2007: 21).2 The individual analyses 
are followed by a paired comparison to highlight and discuss the effects of 
larger and smaller margins of discretion on the negotiation and transposi-
tion of European directives.
1 Modifying directives or modifi cations is used here as a general denominator for amend-
ments, codifications and recasts. Amendments imply changes to an already existing 
directive. Unlike amendments, codifi cations as well as recasts entail that a new law is 
adopted which brings together the legislative act and all its amendments in one piece 
of legislation. Codifying directives replace the acts being codifi ed. The acts subject to 
recasting are repealed. Both codifi cation and recasting are techniques that result from 
the European Commission’s Better Regulation strategy aiming to achieve better acces-
sibility, comprehensibility and coherency of European legislation as well as the latter’s 
smoother transposition and implementation. See the relevant defi nitions provided by 
the European Commission’s legal service (2015) Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
legal_service/index_en.htm (accessed 7 August 2015). See also Voermans, W. (2009). 
Regelvermindering via codifi ceren en consolideren, Regelmaat 24(3): 179-182.
2 Next to the aim of having six cases for the case studies and comparison, another reason 
for drawing a directive sample from the population of directives is to ensure that car-
rying out the analysis is feasible. A population of cases is usually too large in size to be 
analysed by an exploratory case study approach like the one applied in this study. For 
this reason, some further systematic choices were made, resulting in the creation of a 
directive sample from which fi nally six directives were selected for further analysis.
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The decision to compare cases had implications for the further case selection 
process. Comparative case study methodology offers different strategies to 
select cases depending on the exact purpose of the comparison (Lijphart 
1971; 1975; Pennings et al., 1999; Blatter and Haverland, 2012). I decided to 
apply the ‘most similar systems design’ (Lijphart, 1971: 687-690; Seawright 
and Gerring, 2008: 304-305; Blatter and Haverland, 2012: 42-44),3 because in 
my view, it most adequately addresses the purposes and goals of the pres-
ent study. The starting point of the most similar systems design is to select 
two cases based on the assumption that while they are similar in respect of 
several aspects, I refer to as background factors, they differ regarding the 
factor(s) that are to the study’s prime interest. The latter factors have been 
referred to as presumed cause and outcome or independent and dependent 
variables depending on the type of research and methodological approach 
that scholars apply. According to Pennings et al., the main concern of com-
parative case studies with a most similar systems design is the correspon-
dence between the independent and dependent variables based on their 
variation across cases under review (see Pennings et al., 1999: 38). Trans-
lated to the present context of transposition, what is analysed is the link 
between a larger discretion margin – the independent variable or presumed 
cause – and the outcome which is proper or deficient transposition whereby 
‘proper’ is understood as timely and legally correct transposition. More 
concrete, the more discretion a directive grants the more likely it is that 
transposition is proper or deficient.4 Proper and deficient transposition are 
understood as compliance and non-compliance with EU law, respectively, 
and may, from the viewpoint of legitimacy, be considered as detrimental or 
beneficial for both the process and outcome of national decision-making for 
the purpose of formally implementing directives.
To focus on the correspondence between the amount of discretion and 
the corresponding transposition outcome across cases means that the focus 
is on the question whether or not variations of discretion lead to different 
transposition outcomes. In line with a positive reading of discretion, it is 
expected that more discretion leads to proper transposition in terms of time-
liness and legal correctness. What has to be taken into consideration, how-
ever, is that the outcome of interest may be produced by a ‘plurality of fac-
tors’ (Blatter and Haverland, 2012: 24). In order to consider separately the 
impacts of individual factor(s) on the outcome, and, in particular, to focus 
on the particular relationship between the presumed cause (discretion) and 
outcome of interest (transposition result), these other factors must be held 
3 Lijphart refers to it as ‘comparative method’ or ‘comparable analysis on comparable cas-
es’. Cf. Lijphart, 1971, p. 687.
4 This expectation is formulated in line with the objective of the study to highlight the 
potential of discretion in facilitating decision-making processes regarding directives. As 
previously shown in the theoretical part and refl ected by the analytical framework, how-
ever, this study does not disregard evidence to the contrary and therefore the purported 
negative effects of discretion.
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constant. In research methodology this is referred to as the ceteris paribus 
assumption5 (see Lijphart, 1971; Gerring, 2007). Applied in the present con-
text this means that more discretion leads to proper transposition as long 
as all other factors that might affect the transposition outcome remain con-
stant. In this way, it is possible to zoom in on the relationship between dis-
cretion and transposition by screening out, to the greatest extent possible, 
the influence of other factors on transposition. For a better understanding, 
the underlying logic of the research design is visualised in table 6.
Table 6: The role of discretion according to the most similar systems design
















Case 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Case 2 1 1 1 1 0 0
Case 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Case 4 1 1 1 1 0 0
Case 5 1 1 1 1 1 1
Case 6 1 1 1 1 0 0
The first transposition case shows that in the presence of five other factors, 
including discretion, timely and legally correct transposition is achieved. 
This, however, does not say anything particular about the link between dis-
cretion and transposition outcome. Only if other transposition scenarios are 
included, it becomes possible to detect a pattern. As shown in the figure, the 
transposition outcome changes, in case that the directive’s margin of discre-
tion changes, while all other factors remain the same. These factors are the 
background factors which are addressed below. The underlying expectation 
of the relationship between discretion and transposition is, as noted above, 
that in case that more discretion is available for transposition, compliance 
with the directive is achieved. Assuming that 1 indicates the presence of 
larger margins of discretion, its positive effect on transposition is illustrated 
in table 6 by the hypothetical cases 3 and 5 which show that with more dis-
cretion being available, proper transposition / compliance (indicated by 1) 
is achieved. Deficient transposition / non-compliance is the outcome in case 
that only little discretion is conferred upon Member States (indicated by 0 
for both margin of discretion and transposition outcome) – as reflected in 
the transposition scenarios 2, 4 and 6. If the relationships between margins 
of discretion and transposition outcomes just described will show empiri-
cally remains to be seen. The case study analyses below are used to look 
further into the link between these two.
5 The literal meaning of ceteris paribus is ‘other things being equal’.
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Transposition is known to be a multifaceted phenomenon and, as a rule, has 
been analysed by taking into consideration a number of factors (Sverdrup, 
2007). Therefore the most similar systems design comes in handy because it 
creates a research setting which allows for taking into account other alterna-
tive explanations for outcomes of transposition. On the other hand, this can 
be considered a weakness of the case study approach. In this regard, it can 
be argued that the case study approach suffers from the fact that there are 
more potentially relevant independent variables than cases examined which 
may deliver only tenuous findings. But it is exactly at this point where the 
most similar systems design shows its merit. In making the transposition 
cases ‘comparable’ by ensuring the similarity of their background factors, it 
helps to minimise the number of alternative explanations and enhances the 
plausibility of explanations that relate to the factor of prime interest (Ger-
ring, 2007: 71). It is obvious that the key factor considered to influence the 
national transposition of EU directives is discretion. But what are the back-
ground factors in the present study?
Table 7: Selection criteria directives
1 Policy Area   differ
2 Margin of discretion differ
3 Number of transposition actors similar
4 Sort of transposition measures similar
5 Number of transposition measures similar
6 Time for transposition similar
As shown in table 7, the background factors relate to national characteristics 
and include the sort of directive (new and adopted by the Council or the 
Council and European Parliament), the number of transposing actors as well 
as the number and sort of national transposition measures. Additionally, 
since more time available has been assumed to contribute to timely transpo-
sition (Kaeding, 2007b: 122), transposition time was added as an additional 
condition that should not differ between the two cases compared.6 While 
the background factors should be as similar as possible, the two directives 
should differ as to their discretion margin and policy area. In other words, 
each of the three paired comparisons eventually included two directives 
that vary in their discretion margins (small vs. large) and policy area7 they 
6 This latter condition could be ensured by selecting directives with the same amount of 
time - usually 24 months as stated in the directives’ fi nal provisions.
7 The remaining directives in the area of justice and home affairs pertain mostly to migra-
tion policy, including those selected for the case studies, which is the reason that aspects 
of this particular sub-domain of the JHA area (legal and illegal migration) are addressed 
in the empirical analysis of the dissertation.
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address but are both new legislative acts which have been adopted by the 
Council or the Council and the European Parliament. Furthermore, the cases 
to be compared had to meet three further conditions: their transposition 
required the same or a similar number of transposition actors, and the same 
or a similar number and sort of transposition measures. It was furthermore 
important to ensure that both directives allocated the same amount of time 
for transposition. These criteria were thus used to match six directives into 
three pairs for the empirical analysis (see box 7).
Box 7: Pairs for comparative case studies
Blue Card Directive 2009/50/EC & 
Pyrotechnic Articles 2007/23/EC
Waste Framework Directive 2008/98/EC & 
Toy Safety Directive 2009/48/EC
Return Directive 2008/115/EC & 
Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive 2009/126/EC
So far the background factors have merely been mentioned but still need 
to be addressed in more detail. Prior to that, however, two additional notes 
have to be made. First, similarity of background factors is an ideal condition 
but reality usually does not provide for ideal settings. Second, in making 
the final choice, the availability and commitment of interview partners was 
also taken into consideration.
8.3 Background factors
While there certainly is a plethora of factors that may affect the national trans-
position of European directives, it is important to bear in mind that not all of 
these factors are relevant in the context at hand. Considering that this book 
presents a single-country study and that transposition studies were carried 
out in the Netherlands helped in reducing the number of relevant factors. 
For instance, factors were excluded that seem to make more sense in a cross-
country analysis such as, for instance, ‘comparative economic powers’. Fur-
thermore excluded were factors that are unlikely to apply to the Netherlands, 
taking into consideration that it is an EU founding member and an economi-
cally as well as democratically advanced country. From this it follows that, 
factors such as ‘approval of democracy’or ‘financial capabilities’, to mention 
only a few examples, were deemed irrelevant.8 Considering the transposi-
8 The examples are taken from the implementation of EU law database which provides 
more examples. See Toshkov, Dimiter (n.d.) Implementation of EU Law: An Online Data-
base of Existing Research, in cooperation with the Institute for European Integration 
Research. See also footnote 47.
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tion context also helped to identify factors that are of key importance for the 
purposes of this study. To give an example, in the Netherlands transposition 
is carried out first and foremost by ministerial units. Hence, in contrast to 
other stages of the implementation process which involve, for example, other 
public authorities or sectors of industry, transposition is carried out by state 
administration. This is why factors that relate to transposition, being con-
ceived as a largely administrative process, were regarded as highly relevant. 
Nevertheless, transposition is also a political process. It can trigger political 
controversy between the domestic actors involved in the process of incor-
porating EU rules into national law. For instance, due to different political 
interests and preferences they pursue, the national Government and Parlia-
ment may hold different views on how transposition should be carried out.
The selection of background factors, which are further considered in this 
study and therefore included in the present research design, follows from 
the foregoing considerations. The background factors are now addressed in 
more detail, starting out with the sort of directive, followed by the number 
of implementing actors and number and sort of transposition measures.
8.3.1 Sort directive
The sort of directive is expected to affect national transposition. It has 
already been noted that modifying directives are believed to be faster trans-
posed since they do not entail substantial changes for national law. The sort 
of directive can, however, also refer to the EU body by which the directive 
was enacted. Hence, the distinction is made between Commission direc-
tives, Council directives adopted by unanimity, and finally directives that 
are adopted by both the Council of Ministers and the European Parlia-
ment according to the former co-decision procedure (corresponding with 
the period considered in this study and preceding the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon). Commission Directives are found to be more swiftly 
transposed than Council directives or directives which are adopted by co-
decision. The sort of EU decision-making processes, and the applicable 
formal decision-making rules in particular, apparently play a role (Masten-
broek, 2003). According to Mastenbroek, speedy transposition of Commis-
sion directives is due to the better quality of these directives which makes 
transposition easier and therefore faster. Directives that are adopted by the 
Council or by the Council and the European Parliament together are, by 
contrast, associated with political controversy and lower quality of legis-
lation. Low quality stems from the fact that directives represent compro-
mise texts that are vaguely worded. As a consequence, these directives are 
associated with difficulties in the interpretation and application by domes-
tic actors and therefore with delayed transposition. It should be noted that 
Council directives and directives enacted by both the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament are considered to require the same amount of time for 
being transposed into national legislation (Mastenbroek 2003: 375-376).
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8.3.2 Number of transposition actors
To analyse national transposition and the role of discretion therein, spe-
cific attention has to be paid to actors and their preferences – as empha-
sised by the veto-player approach (Tsebelis, 2002) – and in the literature 
on implementation (see Kaeding, 2007b; Mastenbroek, 2007; Steunenberg, 
2007; Thomson, 2007). Transposition may involve actors with different 
preferences as to the way the directive should be transposed. It may also 
entail problems of coordination between actors. For this reason, transposi-
tion delay is associated with more actors being in charge of converting EU 
rules into national law: ‘the number of political and administrative actors 
involved is often related to a decrease in decision-making speed’ (Steunen-
berg and Kaeding, 2009: 438). Put differently, the fewer actors involved, 
the more it is likely that transposition is timely (Kaeding, 2006: 239). The 
number of actors needed for transposition is thereby related to the direc-
tive’s scope and policy issue which may fall within the remit of one or more 
ministries and consequently require intra- or inter-ministerial coordination 
(Haverland and Romeijn, 2007). If the policy issue at stake concerns a new 
topic of legislation, it may additionally require the involvement of Parlia-
ment.
Research focusing on the Dutch transposition context confirms that it 
is worth looking at the number of actors involved in analysing the trans-
position of European directives, and hence, to take into consideration the 
inter-ministerial and intra-ministerial coordination of this process (see sec-
tion 4.2.2). A 2008 study of the Dutch Court of Audits has brought to light 
that lacking inter-ministerial coordination is an administrative shortcoming 
that impedes timely transposition. Having examined the Dutch transpo-
sition of European directives in the period from 2001 to 2006, the authors 
of the study conclude that involvement of more than one ministry led to 
delay in 80 percent of the cases (Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 31498, 
no. 1&2, p. 12). One explanation is that national ministries tend to remain 
attached to their individual autonomy rather than engaging in inter-min-
isterial collaboration for the purpose of transposition (Parliamentary Papers 
II 2007/08, 31498, no. 1&2, p. 56). Regarding intra-ministerial coordination, 
Mastenbroek has pointed to the so-called problem of ‘chinese walls’ which 
describes the fact that the political and legal units of a ministry involved in 
the negotiations and transposition of a directive work in isolation. This is 
expected to result in poor communication and coordination between these 
departments and to contribute to delay in transposition (Mastenbroek, 2007: 
38-39).
In fact, both inter-ministerial and intra-ministerial coordination prob-
lems can be linked to difficulties that are associated with the number of 
transposition actors. But also other approaches are possible. In this study, 
intra-ministerial and inter-ministerial coordination are not discussed under 
the same heading. Intra-ministerial coordination problems and lacking 
transposition knowledge are used to describe the two dimensions of the 
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concept of the ‘administrative capacity’ of transposition actors, focusing on 
the ministerial level. Inter-ministerial coordination between national minis-
tries, on the other hand, is linked to the concept of the ‘number of transposi-
tion actors’. This concept is more broadly understood to include not only 
the transposition debates at the ministerial but also the political level and 
therefore refers to the involvement of other domestic actors such as national 
parliament.
8.3.3 Sort and number of transposition measures9
Both final background factors that the present study takes into account 
pertain to the national transposition measures created to incorporate EU 
directives into national law. In the Netherlands, transposition legislation 
is formulated and adopted by means of the same legislative procedure as 
national legislation (Steunenberg and Voermans, 2006). Transposition may, 
however, involve various legal instruments which differ as to the number of 
actors involved and therefore the time needed to create and adopt them. It is 
carried out by means of high and low order regulation, the former pertain-
ing to parliamentary acts, the latter relating to administrative acts, including 
orders in council and ministerial orders (Van der Burg and Voermans, 2015: 
144). Parliamentary acts require, alongside the ministerial department(s) 
responsible for transposition, also the involvement of the Council of State 
and Council of Ministers, as well as the active participation of the national 
Parliament which in the Dutch context includes the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate.10 Fewer domestic actors are involved in the creation 
of orders in council and ministerial orders. This difference is important to 
the study of transposition performance and there seems to be agreement 
that the higher the level of transposition, and thus the more actors involved 
not only at the ministerial but also political level, the more likely it is that a 
directive will be transposed with delay. This has been found to hold true for 
not only the transposition of directives in the Netherlands but also in other 
EU Member States (Parliamentary II 2007/08, 31498, no. 1&2, p. 12; König 
and Luetgert, 2008). With specific regard to the Dutch transposition con-
text, faster transposition is expected from the use of orders in council and, 
in particular, from the use of ministerial decisions which, unlike other sorts 
of transposition measures, do not require any consultation or scrutiny pro-
cedures (Bovens and Yesilkagit, 2010: 61). Parliamentary acts, by contrast,
9 A note on terminology: ‘transposition measures’ and ‘transposition legislation’ are used 
interchangeably in the dissertation and correspond with ‘implementing measures’, a 
third term used in implementation studies.
10 The Netherlands have a bi-cameral system: the lower house (or House of Represen-
tatives) is known as ‘Tweede Kamer’, the upper house (or Senate) as ‘Eerste Kamer’. 
Whereas the political debates take place in the former, it is the quality of a legislative 
proposal that is of primary importance to the upper house (Eerste Kamer). Cf. Breeman 
and Timmermans, 2012, pp. 153-154.
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take the longest, requiring about a year until they are enacted (Breeman and 
Timmermans, 2012: 153). Alongside the level of transposition, the number 
of transposition measures required to incorporate a directive into national 
law has been found to cause delay. Mastenbroek (2003; 2007) as well as 
Steunenberg and Kaeding (2009) claim that the higher the number of imple-
menting measures, the more time it takes to transpose a directive. Accord-
ing to Mastenbroek this is related to the fact that the likeliness for imple-
mentation problems to arise is higher if many implementing measures have 
to be introduced or changed (Mastenbroek, 2003: 377; 2007: 37).
How was the information on background factors obtained? To this end, 
the earlier-mentioned EU database EUR-Lex proved useful. First of all, it 
provides access to the text and sort of a directive – the latter being imme-
diately revealed by the directive’s heading. From the heading it becomes 
evident whether the directive is a new legislative act and by which EU bod-
ies it was enacted. Furthermore, the database offers an overview of national 
transposition laws that Member States have adopted and notified to the 
European Commission to meet their transposition obligations. This pro-
vided me with the knowledge on the number and sort of legal acts of indi-
vidual transposition measures taken by the Dutch transposition authorities. 
As for the number of transposition actors, information on this factor could 
be gathered from the governmental overviews on the status of transposi-
tion processes being underway. These overviews provide a timeline-view 
including all stages of the transposition process and actors involved.11
8.4 Summary
This chapter has so far set out the step-wise approach to the selection of 
cases for the purpose of arriving at six transposition processes which were 
carried out in the Netherlands. These processes shall be further examined 
by means of case study analyses and paired comparisons. To this end a 
population of cases was defined followed by the application of further sys-
tematic choices resulting in the creation of this study’s directive sample, 
including six directives, two from each policy area addressed (consumer 
protection, environment and migration). Alternative explanations which 
are alongside discretion expected to affect national transposition were pre-
sented as background factors in line with the most similar systems design. 
11 These overviews are provided by the so-called ‘i-timer’. It offers information concerning 
the state of affairs regarding the implementation of EU directives and framework deci-
sions into Dutch law and is published quarterly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
submitted to the Dutch Senate and House of Representatives. The i-timer was developed 
by the Ministry and is used by the Interdepartmental Commission for European Law 
(Interdepartementale Commissie Europees Recht, ICER) to monitor the progress made 
in the Dutch implementation of EU law. Cf. Mastenbroek, 2007, pp. 31-32.
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This case study design allows for singling out the factor of discretion for 
explicit evaluation of its effects regarding the national transposition of EU 
directives.
8.5 Case study analysis
In addressing the case selection strategy and method of comparison, the 
preceding discussion anticipated two important elements of the case study 
approach. Other relevant aspects shall now be addressed in more detail. The 
discussion commences by stating the objectives of the case study analysis, 
including some methodological reflections on the approach. It then turns to 
the data gathering process and, in a last step, sets out the structure for the 
discussion of EU and national decision-making processes concerning direc-
tives. One concept that has been identified in the theoretical discussion as 
being linked with discretion is the compatibility of EU and national law. 
It is a concept which has seen different interpretations and applications in 
implementation studies. The last section therefore concludes by addressing 
the concept of compatibility in the context of national transposition as it is 
used and operationalised in the present study.
8.5.1 Objectives
The overall objective of the case study approach is to throw light on the role 
of discretion in the negotiation and transposition of European directives in 
accordance with the research questions of this study. Drawing on the analyt-
ical framework the relevance of discretion is assessed under particular cir-
cumstances – i.e. in relation to other contextual factors considered relevant 
in the decision-making processes under study. The EU negotiation process 
is analysed with the aim of understanding under what circumstances more 
or less discretion is incorporated into directives and how discretion affects 
legislative decision-making. The transposition of directives in the Nether-
lands is examined with a view to the questions of how discretion was used 
to convert the directive into national law and how discretion affected the 
process; did it facilitate or impede it? The insights gained from the anal-
ysis of the six case studies inform the subsequent comparative investiga-
tion. Finally, the findings from both analyses are used to illustrate aspects 
of the relationship between discretion and legitimacy within the context of 
national transposition.
8.5.2 Approach
To reach the study’s objectives I decided to apply the case study method. It 
allows for an in-depth investigation of an event or process (George and Ben-
nett, 2005; Creswell, 2009), such as EU and national decision-making con-
cerning directives addressed in this book. Its merits regarding the analysis 
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of national transposition have been acknowledged by a number of imple-
mentation scholars, including those that apply quantitative and statistical 
methods to analyse transposition (Falkner et al., 2005; Kaeding, 2007b; Mas-
tenbroek, 2007; Steunenberg, 2007).
A case study approach is deemed appropriate because it matches the 
explorative purposes of this study which seeks to further develop the con-
cept of legislative discretion. The decisive advantages of the case study 
approach lays furthermore in the fact that it allows for a close analysis of the 
negotiations and transposition of directives. It helps to uncover the corre-
sponding decision-making processes at both the EU and national-levels. In 
so doing, the case study approach is used to trace the sequences of events, 
to identify actors, and preferences concerning the content as well as trans-
position of the directives analysed. In short, the case study research opens 
up rich sources of information that are used to assess the sets of expecta-
tions about the role of discretion in the relevant EU and national deci-
sion-making processes. Such an in-depth analysis implies that case study 
research addresses a limited number of cases (Gerring, 2007: 50) which is 
useful when it comes to identifying characteristics and idiosyncrasies of 
cases. What’s more, it is considered important, since one of the main objec-
tives of the present study is to specify the circumstances under which dis-
cretion unfolds its facilitating or impeding effects. This requires attention to 
detail. For instance, the approach adopted here may help to explain cases 
with similar transposition outcomes but which are different regarding the 
way discretion affected the process. Especially in these cases it makes sense 
to have a closer look at the context of transposition by looking beyond the 
mere existence of the expected relationship between the two factors of dis-
cretion and transposition outcome. Hence, it is considered useful to shed 
light on causal paths and mechanisms which constitute the different ways 
in which entities (e.g. transposition actors) and their activities (e.g. measures 
taken to transpose a directive) shape the link between discretion and trans-
position (George and Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007; Beach and Pedersen, 
2013). In other words, the detailed examination of cases serves to open the 
black box between discretion and transposition; it can be used to describe 
their relationship in more detail and identify factors that influence it.
Notwithstanding this intense investigation, the underlying idea of the 
case study method is that findings from the analysis of a few cases (direc-
tive sample) shall be generalised to the entire group of cases (directive pop-
ulation). This, however, has been considered as a weak point of the case 
study method by some who argue that an analysis of merely a small num-
ber of cases precludes the generalisation of outcomes to a larger number of 
cases (Gerring, 2007; Creswell 2009; Toshkov et al., 2010: 7). Put differently, 
case studies suffer from a lack of external validity. This is due to the speci-
ficities and small number of cases as well as the fact that the book presents 
a single-country study which makes it impossible to generalise its outcomes 
to transposition in other Member States. Apparently, decisions concerning 
the research design come with trade-offs. It is then necessary, as sought 
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here, not to turn a blind eye to the downsides of one’s approach but to men-
tion them. The decision to apply the case study method despite the down-
sides just mentioned was based on the consideration that its advantages 
justify possible disadvantages. These advantages pertain first of all to the 
consistency of the present approach, in other words, its reliability in analys-
ing transposition. In this regard, a single-country study has the merit that 
analysing transposition across cases is possible without having to account 
for differences imposed by country-specific, legal-administrative contexts. 
Moreover, conducting a small-n study can also be an advantage for the 
reason that it is deemed easier to ascertain the veracity of a specific rela-
tionship for a small number of cases compared to a larger number of cases 
(Gerring, 2007: 42). Hence, even if inferences about discretion may ‘merely’ 
allow for making modest generalisations due to the small scope of the anal-
ysis, applying the case study approach may nevertheless serve to deliver 
findings that are conclusive and sound. This is not least because both the 
case selection strategy and overall research design are applied in a manner 
that aims to achieve great explanatory power concerning the role of a fac-
tor such as discretion. In addition, the case study research is not confined 
to one but extends to six transposition cases and therefore allows for the 
investigation of the link between discretion and transposition across cases 
(see also Lieberman, 2005; Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Finally, the issue 
of generalisation can also be tackled by comparing the results of the case 
studies to the findings of previous research (Ringeling, 1978: 37). Arguably, 
in the context of the study at hand this is only be possible to a certain extent 
owing to the fact that how discretion has been used by implementing actors 
in the national transposition of European directives has hitherto scarcely 
been dealt with. And yet, all things considered, the small-n approach and 
cross-case evidence thereby provided do not preclude drawing modest and 
tentative conclusions. Besides, one could reflect about the wider relevance 
of research findings for transposition contexts that are similar to the Dutch 
one. These findings could, after all, be used to indicate pathways for future 
research.
Having outlined the case study approach and explained the reasons for 
its application, it is now time to address other more practical issues includ-
ing the data gathering process.
8.5.2.1 Data gathering process
How was the case study research carried out? Relevant data was gathered 
for the analysis by using three key methods and techniques: an extensive 
literature study, document research as well as expert interviews. The inter-
views were held with Dutch civil servants from relevant ministerial depart-
ments. In most of the six cases analysed, this included actors involved in 
both the negotiation and transposition of EU directives.12 Where it was 
12 The interviews were conducted in Dutch and then I translated them into English.
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deemed necessary, interviews were conducted with other relevant actors. 
Moreover, in one case, dossier research was carried out at the relevant 
national ministry. For me, the guiding principle in conducting the case 
study research was to gain and provide a sound understanding of the pro-
cesses addressed. The triangulation method was additionally used for this 
purpose: literature study, document review and expert interviews repre-
sent three different sources by means of which the information gathered 
could be cross-checked and the validity of the negotiation and transposi-
tion accounts ensured (Adcock and Collier, 2001: 540). The interviews with 
experts involved in the negotiation and transposition processes were semi-
structured and recorded.13 The semi-structured approach allowed for flex-
ibility in addressing the issues raised by the questionnaire and stimulated a 
two-way communication at eye-level which made it possible for me to gain 
an in-depth understanding of the processes discussed (Pfadenhauer, 2009). 
Furthermore the individual and face-to-face interviews were taped with 
the prior agreement of the interview partners (listed in Appendix). With-
out intending to deny that recording interviews may inhibit interviewees 
in revealing sensitive information (Mastenbroek, 2007: 93), my experience 
is that it enabled me to gather comprehensive information without loss of 
detail. Each case study chapter was sent to the relevant interview partners 
for the purpose of checking the accuracy of the information provided. The 
case study descriptions were informed by the results of a close examination 
of the relevant literature, and official publications giving insights into the 
EU preparations and negotiations as well as the Dutch transposition of the 
directives.
Regarding the EU-level process, the key documents assessed included, 
alongside directives and the corresponding Commission proposals, also the 
minutes of the Council meetings and other negotiation-related documents, 
such as the legislative resolutions of the European Parliament.14 The Com-
mission proposals enabled me to gain knowledge on the reasons underlying 
the submission of the draft directive and its content. The EU’s legal data-
base EUR-Lex was used to study the length of negotiations and the way a 
directive proposal was treated at Council level in order to establish whether 
or not reaching an agreement on a directive was cumbersome and lengthy. 
In this regard, information about the treatment of a directive proposal by 
the Council of Ministers proved useful. After all, if a legislative proposal is 
dealt with as ‘B-item’ on the Council agenda and examined at both lower 
and higher Council levels it can be considered as having caused difficulties 
in the negotiations on a directive. Proposals scheduled as B-items usually 
pertain to controversial issues which are in any case subjected to meetings 
at the level of Ministers as they require further debate (see for instance Sher-
rington, 2000: 61). A-items, by contrast, refer to proposals on which agree-
13 Except for one case where I took notes of the interview.
14 The analysis thus takes into account the main decision-making players, leaving out third 
parties such as business or interest groups.
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ment is reached at the lower Council level and therefore they only need to 
be formally adopted by the Council.15 Especially the minutes of the meet-
ings of the Council working parties as well as information taken from the 
minutes of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) and the 
Council’s General Secretariat offered insights into the issues at stake dur-
ing the negotiations, revealing the views and preferences of Member States 
in the Council but also those of the European Parliament. The Dutch posi-
tion within the EU negotiations was of immediate interest to this study and 
examined by making use of the Dutch Government’s Position Paper, better 
known as BNC-fiche. The BNC-fiche is named after its author, the Work-
ing Group Assessment New Commission Proposals, (Werkgroep Beoordel-
ing Nieuwe Commissievoorstellen)16 which draws up the fiche to inform 
the Dutch Parliament about new EU legislative initiatives. The BNC-fiche 
consists of a short summary and assessment of the Commission proposal, 
including key issues the Government wishes to amend. Since it represents 
a snapshot of the Government’s initial view and considering that prefer-
ences can change over time, the study of negotiation documents as well as 
interviews with national civil servants involved in the negotiations on the 
respective directive were used to account for possible changes of the Gov-
ernment’s position and strategy.
The Dutch transposition of the directives addressed in the case study 
analyses was mainly reconstructed by studying the transposition measures, 
including the explanatory memoranda and correspondence tables setting 
out in detail how individual directive provisions were incorporated into 
Dutch law. Examining these sources carefully, proved useful since they 
offered illuminating insights into the considerations made by the actors in 
charge in choosing particular transposition techniques and instruments. 
At the same time, it also shed light on the key question of how legislative 
discretion was used in transposing directives. Again, expert interviews 
proved valuable since they provided me with an additional possibility to 
trace the reasons for particular choices in transposition and by asking more 
detailed questions to check my own comprehension of sometimes com-
plex processes. To gain a deeper understanding of the transposition debate 
between the leading ministry and Parliament and additional views held by 
other relevant domestic actors such as the Council of State and stakehold-
ers, studying further legal and policy documents was crucial. Most of these 
documents were accessed through the database overheid.nl, commissioned 
by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, providing access to 
information about government organisations of the Netherlands. Finally, 
15 Council preparatory bodies refer to institutions such as Council working parties, the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper: stands for ‘Committee of the Perma-
nent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States to the European Union’.) 
or senior committees. Cf. Wallace, 2010, pp. 75-82.
16 The Working Group is composed of representatives of the ministries and local govern-
ment representatives. Cf. Steunenberg and Voermans, 2006, pp. 18-19.
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information concerning the timeliness of transposition was gathered from 
closely examining the timeline of the process – as outlined by the national 
transposition monitoring instrument ‘i-timer’-17 and the overviews of noti-
fied transposition measures stating the dates from which these measures 
took effect. As to timeliness as well as legal correctness, examining the Euro-
pean Commission’s implementation reports and further communication on 
transposition performances, (e.g. Commission press releases), was used to 
establish whether or not Dutch transposition was in compliance with the 
directive concerned.
8.5.2.2 Structure
From the previous sections, it may have become obvious that the case study 
analyses include complex accounts of the relevant EU and national decision-
making processes regarding the six directives analysed. That is why, before 
diving into the cases, the structure of the analyses is set out more clearly in 
order to provide for better guidance in reading and to avoid redundancy.
Each of the six case studies comprises an analysis of the EU negotiation 
and an analysis of the national transposition process. The structure of the 
two analyses is roughly the same. Both EU and national decision-making 
processes are presented by means of a descriptive analysis, followed by an 
explanatory analysis. The descriptive analyses are organised with the aim 
in mind to provide comprehensive and relevant information on both the 
negotiation and transposition processes regarding each directive. Hence, in 
a first step, the purpose, background as well as content of the directive ana-
lysed are described, including an outline of the policy area the directive’s 
subject matter addresses. This is also done with a view to the idea that, as 
mentioned before, discretion margins vary among directives from different 
policy areas. In a next step, detailed insights are provided into the nego-
tiations on the directive, especially the position of the Dutch delegation, as 
well as into the Dutch transposition processes including all relevant stages 
and actors.
The information presented informs the subsequent explanatory analy-
ses which aim to illuminate the role of especially discretion but also other 
factors expected to affect EU and national-level processes by assessing the 
expectations constituting the analytical framework of the dissertation.18 
Despite the interrelatedness of EU and national levels in a directive’s life 
cycle, the actors, dynamics and issues at stake are certainly different and 
expectations were developed accordingly. One important concept addressed 
in both the EU and national decision-making analyses is the compatibility 
between the EU directive and national law which can not only serve to 
explain why discretion is granted to Member States for implementation but 
also in what ways it contributes to a certain outcome of transposition.
17 See footnote 11.
18 The expectations are not always discussed chronologically but rather according to con-
text.
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8.6 Compatibility concept
A last point which requires elaboration makes part of the analysis of the 
transposition process and concerns the compatibility concept, also known 
as (mis)fit or goodness-of-fit concept (Risse et al., 2001; Börzel, 2005) which I 
chose to apply in the present study. As already noted, implementation stud-
ies deal with more than one type of misfit (institutional, legal, policy etc.) 
resulting from different conceptualisations with varying explanatory power. 
Carroll takes an in-depth look at the concept and its treatment in implemen-
tation studies and notes that ‘the wide variety of approaches identifying 
themselves with this kind of explanation has led in part to a stretching and 
thus weakening of its theoretical usefulness’ (Carroll, 2014: 48). In addition, 
empirically, the misfit hypothesis is not always successful in explaining 
Member States’ implementation of EU law, as it was illustrated with regard 
to social policy directives (Falkner et al., 2005: 298-291). While the latter 
finding is not irrelevant it relates to one specific policy sector and caution 
should therefore be exercised with a view to generalisation, especially in 
light of the fact that policy sectors matter for explaining transposition defi-
cits. Both the duration and delay of transposition have been found to dif-
fer among sectors (Haverland et al., 2010). Interestingly, also the relevance 
of different types of misfit appears to vary among policy domains (Carroll, 
2014: 49).
Without intending to negate the importance of other sorts of misfit, due 
to the book’s major concern with the legal or formal implementation (trans-
position) of European directives, the case study analysis will focus on legal 
misfit. With regard to the negotiation process, the size of the legal misfit or 
incompatibility between EU directive and Dutch law can only be roughly 
indicated based on the position of the Dutch Government on the directive 
proposal. The actual lack of compatibility can be more precisely determined 
by taking a closer look at the implications of transposition at the national 
level, and in particular by considering the characteristics of transposition 
measures taken to convert directive requirements into national legislation. 
This can give an idea about the scope of misfit present in a particular case. 
Steunenberg and Toshkov offer a categorisation of misfit which I deem use-
ful and apply in this study to assess the lack of compatibility between the 
directives analysed and Dutch law (2009: 959-960). The authors conceive of 
misfit as showing in four degrees: high, moderate, limited, and small misfit. 
The different extents of misfit are derived from the consideration of three 
criteria that relate to national transposition legislation: the number of trans-
position measures, the level of legislation (parliamentary vs. administrative 
act) and legislative novelty. Put in their words:
High misfit is registered when a directive requires the adoption of many (more than two) 
legislative acts, when these acts are of a higher order (laws and regulations) and when the 
transposition measures are mostly extensive amendments rather than new acts. A mod-
erate degree of misfit is observed when many, high order acts are adopted but the acts 
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are new and do not replace existing legislation. A limited misfit is present when no more 
than two transposing acts of second or third order (regulations and ordinances) have been 
adopted and when these acts are amending existing norms. If two or fewer transposition 
acts have been adopted which are new and are not primary legislation, we have a small 
legal misfit (2009: 960).
In attempting to assess the scope of misfit in the six transposition cases by 
means of this categorisation, experts who were involved in transposition 
were additionally questioned for verification purposes. They were asked to 
assess the legal implications of the directive concerned for Dutch legislation. 
Even though the concept of misfit or incompatibility is used in the present 
study to explain specific transposition outcomes, it should nevertheless be 
born in mind that the factor of compatibility has not been found to be a 
sufficient explanation for transposition deficits. Mediating factors such as 
a consensus-oriented decision-making culture (Börzel, 2005) – exhibited for 
instance by decision-making processes in the Netherlands – may ease com-
pliance even in cases where lacking compatibility results into high pressure 
to adjust national legislation to EU law (Risse et al., 2001).
Under what circumstances discretion facilitates or impedes decision-
making on EU directives and their subsequent transposition shall be 
addressed in the next chapters which comprise the empirical analysis car-
ried out in the Netherlands. The presentation of the six individual case stud-
ies is organised with a view to the subsequent paired comparison, starting 
out with the EU Blue Card Directive, followed by the Pyrotechnic Articles 
Directive, Waste Framework Directive, Toy Safety Directive, Return Direc-
tive and, last but not least, the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive.
8.7 Summary
The six transposition cases are analysed using the case study method. 
The benefit of the case study method for the purposes of this book is that 
it allows for the detailed reconstruction of negotiation and transposition 
processes as well as an in-depth study of the role and effects of discretion 
therein. In each case study, this approach translates into the structure of a 
descriptive and explanatory analysis of both EU- and national-level pro-
cesses. Case study research combining literature study, document review 
and expert interviews offer comprehensive data on which the analyses are 
based. This includes indicators to describe the concept and scope of the 
compatibility between EU directive and national (Dutch) law, a factor which 
is considered relevant in explaining reasons for the granting of discretion 
to Member States and its effects on the national transposition of directives.
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In this chapter the first of six transposition cases is presented. It focuses on 
the transposition of the EU Blue Card Directive1 in the Netherlands. This 
Directive relates to the area of justice and home affairs, and in laying down 
conditions and rights of residence in the issuing and other Member States, 
it addresses legal migration in particular. This chapter commences by intro-
ducing the background to and preparations of the Directive as well as the 
development of the justice and home affairs policy area. It subsequently 
addresses the EU negotiations and national transposition process regarding 
the Directive, paying specific attention to the role of discretion.
9.2 The directive
Labour migration is one of the subjects addressed in the field of Member 
State cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs. Alongside immi-
gration for the purpose of family reunification and admission for humani-
tarian reasons, it represents the third channel of legal migration (Bia, 2004: 
8).2 The Blue Card Directive addresses a subject matter that relates to this 
area. The Directive is divided into six chapters. While chapter one and six 
present the general and final provisions which include standard rules per-
taining to the Directive’s objective, scope and application conditions (e.g. 
transposition deadline) the other chapters cover the substantive provisions 
establishing Member States’ obligations. Chapter two addresses the criteria 
for admission (Articles 5 and 6), followed by chapter three which comprises 
some basic rules regarding the Blue Card, and includes procedural rules 
that determine the conditions for granting it (Articles 7-11). Chapter four 
(Articles 12-17) centres on ‘rights’; it lays down rules regarding the access 
to employment. Additionally, it deals with the treatment of third-country 
nationals having received a Blue Card in case of unemployment as well as 
their equal treatment with nationals. Chapter five (Articles 18-19) estab-
lishes the conditions under which Blue Card holders and their family mem-
bers may reside in another Member State.
1 Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence 
of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualifi ed employment, OJ L 155, 18 
June 2009, pp. 17-29.
2 The terms migration and immigration are used interchangeably.
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The Blue Card Directive is no pioneer legislation in the area of legal migra-
tion. It was preceded by other initiatives. Nevertheless, it represents the 
Commission’s first initiative in the area of legal / labour migration, which 
was negotiated in the Council of Ministers. Hence, once adopted, it became 
the first regulatory instrument in the area of labour migration (Wiesbrock, 
2010: 284). At the same time, the negotiations and adoption of the Direc-
tive underlined a shift of competences: with the incorporation into the EU 
legal framework, subject matters such as economic migration and the entry 
of third-country nationals, ceased to be regulated at the national level. In 
providing for common rules on the entry and residence of non-EU citi-
zens including the group of migrant workers, the Blue Card regulates legal 
migration for the purpose of enhancing the EU’s economic competitiveness. 
The underlying idea of the Commission’s proposal for this Directive was to 
attract highly-skilled third-country nationals including their family mem-
bers, while at the same time high-level migration of human capital from less 
developed regions, the so-called ‘brain drain’, should be avoided.3 Albeit 
introducing a fast-track procedure for the admission of highly-qualified 
third-country workers based on common entry criteria, as well as, under 
certain conditions, residence and mobility rights to these workers and their 
family members in a second Member State, the Directive, however, pre-
cluded the creation of an immediate right to admission (Wiesbrock, 2010: 
286). The latter tied in well with Member States’ wishes to achieve a flex-
ible and demand-driven labour migration policy (Eisele, 2013: 22). More-
over, the Directive took account of Member States’ preferences for a sectoral 
approach to labour migration. Previously, the Commission had aimed for a 
horizontal approach – implying common measures applicable to all third-
country nationals. But this idea had been rejected by the Member States: 
They were against the far-reaching harmonisation of national rules (Hail-
bronner and Schmidt, 2010: 705; Eisele, 2013).
The Blue Card seemed to imply a number of advantages for Member 
States. It should facilitate meeting labour needs and the better handling of 
circular and temporary labour migration, without obliging Member States 
to confer a permanent resident status on migrants. And yet, the negotiations 
on the Directive were ‘no piece of cake’; the path up to its adoption in May 
2009 was quite rocky. Given the development and characteristics of the jus-
tice and home affairs area, and labour migration in particular, this may not 
be surprising.
3 Recital (24) of the Directive states: ‘Specifi c reporting provisions should be provided for 
to monitor the implementation of this Directive, with a view to identifying and possibly 
counteracting its possible impacts in terms of “brain drain” in developing countries and 
in order to avoid “brain waste.”’
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9.2.1 Justice and home affairs
At present the JHA area is in full development. Since the pre-Lisbon period 
increasingly more matters have been dealt with under co-decision (Council 
of the European Union, 2009). But before that time, the JHA area did not 
represent more than a number of ad-hoc initiatives taken by Member States. 
The founding Treaties of the European Communities did not provide for 
any rules on which supranational action in the area could have been based 
(Bia, 2004: 6). Early cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs 
was characterised by loose forms of Member State interaction which were 
mostly established through pragmatic arrangements outside the EU treaty 
framework4 (Hailbronner, 2010). Following from a European Council ini-
tiative of ministers of interior affairs, pre-JHA collaboration started to take 
institutional shape in the mid-1970s, with the foundation of the Trevi Group 
aiming at combatting counterterrorism. EU institutions were not involved 
but senior officials and civil servants from national ministries made Trevi 
a highly intergovernmental project at ministerial level. Intergovernmental 
cooperation at ministerial level continued to be the typical working form 
in the area in subsequent years (Kostakopoulou, 2007: 156-157). Alongside 
terrorism and drug trafficking, implications of immigration ranked high on 
the political agenda: the issue of illegal influx of migrants was addressed 
first, followed by legal (labour) migration which became a matter of great 
concern (Lavenex and Wallace, 2005). Economic integration and the EU’s 
major objective of establishing an internal common market resulted in vari-
ous cross-border activities intensifying administrative cooperation in the 
JHA area. This is exemplified, for instance, by the setting up of a central 
data base, the Schengen Information System (SIS) which provides informa-
tion on non-EU citizens to Member States’ authorities. All in all, the Schen-
gen arrangements, Schengen Agreement (1985) and Schengen Convention 
(1990), acted as a catalyst to collaboration on both asylum and migration. 
The removal of internal frontiers while creating a single external border, 
made both cross-border crime and (illegal) immigration pressing questions. 
Closer cooperation on asylum and migration issues was reflected in the 
increasing number of working group formations with the ‘ad hoc working 
group on immigration’ standing out this in respect. Founded in 1986 by the 
ministers of interior affairs, the aim of this working group was to advance 
collaboration on external and internal border controls, visa policy, asy-
lum matters but also admission, including questions concerning the entry 
4 This means outside the framework of the Treaty on the European Economic Communi-
ties.
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of third country nationals and their rights to move and reside in the EU 
(Kostakopoulou, 2007: 159).5
The removal of internal borders agreed in Schengen and the achieve-
ment of a common market, the primary objective of the EU along the lines 
of the Single European Agreement (1986), bringing about the free movement 
of goods, capitals, services, and persons entailed benefits for the domestic 
markets of the Member States. At the same time, however, the open border 
policy following from the Schengen and Dublin agreements, raised concerns 
among the Member States over internal security levels. Moreover, it fuelled 
the demand among them for more inter-state cooperation in areas such as 
organised crime, terrorism, and immigration (Lavenex, 2010: 459). Appar-
ently, the dismantling of borders to remove hurdles hampering trade was 
taking its toll: the abolition of internal borders did not only contribute to the 
increase of intra-EU trade. Growing migration from outside into the EU also 
resulted in the increase of migration rates. What’s more, this increase seemed 
to be causally connected to the growth of crime (Kostakopoulou, 2007: 158). 
Hence, advantages from economic integration and disadvantages related to 
security issues became two sides of the same coin: the single market. The 
lack of internal borders had to be compensated by reinforcing security at 
the Union’s external frontiers. This made external security a major issue for 
Western politicians (Bia, 2004, Kostakopoulou, 2007). Hence, closer coopera-
tion on asylum and migration issue became a corollary of both the single 
market and the abolition of internal borders (Favell, 1998; Guiraudon, 2000; 
Kostakopoulou 2007). The role of economic integration has been viewed crit-
ically by some observers. They argue that, for fears of social-economic and 
ethno-political effects, Member States have sought to limit migration from 
third countries which had increased since the mid-1960s: ‘The single market 
became the pretext and the justification for restrictive measures of migra-
tion control and internal surveillance’ characterising Member States’ poli-
cies in subsequent years (Bias, 2004: 5; Kostakopoulou, 2007: 158-159). With 
the Schengen project the notion of the free movement of persons emerged 
and crystallised as a fundamental right, being enshrined in the EU Treaties 
and realised with the creation of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.6 
5 These concerted efforts eventually led to the 1990 Schengen and Dublin conventions - 
the latter being replaced by the Dublin Regulation in 2003 (Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 43/2003 of 23 December 2002 laying down detailed rules for applying Council Regu-
lations (EC) No 1452/2001, (EC) No 1453/2001 and (EC) No 1454/2001 as regards aid for 
the local production of crop products in the outermost regions of the European Union, 
OJ L 7, 11 January 2003, pp. 25-57). It is also referred to as Dublin II Regulation.
6 Since 2004 EU citizens are provided with mobility rights under the Free Movement of 
Persons Directive (Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) 
No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/
EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, OJ L 158, 30 
April 2004, pp. 77-123).
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However, it was a right conferred upon EU nationals. Migration from out-
side the EU borders, on the contrary, was put under restrictive control 
(Kostakopoulou, 2007: 172).
Despite advanced intergovernmental cooperation, integration in the 
field of JHA proceeded in a piecemeal fashion in subsequent years. Argu-
ably due to the double-edged consequences of economic advantages on the 
one hand, and on the other hand security issues, Member States were reluc-
tant to give up further decision-making power in exchange for more supra-
national coordination. Since it had been a domain of national sovereignty, 
Member States sought to avoid an explicit linkage of economic integration 
with the ‘association of the concept of freedom with security and justice’ 
expressing the EU’s objective of further advancing asylum and migration 
policies (Guiraudon, 2000: 255; Kostakopoulou, 2007: 171).
Member States’ hesitation to deepen integration in the area of asylum 
and migration was reflected in the institutional and legal arrangements. 
More supranational coordination and therefore full integration of the JHA 
area into the EU framework seemed to be out of question. This shows in 
Member States’ rejection of the idea to bringing together common foreign 
and security policy (CFSP) and justice and home affairs into a single inte-
grated structure as envisaged by the initiative of the Dutch presidency for-
warded during the 1991 intergovernmental conference on political union 
(Lavenex and Wallace, 2005: 461).7 Keeping the two areas separate and sub-
ject to intergovernmental decision-making was confirmed by the Treaty of 
Maastricht (1993). Hence, alongside judicial and policy cooperation in civil 
and criminal matters and border controls as established by the provisions of 
Title VI of the Treaty (third pillar), Title IV of the EC encompassed, amongst 
others, migration and asylum policies, thereby combining supranational 
and intergovernmental elements. In Maastricht-Europe power over migra-
tion-related issues largely remained reserved for the Member States.
Especially the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) but also the Treaty of Nice 
(2003) brought significant changes. Member States had realised the neces-
sity for common action at the EU level not least because of their own eco-
nomic and demographic situations. Accordingly, the EU objectives of creat-
ing an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, and alongside with it the free 
movement of persons as an exclusive right of EU citizens were supported 
by the Member State. Impetus to these developments was given through the 
incorporation of the Schengen agreement into the legal framework of the 
EU.8 Furthermore, parts of the JHA area were integrated into the Commu-
nity (first) pillar and therefore subjected to the Community method which 
replaced the intergovernmental institutional framework. Corresponding 
7 The idea of integrating these two was based on a proposal put forward by the Dutch 
Council presidency during the Intergovernmental Conference in 1991. The proposal 
lacked support from the British Government who disapproved of these plans.
8 The Schengen Acquis was integrated by means of protocol B (Protocols annexed to the 
Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community).
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provisions were laid down under the newly introduced Title IV (Articles 
61-69 TEC).9 Articles 62 and 63 provided the EU with a constitutional basis 
including the possibility for legislative initiative in the area of legal migra-
tion. In fact, this was the precondition for the adoption of the EU Blue Card 
Directive which became the first ‘successful’ legislative initiative tabled 
by the Commission and adopted by unanimity by the EU Member States 
(Cerna, 2013: 186). However, Member States were not willing to surrender 
too readily considerable decision-making powers, showing in the fact that 
they insisted on the application of transitional arrangements in respect of 
‘new’ issues (JHA matters) under the first pillar.10 Only at the end of this 
five year transition period, unanimity in the Council of Ministers should 
be replaced by qualified majority voting and consultation followed by the 
co-decision procedure making the European Parliament co-legislator in JHA 
matters (Peers, 2008: 220).11 With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
on 1 December 2009 the shifting of migration and asylum issues to the first 
pillar was eventually completed (Hailbronner, 2010: 3).
However, the political reality led to a paradoxical situation being 
expressed by intergovernmental arrangements such as opt-outs clauses, 
variable geometry or enhanced cooperation which followed from the treaty 
changes in Amsterdam and Nice (Lavenex and Wallace, 2005: 464; Kostako-
poulou, 2007: 164-170): on the one hand, some of these intergovernmental 
arrangements reflected the manifest and persistent unwillingness of several 
Member States to participate in supranational collaboration whereas, on the 
other hand, other arrangements show that some Member States were will-
ing to participate in further integration, under the precondition that they 
could decide on what terms. The European Pact on Immigration and Asy-
lum represents a case in point in this regard. It was adopted at the Brussels 
European Council meeting in October 2008 and included the idea to orga-
nise legal immigration within the EU legal framework. At the same time, 
9 Cooperation in police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (PJCCM) continued to 
be subjects of the third, intergovernmental, pillar under Title VI TEU.
10 As established in Articles 64, 67-68 TEC.
11 The transitional arrangements agreed upon in Amsterdam are complex but clearly 
explained and summarised by Kostakopoulou: ‘Title IV EC (…) set out a fi ve-year tran-
sitional period from the entry into force of the Treaty during which the Council would 
take decisions by unanimity (with the exception of visa matters under Article 100c EC) 
on an initiative put forward by either the Commission or a MS [Member State] after 
consultation with the EP. Following the end of the fi ve-year transitional period (1 May 
2004), the Community method replaced the intergovernmental institutional framework: 
the Commission assumed its exclusive right of initiative, but had an obligation to con-
sider any request by a MS for a legislative proposal, and the Council would decide by 
unanimous vote to switch to co-decision and qualifi ed majority voting. The Treaty of 
Nice inserted a fi fth paragraph in Article 67 EC which allowed for measures relating to 
civil judicial cooperation and asylum to be adopted by using the co-decision procedure, 
under certain conditions. In December 2004, co-decision and qualifi ed majority voting 
were extended to all Title IV measures, applicable as of 1 January 2005 with the excep-
tion of legal migration.’ Cf. Kostakopoulou, 2007, pp. 165-166.
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the Pact put emphasis on the relevance of considering national priorities, 
needs and ability to receive migrants. It established that Member States 
should decide on the admission conditions for legal migrants and deter-
mine the number of those entering their territories (Hailbronner, 2010: 7). 
Against this background, it therefore does not come as a surprise that, more 
generally speaking, in the area of migration and asylum law discretion is 
made available for national implementation: corresponding EU directives 
include minimum harmonisation provisions which offer Member States 
the possibility to adopt or maintain more favourable, national provisions 
(Hailbronner, 2010: 24). Be it as it may, by the end of the decade the JHA 
area had become the ‘most active field for meetings convened under the 
Council of Ministers’ (Lavenex, 2010: 460). Growing EU-level involvement 
was additionally reflected in the institutional development of the European 
Commission with its Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs 
(DG HOME) being founded in 2010 (Strik, 2011: 44-45). Regarding legal 
migration integration was given further impetus through the adoption of 
the Directive on EU long-term residency of third-country nationals and the 
Directive on the right to family reunification (Lavenex, 2010: 470-471).12 It 
seems that integration in the JHA area, labour migration in particular, had 
become an essential objective which was also addressed in various Euro-
pean Council programmes13 in which the accomplishment of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice was presented as a long-term goal (Hailbron-
ner and Schmidt, 2010; Eisele, 2013). In fact, the proposal for the EU Blue 
Card Directive bears further witness to the increasing relevance of legal 
migration on the EU agenda. The adoption of the Directive coincided with 
Member States’ agreement on the 2009 Stockholm Programme (2010-14), 
which alongside the EU 2020 goals, made legal migration a priority (Coun-
cil of the European Union, 2009; European Commission, 2010).
9.2.2 Purpose and background to the directive
Within the EU legislative procedure, the European Commission has the 
quasi-exclusive right of legislative initiative (Ponzano et al., 2012). In exer-
cising this role, it tabled a proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions 
of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly 
qualified employment in 2007 (European Commission, 2007a). The pro-
posal made part of the EU’s ‘roadmap for legal migration’, presented two 
years earlier (Hailbronner and Schmidt, 2010: 705). This roadmap involved 
12 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-
country nationals who are long-term residents, OJ L 16, 23 January 2004, pp. 44-53 and 
Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunifi cation, 
OJ L 251, 3 October 2003, pp. 12-18.
13 The Tampere conclusions (1999-2004) followed by The Hague (2004-2009) and Stock-
holm (2010-2014) Programmes all shed light on the EU’s plans for common policies in 
the area of justice and home affairs.
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a number of legislative initiatives on immigration for labour purposes tar-
geted at different migration groups (European Commission, 2005b).
At first blush, the Commission’ s interests and motivation underlying the 
proposal for the Blue Card Directive seemed to be highly compatible with 
the preferences and wishes of the Member States. Motivations were largely 
economically driven. First, the Commission wished to respond to demo-
graphic and economic developments in the Member States which gave rea-
son for concern (European Commission, 2007a). Many Member States were 
facing low fertility rates and higher life expectancy which, in combination 
with each other, put a serious risk to the well-functioning of national pen-
sion schemes and the maintenance of the welfare state in general. Alongside 
population decreases, major challenges were presented by domestic labour 
shortages, and, in particular, a lack of highly-skilled workforce (Cerna, 2013: 
180-181). Attracting highly-skilled non-EU nationals by introducing a Euro-
pean Blue Card should alleviate these problems (European Commission, 
2007b). In realising the need for common action to tackle future challenges, 
the Member States agreed upon advancing the approximation of national 
rules on legal migration during the first European Council in JHA held in 
Tampere (1999) (Council of the European Union, 1999; Carrera et al., 2011: 
1-2).14
Besides tackling Member States’ pressing concerns, the proposal was 
clearly motivated by a purely supra-national interest. It should give new 
impetus to the EU’s 2000 Lisbon Strategy and its objective of turning the EU 
within a decade into a competitive, dynamic, knowledge-based economy,15 
thereby sharpening its competitive edge vis-à-vis the United States, Canada 
or Australia (European Commission, 2007b). Legal migration was seen as 
playing a key role in reaching that goal. At the same time, it was presented 
as a means to promote and stimulate Member State cooperation in the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice (European Commission, 2005a).
By 2007 the European Union was, however, clearly lagging behind its 
ambitious goal.16 The EU’s poor performance was considered as a result of 
the different admission systems applied in the Member States making appli-
cation for third-country nationals too complex and unattractive. The pro-
14 ‘The European Council acknowledges the need for approximation of national legislations 
on the conditions for admission and residence of third-country nationals, based on a shared 
assessment of the economic and demographic developments within the Union, as well as 
the situation in the countries of origin. It requests to this end rapid decisions by the Council, 
on the basis of proposals by the Commission.’ See Council conclusions – Tampere (1999).
15 See Council conclusions - Lisbon (2000).
16 The fi gures speak for themselves. According to the EU Commissioner for Justice, Free-
dom, and Security Franco Frattini and the Commission’s president Manuel Barroso, 
comparing the EU to the USA as to their shares in worldwide labour migration gave the 
following picture: regarding low-skilled labour immigration the EU had an 85 percent 
share compared to the USA with a 5 percent share. As for skilled labour immigration, the 
EU’s share was merely 5 percent whereas the USA’s share amounted to 85 percent. See 
COM(2007a).
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posal for the EU Blue Card should make an end to that situation. According 
to the Commission’s ‘best-case scenario’, the envisaged Blue Card scheme 
should replace the various national admission schemes and become appli-
cable throughout the Union. This objective, in particular, was to become one 
of the most controversial issues during the negotiations on the Directive.
9.3 Negotiations
The Directive proposal seemed to be based on overlapping EU and national 
interests but negotiations in the Council Working Party nevertheless 
revealed tensions and conflicting interests. While the negotiations were 
not necessarily lengthy the adoption of the Directive was reached within 
two years forging ahead under four presidencies (see table 8) – they turned 
out to be cumbersome (Hailbronner and Schmidt, 2010; Cerna, 2013; Eisele, 
2013). Falling under the ‘old’ decision-making regime, the legislative pro-
cess in the Council of Ministers required unanimity and consultation of the 
European Parliament.17
Table 8: Timeline for negotiations on the Blue Card Directive
23 Oct 07 Adoption by Commission proposal
18 Jun 08 Committee of Regions opinion
09 July 08 European Economic and Social Committee opinion
20 Nov 08 Adoption of the directive at first reading by European Parliament 
Nov 07 - May 09 Discussions within the Council of Ministers 
25 May 09 Formal adoption by Council 
The requirement to achieve unanimity certainly did not make it any easier 
for the Member States to struck compromises in reaching a final agreement 
on the draft Directive. Various provisions of the Directive were the sub-
ject of controversial debates within the Council (Hailbronner and Schmidt, 
2010).
The subsequent approach to the negotiations is selective in that it 
focuses on a limited number of issues which, however, are believed to give 
sufficient insight into the Commission’s proposal and the final agreements 
reached whereby the focus comes to lie on the position of the Netherlands. 
Especially some key definitions, the admission criteria, amongst other 
issues, raised high controversy among national delegations, including the 
17 The opinion of the European Parliament was mainly substantiated by the Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs but also drew on arguments presented in the 
opinions of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs and the Committee on 
Development.
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Dutch one (Eisele, 2013: 4). These controversial issues are addressed in more 
detail in the subsequent paragraphs alongside other aspects that were of 
concern to especially the Dutch delegation.
The Commission proposal envisaged introducing a work- and residence 
permit along the model of the American Green Card for labour migrants 
(European Commission, 2007a). It covered three main aspects regarding 
legal immigration of highly-skilled third-country nationals.18 The first two 
aspects pertained to the admission of non-EU migrants, including substan-
tive and procedural aspects: admission criteria and conditions as well rea-
sons for refusal, withdrawal and non-renewal. The third aspect concerned 
rights to be granted to highly-skilled third-country nationals and their fam-
ily members, including residency in other Member States under certain con-
ditions.
From the Commission proposal it was not entirely clear whether the 
EU Blue Card was intended to become the only admission scheme EU-
wide and whether it should replace national admission schemes already in 
place (Guild, 2004: 4). According to the wording of Article 4(2) the Directive 
should not affect the right of Member States to adopt or retain more favour-
able provisions concerning conditions of entry and residence for persons 
to whom it applies, except for entry into the first Member State (italics added). 
Especially this wording at the end of the provision suggested the exclusive 
applicability of the EU admission scheme. Having already own admission 
schemes in place, it caused disapproval among various Member States, 
including the Netherlands.
The Dutch Government was not opposed to the general idea of the 
Commission proposal to attract highly skilled migrants from third coun-
tries and to stimulate mobility of workers within the European Union. As 
a matter of fact, the Netherlands was in good company with other Member 
States, such as Germany, in that it faced future shortage of highly-skilled 
workers in particular sectors as illustrate by a 2003 study of the CPB Neth-
erlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Roodenburg et al., 2003). Up 
to that point, immigration to the Netherlands had mainly been driven by 
family reunion, family formation and asylum. Economic-driven immigra-
tion was only considered to be an option if it turned out to be truly ben-
eficial for the Netherlands: immigrants should proof to be an economically 
valuable source of labour. This demand-driven approach coincided with 
what the Directive set out to achieve, including its sectoral approach that 
met with approval from the Dutch side. And even though labour migra-
tion was not considered to be a long-term solution to demographic chal-
lenges (Roodenburg et al., 2003: 10), the purpose and sectoral approach of 
the Directive made it an appealing measure to alleviate imminent bottle-
necks in the national labour market, productivity and competitiveness 
of the Dutch economy. Alongside this EU initiative, action had also been 
18 ‘Legal immigration’ and ‘legal migration’ are used interchangeably. ‘Economic migra-
tion’ is also used to denote the same type of migration.
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taken at the national level. The Dutch Government itself had not remained 
inactive but as other Member States like Germany or Italy (Bia, 2004),19it 
searched for solutions, resulting in the adoption of the 2004 Knowledge 
Migrant Regulation (in Dutch: Kennismigrantenregeling)20 to match the 
needs of the corporate sector (Hertoc, 2008: 19). Under the framework of 
the Knowledge Migrant Regulation and its so-called ‘Knowledge Migration 
Scheme’, highly-skilled third-country nationals were considered eligible for 
a combined residence and work permit if they met the salary criteria set out 
in the Regulation.
Unlike the Commission proposal, the national scheme did not oblige 
domestic employers to check whether vacancies could be filled by Dutch 
nationals or citizens of another EU Member State before offering them 
to non-EU / EEA foreign nationals. More in general, the rules under the 
Knowledge Migration Scheme appeared to be less complex compared to 
those of the envisaged Blue Card scheme and were in some respects more 
favourable to the specific group of migrants the proposal was targeted at 
(Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 23490, no. 518, p. 5). The Dutch scheme did 
not require a work permit and, once admission had been granted, residence 
was permitted for a maximum of five years – a longer period than implied 
by the Blue Card (Hertoc, 2008: 21). Furthermore, and in contrast to the pro-
posed EU admission system, the Knowledge Migrant Scheme was based on 
the principle of authoritative representation of the migrant (referred to in 
Dutch as ‘referentenstelsel’) which had proven its worth.21 Plans for new 
national legislation to be established by the Modern Migration Policy Act, 
should therefore maintain this approach to employment-based immigration 
(Groen and De Lange, 2011: 340).
All in all, the Dutch admission scheme was considered to work ‘very 
satisfactorily’ as pointed out by the interviewee from the Ministry of Secu-
rity and Justice. The national approach to highly-skilled migrants was gen-
erally seen as one of the most progressive within the EU (Ministry of Secu-
rity and Justice, 2008a, p. 5).22 Nevertheless, since 2006, reform plans were 
under way, geared towards improving the Knowledge Migrant Scheme and 
Dutch Migration policy in general (European Migration Network, 2007). 
Hence, the preparation and negotiations of the Blue Card Directive coin-
cided with Dutch efforts to review and amend national legislation already 
in place.
19 Germany adopted a national Immigration Act in 2003, whereas Italy had laws on man-
aging immigration already in place.
20 Meanwhile, the Regulation has undergone some changes due to the introduction of new 
legislation (the Modern Migration Policy Act, in Dutch: Wet Modern Migratiebeleid, 
MoMi) which entered into force in June 2013, revising the Dutch immigration policy.
21 The ‘referent’ is a natural or legal person, or an organisation (university, company), that 
is entitled to act on behalf of the non-EU national that wishes to apply for admission and 
residence in the Netherlands.
22 Letter Immigration Policy Department, Ministry of Justice to European Affairs Commit-
tee, Dutch Senate, 5565180/DVB, 19 September 2008.
150 Part 3  Empirical aspects – negotiation and transposition analyses 
9.3.1 Exclusiveness of EU admission scheme
The Dutch Government decided early in the negotiation process that the 
guiding principle for the Dutch delegation should be to support the intro-
duction of the Blue Card while ensuring, however, that it would be comple-
mentary to but not substituting the already existing national scheme (Par-
liamentary Papers II 2007/08, 22 112, no. 595, p. 12). Hence this should be the 
Government’s priority in the Council negotiations and corresponding plans 
were supported by domestic actors. The Immigration and Naturalisation 
Service (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst, IND), the authority in charge 
of implementing the Dutch admission policy, took the view that the proper 
practical application of the EU Blue Card system was only guaranteed if it 
existed alongside the national one (Ministry of Security and Justice, 2008a, 
p. 2). In this context, the Ministry of Justice underlined that replacing a well-
functioning admission scheme such as the Knowledge Migration Scheme 
by a European counterpart would put at stake the Netherlands’ interna-
tional competitiveness (ibid, p. 2). Also the Dutch House of Representatives 
stressed the importance of the national admission scheme and the principle 
of complementarity regarding the introduction of the Blue Card scheme.23 
Members of both Government and Opposition parties questioned the addi-
tional value of the Blue Card Scheme for Dutch migration policy and under-
lined that, if a common EU policy was to be adopted in the area of labour 
migration, the national demand-driven approach should be preserved (Par-
liamentary Papers II 2007/08, 22 112, no. 663).24 The Government acknowl-
edged that there were still points for discussion and the Minister’s intention 
was it therefore to improve the Commission proposal on a number of points 
during the negotiations (Ministry of Security and Justice, 2008b, p. 24; Par-
liamentary Papers II 2007/08, 22 112, no. 595, p. 12).25
Having already own rules in place explains why the Netherlands, 
backed by other Member States like Germany and Finland, rejected the 
exclusiveness of the EU Blue Card. Together they took the view that Mem-
ber States should be allowed to keep in force their national schemes (Coun-
cil of the European Union, 2008b, p. 3). Facing strong resistance from the 
Member States, the Commission could not adhere to its plans for far-reach-
ing harmonisation in this matter. Consequently, it was forced to give up on 
one of its major objectives: making the Blue Card scheme the only appli-
cable admission scheme throughout the European Union. The formulation 
finally reflected the ideas of a Dutch proposal. Article 3(4) of the final Blue 
23 During the negotiations the Dutch Government, publicly known as ‘fourth Balkenende 
cabinet’ (2007-2010), was formed by a coalition of Christen Democratic Appeal (CDA), 
the social democratic Dutch labour Party (PvdA) and the Christen Union (Christe-
nUnie).
24 A parliamentary motion had been issued to underline this point. Cf. Parliamentary Papers 
II 2007/08, 29861, nr. 28.
25 Letter Immigration Policy Department, Ministry of Justice to European Affairs Commit-
tee, Dutch Senate, 5525214/08/DEIA, 11 January 2008.
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Card Directive, safeguards the right of Member States to issue, for the pur-
pose of employment, residence permits other than the EU Blue Card. From 
this it followed that already existing or future national schemes26 should 
coexist with the European scheme (Council of the European Union, 2008b, 
p. 3). In addition to that, the scope of the minimum harmonisation clause 
enshrined in Article 4(2) was broadened, allowing those Member States 
which represent the first country of admission to keep in force more favour-
able provisions regarding a number of issues. In concrete, more favourable 
provisions could be established regarding the minimum salary threshold, 
one of the admission criteria applicants for the Blue Card were to meet, pro-
visions on procedural safeguards, labour market access rights, temporary 
unemployment, equal treatment, and rights for the family members of Blue 
Card holders as well as provisions addressing the possible EC long-term 
resident status flowing from the status as Blue Card holder (Hailbronner 
and Schmidt, 2010: 731).27 Giving Member States the possibility to depart 
from EU rules, made  the increase of legal diversity in the application of the 
EU Blue card scheme a likely corollary. What’s more, it made clear yet again 
that the Commission’s major objective of establishing common rules to 
attract highly-skilled migrants and facilitate their admission was definitely 
off the table (Wiesbrock, 2010: 220).
While efforts of the Dutch delegation contributed to prevent that 
national admission schemes were substituted by the EU admission system, 
the wishes and preferences of the Dutch delegation were not accommodated 
in all respects or only to a limited extent. For instance, Dutch attempts to 
broaden the overall scope of the Directive to include workers in frontier 
regions failed. The idea of the Dutch delegation was to allow Blue Card 
holders to reside in one Member State while working in another arguably in 
order to better respond to regional and local labour market needs (Council of 
the European Union, 2008f, p. 4). This proposal was, however, rejected by the 
French Council presidency which argued that these rules would fall beyond 
the envisaged scope of the Directive and should be addressed by negotia-
tions on another Commission proposal (Groen and De Lange, 2011: 341).
9.3.2 Key terms
Member States held diverging views on some of the Directive’s key terms. 
In particular the question of what should be understood as ‘highly quali-
fied employment’ and ‘higher professional qualifications’, as defined in 
Articles 2(b) and 2 (g) of the proposal was subject to intensive debates. A 
26 National schemes were still introduced in a number of Member States after the adoption 
of the Blue Card Directive. In its 2014 report on Member States’ performances regard-
ing the implementation of the Blue Card, fi fteen Member States appear to have national 
rules in place - hence, if compared to 2008, seven Member States more. See COM(2014) 
287 fi nal, p. 2.
27 See Article 4(2) (a) and (b) of the Blue Card Directive.
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group of Member States including Hungary, Estonia, and Greece wished 
to define ‘highly qualified employment’ solely on the basis of higher edu-
cation performance, excluding any qualifications through professional 
experience. Others like Italy or Slovakia questioned the minimum number 
of years of professional experience which the proposal set at three, while 
for fears of intentional misstatement or misrepresentation of information, 
Germany suggested a strict approach requiring both education and pro-
fessional qualifications (Council of the European Union, 2008a). Likewise, 
Poland wanted to adopt a stricter approach to professional qualifications by 
increasing the number of years from three to five – a suggestion that even-
tually made it into the final directive. But this suggestion, did not match 
the ideas of the Dutch and Swedish delegations (Council of the European 
Union, 2008d, p. 4). With a view to the labour needs of certain sectors and to 
avoid decreasing the attractiveness of the Blue Card Directive, the option of 
professional qualification as an equivalent to higher education qualification 
was maintained (Eisele, 2013: 6). In contrast to the proposal’s original word-
ing, the resulting definitions, as laid down in Articles 2 (b) and (g), empha-
sise national legal approaches. Accordingly, ‘highly qualified employment’ 
is understood as ‘employment of a person who in the Member State con-
cerned, is protected as an employee under national employment law and / or in 
accordance with national practice’ (italics added). In addition, derogation from 
the requirement to attest ‘higher professional qualifications’ by higher edu-
cation qualifications was made conditional on the existence of national law 
provisions and hence tailored on the basis of already existing national legal 
practice.28 This does not remove the fact that the preferences of both the 
Dutch and Swedish delegations were not entirely met. They preferred dero-
gation to allow for the alternative of attesting higher professional qualifica-
tions by three instead of five years of professional experience. Their wishes 
to further relax the proposed EU rules in this way, however, were not taken 
into account.
9.3.3 Admission criteria
Eligibility for the EU Blue Card is based on a number of criteria that are set 
out in Article 5. It is interesting to note in this regard, that the final version 
of the Article, in particular its first provision, takes national legal frame-
works as a point of departure, leaving Member States with more discretion 
than initially included by the Commission proposal (Eisele, 2013: 6-8). This 
28 See Articles 2 (h) and (g) of the Blue Card Directive. To recall, in the codebook these 
manifestations of discretion are identifi ed as permissions or obligations referring to the 
national legal order. According to the codebook defi nitions of relevant terms related to 
the directive’s subject matter and usually mentioned in one of the fi rst articles, these 
were not coded as relevant directive provisions and therefore not considered in calculat-
ing discretion margins. In the present case of the Blue Card Directive, however, it shows 
that provisions concerning defi nitions of key terms can be of relevance when it comes to 
determining a directive’s scope of discretion.
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is evidenced by various references to national legal orders and practices (‘as 
/ if provided for in national law’; ‘as determined by national law’, ‘under 
national law’). This follows from the fact that Member States were dissatis-
fied with the Commission’s admission criteria and consequently sought to 
amend them (Eisele, 2013: 7-9). While some Member States such as Slovakia, 
Hungary, and Austria advocated extending the list of requirements, others 
emphasised the lack of incompatibility between EU rules and their legal 
systems. National law in Greece and Poland, for instance, did not require 
from third-country nationals to have a ‘binding job offer’ which should 
make part of their applications for admission. This legal disparity between 
EU and national law resulted in the amendment of the Directive proposal. 
The amendment implied that the EU requirement concerning the binding 
job offer would become applicable in case that national law provided for 
the same requirement (Council of the European Union, 2008b, p. 4). A simi-
lar way to accommodate Member States’ preferences was chosen regarding 
the aim to exclude the possibility of double insurance, referring to Article 
5(1) point (e) of the proposal, following a request of the Dutch delegation 
(Council of the European Union, 2008c, p. 12). Also this time, incongruences 
between EU and national laws were sought to be removed by including into 
the proposal references to national legal frameworks. The corresponding 
provision eventually established that, if provided for by national law, the 
third-country national can attest for adequate health insurance by means of 
an application for sickness insurance in the Member State concerned. Again, 
Member States were left with discretion based on the fact that national legal 
frameworks were taken as a reference point (Eisele, 2013: 9).
Member States furthermore objected to the Directive’s requirements 
regarding unregulated professions established by Article 5(1)(c), requiring 
from third-country nationals to ‘present the documents attesting the rele-
vant higher professional qualifications in the occupation or sector specified 
in the work contract or in the binding offer of work’. From the reactions 
of the Dutch, but also Swedish and Polish delegations, it becomes obvious 
that the envisaged rules were considered to make admission more complex 
and increase the workload of national authorities (Council of the European 
Union, 2008b, p. 5; Council of the European Union, 2008c, p. 11). The Dutch 
Government took the view that the requirements for unregulated profes-
sions impeded the Directive’s objective of fostering intra-EU mobility (Par-
liamentary Papers II 2007/08, 22112, no. 595, p. 12). Moreover, they did not 
correspond with the approach of Dutch law and met with incomprehension 
on the part of the Dutch Government. The Government did not understand 
the necessity of having regulatory measures for professions supposed to 
be ‘non-regulated’ (Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 22112, no. 595, p. 12). 
Therefore, the Dutch delegation, supported by the Irish delegation, advo-
cated the removal of this provision (Council of the European Union, 2008d, 
p. 9). However, on this point the proposal remained largely unchanged.
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The salary threshold was another issue on which Member States’ views 
differed. Article 5(2) of the proposal suggested a gross monthly salary 
which should be ‘at least three times the minimum gross monthly wage as 
set by national law’. While some Member States, including the Netherlands, 
aimed for a lower standard, other Member States like Germany and Ireland 
insisted on establishing a high salary threshold (Council of the European 
Union, 2008b, p. 7). The final compromise that eventually emerged, foresees 
a threshold of at least 1.5 times the average gross annual salary applicable in 
the Member State concerned (Article 5(3)). Furthermore it allowed Member 
States representing the second country of admission to positively derogate 
from the salary threshold established by the Directive by means of Article 
4(2). The Dutch delegation, however, feared that the envisaged upper limits 
of the salary threshold would trigger fraud, exposing migrants to the risk 
of not receiving a high salary (Groen and De Lange, 2010: 339). Therefore 
the Dutch delegation sought to align EU rules on this point with the lower 
threshold as included in the Knowledge Migration Regulation. However, 
the Dutch delegation failed in asserting these preferences.
9.3.4 Volumes of admission
A particular Dutch concern related to the volumes of admission. Member 
States should have, as laid down in Article 7, the right to put a limit to the 
admission of third-country nationals by setting quotas, including the implicit 
permission of setting zero quotas. The Dutch delegation, however, aimed 
for a more explicit wording of this Article, aiming to preclude by all means 
applications of third-country nationals working as professional soccer play-
ers, clerics and prostitutes (Groen and De Lange, 2011: 339-340; interview). 
Preventing these particular groups of migrants from applying for admission 
was in line with national rules provided for by the Dutch Regulation (Euro-
pean Migration Network, 2007: 15) and was envisaged by national legislation 
in the pipeline (interview). The German delegation supported the idea of 
being more precise in the exclusion of particular groups (Council of the Euro-
pean Union, 2008d, p. 11). At its request and in line with the preferences of 
the Dutch delegation, EU rules were amended accordingly by establishing in 
the preamble to the Directive that ‘regarding volumes of admission, Member 
States retain the possibility not to grant residence permits for employment in 
general or for certain professions, economic sectors or regions’ (recital (8)).
9.3.5 Blue Card Validity
Initially, the Commission proposal suggested a validity of the Blue Card of 
two years, which could be renewed for the same duration. This arrangement 
was seen to be in line with the idea of a national labour market test to be car-
ried out prior to Member States’ decision on renewing the Blue Card (Groen 
and De Lange, 2011: 340-341). In case of a work contract of less than two 
years, the Blue Card should be issued for the duration of the contract includ-
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ing three additional months as set out in Article 8(2). Member States’ opin-
ions were divided regarding the length of the proposed validity. The Spanish 
delegation, for example, favoured a shorter period while the Dutch delega-
tion questioned if there should be any such period at all. Greece supported 
the Commission’s idea of renewal and therefore the possibility to check 
whether or not the Blue Card holder was still in compliance with the rel-
evant conditions (Council of the European Union, 2008b, p. 10). The Dutch 
delegation, on the other hand, urged to simplify matters. It took the view 
that unnecessary administrative burdens should be avoided, also in order to 
foster the Directive’s objective of intra-EU mobility procedures (Parliamen-
tary Papers II 2007/08, 22112, no. 595, p. 12). Therefore it came up with the 
suggestion, supported by amongst others the Polish and Swedish delega-
tions, to make the validity of the Blue Card dependent on the length of the 
work contract with an additional extension of three months. Standard valid-
ity should be based on a minimum of two up to a maximum of five years 
(Council of the European Union, 2008e, p. 11). Such an arrangement would 
have corresponded with Dutch rules already in place. Under the Knowledge 
Migrant Regulation the work and residence permit were granted to non-
EU nationals for a period of five years. Be it as it may, the final agreement 
eventually struck in the Council of Ministers was not in line with Dutch 
preferences. According to Article 7(2) of the Directive, the Blue Card has a 
minimum validity of one year and a maximum validity of up to four years, 
which, on certain conditions, can be extended by three months.
9.4 Analysis
At a first guess, one certainly expects that discretion was of relevance in 
the negotiations on the Blue Card Directive. Already from the legislative 
proposal it becomes clear that some discretion would be granted for the 
national implementation of the Directive (Peers, 2009) – arguably due to the 
Commission’s anticipation of Member States’ objections to relinquish too 
much decision-making power. Without even looking further into the nego-
tiation process, the observations from the coding exercise seem to support 
this observation. The Directive was selected for further analysis because of 
its higher discretion margin stemming from a number of permissions, most 
of them not being restrained by additional conditions. Remarkable in this 
regard is the vast amount of references that the Directive makes to national 
legal frameworks. In addition to that, from a cursory comparison of the ini-
tial Commission proposal and the final draft Directive, it can be concluded 
that the number of discretionary provisions has increased. Two relevant 
observations can be made. First, in at least a handful of cases shall-clauses 
were changed into may-clauses and, second, a number of permissions were 
added to the original text of the Commission proposal. From this it follows 
that Member States were provided with wide discretion (see Parkes and 
Angenendt, 2010; Eisele, 2013). This applies, for instance, to Articles 8, 9 and 
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11 which, in contrast to the original proposal, offer Member States a broader 
range of grounds on which they can justify the rejection of applications for 
admission.29 It also holds for Articles 12 and 18 where Member States have 
additional flexibility in allowing migrants from third countries access to 
their labour markets.30 Apparently, not only more discretion was eventually 
offered to Member States. In addition, through the incorporation of further 
permissions in case of articles formerly worded in obligatory language, the 
conferral of discretionary powers was also made more explicit.
However, from the very fact that the Directive implies a higher discre-
tion margin, nothing can be derived as to why discretion was used and with 
what effects. Discussing the previously developed expectations is supposed 
to shed more light on the dark. The controversial debates during the nego-
tiations reveal the different national views and approaches regarding labour 
migration. Nevertheless, the EU Blue Card became political reality with its 
adoption on 25 May 2009. Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland made 
use of their opt-out clauses. What was the role of discretion in the negotia-
tion process? Did discretion facilitate the Directive’s adoption procedure?
9.4.1 Discretion and policy area
According to the first expectation the less a policy area is influenced by 
the EU in institutional and legal terms, the more discretion is granted to 
Member States. Regarding the present case, a number of indicators point 
into this direction: first, long-standing intergovernmental cooperation and 
flexible arrangements such as opt-outs or variable geometry; second, Mem-
ber States’ rejection to the Commission’s attempts to harmonise national 
approaches to labour migration prior the proposal for the Blue Card Direc-
tive; third, and as apparent from the Treaty of Amsterdam, the continua-
tion of the rule of unanimity in the Council, also applying to EU decision-
making on the Blue Card Directive. Furthermore, on a number of occasions 
during the negotiations the incorporation of additional discretion into the 
Directive provided an answer to Member States’ disagreement with some of 
the Directive’s requirements. The most telling example in this regard refers 
to the Commission’s attempt to replace national admissions schemes by the 
Blue Card system. This was precluded by adding to the proposal additional 
derogation and minimum harmonisation provisions (Articles 3(4) and 4(2)). 
29 See in particular: Articles 8(3) and (4) according to which the non-EU national’s appli-
cation can be rejected in case that volumes of admission set by Member States are 
exceeded as established in Article 6 and, second, to ensure ethical recruitment from third 
countries. Additionally, Article 9(3) states that rejection may be grounded if the applicant 
poses a threat to public policy, public security or public health, or fi nally, if the applica-
tion is found inadequate or incomplete as established by Article 11(2).
30 This becomes apparent from Article 12(1) which formerly included an obligation. Arti-
cle 18(2) was added in the negotiations. It is addressed at the second Member State of 
admission that is allowed to deny applicants’ access to the national labour market until 
admission has been offi cially granted.
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It is noteworthy that, in retrospect, the Commission itself established a link 
between the unanimity requirement in the Council, the difficulties experi-
enced in the negotiations, and the granting of discretion. In this regard, it 
arrived at the conclusion that by setting minimum standards and using for-
mulations including may-clauses and references to national legislation, the 
Directive left wide discretionary leeway to the Member States for its imple-
mentation into national law (European Commission, 2014, p. 10).
In the light of these findings, the policy area expectation is found to hold 
true: little EU influence went hand in hand with granting more discretion 
to Member States. Nevertheless, the question remains for what reasons was 
discretion incorporated?
9.4.2 Discretion, political sensitivity and compatibility
This brings up expectations 2 and 3. The core idea of the former is that the 
more politically sensitive the directive’s policy issue is, the more Member 
States are inclined to retain decision-making power which leads to more 
discretion being incorporated into the directive to ensure Member States’ 
approval of it. To this end, the explanatory analysis sought to provide a 
broader insight illustrating, next to the Dutch position on the proposal, also 
the views of other Member States for political sensitivity is associated with 
controversy among Member States in the Council. Compatibility implies 
that the less compatible the EU directive and already existing national legis-
lation are the more Member States seek to translate own preferences into the 
directive proposal. Since their preferences differ, however, it is more discre-
tion which is incorporated into the directive to reach common agreement. 
As for the compatibility argument, the focus was laid on the match between 
the Blue Card Directive and the relevant legislation in the Netherlands.
To begin with, there is a general consensus that labour migration and 
the JHA field more in general are politically sensitive areas which has 
made EU integration in this field a cumbersome process (Guidron, 2000; 
Geddes, 2003; Carrera and Formisano, 2005; Kostakopoulou, 2007; Cerna, 
2010; Gümüs, 2010; Eiseler, 2013). This has been explained by the fact that 
the JHA area addresses the domain of ‘high politics’ (Kostakopoulou, 2007: 
153) and therefore issues that are ‘deeply entrenched in [the] national and 
juridical systems’ of the Member States (Lavenex and Wallace, 2005: 458). 
Migration control is a specific case in point, being an ‘emblem of national 
sovereignty’ (Guiraudon, 2000: 251) and therefore an area where ultimate 
decision-making competence rested with the Member States. In addition to 
that, due to its ‘transversal character’ showing in the fact that it affects a 
range of domestic issues such as national labour markets, economics, for-
eign affairs, and social affairs (Guiraudon, 2000, 252; see also Carrera and 
Formisano, 2005), migration control is a matter of not only political but 
also public concern, carrying with it the potential for political and public 
controversy. The negotiations on the Blue Card Directive exemplify the 
political sensitivity and controversy that the Directive triggered: almost all 
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directive provisions raised objections, revealing different national views 
and approaches, prompting the Member States to insert reservations and 
suggest amendments which more than once resulted in the incorporation of 
more discretion into the Directive (Hailbronner and Schmidt, 2010). Hence, 
being a delicate political issue which used to be under Member States’ con-
trol, harmonisation called forth resistance: ‘It would be anything but far-
fetched to assume that Member States want[ed] to keep sufficient control of 
these issues to guarantee that the influx of migrants does not put nationals 
at a disadvantage in the context of labour or the provision of social benefits’ 
(Cerna, 2008: 24).
In fact, the negotiations on the Blue Card Directive reflect a typical 
approach taken by Member States on legislative initiatives in the area of 
migration more generally. In this regard, Bia notes that the Commission 
itself was aware of the fact that its proposals were usually exposed to criti-
cal reviews in the Council being motivated by Member States’ determina-
tion to avoid any adjustments of their national legislation (Bia, 2004: 8-9).
Member States’ insistence, not least by the Netherlands, to keep national 
admission schemes in place, and the resulting conferral of more discretion-
ary power upon Member States through the above-mentioned minimum 
harmonisation and derogation arrangements is an example par excellence 
of the fact that asserting national preferences can be linked to the making 
available of discretion for national transposition. Moreover, negotiations on 
the Directive’s key terms and admission criteria show that as a solution to 
divergent views and wishes on these provisions the wording of the Direc-
tive was changed, resulting in the formulation of provisions taking national 
legal systems as reference points. This happened upon explicit request by 
the Dutch delegation (regarding insurance matters). It also followed from 
the objections of other Member States, criticising the lacking compatibility 
between the Directive and their national legal arrangements as illustrated, 
for instance, by the proposal’s requirement of a ‘binding job offer’ which 
did not make part of national legislation in Hungary and Poland. By incor-
porating references to the national legal order and practices, EU rules were 
brought into better alignment with national rules. What motivated nego-
tiation efforts in this respect, can be explained with some certainty for the 
Dutch delegation. Its suggestions for adding amendments to, for instance, 
the provisions regarding the volumes of admission or the validity of the 
Blue Card were motivated by considerations to retain own legislation as 
well as to keep administrative burdens low.
All things considered, the reasons for the Directive’s larger margin of 
discretion lie in the fact that it entailed a number of politically sensitive 
and controversial issues. Furthermore, the wide scope of discretion results 
from Member States’ attempts to translate national legal arrangements into 
the Directive in order to increase the latter’s compatibility with national 
rules. With specific regard to the participation of the Dutch delegation in 
the negotiations, the attempt to upload own standards was driven by con-
siderations to facilitate national transposition and implementation. Get-
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ting discretion incorporated into the Directive turned out, however, to be 
more feasible than turning own legislation into a part of the EU Directive. 
This is due to the fact that Member States’ preferences diverged, making 
coalition-formation to assert common objectives apparently a less attrac-
tive strategy to embark on. Besides, uploading of own standards was not 
always crowned by success, as evidenced by the Dutch efforts to bring EU 
rules with regard to the Blue Card’s validity more in line with those of the 
Knowledge Migrant Regulation and its attempt to change EU requirements 
for unregulated professions to make them more compatible with national 
rules already in place.
Funny enough, preference divergence, on the other hand, unified Mem-
ber States in their wish to leave national rules intact which resulted more 
than once in the granting of discretionary powers for the purpose of imple-
mentation. In this way, disagreement was apparently resolved and poten-
tial deadlock avoided. In the prospect of having discretion available for the 
(formal) implementation of the Directive, it seems that Member States were 
more willing to agree on even controversial issues. As Cerna notes, ‘the 
Directive’s flexibility regarding how member states might make use of the 
scheme might be one of the reasons that the Directive was passed’ (Cerna, 
2013: 186). This view was confirmed by the Dutch civil servant involved in 
the negotiations on the Blue Card Directive:
Yes, discretion played a very important role; just look at the number of provisions includ-
ing shall that were changed during the negotiations into may-provisions. Without discre-
tion being granted to Member States, the Directive would have never been adopted (…). 
The negotiations show that Member States wanted to turn the proposal into a copy of 
their national legislation. Generally speaking, the more discretion is created, the easier it is 
for a Member State to approve of EU rules.
9.4.3 Discretion and European Parliament
So far the discussion has left out the European Parliament and especially 
the question if anything can be derived from its opinion on the Commis-
sion proposal in support of expectation 4 of the analytical framework. 
This expectation concerns the idea that the European Parliament seeks to 
influence the granting of discretion to Member States. To be more precise, 
according to this expectation, it is posited that the greater the role of the 
European Parliament in the legislative process, the less discretion is granted 
to Member States. To start with, the role of the European Parliament in the 
negotiation process was limited; it could merely deliver a non-binding 
opinion on the proposal. Although it has been pointed out that with the 
approaching changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty the position of the 
European Parliament in the legislative process was taken more seriously in 
the negotiations (Eisele, 2013: 15), the case study results do not show that 
the European Parliament had a crucial say in shaping the final decision out-
come. This finding matches the general observation that both the consulta-
tion procedure and unanimity voting leave only little scope for influence of 
160 Part 3  Empirical aspects – negotiation and transposition analyses 
the European Parliament in legislative decision-making especially if conten-
tious issues have to be resolved in political sensitive areas such as justice 
and home affairs (Thomson and Hosli, 2006).
Like the Netherlands, the European Parliament considered the Direc-
tive to offer short-term solutions to future economic and demographic 
challenges which Member States would have to tackle in the long-run by 
adopting more structural measures (European Parliament, 2008). On the 
whole, the European Parliament advocated a more favourable treatment 
of third-country nationals under the Blue Card Directive compared to the 
rather restrictive approach taken by some Member States in the negotia-
tions.31 Endorsing the proposal’s objectives of creating an attractive Euro-
pean labour market fostering EU-intra mobility and therefore the idea of a 
common and comprehensive approach towards labour migration, the Euro-
pean Parliament disapproved of the inclusion of any requirements implying 
substantial deviation from EU rules (European Parliament, 2008, p. 34). As 
can be derived from its legislative resolution, the European Parliament was 
therefore cautious in allowing derogations, with few exceptions referring to 
the positive derogation from the salary threshold in the case of admission 
to another Member State (European Parliament, 2008, p. 17). Nonetheless, 
the European Parliament supported the conferral of discretionary powers 
on Member States in two respects: with a view to Member States’ right to 
make admission conditional on the situation of their domestic labour mar-
kets and regarding the setting of zero quotas or admission volumes for 
particular sectors. In its argumentation, the European Parliament linked 
the granting of discretion to the aim of achieving a balance in the distribu-
tion of decision-making powers between the Member States and the EU: 
due to the implications of migration for domestic labour markets, Member 
States should retain decision-making competences which should further-
more ensure the Directive’s compatibility with the principle of subsidiarity. 
Moreover, and confirming earlier observations regarding the link between 
discretion and the sensitivity of the policy issue addressed, the European 
Parliament recognised Member States’ control over access of migrants to 
their labour markets as an expression of their sovereignty (European Par-
liament, 2008, pp. 35-36). Against this background and due to the marginal 
role that the European Parliament played in the negotiation process, the 
expectation that it reduces the scope of discretion granted to Member States 
does not have any weight for the present case. It is furthermore concluded 
that even though the European Parliament did not support the granting of 
considerable discretion for national (formal) implementation, it, however, 
approved that discretion was conferred upon Member States. The confer-
ral of discretion was supported because it was seen as a way of showing 
31 It is possible that such a restrictive approach resulted from the implications of the eco-
nomic crisis, and was thus triggered by Member States’ concerns about their (high) 
social security standards and domestic labour markets which should make available suf-
fi cient employment possibilities for nationals. See in this respect Cerna, 2013.
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respect of Member States’ ultimate decision-making powers on issues of 
strong national relevance (European Parliament, 2008, pp. 34-36). Taking 
this point in the argumentation of the European Parliament one step further, 
the latter’s support of making discretion available reflects the idea, which is 
implied by the EU treaties, namely that discretion is granted by the EU legis-
lature to show respect for the fundamental political and constitutional struc-
tures of the Member States, in other words their national legal identities.
9.5 Conclusion
All in all, it can be concluded with some certainty that discretion was impor-
tant for the negotiation process on the EU Blue Card Directive. Discretion 
being incorporated into the legislative text on a number of points, guaran-
teed the Member States a high level of flexibility in transposing and imple-
menting the provisions of the Directive. This should, however, not give the 
erroneous impression that discretion was frequently referred to by Mem-
ber States during the negotiations. In fact, from the Council documentation 
of legislative decision-making on directives more in general and the inter-
views with civil servants involved in these processes, the general picture 
emerges that the wish for more discretion is usually not explicitly voiced by 
Member States when meeting at the negotiating table to discuss a legislative 
proposal. It can well be the case that Member States, as illustrated by the 
present context, ask for more flexibility in the implementation of a specific 
EU requirement and that this results into the inclusion of flexibility arrange-
ments such as derogations or other facultative (non-discretionary) provi-
sions. More concrete, the case of the Blue Card Directive shows that seeking 
more discretion can be part of Member States’ suggestions for amendments. 
It can, thus, be an implicit goal of their negotiating strategies. In addition, 
the descriptive analysis of the negotiation process brings into view that dis-
cretion can take an important role within negotiations. To use an image for 
illustration purposes, like lubricating oil in the engine of a vehicle, discretion 
kept the negotiation process on the Directive running thereby facilitating 
decision-making in contributing to reaching compromises in the Council.
While this conclusion of the above analysis puts discretion in a positive 
light, I do not want to ignore that the role of discretion has been assessed 
differently in the literature on EU integration in the area of migration and 
with regard to the Blue Card Directive in particular. The following assess-
ment is a case in point:
In any event, taking into consideration the option for member states to apply national 
highly skilled systems in parallel and the wide discretion that many provisions of the 
Blue Card Directive leave to the member states challenge the initial idea of creating “com-
mon rules for admission” for highly skilled migrants who should enjoy “the same level 
of rights throughout the EU” as envisaged by the Commission. We have now in place a 
multi-layer, complex system, as the Blue Card Directive exists alongside the (possibly up 
to 28) national systems for highly qualified employment (Eisele, 2013: 17).
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In addition, Eisele points to the negative implications from available discre-
tion for the level of rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a 
Member State (chapter five of the Directive) (see also Peers, 2009). Accord-
ing to her, the number of discretionary provisions which were added to 
the proposal during the negotiations lowered the high-level standards for 
third-country nationals which the Directive proposal had initially envis-
aged regarding provisions on equal treatment. The same, i.e. the lowering 
of initially envisaged standards, was considered to result from the posi-
tive derogations from initial Directive requirements which had actually 
been intended to improve the legal situation of third-country nationals and 
their family members (Eisele, 2013: 9-14).32 Eisele’s point of departure dif-
fers from the one chosen in the dissertation in that she does not primarily 
look into the question of which functions and effects discretion has within 
EU negotiations or what the motive behind the concept of discretion is and 
what its use within EU law implies. Instead, she seems to be more inter-
ested in finding out whether discretion can be expected to contribute to the 
Directive’s objective of establishing common standards regarding migration 
for the purpose of highly qualified employment. The way she interprets the 
role of discretion within the negotiations of the Blue Card Directive seems to 
suggest that she doubts a positive contribution of discretion in this regard. 
Eisele anticipates that Member States use discretion to implement restrictive 
approaches to legal migration which are rather compromising than advanc-
ing the Directive’s objectives. In my opinion, however, the role of discretion 
should be viewed more positively, by taking into consideration the broader 
political context. Such an approach is taken by Peers who makes the follow-
ing observation:
Certainly, back in 1994 when the EU adopted its highly negative resolution on admission 
of workers, and after 2001 when the Commission’s proposal for a regime on labour migra-
tion was ‘dead on arrival’ in the Council, it was hard to imagine the EU adopting, just a 
few years later by unanimity, a Directive which explicitly aims to encourage significant 
levels of labour immigration to the Union. Moreover, as compared to prior immigration 
legislation, the Council has reduced the standards in the Commission proposal by less 
than usual, and even improved them on a few points (Peers, 2009: 410).
Against this background, the granting of discretion to Member States for 
national implementation should be seen as having facilitated the adop-
tion of the Blue Card Directive, giving decisive impetus to EU regulation 
in an area that had previously been dominated by the pursuit of national 
interests (Cerna, 2013: 186). It should be born in mind that with a view to 
legislative EU arrangements – and not withstanding the fact that it contin-
ues to develop – the JHA is an area which is still in its infancy, certainly if 
compared to the more Europeanised fields of consumer protection and the 
environment. Moreover, the evolution of the latter two policy areas illus-
32 See in particular Articles 14 on equal treatment and Article 15 on the rights for family 
members of the EU Blue Card holder.
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trates that EU integration proceeds stepwise, i.e. through phased EU har-
monisation. Where this process has advanced considerably such as in the 
area of consumer protection, particularly product regulation, it is shown 
that initially discretionary directives are further elaborated, and discre-
tion therefore reduced, through recasts. Through these recasts directives 
become more detailed and the differences between directives and regula-
tions get blurred (Van der Burg and Voermans, 2015: 43), with the result that 
directives turn into ‘pseudo-regulations’. In fact, in a last step of EU har-
monisation these directives are replaced by regulations which are directy 
applicable at the national level and leave virtually no discretion. In fact, the 
Commission promotes the application of regulations instead of directives in 
a number of policy areas, including the JHA area (European Commission, 
2007a). Meanwhile, the adoption of regulations in the JHA area has already 
become political reality (Hailbronner, 2010). Against this backdrop, expec-
tations may not be unrealistic that the Blue Card Directive eventually will 
become more than what is regarded by some as a measure of merely sym-
bolic value (Boswell and Geddes, 2011). At least, the Directive might foster 
the progressive development towards harmonisation of national migration 
laws. Be it as it may, even before the Directive was enacted, it seemed to be 
clear for the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, that the Directive, repre-
sented only a first step towards a common, European approach to migration 
of highly-skilled migrants (Ministry of Security and Justice, 2008a, p. 5).33
From the detailed discussion of the negotiation process, the focus now 
shifts to the transposition of the Directive in the Netherlands which is anal-
ysed in more detail in the next sections.
9.6 Transposition
The transposition of the Blue Card Directive in the Netherlands is analysed 
by applying the analytical framework which was previously developed. 
The presentation of the transposition process shall not be exhaustive but 
focus on the use of some discretionary provisions in order to shed light on 
the role of discretion in transposition. In this context the analysis seeks to 
provide answers to the following questions: how did transposition pro-
ceed? Was discretion used in transposing the Directive into national law 
and if so, how did discretion affect the process alongside other factors such 
as national-level characteristics which possibly had an influence on national 
transposition? Alongside a thorough study of relevant literature and docu-
ments, the discussion draws on an analysis of Dutch implementing legisla-
tion and insights provided by interviewees which were directly involved in 
the transposition process.
33 Letter Immigration Policy Department, Ministry of Justice to European Affairs Commit-
tee, Dutch Senate, 5565180/DVB, 19 September 2008.
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In the Netherlands, European directives are transposed by means of the 
standard legislative procedure. The type of legislation by which transposi-
tion shall be carried out (e.g. lower-level instruments or acts of parliament) 
is determined by the content of the directive and principles of national 
law (Steunenberg and Voermans, 2006: 21).34 The Blue Card Directive was 
transposed into the Dutch legal system by virtue of an administrative order 
amending the Dutch Foreigners Decree (Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000).35 The 
Decree elaborates some Articles of the Dutch Alien Act (Vreemdelingenwet 
2000). Chapter three of the Decree lays down the conditions for residence of 
third-country nationals. The Decree was, however, amended in 2011 result-
ing from the introduction of new legislation (Modern Migration Act).36 Since 
the structure of the Dutch Alien Act provided for delegation possibilities, 
transposition could be carried out by means of a lower-level instrument. 
Hence, involving the national Parliament was not required. As was already 
the case with the negotiations, also the transposition of the Blue Card Direc-
tive was, mainly in the hands of the Ministry of Security and Justice.37
Member States (except Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom) 
had to transpose the Blue Card Directive by 19 June 2011. However, due to 
non-compliance, the Commission started infringement proceedings against 
twenty Member States, of which the last ones were closed in 2012 (European 
Commission, 2014; see also Cerna, 2013: 187-188). On the part of the Dutch 
Government, timely transposition had been viewed as feasible right from 
the start of the negotiations (Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 22 112, no. 595, 
p. 10) and was eventually achieved (see table 9). Contrary to the majority of 
Member States, the Netherlands implemented the Directive without delay.
Table 9: Fact sheet transposition Blue Card Directive 
Transposition deadline: 19 Jun 11
Publication transposition legislation: 30 Jul 10
17 Jun 11
Sort transposition measure (and number): Order in council (2)
In charge: Ministry of Justice
Legal Framework: Dutch Alien Act 2000
Dutch Alien Decree 2000
34 This is in accordance with the principle of primacy of the legislature.
35 Adopted on 24 July 2010.
36 Besluit van 15 juni 2011 tot vaststelling van het tijdstip van inwerkingtreding van 
onderdelen van het Besluit modern migratiebeleid en tot wijziging van het Vreemdelin-
genbesluit 2000 en het Besluit inburgering in verband met die inwerkingtreding. respec-
tively. Cf. Offi cial Bulletin, 2010, 307.
37 But a cabinet change had taken place. The new Dutch coalition cabinet, the so-called 
‘Rutte I cabinet’ (2010-2012), was formed by the political parties People’s Party for Free-
dom and Democracy (VVD) and Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA).
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9.6.1 Admission scope and criteria
To qualify for the EU Blue Card in the Netherlands, neither higher profes-
sional qualifications nor higher educational qualifications are required. 
Hence, the possibility of making admission depending on the applicant’s 
level of professional experience (of up to five years) was not used once the 
Directive was transposed at the national level. This was arguably due to 
Dutch wishes to exclude, as mentioned earlier, the application of third-
country football players and clerics. It probably also resulted from the fact 
that under the Knowledge Migration Scheme, approval of admission is 
based on compliance with the salary criterion and no further condition has 
to be met. To ensure the exclusion of the third undesired category of work-
ers, i.e. prostitutes, Article 3.32 of the Dutch Foreigners Decree precludes 
residence permits for sex workers. As shown in the correspondence table 
listing the Directive’s articles and the corresponding Dutch implement-
ing measures, Article 3.32 is meant to transpose Article 6 of the Blue Card 
Directive regarding admission volumes (Official Bulletin, 2010, 307, p. 208). 
According to the Dutch transposition law, admission for the purpose of 
highly qualified employment is not made dependent on the outcome of a 
preceding examination of the Dutch labour market; hence the correspond-
ing Directive provision (Article 8(2)) was not transposed which is in line 
with national practice; also the Knowledge Migrant Scheme does not pro-
vide for such a measure (Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 29 861, no. 29, p. 4).
Based on Article 3.30b of the Foreigners Decree, the applicant is required 
to meet the salary criterion. It implies a gross annual salary of 60.000 Euro, 
being indexed and published annually by the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment. In addition, the applicant has to present a valid work con-
tract or binding job offer as well as evidence of formal qualifications which 
are further specified for both regulated and non-regulated professions in 
Article 3.30c of the Foreigners Decree. The processing time for Blue Card 
applications is up to 90 days which is considerably longer if compared to 
the maximum of six weeks regarding applications obtainable under the 
national scheme (Kroes, 2011).38 The Directive’s insurance requirement39 
made already part of existing legislation.40 In order to contribute to the 
Directive’s objective to foster intra-EU mobility instead of compromising 
it, Dutch transposition legislation does not require, as permitted under the 
Directive, a higher threshold for those Blue Card holders which are about to 
move to the Netherlands from another Member State.41 Likewise, arguably 
38 Kroes, S. (2011) Netherlands: The EU Blue Card and the Dutch Knowledge Migrant 
Scheme, http://www.abilblog.com/global-blog/netherlands-the-eu-blue-card-and-the-
dutch-knowledge-migrant-scheme (accessed 23 November 2015).
39 Cf. Article 5(1), point (e).
40 Cf. Article 3(7) under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Foreigners Decree 2000.
41 See Article 4(2) of the Blue Card Directive.
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due to already established national practice which does not provide for it, 
the option to lower the prescribed threshold from 1.5 to 1.2 times the aver-
age gross annual salary for sectors in specific need of labour force has not 
been transposed.42
9.6.2 Non-admission and grounds for refusal
Dutch transposition of Article 5(1) under point (e) foresees that to acquire 
the Blue Card the applicant must not pose a threat to public policy, public 
order, or public security.43 While the Directive’s requirement also refers to 
the notion of ‘public health’ it has been subsumed in the Dutch translation 
under the notion of ‘public order’,44 of which, however, no mentioning is 
made in the Directive. While doubts have been raised as to the correctness 
of transposing the notion of public order this way (Groen and De Lange, 
2011: 343), other Member States have also used the notion of public order 
instead of public policy when implementing the Directive’s requirements 
as noted by the European Commission (European Commission, 2014, p. 7).
Article 8 of the Directive which contains the grounds for refusing the 
granting of the Blue Card is largely covered by the 2000 Dutch Alien Act. 
Article 18.1 of this Act comprises a number of reasons, including those 
specified by the Directive such as the refusal to grant the Blue Card in case 
that the applicant has presented false documents.45 More interesting in 
this regard is the transposition of Article 8(5) of the Directive, which per-
mits Member States to reject an application for an EU Blue Card on the 
ground that according to national law sanctions have been imposed on the 
employer for undeclared work and / or illegal employment. Discretion, as 
implied by this provision, has not only been used by the Dutch authorities 
in transposing these EU rules. In fact, the Dutch transposition is stricter than 
what is prescribed by the Directive. This becomes manifest not only from 
the obligatory language of the relevant Dutch measure but also stems from 
its content: refusal of admission is considered as justified if the employer 
has been punished within a period of up to five years preceding the appli-
cation for a Blue Card.46 The five-year interval linked to the sanctioning of 
the employer is an element that does not make part of the Directive but was 
added to the Dutch transposition measure.47 Regarding this point, Groen 
and De Lange regard the Dutch transposition as disproportionate and as 
undermining the Directive’s attractiveness. In their view this way to trans-
pose the Directive provision cannot be simply justified on the ground that 
42 See Article 5(5) of the Directive.
43 Cf. Articles 3(30) sub-section one under clause (f) of Foreigners Decree 2000.
44 See Offi cial Bulletin, 2010, 307, p. 128.
45 Cf. Article 8(1) of the Blue Card Directive.
46 See Article 3(30) sub-section one under clause (b) of Foreigners Decree 2000.
47 This is actually something that is to be avoided according to the Instructions for drafting 
legislation (no. 331).
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it fits into the context of Dutch legislation (the Modern Migration Policy 
Act) as argued by the Ministry of Security and Justice (Groen and De Lange, 
2011: 343). Interestingly, the same argumentation – to transpose the Direc-
tive’s provision in harmony with Dutch law – was used by the Ministry 
to explain the non-transposition of Article 8(4). It gives Member States the 
option to reject an application for an EU Blue Card to ensure ethical recruit-
ment which aims to mitigate brain drain from third countries. This Article 
was not transposed into Dutch legislation, because, according to the Minis-
ter, national plans were already under way to introduce a code of conduct 
for ethical recruitment in the Netherlands (Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 
22 112, no. 663, 7). Finally, in line with the Dutch transposition law, unem-
ployment does not constitute a reason for withdrawing the Blue Card from 
third-country nationals already residing in the Netherlands for the purpose 
of highly-qualified employment. However, discretion granted by Article 
9(3) of the Directive has been used to establish that unemployment justifies 
refusal of renewing the Blue Card.48
9.6.3 Intra-EU mobility
The Netherlands supported the Directive’s objective to foster intra-EU 
mobility and therefore did not approve of nor implemented, as already 
noted, the Directive’s provisions concerning the labour market test and der-
ogation from the salary threshold. Intra-EU mobility also plays a role with 
regard to the migration of family members that the Directive addresses in 
Article 15. In this regard, the Directive implies more favourable provisions 
than its Dutch counterpart. Article 15(5) obliges Member States to derogate 
from already existing EU rules on family reunification when it comes to 
the provision of residence permits to the Blue Card holder’s family mem-
bers (Groen and de Lange, 2011: 348). Under the condition that the family 
was already constituted in the first Member States, the family members 
shall have the possibility to accompany the Blue Card holder in moving 
to a second Member State (Article 19(1)). The Dutch transposition of these 
EU rules, however, turned out to be stricter, arguably due to the difference 
between the Directive and national rules regarding the obligation of imme-
diate application. According to the Dutch transposition law, moving to 
another Member States is only permitted for family members if they have, 
corresponding with the requirement for the Blue Card holder, resided in the 
Netherlands for at least eighteen months. This does not seem to be in line 
with the Directive which does not include any rules justifying such a strict 
interpretation, as applied by the Dutch transposing authority (Groen and 
De Lange, 2011: 346).
Having taken a closer look at the Dutch transposition of the Blue Card 
Directive, it is now time to turn to the explanatory analysis.
48 See the newly added Articles 3.89b and 3.91c of the Foreigners Decree 2000.
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9.7 Analysis
The descriptive analysis provided a number of insights into the Dutch trans-
position of the EU Blue Card Directive which shall now be used to assess 
the role of discretion by means of the sets of expectations previously devel-
oped with regard to the formal implementation of European directives.
9.7.1 Discretion-in-national-law
The discretion-in-national-law expectation implies that having a wide margin 
of discretion available for the purpose of transposition facilitates integrating 
EU rules into the national legal corpus. Was that so in the case of the Dutch 
transposition of the Blue Card Directive? The Netherlands already had their 
own national admission system in place, the Knowledge Migrant Scheme, 
from which the European counterpart diverged in a few aspects – despite 
the amendments which the Commission proposal had undergone during 
the negotiations. However, it appears that the Dutch transposition author-
ity, the Ministry of Security and Justice, managed to smoothly convert EU 
rules into national migration law. Discretion certainly played a relevant role 
in this regard. Due to the Directive’s wide margin of discretion it was pos-
sible for the Netherlands to maintain the status quo, and hence, to hold on 
to an admission system that had already proved to work well and that pro-
vided the reference point for future national legislation.
Discretion is described by implementation scholars as providing Mem-
ber States with a broader range of policy alternatives in transposition. This 
can be understood as implying that all of the alternatives are based on the 
idea that discretion is used whereas I believe that one of these alternatives 
is also not to make use of discretion. In other words, if a Member States 
uses discretion when transposing EU rules it may do so with a view to leav-
ing national rules intact. The same objective may, however, be pursued by 
not using discretion. This is evidenced by the Dutch transposition of the 
Directive’s rules relating to domestic labour markets and salary standards. 
Neither the option of applying a labour market test prior to granting admis-
sion nor any changes to the salary threshold were taken over in Dutch 
transposition legislation. Hence, in not being forced to use these options the 
discretionary decision was made not to consider them, and thus, to keep 
the status quo in place that did not provide for any such measures. What’s 
more, additional administrative burdens which would have resulted from 
the introduction of the aforementioned EU rules could be avoided.
Discretion also played a role in some cases where national transposition 
turned out not to be entirely in line with the Directive. Having diverging 
national rules in place or facing the obligation to create new ones for the 
purpose of transposition, were apparently also reasons for the transposing 
Ministry to formally implement EU rules differently than intended by the 
Directive. This is exemplified by the way mobility rights of the Blue Card 
holder’s family members were transposed: regarding this point the Dutch 
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transposition measure is stricter than the relevant EU rules but in line with 
Dutch law and practice. It also shows in the fact that the ethical recruit-
ment provision was not transposed which would have required additional 
transposition efforts since Dutch migration law did not provide for cor-
responding rules. Finally, the stricter approach emerging from the Dutch 
transposition law with regard to rejecting applications for the Blue Card in 
case of sanctions against the future employer of the third-country migrant 
was justified on the ground that it was seen to be in line with new national 
legislation. Especially in the latter case it becomes evident that additional 
discretion was apparently sought outside the Directive’s limits. This ‘illicit’ 
discretion did, nevertheless, not trigger any criticism on the part of the 
European Commission. The Netherlands were not considered responsible 
for infringing Directive’s requirements, in contrast to many other Member 
States that were eventually found not to comply with the Blue Card Direc-
tive.
9.7.2 Discretion and disagreement
Compliance with the Direcive, does, nevertheless, not remove that fact that 
the final Blue Card Directive did not only include requirements meeting 
Dutch preferences. Next to the validity of the Blue Card and rules regarding 
unregulated professions, it was also the salary threshold that could not be 
brought more in line with already existing Dutch rules. This brings expecta-
tion 6 into the picture. It is expected that Member State disagreement with a 
directive’s requirement raises the likelihood of deficient transposition, and 
that this effect becomes more positive as the degree of discretion decreases. 
In other words, if a Member State lacks discretion for transposing the rel-
evant requirement, it is supposed not to implement it properly. This expec-
tation can be ruled out, however, since the Blue Card Directive came along 
with a wide margin of discretion. Additional discretion was used to create 
‘suitable solutions’. The latter shows in the way the Netherlands realised 
their wish to exclude certain professions from the scope of the Blue Card 
by using discretion flowing not only from the Directive’s substantive part 
(Article 6), but also from its standard provisions (definition) and specifica-
tions in the preamble.49 What’s more, no problems were reported regard-
ing the transposition of requirements that had not been brought into closer 
alignment with Dutch rules during the negotiations and hence did not 
entirely match Dutch preferences (e.g. those related to unregulated pro-
fessions or the Blue Card’s validity). Finally, it should be noted that in the 
absence of any complaints by the European Commission, Dutch transposi-
tion did not appear to be deficient.
49 For the exclusion of sex workers Article 6 was used, being specifi ed by recital 8 (see sec-
tion 9.3.4).
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9.7.3 Discretion, compatibility, administrative capacity and 
transposition actors
The foregoing does not change the fact that affording Member States higher 
levels of discretion may under certain circumstances turn discretion into an 
impeding factor in the process of transposing a directive, in particular the 
more EU and national rules are not compatible, if administrative capacity 
is lacking but also in the presence of a high number of actors carrying out 
transposition.
Discretion can, however, also enforce positive effects from factors such 
as compatibility, particularly if it is granted by larger degrees and if the 
match between EU Directive and national legislation appears to be good 
(expectation 7). These two conditions apply in the present case: legal dispar-
ities between the Directive and Dutch law did not become very pronounced 
due to the fact that national admission schemes continued to co-exist with 
the Blue Card admission scheme. What’s more, legal incongruence between 
EU and Dutch legislation was eventually low, in other words, the Directive 
and Dutch migration law matched relatively well. This observation is sup-
ported by taking Steunenberg’s and Toshkov’s concept of compatibility as a 
benchmark. According to this concept a small legal misfit applies if transpo-
sition is carried out by means of two or fewer transposition measures which 
are lower-ranking legal instruments (delegated legislation) (Steunenberg 
and Toshkov, 2009: 960). The Blue Card Directive required the adoption of 
not more than two administrative decrees. Furthermore, difficulties in the 
formal implementation of the Directive resulting from administrative short-
comings such as lacking administrative capacity (insufficient transposition 
knowledge) or coordination problems within the responsible Ministry did 
not arise. On the contrary, transposition went smoothly. This is for instance 
evidenced by the fact that all stages in the process, including the treatment 
of the draft transposition measure in both the Dutch Council of Ministers 
and the Council of State, had been passed within the envisaged time frame. 
This can be derived from the i-timer report which the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs regularly submits to the Dutch Parliament.50 On top of all 
that, the Directive has a wide scope of discretion and, as noted further up, 
discretion facilitated the incorporation of EU requirements into national 
law. Having said this, it seems safe to say that the compatibility interaction 
expectation holds true.
Next, the capacity interaction expectation assumes that administrative 
capacity raises the likelihood of proper transposition but that this effect 
becomes less strong the more discretion is granted by a directive. While con-
siderable discretion was available for transposition, administrative capacity, 
i.e. insufficient transposition knowledge and / or coordination problems 
50 See the attachment to the Ministry’s letter to the Dutch Parliament about the state of 
affairs concerning the implementation of EU law, fourth quarter of 2010, BLG98235, 
21109, no. 198, 3 February 2011.
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within the transposing national authority, did not play any role. Hence, the 
capacity interaction expectation does not appear to be of relevance in the pres-
ent case.
Finally, transposition may be hampered by more actors entrusted with 
this task in combination with more discretion being granted by a directive 
(expectation 9). The transposition of the Blue Card Directive only involved 
one (main) transposition actor. This precluded any controversy with other 
domestic actors about how to transpose the Directive. Neither the coordina-
tion tasks that had largely been carried out already at the negotiation stage, 
involving next to the implementing Ministry of Security and Justice, the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment nor the internal communication 
between the former’s political and legal units involved in the Directive’s 
dossier, impeded transposition (interview). Against this background, the 
plausibility of the expectation is difficult to establish. Hence, the conclusion 
that there was no interaction effect from more actors involved in transposi-
tion and the Directive’s wider discretion scope.
All things considered, it seems that discretion could unfold positive 
effects on the Dutch transposition of the Blue Card Directive. In this regard, 
discretion did not only contribute to timely and legally correct transposi-
tion. The fact that, through discretion, the national scheme could be pre-
served and the preferences of a number of domestic actors therefore accom-
modated, including alongside the Dutch Government and Parliament also 
the national authority in charge of the practical application of the EU’s 
requirements (the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, IND), seems to 
have enhanced the domestic support of the Directive and its incorporation 
into the Dutch legal framework.
The domestic responses to the Directive in and beyond the Netherlands 
have, however, triggered negative reactions. Concerns have been voiced 
about restrictive approaches taken by Member States in transposing the 
Directive since wide discretion allowed them to do so (Cerna, 2013). But, 
as can be derived from the recent Commission report on Member States’ 
implementation of the Directive, with a view to the Netherlands, it does not 
seem to have adopted a purely minimalist approach to transposition. On 
the contrary, it has shown a more favourable approach than other Mem-
ber States to some of the Directive’s requirements (European Commission, 
2014). Nonetheless, the Dutch transposition case illustrates that the attrac-
tiveness of the Directive is harmed by the fact that EU and national admis-
sion schemes compete (Cerna, 2013: 192). The Commission’s figures for the 
year 2012 are telling in this regard: while within this period Member States 
like Germany, Spain or Lithuania were countries with the greatest share 
of the total amount of Blue Cards granted within the EU (Germany: 2584, 
Spain: 461, Lithuania: 183), the Netherlands was one of those Member States 
with the lowest share of the overall amount of Blue Cards – having granted 
merely one Blue Card. This sharply contrasts with 5514 permits that third-
country nationals obtained in the same period under the Dutch admission 
scheme (European Commission, 2014, p. 3; 13).
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9.8 Conclusion
The possibility cannot be ruled out that discretion may be used by Mem-
ber States to make restrictive policies. Nor can it be denied that discretion 
adds to legal diversity in the application of a number of issues the Direc-
tive regulates (e.g. admission criteria, volume, salary threshold, validity, 
grounds for refusal) undermining a more unified approach towards legal 
migration within the EU. In spite of it all, the case of the Blue Card Direc-
tive shows that discretion had a number of positive effects which may in the 
long-term outweigh immediate disadvantages: Due to discretion the first 
measure ever seeking to establish a common EU approach to labour migra-
tion was adopted in a field previously governed by national interests. In the 
negotiations, discretion came to the fore as facilitating factor, by means of 
which different Member States’ interests could be reconciled. Moreover, the 
directive has meanwhile been transposed by all Member States whereby, as 
exemplified by the Directive’s formal implementation in the Netherlands, 
discretion has eased converting EU rules into Dutch law and shown its 
potential in fulfilling a facilitating-fit-function in transposition.
10.1 Introduction
In this chapter EU- and national-level processes regarding the Pyrotechnic 
Articles Directive1 take centre stage. Mapping out the area of consumer law 
and the background to the Directive, is followed by a closer examination of 
the negotiations and Dutch transposition of it. Presentation of either process 
includes a descriptive and explanatory analysis. Both analyses are geared 
towards shedding light on the role of discretion.
10.2 The directive
Consumer law is an area where the European legislature defines legislation 
mostly in the form of directives (Antoniolli, 2006: 868) of which the Pyro-
technic Articles Directive, adopted in May 2007, provides one example. 
Based on Article 95 TEC (now Article 114 TFEU),2 the so-called internal mar-
ket article – envisaging harmonisation of national laws with a view to EU-
wide market integration – 3 introduces a certification system for pyrotech-
nic products. Lying at the interface of consumer protection / product safety 
and the internal market, the Directive is a piece of EU regulation pursuing 
the objectives of free circulation of pyrotechnic articles in the internal mar-
ket – in line with one of the EU’s founding principles, the free movement of 
goods (Article 23 TEC, now Article 28 TFEU) – and a high level of human 
health protection, public security and safety of consumers.4 Pyrotechnic 
articles are defined broadly in the Directive, in so far as they do not merely 
include fireworks, but ‘any article containing explosive substances or an 
explosive mixture of substances designed to produce heat, light, sound, gas 
or smoke or a combination of such effects through self-sustained exother-
mic chemical reactions.’5 This description applies next to fireworks, also to 
theatrical pyrotechnic articles, and pyrotechnic articles for vehicles as well 
as a variety of products designed for a more specific application (Aufauvre, 
1 Directive 2007/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007 on 
the placing on the market of pyrotechnic articles, OJ L 154, 14 June 2007, pp. 1-21.
2 Also Article 115 TFEU implies legislative harmonisation but requires unanimity voting, 
unlike Article 114 TFEU which is based on ‘qualifi ed majority voting’.
3 Article 95 EC provided the legal basis for Community institutions for taking measures 
aiming at promoting the establishment and functioning of the internal market.
4 See Article (1) of Directive 2007/23/EC.
5 Cf. Article 2(1).
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2008: 59). While the 1993 Explosives for Civil Use Directive6 excluded pyro-
technic products explicitly from its scope, it anticipated the adoption of EU 
regulation on this matter.7 Both Directives on Explosives and Pyrotechnic 
Articles follow the new approach to technical harmonisation and standardi-
sation. This new regulatory technique, outlined first in a 1985 Commission 
White Paper, was agreed by the Council with the aim of simplifying and 
further facilitating harmonisation for the purpose of economic and market 
integration.8 It is based on the principle of mutual recognition which, trans-
lated to the present case, means that for pyrotechnic articles lawfully mar-
keted in one Member State access to the market of another Member State 
shall be guaranteed. ‘Lawfully’ means ‘according to EU-wide harmonised 
essential safety requirements’ and is supposed to ensure the free circula-
tion of goods – as well as a high level of consumer health protection – also 
in situations where the buying Member State has technical rules in place 
with which the traded pyrotechnic products do not comply. Harmonisation 
is facilitated by the fact that, as reflected by the Directive, it is limited to 
the essential safety requirements and applied to only very few other issues. 
Compliance with the essential safety requirements is controlled by a sys-
tem of market surveillance and conformity assessment procedures at the 
end of which, if the product complies with EU harmonised standards, the 
CE marking is affixed to the product. Trade in fireworks involves a num-
ber of economic operators. Therefore the Directive establishes obligations 
for not only Member States but also for economic manufacturers, importers 
and distributors – not removing, however the ultimate responsibility from 
Member States to provide for the proper transposition and application of 
the Directive.9 With its aims to remove (trade) barriers to intra-Community 
trade and legislative harmonisation at minimum level (regarding safety 
requirements and information provisions on safe handling and use of pyro-
technic articles), the Directive reflects both negative and positive integra-
tion dynamics that underlay the development of the internal market (as 
an area being internally free of borders, thus allowing for three movement 
of goods). In so doing, the Directive provides a typical instance of product 
6 See Directive 93/15/EEC of 5 April 1993 on the harmonisation of the provisions relating 
to the placing on the market and supervision of explosives for civil uses, OJ L 121, 15 
May 1993, pp. 20-36.
7 The preamble of the Directive stipulates that ‘Whereas, pyrotechnical articles require 
appropriate measures to ensure the protection of consumers and the safety of the public; 
whereas an additional directive is planned in this fi eld’ [italics added].
8 See Council Resolution of 21 December 1989 on a global approach to conformity assess-
ment, OJ C 10, 16 January 1990, pp. 1-2 and implementation by means of Council Deci-
sion of 22 July 1993 concerning the modules for the various phases of the conformity 
assessment procedures and the rules for the affi xing and use of the CE conformity mark-
ing, which are intended to be used in the technical harmonisation directives OJ L 220, 30 
August 1993, pp. 23-39.
9 Directives are, in principal, addressed to the Member States. See Article 288 TFEU (ex 
Article 249 TEC).
Chapter 10  Pyrotechnic Articles Directive 175
safety regulation that brings with it measures of both market regulation and 
deregulation.
10.2.1 The area of consumer protection
Already for a good while, the EU has been active in the field of consumer 
protection and product safety – even though, the overall development of 
EU consumer law was built on thin ground. The Treaty of Rome (1957) 
referred to ‘the consumer’ only sporadically alongside rules on the free 
movement of goods and services that were of direct or indirect relevance 
to the consumer (Weatherill, 2013: 3; 6). It should be noted that, in a field 
where the directive has become the prominent regulatory instrument, it 
was, however, soft law, issued by both the Commission and the Member 
States in the Council that gave essential impulses to the development of 
EU consumer law (Antoniolli, 2006: 862). This is all the more interesting 
because soft law in EU areas including consumer protection is not devoid 
of any legal effects (Senden, 2005: 81; Weatherill, 2013). In this regard, it is 
relevant to note that the European Court of Justice has supported the har-
monisation of national laws regarding consumer protection by referring to 
soft law in its interpretation of consumer-related treaty provisions10 as well 
as, at later stages in the evolution of consumer law, by emphasising both the 
effects of harmonising directives found to confer consumer rights and the 
obligation of Member States to ensure these rights.11 In any case soft law has 
paved the way for legislative initiatives regarding consumer law, the 1975 
Council Resolution12 being only one example out of many. In setting out 
out a consumer protection and information policy, it highlighted five con-
sumer rights, including the ‘right to protection of health and product safety’ 
and the ‘right to protection of economic interest’ as top priorities. Moreover, 
the Council Resolution is illustrative of the fact that the close connection 
between economic integration / EU internal market project and consumer / 
product safety was established early on (Weatherill, 2013: 254-255; see also 
Twigg-Flesner, 2012).
10 As shown in case C-362/88, GB–INNO–BM v Confederation du Commerce Luxembour-
geois [1990] ECR I-667. Weatherill states that the Court was also explicit in its judgments 
about its use of soft law in interpreting binding legal provisions as emerges from case 
C-322/88, Grimaldi v Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles [1989] ECR 4407. Cf. Weath-
erill, 2013, p. 8.
11 See, in particular, the case C-9/90, Francovich and Others v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357and 
later judgments, amongst others, case C-91/92, Faccini Dori v Recreb [1994] ECR I-3325.
12 Other measures followed: Council Resolution of 19 May 1981 on a second programme 
of the European Economic Community for a consumer protection and information pol-
icy, Council Resolution of 15 December 1986 on the integration of consumer policy in 
other common policies, Council Resolution of 9 November 1989 on future priorities for 
relaunching consumer protection policy.
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While the Treaty of Rome underlined the benefits for consumers from eco-
nomic integration, the following soft law initiatives increasingly empha-
sised the EU’s intention to ensure that integration through trade with a 
view to economic expansion and the free movement of goods would not 
jeopardise the interest and safety of consumers. The increase in available 
products should bring with it more choice and better quality as well as an 
attractive cost-to-performance ratio for consumers. At the same time, the 
idea of consumer protection began to crystallise showing in both the Res-
olutions of the Council and Commission papers which set out a vision of 
future measures regarding the protection and promotion of consumer inter-
ests against the background of growing economic integration. The focus 
on the protection of consumers’ interests became apparent in the Council’s 
reflections upon the possibility to integrate consumer protection as an objec-
tive into common EU policies, and the importance of ensuring the safety 
of products and services (Council of European Union, 1986). It furthermore 
was expressed by the Commission’s wish to give a ‘new impetus for con-
sumer protection policy’ (European Commission, 1985) in the light of the 
fact that progress in the area remained slow. By means of a new approach 
to technical harmonisation, the Commission’s idea was to breathe new life 
into the development of consumer protection laws and policies: common 
health and safety objectives should be achieved by having in place common 
standards for goods.
From the foregoing it can be followed that in the pre-Maastricht period 
the development of EU consumer law was shaped through three major 
streams or ‘routes’: soft law measures, internal market promotion and leg-
islative harmonisation (the so-called ‘new approach’ to technical harmoni-
sation). The latter two streams are interwoven with each other as noted by 
Weatherill: ‘[i]n so far as economic integration improves the consumer’s 
position by promoting a more efficiently functioning market, then harmoni-
sation is a pro-consumer policy’ (2013: 11; 15). In other words, legislative 
harmonisation has been framed by the EU institutions as a means used on 
behalf of the consumer to protect his needs and rights (Twigg-Flesner, 2012).
Already with the European Single Act (1986), and in particular Article 
100A (later Article 95 TEC), a supranational commitment was expressed 
to guarantee a high level of consumer protection with a view to measures 
concerning the functioning of the internal market (Antoniolli, 2006: 862-
863). This commitment was also reflected by the foundation of the Com-
mission’s Consumer Policy Directorate General in 1995, and, already before, 
the development of the area had reached a peak with the adoption of the 
Treaty of Maastricht, and the new Title IX on ‘common commercial policy’, 
in particular, which was added to the EU legal framework. With these legal 
arrangements in place, the EU entered a new stage of development, gain-
ing legislative competence in the field of consumer law. The new Titel of 
the Treaty centred on consumer protection without exclusively linking it 
to the EU’s internal market project (Article 129a TEC). EU harmonisation 
was given a boost by both the application of the co-decision procedure to 
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EU consumer law-making and the establishment of qualified majority vot-
ing in the Council regarding legislation concerning the completion of the 
internal market. And yet, even though the legislative activities of the EU 
increased in subsequent years, many of its measures were not taken on the 
basis of the newly required competence. This was apparently due to the fact 
that – as reflected in Article 129a13 and maintained in later treaty changes 
(Article 153 TEC and now Article 169 TFEU) – the EU’s role was under-
stood as supplementary to that of the Member States which remained in the 
driver’s seat (Weatherill, 2013: 306-307). In general, it seems that the alloca-
tion of decision-making competences between the EU and national levels 
became an increasingly relevant topic. After all, with the Maastricht Treaty 
also the principle of subsidiarity was introduced which aimed to clarify 
the conditions under which the EU was to take legislative action or leave 
it to the Member States.14 Being a principle covering areas not belonging to 
the realm of exclusive Community competence, the principle of subsidiar-
ity was to be observed by the EU in justifying its legislative acts, including 
those proposed in the area of consumer law. The introduction of this prin-
ciple made it all the more obvious that the EU merely had an assisting role 
and its application emphasised the idea that ‘Community intervention must 
complement, rather than substitute for, state action’ (Antoniolli, 2006: 865).
In the post-Maastricht period and continuing beyond the Amsterdam 
and Nice Treaties, the Commission set up further objectives and strategies 
in its ‘action plans’ and ‘consumer policy strategies’. The Commission’s pri-
mary concern was not anymore with legislative output but with the qual-
ity of legislation as evidenced by its better-law-making initiative. Since its 
inception in 1995 it covers all areas of EU activity, including, as reflected 
in the Commission’s policy plan, the area of consumer law (European 
Commission, 1999). Re-enforcing its commitment to better law-making in 
200215 resulted in the review of a list of future legislative measures which 
should now be shaped with a view to the objectives of deregulation and 
simplification. This review exercise may have prompted the Commission 
to get back to plans concerning a directive on pyrotechnics that had come 
to a halt (interview). Furthermore, it is relevant to note that both the qual-
ity of legislation and the dissatisfying implementation results led the Com-
mission to adopt a more rigorous approach in the field of consumer law. 
13 According to Article 129a TEC a high level of consumer protection shall be achieved 
by ‘specifi c action which supports and supplements the policy pursued by the Member 
States to protect the health, safety and economic interests of consumers and to provide 
adequate information to consumers.’
14 Article 3b(2) TEC, now Article 5(3)(1) TEU.
15 COM(2002) 275 fi nal. See also the Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making in 
which the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the European 
Parliament affi rm their intention to facilitate, with a view to principles such as demo-
cratic legitimacy, subsidiarity and proportionality, and legal certainty, the legislative pro-
cess and to improve legislative quality of EU acts. Cf. Interinstitutional agreement on 
better law-making. OJ C 321, 31 December 2003, pp. 1-5.
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The widespread use of directives implying the minimum harmonisation of 
national laws had apparently led to different interpretations of EU direc-
tives, and therefore inconsistency in the application of EU consumer law as 
a whole. This appeared to be detrimental to the aim of achieving common 
safety standards, consumer confidence and legal certainty for business and 
consumers throughout the EU. In the face of this problem, the Commission 
sought to intensify legislative harmonisation by increasingly promoting full 
(or maximum) instead of minimum harmonisation to tackle market frag-
mentation caused by divergent national legal frameworks (Reich, 2012b: 3).
The shift from minimum harmonisation to full harmonisation in the 
development of EU consumer law is of relevance with regard to legisla-
tive discretion. After all, it is quite obvious that increasing harmonisation 
of national legal frameworks implies little legislative discretion being left 
for the Member States to implement EU directives. Seen in this light, the 
Pyrotechnic Articles Directive possibly reflects the shifting paradigm in EU 
Consumer Law from the earlier minimum harmonisation approach to more 
detailed legislation and fuller harmonisation aspirations of the Commis-
sion. The Directive contains minimum harmonisation arrangements. Hence, 
it grants discretion. At the same time, however, its detailed and lengthy pro-
visions reduce the discretion available for Member State implementation. 
Meanwhile, the trend towards full harmonisation has not remained without 
consequences for the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive. The Directive has been 
revised in 2013 with the purpose of further clarifying terms, concepts and 
conditions. This amendment has resulted in a still more detailed and there-
fore lengthier piece of legislation which more explicitly pursues the aim to 
harmonise national laws, indicating this objective already in its title.16
10.2.2 Purpose and background to the directive
In fact, plans for a directive regarding pyrotechnics had already been dis-
cussed parallel to the preparations and negotiations of the Explosives for 
Civil Use Directive. But they did not materialise – arguably due to national 
differences concerning the sale and use of pyrotechnic articles – and were 
eventually put aside (interviews). A decade later, a new attempt was 
launched by the Commission which preferred a regulation over a directive. 
However, support for directly binding EU rules did not find support among 
the Member States and, as for the new approach to technical harmonisation, 
it was only applied in combination with directives; hence the Commission 
abandoned the idea of using a regulation as regulatory instrument (inter-
view).
16 See Directive 2013/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 
2013 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the relating to the 
making available on the market of pyrotechnic articles (recast), OJ L 178, 28 June 2013, 
pp. 27-65.
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The proposal for the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive was tabled in Octo-
ber 2005. It entailed a number of clear-cut aims relating to the internal mar-
ket and consumer protection. To begin with, it set out to achieve the free 
circulation of pyrotechnic products within the EU – with the exclusion of 
those products that were used by armed forces, police, in aircraft or cov-
ered by other EU legislation. The free movement of goods should be facili-
tated by the harmonisation of safety requirements of national consumer 
laws. Common safety standards should, in turn, contribute to the increased 
protection of consumers and professionals alike and eventually reduce acci-
dents resulting from the misuse and malfunctioning of pyrotechnic prod-
ucts (European Commission, 2005). The emphasis on the safety of fireworks 
matched one of the Commission’s top priorities: to achieve a high and com-
mon level of consumer protection as reflected in its 2002-2006 consumer 
policy strategy (European Commission, 2002).
Despite the EU’s early announcement in the 1993 Explosives for Civil 
Use Directive to come up with legislation regulating consumer protection 
and public safety regarding pyrotechnic products, preparations in this 
regard started a mere ten years later with the setting up of an EU-level 
working group for pyrotechnic articles composed of various stakehold-
ers from the Member States: representatives of relevant industries, above 
all the Pyrotechnic industry, public authorities dealing with pyrotechnics 
as well as the European Committee for Standardisation, in particular its 
technical committee for pyrotechnic articles which played a leading role in 
the drafting of the essential safety requirements. The different stakeholder 
groups voiced support for the Directive, except for representatives from the 
United Kingdom and Sweden that saw no need for EU legislation on this 
matter (European Commission, 2005, p. 5).
The proposal for a Pyrotechnic Articles Directive seemed to be in the 
best interest of the Member States. The Directive has been assessed as a 
‘real opportunity to achieve a higher safety level with fireworks articles 
through harmonised testing and quality assessment procedures’ (Aufau-
vre, 2008: 59). Having in place one single legal framework for the pro-
motion of pyrotechnic articles replacing the various national approval 
procedures was seen as guaranteeing the free circulation of products and 
therefore benefitting the domestic industries (Brochier and Branka, 2007: 
619). What’s more, a harmonised approval system for the placing of pyro-
technic articles on the market would reduce administrative burdens for 
all parties involved in the European single market, especially enterprises 
(Aufauvre, 2007). Finally, the EU’s regulatory approach seemed to benefit 
Member States also in another respect. While national differences regard-
ing the examination of fireworks and approval processes for market plac-
ing of pyrotechnic products, as well as restrictions on the availability of 
certain consumer fireworks were to be ironed out by a comprehensive 
and coherent legislative framework at Community level, the removal of 
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barriers to intra-Community trade should,17 however, not unnecessar-
ily interfere with national legal orders and practices. Hence – and in line 
with Article 95 TEC – the choice for a directive as regulatory instrument 
shows that the Commission paid due attention to the various regional tra-
ditions and local customs in the usage of fireworks within Member States 
(European Commission, 2005, p. 5). The Directive proposal was subject to 
the co-decision procedure, thus involving alongside the Council also the 
European Parliament. The leading role, on the part of the European Parlia-
ment, was taken by the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection. It was responsible for drafting the legislative resolution, being 
herein supported by the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. In 
general, the European Parliament welcomed the proposal, considering it, 
with a view to the Commission’s efforts at better law-making, as a ‘good 
example of deregulation and simplification’ (European Parliament, 2006a, 
p. 44). It emphasised, however, the need for some clarification, pertain-
ing, for instance, to the concept of ‘pyrotechnic articles’ or ‘manufacturers’ 
in order to truly realise the Directive’s objectives (European Parliament, 
2006a, p. 37). To this end, the European Parliament came up with various 
suggestions to improve the quality of the proposal to guarantee coherency 
in the application of the envisaged legal framework.
10.3 Negotiations
While the Commission proposal was submitted in October 2005, Council 
negotiations did not commence immediately owing to some organisational 
difficulties during the start-up phase (interview). Under the Presidency 
of Finland, the Member States got down to business in the second half of 
2006. Negotiations took place in the Council Working Group Technical Har-
monisation and proceeded fast as witnessed by the participating civil ser-
vant from the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. Indeed, the 
European Parliament approved the proposed Directive at first reading by 
the end of November 2006 (European Parliament, 2006b). Negotiations in 
the Council were eventually concluded with the adoption of the final Direc-
tive in April 2007 (Council of the European Union, 2007). The Directive 
17 Interstate-barriers to trade refers to the situation where goods produced in one Member 
State are not allowed access to the market of another Member State because the latter 
applies different technical rules concerning these goods than the former. Since the mean-
while famous ‘Cassis de Dijon’- judgment of 20 February 1979 these kinds of restrictions 
on the free movement of goods are considered unlawful. From the judgment it followed 
that goods that can be lawfully produced or marketed in one Member State and are not 
subject to Union harmonisation should be allowed to be marketed in any other Member 
State. This shall apply even if the product does not entirely comply with the technical 
standards of the Member State of destination. This is also known as ‘principle of mutual 
recognition’. Cf. case 120/78, Rewe Zentrale v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Brannt-
wein [1979] ECR 649 (‘Cassis de Dijon’).
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was treated as an A-item throughout the entire negotiation process which, 
therefore, took less time than negotiations on the more controversial B-items 
would have required (see table 10).18
Table 10: Timeline for negotiations on the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive
11 Oct 05 Adoption by Commission proposal
17 May 06 European Economic and Social Committee opinion
30 Nov 06 Adoption of the directive at first reading by European Parliament 
16 Apr 07 Approval by the Council of the European Parliament position at 1st 
reading
23 May 07 Formal adoption by Council and European Parliament
Additionally, and in conformity with Article 259 TEC (now Article 302 
TFEU) the Economic and Social Committee delivered its opinion on 17 May 
2006.
The Netherlands were amongst the majority of countries that supported 
the idea of introducing common rules on the marketing and use of pyro-
technic articles. The Dutch position on the proposal had been prepared by 
the Working Group Assessment New Commission Proposals (Werkgroep 
Beoordeling Nieuwe Commissievoorstellen (BNC)). In principal, being 
composed of civil servants from all ministries and representatives of the 
regional and local authorities,19 its composition can slightly differ from case 
to case depending on the content of the directive under negotiation. Next 
to local representatives, the Working Group involved, in the present case, 
the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment – as the authority being 
chiefly responsible for the dossier on the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive – 
the Ministries of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Justice (nowadays Secu-
rity and Justice), the Ministry of Finances and a few others. Member States’ 
support for the proposal did not only result from the economic advantages 
it implied for domestic pyrotechnics industries. In particular the safety of 
pyrotechnics seemed to be a problem with a European dimension even 
though Member States were differently affected by it (European Commis-
sion, 2005, p. 3). Be it as it may, in 2006, coinciding with the negotiations on 
the Directive proposal, EU wide figures were estimated at 45.000 casualties 
18 To briefl y recall from the previous discussion: As a rule, treating the directive propos-
al as a B-Item in the negotiations, indicates that the proposal contains contested issues 
which require further debate to reach agreement. A-items, by contrast, only require for-
mal adoption because agreement on the proposal has already been reached in the Coun-
cil preparatory bodies (see section 8.5.2.1).
19 Dutch regional and local authorities are: the Association of Provinces of the Nether-
lands (Interprovinciaal overleg, IPO) and the Association of Netherlands Municipalities 
(Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, VNG).
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resulting from the misuse or malfunctioning of pyrotechnic products (Bos, 
2006).20
Problems with pyrotechnic articles had caused a fireworks explosion 
earlier on, in the Dutch city of Enschede on 13 May 2000. Being the worst 
fireworks disaster ever occurring on European territory, it was a ‘dramatic 
experience for the country’ (interviewee of the Ministry of Infrastruc-
ture and the Environment) causing deaths (23) and injuries (947), and the 
destruction of residential areas and public space (Speksnijder and Wiegman, 
2000).21 Later on it was found that very dangerous fireworks had intention-
ally been classified as not dangerous when being put on transport to be 
eventually stored close to a residential area (interview). The Government’s 
response in the aftermath of this disaster was to bring new legislation into 
force, by means of the 2002 Fireworks Decree (Vuurwerkbesluit) which was 
amended in 2004 to improve its practical application and enforcement. The 
Fireworks Decree includes rules addressing all stages of the product cycle 
(amongst others import, assembling, selling, transporting, storing, and 
igniting) to ensure high safety levels (Official Bulletin, 2009, 605, p. 33). Even 
though new legislation and additional measures in the enforcement sphere 
alleviated the problem of unsafe and illegal fireworks circulating on Dutch 
territory to a certain extent in the years after the Enschede fireworks disas-
ter, it nevertheless persisted (Biezeveld, 2010: 42).
Given this situation, it may not come as a surprise that the Dutch Gov-
ernment did not object to the Commission proposal. Maybe it was even seen 
as an opportunity to further improve own legislation. After all, the Dutch 
Fireworks Decree has been assessed as lacking a clear definition of profes-
sional fireworks from which requirements for its use and sale could have 
been derived (Biezeveld, 2010: 44-45). In any case, the Dutch Government 
acknowledged the economic benefits which the single market for pyrotech-
nic articles entailed and the fact that safety rules and measures against ille-
gal fireworks were planned to be realised, even though, it wished the envis-
aged rules regarding the enforcement of the Directive to be more in line 
with national practices. Especially these rules should be clarified and pro-
vide for more effective enforcement through, for instance, the extension of 
safety requirements to the transport and storage of pyrotechnic articles, an 
issue which the proposal did not address (Parliamentary Papers II 2005/06, 
22112, no. 429).
It is not only due to the experience of the Enschede fireworks disaster 
that the Dutch situation regarding the sale and use of pyrotechnic articles 
is a specific one compared to other Member States. Relatively speaking, 
considering the EU as one sales market for pyrotechnic articles and tak-
ing the per capita consumption as a benchmark, the popularity of pyro-
20 Bos, ‘Vuurwerkverschillen tussen EU-landen verdwijnen’, in Algemeen Nederlands 
Persbureau (ANP) 30 November, 2006.
21 C. Speksnijder and M. Wiegman ‘Deuren tussen de bunkers moeten hebben opengesta-
an’, in Het Parool 15 May 2000.
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technic articles in the Netherlands appears to be one of the highest among 
other countries (interview). Against this background it is a dilemma that 
not only legal fireworks but also illegal ones – being illegal for reasons of 
safety and health – are among those consumed, making up, in fact, fifteen 
percent of the annual consumption of fireworks. In fact, the Netherlands 
have been struggling more than other Member States with the problem of 
‘illegal fireworks’ that put consumers in dangerous and harmful situations. 
This is additionally aggravated by the fact that illegal fireworks are difficult 
to distinguish from their legal counterparts. While this may, on the face of 
it, suggest that illegal fireworks constitute a truly ‘Dutch problem’ caused 
by national habit, trade in fireworks certainly is a cross-border business, 
involving other countries for transportation and storage purposes.22
In any case, for the Netherlands, the safety of pyrotechnic articles was 
a major issue when entering the negotiations on the draft directive. But it 
certainly was not the only Member State with clear preferences.
10.3.1 Placing on the market
According to the civil servant from the Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment who was closely involved in the negotiations on the Directive, 
Germany appeared to be very assertive in attaining outcomes resembling 
its own rules enshrined in the German Explosives Act (Sprengstoffgesetz). 
It was herein supported by a couple of other Member States such as France 
and Denmark, but also others that approved of proposals forwarded by the 
German delegation. On the other hand, negotiations revealed the various 
cultural traditions between the Member States in dealing with pyrotechnic 
articles and the different preferences resulting from this.
The Commission proposal specified conditions on the placing on the 
market of pyrotechnic articles in Article 5: goods have to meet the obliga-
tions of the Directive, bear a CE marking and comply with the conformity 
assessment procedure established to determine whether or not the placing 
of the marking is lawful. ‘Placing on the market’ refers to products being 
available on the Community market for the purpose of distribution or use 
– either for payment or free of charge (Article 2(2)). The delegation from 
Malta objected to the definition by pointing out that, if it was applied, 
Malta could not preserve its local custom of having, within its territory, fire-
works produced by associations for village fairs. According to the proposed 
EU rules domestically produced fireworks would have to be subjected to 
the intended certification and assessment procedures. It was therefore 
unlikely that the fireworks produced by the Maltese associations would be 
approved. And yet, Malta wanted to maintain its ‘century-old tradition’ and 
22 In this context it should be mentioned that the Directive is also applicable to the Euro-
pean Economic Area and therefore to Iceland, Norway and Lichtenstein. In other words, 
products that are for instance placed on the market in Norway are considered to having 
been made available on the Community market.
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to accommodate its preferences, which were also shared by other Member 
States such as Spain, the definition was extended resulting in the so-called 
‘Malta-clause’. It established that articles produced by domestic manufac-
turers for own use and approved by the Member State concerned for use on 
its territory would be excluded from the definition given in the draft direc-
tive (interview). Recital (8) of the final draft points to Member States’ reli-
gious, cultural and traditional festivities justifying the limitation of the defi-
nition. This amendment was also supported by the European Parliament 
which was well aware of the specific national regulations on the marketing 
and use of fireworks resulting from different customs and traditions (Euro-
pean Parliament, 2006a).
10.3.2 Categorisation
The Commission proposal distinguished between two different types 
of pyrotechnic articles, fireworks and other pyrotechnic articles which 
were further divided into different sub-categories and hazard levels (low-
medium-high). According to its suggestions made at first reading, the Euro-
pean Parliament wanted to have a still clearer distinction between the vari-
ous types of pyrotechnic products as well as a further criterion on the basis 
of which, within the type of fireworks, categories were to be distinguished 
(European Parliament, 2006a). This became the noise level, on the basis 
of which, next to the level of hazard, four different categories are distin-
guished: category 1, 2 and 3 pertain to fireworks for consumers, category 4 
to fireworks for use only by persons with specialist knowledge.
These amendments were certainly in accordance with ideas of the 
Dutch delegation which wished to have clearer and more explicit distinc-
tions between the relevant categories, especially between those three per-
taining to pyrotechnic articles for consumers, which were – up to that point 
– only implicitly mentioned, on the basis of product features listed in the 
Annex to the Directive. Having established clearer distinctions between cat-
egories in the substantive part of the Directive was considered to facilitate 
its practical application and enforcement (Parliamentary Papers II 2005/06, 
22112, no. 429).
The Dutch Government also wanted the numbering of categories within 
Article 3(1) to be changed. The proposal mentioned categories 1 to 4 reflect-
ing a scale from the least dangerous (1) to the most dangerous (4) pyrotech-
nic articles (according to different hazard and noise levels). This number-
ing was seen as ‘confusingly’ similar to the classification of pyrotechnic 
products for transport purposes where class 1.1. is used to identify very 
dangerous products and class 1.4 refers to those that are the least danger-
ous (Parliamentary Papers II 2005/06, 22112, no. 429, p. 27). Possibly due to 
the Enschede accident, fears were that similarities of classification systems 
might be exploited for false hazard classifications, increasing chances that 
very dangerous fireworks might fall into the hands of consumers. Alongside 
this, the Dutch Government urged that it should be prohibited that articles 
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within category 4 professional fireworks, presenting a high hazard, become 
available for private use. Even though the Directive proposal addressed this 
aspect in Article 7(3), the Government still saw room for improvement espe-
cially in respect to limitations on trading (Parliamentary Papers II 2005/06, 22 
112, no. 429, p. 27).
This wish of the Dutch Government corresponded with the national 
approach already applied; the Fireworks Decree pursued the aim to effec-
tively combat trade in illegal fireworks, including the possibility to sanc-
tion the (mis-)use of these products (Fireworks Decree, 2002).23 Whereas 
for clarification purposes a third category (theatrical pyrotechnic articles) 
was added to Article 3(1), the classification numbering suggested by the 
Directive proposal remained the same.24 Dutch preferences were also not 
accommodated as regards the prohibition of certain category 4 professional 
fireworks. This concerned, for example, firework rockets creating a sound 
effect, which are not allowed to be used in the Netherlands but, on the con-
trary, are regularly used in Spain. The Dutch Government was not alone 
in wishing to get this prohibition into the Directive. But then again, other 
Member States as well as the Commission considered such a ban as a likely 
obstacle to the objective of a common market in pyrotechnics. The requested 
introduction of a ban was certainly a thorn in the side of the pyrotechnics 
industry which, while not sitting at the negotiation tables in Brussels, had 
previously been consulted on the draft directive (interview). As for Article 
3(2), requiring from Member States to inform the Commission about their 
authorisation and identification procedures regarding ‘persons with spe-
cialist knowledge’ the Dutch Government accepted that a legal basis, so far 
lacking, would have to be introduced into Dutch law (Parliamentary Papers 
II 2005/06, 22112, no. 429, p. 27). With a view to the principle of subsidiarity, 
the Government objected, however, to further specification of the content of 
these rules. The final directive does not imply any further specification.
10.3.3 Consumer restrictions
The Netherlands were not the only country that advocated stricter mea-
sures. Specific preferences had already emerged from the Commission’s 
consultation rounds in preparing the legislative proposal. It became obvious 
that a number of Member States would not support EU legislation which 
implied giving priority to economic benefits over safety. It was clear to the 
Commission that, for instance, Greece and Ireland, having in place a ban 
on the sale of fireworks to consumers, would not agree to a proposal dis-
regarding their national circumstances (interview). Therefore, and in line 
23 See Article 1.2.6 of the 2002 Fireworks Decree.
24 It is interesting to note that with the ‘recasted’ Directive 2013/29/EU being adopted, the 
categories for fi reworks were eventually amended. Article 6 of the Directive now divides 
fi reworks into the categories F1, F2, F3, and F4, with F standing for ‘fi reworks’. This was 
the result of a proposal from Germany (interview).
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with Dutch preferences to attain high levels of health protection and safety, 
the Commission proposal established in Article 6(2) a limitation on the ‘free 
movement clause’ concerning pyrotechnic articles as foreseen by Article 
6(1). Accordingly, Member States could justify restrictions on the posses-
sion, use, and / or sale of fireworks of category 2 and 3 to consumers on the 
grounds of public order, security or safety, or – following from an amend-
ment by the European Parliament – environmental protection. Recital 10 of 
the final draft Directive explicitly links the conferral of discretion in imple-
mentation to the different cultural practices of the Member States:
The use of pyrotechnic articles and, in particular, the use of fireworks, is subject to mark-
edly divergent cultural customs and traditions in the respective Member States. This 
makes it necessary to allow Member States to take national measures to limit the use or 
sale of certain categories of fireworks to the general public for reasons of public security 
or safety.25,26
On similar grounds Member States are allowed to increase age limits, 
according to Article 7, regarding the use of the three different types of pyro-
technic articles that are established in Article 3. Member States are also per-
mitted to lower age limits with regard to those persons that are vocationally 
trained or complete such training (Article 7(2)). Apparently, the Commis-
sion was aware of the need to confer discretion upon Member States. In the 
face of legal diversity and therefore preference divergence which it encoun-
tered during the preparation and consultation phase, it ensured that some 
discretion was built into the Directive proposal (European Commission, 
2005, p. 3). As a consequence, the provision was not substantially amended 
during the negotiations and also the Dutch Government did not see any 
problems resulting from it for Dutch national legislation on fireworks (Par-
liamentary Papers II 2005/06, 22112, no. 429, p. 27).
25 Article 16 of the fi nal Directive includes a safeguard clause (Article 15 of the initial pro-
posal): in case that one Member State does not agree with restrictions imposed by anoth-
er Member State on the grounds laid down by Article 6(2), it can notify the Commission 
which takes the fi nal decision regarding the justifi cation of these measures.
26 In spite of this permission the circulation of unsafe and very dangerous pyrotechnic arti-
cles cannot be entirely ruled out. As pointed out by the civil servant from the Ministry 
of Infrastructure and the Environment, the idea of free circulation of pyrotechnic articles 
as enshrined in Article 6(1) as well as the lack of specifi c rules on the storage of these 
articles, make it possible that articles which are actually restricted under national rules 
become available, however, to consumers. This can happen if articles that are meant to 
be placed on the market only if market access is allowed by a Member State, are, never-
theless, placed on the market of a Member State that prohibits the placing on its market 
but allows these articles to be stored on its territory.
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10.3.4 Certification procedure
According to the Commission proposal the placing on the market of pyro-
technic articles was to be preceded by an ex-ante control of products which 
several Member States already had in place. In the final draft Directive the 
procedure boils down to the following steps. Next to categorising each 
product, manufacturers are to ensure that products placed on the market 
comply with the essential safety requirements; compliance is controlled by 
a so-called notified body to be designated by the Member States (Articles 
9 and 10). It shall check if pyrotechnic products meet the relevant essential 
safety requirements provided in Annex I to the Directive. If this is the case, 
the manufacturer has to affix CE marking to the product (Article 4), to indi-
cate compliance. If the manufacturer is established outside the Community, 
the importer has to ensure that the latter has fulfilled his obligations and 
can be held liable in this regard (Article 4(2)) by national authorities. Dis-
tributors, finally, have verification responsibilities: they have to ensure that 
pyrotechnic articles display the CE marking and are accompanied by other 
relevant documents containing product information (Article 4(3)). Assess-
ments should be carried out based on harmonised standards, which under 
a mandate from the Commission are adopted by a European standardisa-
tion body (Article 8) for the design, manufacture and testing of pyrotech-
nic articles. Adhering to EU harmonised standards is recommended but not 
compulsory for Member States.27 Next to the CE marking, the conformity 
assessment procedures shall verify whether pyrotechnic articles other than 
fireworks are properly labelled following the minimum standards estab-
lished in Article 12(2) or, as implied by this provision, adhering to stricter 
standards imposed by the Member States. These minimum requirements 
leave some discretion to Member States.
Whereas some Member States, such as Germany, already had ex-ante 
approval systems in place, the introduction of such an approval procedure 
implied a decisive change for the Netherlands where enforcement practices 
were based on controlling products already placed on the market. The Com-
mission proposal underlined that harmonising national approval systems 
would make an end to the different systems and varieties of national stan-
dards applied in the Member States and therefore reduce administrative 
burdens considerably. While acknowledging that the proposed certifica-
tion system and presumption of conformity28 would facilitate the task of 
national authorities in supervising compliance ex-post, the Dutch Govern-
27 Cf. Recital (9) of the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive.
28 See in this regard Article 8(3) of the fi nal Directive which stipulates that ‘Member States 
shall consider pyrotechnic articles falling within the scope of the Directive which comply 
with the relevant national standards transposing the harmonised standards in the Offi -
cial Journal of the European Union to be in conformity with the essential safety require-
ments set out in Annex I (…)’. See in this respect also recital (16) of the Directive’s pre-
amble.
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ment expected costs running into millions from having to create this certifi-
cation system from scratch (Parliamentary Papers II 2005/06, 22112, no. 429, 
p. 25).29,30 Against this backdrop, the Ministry of Economic Affairs sought 
to invite the Commission to come up with an alternative to the CE marking 
or to otherwise relax rules concerning the identification of producers for the 
least dangerous group of pyrotechnic articles (category 1). But the Nether-
lands, being isolated with this request, was fighting a losing battle (inter-
view). The measure was a core part of the Commission proposal and as 
such it remained in place. Failing to assert Dutch preferences in this decisive 
respect, it should, however, be noted that the Dutch delegation succeeded in 
getting some of its preferences incorporated into the Directive, with respect 
to the essential safety requirements for pyrotechnic products. Both safety 
distances and noise levels were determined along the lines of the sugges-
tions made by the Dutch delegations during the negotiations (interview). 
In addition, under the Directive it was made possible to establish an admin-
istrative cooperation group of Member State market surveillance authori-
ties (ADCO).31 This turned out to be important from the Dutch perspective 
because it provides for better control of fireworks coming from neighbour-
ing countries, in particular Belgium, and fireworks bought via the Internet. 
The setting up of the ADCO was initiated by the Netherlands (interview 
with Commission civil servant).
10.4 Analysis
Looking at the final outcome, the Directive grants little discretion. The cod-
ing exercise already pointed into this direction, merely indicating as ‘discre-
tionary’ the permission to restrict the free movement of pyrotechnics (Article 
6(2)), to set higher minimum age limits (Article 7(2)) as well as the permis-
sion granted to Member States to designate notified bodies carrying out the 
conformity assessment procedures (Article 10), granting discretion on the 
principle of institutional autonomy. In addition, and as highlighted in the 
29 It is worthy of note that the introduction of the Fireworks Decree amounted to 2.7 mil-
lion for 2530 companies. As regards the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive, by contrast, the 
total amount of its implementation was estimated to be 12 million based on the fi gures 
of the annual amount of consumer fi reworks available – in 2001 boiling down to 8000 
million – and the amount of 1500 Euros for CE marking for each individual product. 
Further budgetary effects could not be specifi ed but were not considered unlikely. Parlia-
mentary Papers II 2005/06, 22112, no. 429, p. 25.
30 It was expected that enforcement was not facilitated but rendered more diffi cult by the 
proposed rules. As an implication of the new defi nition of fi reworks Dutch authorities 
had to carry out controls at retailers and not, as before, at importers of pyrotechnic arti-
cles. Suffi ce it to say that tracing of unsafe and dangerous products at the importer used 
to be easier due to the fact that greater amounts of products were concentrated here 
before they were distributed in smaller amounts to retailers (interview).
31 See paragraph 8.6 of the European Commission’s Guide to the implementation of direc-
tives based on the New Approach and the Global Approach published in 2000.
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interviews, being typical of European directives related to the achievement 
of the internal market and therefore approximation of Member States’ laws, 
the Pyrotechnic Articles did not grant considerable discretion. Having said 
this, does it mean that discretion did not play any relevant role in the nego-
tiations? The preceding analysis offers a number of insights that shall serve 
to answer this question.
10.4.1 Discretion, policy area and political sensitivity
To start with, consumer protection is certainly not an area where EU law-
making is in its infancy. Even though explicit legislative competence was only 
conferred upon the EU with its actual establishment through the Treaty of 
Maastricht that subjected consumer protection to the Community method 
(first pillar), it has promoted integration for decades, using the rhetoric of 
consumer interest, protection and confidence against the background of the 
emerging internal market to motivate its legislative initiatives. Aptly put, in 
Weatherill’s words: ‘The project to construct an internal market for the EU 
is itself a form of consumer policy’ (Weatherill, 2013: 307). Hence, the EU 
has become influential in terms of legislation, even if it did not exhaustively 
made use of its legislative powers conferred upon it by the Maastricht Treaty. 
EU integration in the area of consumer protection has been largely based on 
legislative harmonisation justified by the EU’s objective of an internal market. 
Where harmonisation is pursued, the role of legislative discretion is limited 
from the outset. The Pyrotechnic Articles Directive seems to fit well into this 
context. First, because it is based on Article 95 which pursues the approxi-
mation of Member States’ law for the sake of economic integration (common 
market) and second, because it is an instance of the new approach to technical 
harmonisation which additionally promotes legislative harmonisation. The 
conclusion that the Directive implies a small discretion margin (also based 
on the codebook exercise), was not only confirmed during the interviews. It 
was furthermore pointed out that with its detailed provisions the Directive 
resembles for some part an EU regulation which is known for its lack of dis-
cretion and direct applicability of EU rules. All things considered, support is 
found for the link between the influence of EU legislative competence in a 
policy area and the amount of discretion granted to Member States by direc-
tives related to it (expectation 1). In the case at hand, increased EU impact 
results into the conferral of less discretion for national implementation.
And yet, the simple truth is that EU integration can hardly proceed 
without ensuring that Member States stay ‘on board’. Therefore integration 
in the area of consumer law was pursued true to the motto that a common 
objective needs a shared will: minimum harmonisation followed from this, 
leaving Member States discretionary room for own (additional) measures. 
In addition, consumer protection is a shared competence as evidenced by 
the current treaty framework (Lisbon Treaty). In fact, EU consumer law pro-
vides an example of the ongoing debate on the distribution of competences 
between the EU and its Member States. In this debate discretion plays a 
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role, too, albeit rather indirectly, for the focus is on the principle of subsid-
iarity which Member States have apparently used as an argument to limit 
increasing EU competences resulting from the Commission’s re-orientation 
towards measures implying full harmonisation (Weatherill, 2013: 18-24; see 
also Antoniolli, 2006; Reich 2012a, 2012b). Granted, the subsidiarity princi-
ple is of less relevance in the present analysis. But insights into the negotia-
tions on the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive suggest that discretion played a 
relevant role in mediating between the envisaged application of EU law and 
peculiarities of national laws. The debate on the definition of the ‘placing 
on the market’ that conflicted with national customs in the use of pyrotech-
nics exemplifies this. The two sides of consumer law-making are brought 
into view here: while legislative harmonisation on the grounds of consumer 
protection and product safety was largely supported, above all by the Neth-
erlands, EU harmonisation seemed to be at odds with the different national 
legal cultures and regulatory techniques as regards the sale and use of pyro-
technic articles. Member States generally subscribed to the two major objec-
tives of the proposal, establishing an internal market for pyrotechnic articles 
and ensuring health protection / product safety in dealing with these arti-
cles; and yet discretion was incorporated in fact already prior to the nego-
tiations as reflected by the initial Commission proposal, in order to cope 
with potentially contentious issues resulting from highly divergent cultural 
traditions and national habits in the Member States. This leaves no doubt 
that the Directive proposal entailed political sensitive issues and therefore 
potential for controversy. The sole fact that a decade had to pass from the 
first Directive proposal being prepared until the matter of pyrotechnic arti-
cles was actually addressed by the Member States in the Council supports 
this view. Arguably due to the fact that the Directive proposal which was 
finally tabled by the Commission already provided for some discretion in 
matters relevant to the Member States,32 political controversy, however, did 
not seriously affect the process of negotiations once they were under way.
Seen in this light, the present case does not seem to lend itself to illus-
trate the plausibility of the second expectation under consideration. It pos-
its that political sensitivity arising from the content of the directive under 
negotiation results into the granting of more discretion to Member States. 
On the other hand, if the expectation is understood less strictly, it still holds 
true for the present case, as it cannot be denied that for this reason more 
discretion was incorporated into the Directive, albeit prior to the actual 
negotiations. As a matter of fact and as pointed out by the Commission civil 
servant involved in the negotiations, discretion granted by Article 6(2) is 
unusual for a Directive related to the internal market for it restricts the core 
principle of the latter, the free movement of goods. From the viewpoint of 
the Commission and the pyrotechnics industry legislative discretion was 
also undesirable; for what was preferred were common rules guaranteeing 
32 See Articles 6(2) – limitation of free movement and 7(2) – age limits.
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the removal of trade-barriers, contributing to the creation of a level play-
ing field in the Community. And yet, the Commission was quite aware that 
by incorporating discretion, achieving Member States’ agreement on the 
Directive would be facilitated (interview). In fact, both civil servants from 
the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment and the Commission, 
explicitly stated that without discretion there would have been no Direc-
tive due to lack of approval by the Member States. Hence, even if granted 
only by little degrees, discretion did play a decisive role in contributing to 
the successful conclusion of the negotiations, leading to the adoption of the 
Directive without any opposing votes or abstentions (Council of the Euro-
pean Union, 2007). Against this background, the political sensitivity expec-
tation is found to partially hold true. The granting of at least some discretion 
to Member States for the purpose of implementation was also supported by 
the European Parliament, another relevant actor in the negotiations.
10.4.2 Discretion and European Parliament
With the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Parliament 
was promoted to co-legislator with the Council in a number of areas, includ-
ing consumer protection. The descriptive analysis gives to some extent an 
insight into its legislative contribution to the Directive. Taking a closer look 
at both the European Parliament’s legislative resolution and the Directive 
finally adopted, it can be concluded that the European Parliament influ-
enced the content of the Directive to a rather great extent. With very few 
exceptions all of its amendments were taken over in the final draft Direc-
tive.33 In contrast to the Council, where negotiations took a bit longer to get 
started, the European Parliament ‘played its cards well’: it swiftly reached 
a common view on the proposal (interview). As a supporter of the inter-
nal market project, the European Parliament is known to favour the new 
approach to technical harmonisation and has taken an active legislative role 
in promoting harmonisation directives (Maciejewksi, 2015).34 With a view 
to the present case, does that mean that an assertive European Parliament 
sought to keep legislative discretion to a minimum (expectation 4)? First of 
all, it is difficult to give a clear-cut answer to this question. On the one hand, 
it could be argued that corrections and improvements made by the Euro-
pean Parliament certainly pursued the objective of legislative harmonisa-
tion as envisaged by the new approach which was highlighted as inadmis-
sible for the completion of the internal market (European Parliament, 2006a, 
33 In this regard it is interesting to note that the European Parliament obviously sought to 
underline its position as co-legislator vis-à-vis the Commission. This shows in the amend-
ments it made to Article 18 regarding implementing measures. Whereas previously, as 
proposed by the Commission, the Article was worded broadly, references to the 1999 
Comitology decision, added by the European Parliament, made the limitations of the 
Commission’s implementing powers more explicit. Cf. European Parliament, 2006a, p. 23.
34 Maciejewski, M. (2015) ‘Free movement of goods’, EU Fact Sheets, retrieved from http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_3.1.2.pdf (accessed 23 November 2013).
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p. 38). On the other hand, the analysis of the European Parliament’s posi-
tion does not offer more explicit statements on the conferral of discretionary 
power to the Member States. What’s more, although it supported the com-
mon objective of an internal market in pyrotechnics, the legislative resolu-
tion brings into view that the European Parliament accepted the granting 
of legislative discretion to the Member States for imposing restrictions to 
the free movement of goods under certain conditions (Article 6(2)) as well 
as for the setting of standards regarding the minimum age of consumers 
and persons undergoing vocational training (European Parliament, 2006). 
While it supported the Directive’s aims, including next to the creation of an 
internal market also the safety and health protection objectives, it obviously 
acknowledged that cultural differences had to be respected showing in its 
support for not only Article 6(2) but also with regard to the so-called ‘Malta 
clause’ (Recital 9 and Article 2(2)).
Considering the foregoing, I tend to conclude that despite the European 
Parliament’s important role in legislative decision-making on the Directive, 
the immediate result from its powerful position was not in the first place 
to minimise Member States’ discretion. Instead, it seems that the European 
Parliament accepted the conferral of discretion based on the consideration 
that it should ensure the achievement of the Directive’s objectives.
10.4.3 Discretion and compatibility
Another issue that is of importance in shedding light on the role of discre-
tion during the negotiations on the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive relates 
to the match between EU requirements and already existing legal arrange-
ments in the Netherlands. In this regard it is expected, in line with the third 
expectation of the analytical framework, that the less compatible EU and 
relevant national rules are, the more likely it is that discretion is incorpo-
rated into the directive. It is a fact that the Directive did not entirely cor-
respond with Dutch preferences and that efforts made during the negotia-
tions to bring the Commission proposal more in line with them produced 
mixed results. Even though amendments to the categorisation of pyrotech-
nic articles (Article 3) alongside the proposed limitation on the free move-
ment of pyrotechnics contributed to maintaining standards of enforcement 
and safety, the numbering of the category system which the Dutch Govern-
ment considered likely to create undesirable conditions regarding the circu-
lation of unsafe fireworks, stayed unaltered. Additionally, the ban on cer-
tain category 4 products precluding that very dangerous fireworks would 
be available for private use did not make it into the final draft Directive. 
What’s more, the ex-ante approval system for obtaining the CE marking 
remained a core part of the Directive, thereby implying considerable mis-
match with domestic arrangements,35 including administrative burdens and 
35 The transposition analysis below is more explicit as to the sort of misfi t this requirement 
implied.
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costs for business and higher prices for consumers. In this light it seems to 
be a tiny success for the Dutch delegation that the content of the essential 
safety requirements was partially informed by its ideas. Finally, the Direc-
tive did not include any rules concerning the transport and storage of fire-
works which for safety reasons was considered important by the Dutch 
Government. The absence of these rules did not imply, however, any incom-
patibility since Member States could take this matter into their own hands 
by establishing national rules.36
In view of the foregoing, it should be noted that lacking compatibility 
did not result in the incorporation of wide discretionary provisions into 
the Directive. Hence, the expectation analysed above does not hold true. It 
remains to be seen to what extent EU and Dutch rules were not compat-
ible in legal terms and the transposition analysis shall return to this aspect. 
It remains a fact that the Netherlands could not push through more flex-
ible arrangements in the Council of Ministers regarding the requirement of 
introducing a pre-market approval system. Generally speaking, the Direc-
tive’s small scope of discretion is, however, not too surprising given the fact 
that the Directive addresses product safety and internal market aspects, and 
therefore implies rather high levels of legislative harmonisation which are, 
in principle, not detrimental but rather in line with Member States’ prefer-
ences for high safety standards as well as economic benefits which can only 
result from common market rules.
10.5 Conclusion
What can be said in conclusion about the role of discretion, after having 
brought together and discussed the various insights derived from the 
descriptive analysis? To begin with, and on a more general note, what can 
be expected from EU directives that relate to the field of consumer law and 
to internal market matters is that they do not imply high degrees of discre-
tion. After all, these directives are adopted with the primary aim to contrib-
ute to the creation of the internal market which is based on a coherent legal 
framework. Hence, there is no relevant role of discretion. On the contrary, 
discretion is rather avoided for it entails the possibility that EU rules are 
interpreted and applied differently in the Member States, leading to mar-
ket barriers or different safety levels for products (and services). As pointed 
out in the interview, the pyrotechnics industry, being an important stake-
holder in the European fireworks market, is against too much flexibility as 
it undermines the creation of a common level-playing field. Member States, 
on the other hand, even if they support the creation of the internal market, 
36 This does not mean, though, that Member States were granted discretion. After all, dis-
cretion, as it is defi ned in this study, fl ows from EU primary and secondary legislation 
and is therefore not implied by the absence of EU rules.
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they nevertheless seek discretion to be able to exclude products from their 
markets for safety reasons or in order to preserve national particularities.
Another important conclusion is that discretion had a relevant role to play 
despite the overall rather small margin of discretion granted to Mem-
ber States. Put differently, not necessarily more discretion was decisive to 
achieve compromise among Member States, but discretion in relation to 
particular aspects that were of primary concern to the Member States such 
as the permission to limit the circulation of pyrotechnics under specific 
national conditions. What’s more, granting discretion was done consciously 
indicating the Commission’s awareness of the relevance of discretion in 
securing Member States’ support for new legislation on pyrotechnics. It 
is not only the facilitating role of discretion in contributing to reaching a 
negotiation outcome in the Council that shows here. The inclusion of discre-
tion by the Commission also substantiates the claim that discretion is used 
intentionally in law-making processes. Finally, the motives underlying the 
conferral of discretion upon Member States reflect the role of discretion as a 
preserving factor: having the prospect of discretion in transposition, Mem-
ber States suppose that they are able to incorporate EU rules by maintaining 
national legal frameworks and practices.
Having reached a conclusion regarding the role of discretion in the 
negotiations on the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive, the subsequent sections 
present and discuss the Dutch transposition of the Directive to gain insights 
into the role of discretion.
10.6 Transposition
The Dutch transposition of the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive is mainly 
traced by analysing the relevant documents and using material from inter-
views held with experts involved in this process. Especially the explanatory 
memorandum to the main transposition measure (the amended Fireworks 
Decree) provides relevant information such as the considerations made by 
the transposing authority in converting the Directive’s rules into national 
law, including its use of discretionary provisions.
The Pyrotechnic Articles Directive was adopted on 23 May 2007 and 
required from Member States to complete transposition by 4 January 2010 
and practically apply the Directive by 4 July 2010 to fireworks of categories 
1 through 3 (Article 21(1)). For fireworks of category 4 as well as other pyro-
technic articles and for theatrical pyrotechnic articles a transitional period 
was granted, making the practical application of rules compulsory by 4 July 
2013 (Article 21(2)). From the implementation report commissioned by the 
European Commission, it becomes obvious that the formal implementation 
of the Directive raised a number of issues causing incomplete or incorrect 
transposition in various Member States (Van der Burgt et al., 2011). In fact, 
the Commission had previously come into action against some Member 
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States: Dutch transposition was delayed by six months and, as a result, for-
mal implementation only partially completed which prompted the Com-
mission to open an infringement proceeding by initiating a letter of formal 
notice which was also sent to Luxemburg and Hungary for the same reason: 
deficient transposition.37 Against the background that German legislation 
partially served as a blueprint for the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive, it is 
interesting to note that Germany was amongst those Member States that 
did not comply with the Directive, receiving, still in January 2014, a rea-
soned opinion38 in which the European Commission requested it to review 
its national transposition legislation. Additional obligations resulting from 
German rules and being outside the Directive’s scope were found to under-
mine the latter’s internal market objective (European Commission, 2014). 
In other cases, including the Netherlands, where additional measures were 
found (likely) to impede the internal market, no further action was, how-
ever, taken by the Commission.39
In the Netherlands, the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive was transposed 
by three lower-level instruments (see table 11): an amendment to the 2002 
Fireworks Decree – by means of which also the EU Service Directive was 
transposed – as well as two ministerial orders, one of them transposing 
the Directive’s rules concerning the category of ‘other pyrotechnic articles’, 
which given their different scope (not addressing all stages of the product 
cycle), did not fit into the Fireworks Decree. In addition, another ministerial 
order pertained to consumer and theatrical pyrotechnic articles (Official Bul-
letin, 2009, 605, p. 33). Since there was no need to transpose the Directive by 
means of legislative act(s), the role of the national Parliament was marginal. 
In line with Dutch administrative and environmental law, the national Par-
liament was involved in the transposition process by means of a notification 
procedure following the drafting of transposition measures by the Ministry 
of Infrastructure and the Environment (Official Bulletin, 2009, 605, p. 52).40
37 Like in the Netherlands, the Directive was only partially transposed in Luxembourg. In 
Hungary transposition measures were completely lacking. See Van der Burgt et al. (2011).
38 The Commission’s reasoned opinions represent the second stage in EU infringement 
proceedings.
39 Regarding the Dutch transposition of the Directive, the Commission deplored that 
cross-border transfer of products by persons had to be notifi ed to the Dutch Ministry in 
charge. This was seen as a likely barrier to the free market. The Netherlands were also 
among those Member States that were criticised for their transposition of Article 14(6) 
allowing Member States to withdraw products from the market considered to be liable 
to endanger health and safety of persons. See European Commission, 2011. Interestingly, 
the revised Directive 2013/29/EU does not contain this provision anymore, possibly due 
to the incorrect and incomplete transposition it was found to have caused.
40 Cf. Article 1:8 of Dutch Administrative Law and Article 21.6 of the Environmental Man-
agement Act.
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Table 11: Fact sheet transposition Pyrotechnic Articles Directive 
Transposition deadline: 04 Jan 10
Publication transposition legislation: 29 Dec 09
16 Jul 10
19 Oct 10
Sort transposition measure (and number): Order in council (1), 
ministerial decision (2)
In charge: Ministry of the Environment
Legal Framework: Dutch Fireworks Decree 2002
The amendment to the Fireworks Decree was assessed by Actal, the inde-
pendent Dutch advisory board on regulatory burden. Its comments, how-
ever, did not prompt the Ministry to add substantial changes (Official Bul-
letin, 2009, 605, pp. 51-52). Likewise, responses from other parties, including 
the Dutch pyrotechnics industry which asked for the clarification of some 
aspects, did not lead to significant alterations of the draft transposition mea-
sure (interview).
While transposition was the chief task of the Ministry of Infrastructure 
and the Environment, also the Dutch Public Prosecution Service (Openbaar 
Ministerie)41 took an interest in the Directive dossier. It had been involved 
in the formulation of the national Fireworks Decree after the Enschede 
accident, its major concern back then being with illegal fireworks. There-
fore it sought to influence the position taken by the Dutch Government in 
the negotiations on the Directive. Additionally, it attempted to exert influ-
ence on the way the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment set out 
to transpose the Directive, in particular regarding safety issues. Against 
the background that the final draft Directive did not include any ban on 
certain articles of category 4 (professional fireworks) and applied a differ-
ent approach to the definition and categorisation of pyrotechnic articles 
in general, efforts of the Public Prosecution Service were geared towards 
maintaining a firm national approach to enforcement. This approach 
aimed to keep chances low that unsafe products would be traded illegally 
and therefore fall into the hands of consumers (Official Bulletin, 2009, 605, 
p. 47). Hence, communication between the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
the Environment and the Public Prosecution Service during the transposi-
tion process, concentrated on the question of how to maintain the national 
practice of banning illegal fireworks. Unlike the Directive’s categorisation 
system taking specific features as basis for determining types of fireworks, 
the national approach was based on the identification of pyrotechnic articles 
41 In spite of the Dutch name ‘Openbaar Ministerie’, the Public Prosecution Service does 
not belong to the group of national ministeries but represents the body of public pros-
ecutors in the Dutch criminal justice system.
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according to the purpose of use. From the Directive’s approach it followed 
that potentially dangerous articles, being so far unobtainable for consumers 
under Dutch rules, could now become available for private use. In the first 
place this pertained to pyrotechnic articles of category 4 but also to prod-
ucts of category 2 and 3. Exchanging views regarding this point possibly 
contributed to the fact that transposition did not proceed swiftly. Officially, 
however, delay was explained by the Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment as a result of difficulties flowing from the complex technical 
requirements of the Directive as well as from lacking clarity of terms and 
concepts used in it, impeding smooth transposition (Parliamentary Papers II 
2009/10, 21109, no. 195, pp. 3-4).
10.6.1 Transposition measures
The Dutch Fireworks Decree is composed of five chapters, the first one 
addressing the scope of the measure, containing rules on both consumer fire-
works and professional fireworks which are, for each group, explained in 
greater depth in chapters 2 and 3 respectively. Chapter 4 deals with safety 
distances regarding groups of harmful objects and chapter five includes 
other transitional provisions. The transposition of the Pyrotechnic Articles 
Directive brought some changes to the structure of the first three chapters. 
Chapter 1 was extended by the insertion of chapter 1A comprising rules 
adopted for the specific purpose of formally implementing the Directive. 
They concern, more concretely, the obligations to observe the essential safety 
requirements established by the Directive’s Annex I, provisions on the con-
formity assessment procedures, the CE marking and the designation of noti-
fied bodies (Official Bulletin, 2009, 605, p. 44). In adding a new chapter 3A 
it was furthermore taken into account that henceforth, theatrical pyrotech-
nic articles were to be considered, in line with the Directive (Article 3(1) (b)) 
as a category in their own right instead of the previous Dutch approach to 
subsume them under the category of professional fireworks. Despite these 
changes in the structure and content of the Decree, the Ministry of Infrastruc-
ture and the Environment, however, noted in the explanatory memoran-
dum to the amendment, that large parts of the Fireworks Decree remained 
unchanged; in the words of the Ministry the ‘truly national part’ of the Fire-
works Decree – lacking any linkage with the rules concerning the placing 
on the market of pyrotechnic articles – was preserved (Official Bulletin, 2009, 
605, p. 38; 41). Provisions on, for instance, age limits (Directive’s Article 7) 
or labelling requirements (Article 12) were incorporated into national law 
without noticeably altering the Decree.42 The Directive’s definitions and cat-
egorisation, on the other hand, entailed changes, albeit to a limited extent.
42 Parts of Article 7(1) were incorporated into chapter 2 (Article 2.3.5), Article 7(3) into 
chapter 3 (Articles 3.3.1, 3A.3.1). Article 7(2), being not obligatory, was not transposed. 
Article 12 of the Directive was mainly integrated into chapter 2. Cf. correspondence 
table, Offi cial Bulletin, 2009, 605, p. 87.
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10.6.2 Definitions and categorisation
Prior to the Directive, the Dutch Fireworks Decree distinguished between 
two groups of fireworks, based on their purpose of use: consumer fireworks 
and professional fireworks – both being deemed as complementary to one 
another. The basic principle was that any fireworks intended for use by con-
sumers was automatically regarded as consumer fireworks, the purpose 
of the product thus being the distinguishing feature (Official Bulletin, 2009, 
605, p. 42; 47). Both terms, consumer fireworks and professional fireworks, 
have a firm place within the Fireworks Decree, being used in the rules on 
storage of pyrotechnics, as well as in the provisions of other Decrees.43 
And yet, in the Directive, the purpose of use is not the decisive criterion. 
Instead, and as noted above, in Article 3 three types of pyrotechnic articles 
are defined according to characteristic features (hazard and noise levels): 
fireworks, theatrical pyrotechnic articles and other pyrotechnic articles. The 
Ministry’s intention was, however, to keep changes to Dutch legislation to a 
minimum. Hence, the terminology applied in the Decree was retained and 
therefore already firmly established terms such as ‘consumer fireworks’ and 
‘professional fireworks’ continued to be used. At the same time, the Min-
istry attempted to ensure that the definitions of the Directive were taken 
into due account. The Directive’s division into categories was transposed by 
means of Article 1A.1.3 – for fireworks and theatrical pyrotechnic articles, 
while other pyrotechnic articles were transposed by means of a separate 
ministerial order. Especially relevant is the Dutch transposition of EU rules 
concerning fireworks of categories 1, 2, 3, and 4. As for categories 1 and 4, 
both could smoothly be integrated into the Fireworks Decree, the former 
category largely corresponding with the scope of consumer fireworks and 
the latter category fitting in well with the scope of professional fireworks 
as established by the Decree. A specific approach was chosen by the Min-
istry of Infrastructure and the Environment as regards the transposition of 
categories 2 and 3 fireworks. By extending the scope of the Directive’s cat-
egory 4 fireworks in its own transposition legislation, the Ministry ensured 
that certain fireworks of the Directive’s categories 2 and especially 3 would 
become available only for professional use. These fireworks were thus iden-
tified as professional fireworks even though the Directive did not stipulate 
that (Official Bulletin, 2009, 605, p. 42). Maintaining national practice for 
safety reasons was possible by making use of the discretion granted under 
Article 6(2) which explicitly allowed Member States under specific condi-
tions to prohibit or restrict the possession, use and / or the sale to the gen-
eral public of category 2 and 3 fireworks, as well as theatrical pyrotechnic 
articles and other pyrotechnic articles (Official Bulletin, 2009, 605, p. 38).
43 That concerns the Establishments and Permits (Environmental Management) Decree, the 
Decree on External Safety of Establishments, and the Working Conditions Decree.
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Further changes to the Fireworks Decree became necessary due to the new 
category of ‘theatrical pyrotechnic articles’ introduced by the Pyrotechnic 
Articles Directive. Articles of this new category of theatrical pyrotechnic 
articles were, in contrast to the ‘theatrical fireworks’ of the Dutch Decree not 
subsumed under professional fireworks but put into a separate category.44 
To bring national law in line with the Directive, chapter 3 of the Fireworks 
Decree was changed through the addition of chapter 3A, which now cov-
ers the rules on ‘theatrical fireworks’, the latter being treated as a sub-cat-
egory of the Directive’s ‘theatrical pyrotechnic articles’. Having shifted the 
rules concerning these articles to a new category, the term ‘theatrical fire-
works’, however, continued to be in use. In doing this, the transposing Min-
istry ensured that other parts of the Fireworks Decree, including the ‘truly 
national one’ were left intact. In addition to that, national safety standards 
for this category (as well as for the consumer and professional fireworks), 
previously laid down in Article 1.2.1 were replaced by the Directive’s essen-
tial safety requirements (Annex I).45 The new Article 1A.1.5 provides the 
legal basis for the recognition of harmonised EU standards in national leg-
islation. In this context, alongside the Fireworks Decree, the 2004 ministe-
rial order concerning further specification of requirements for fireworks 
(Regeling nadere eisen aan vuurwerk, Rnev) was replaced by another min-
isterial order, the Regulation on the designation of consumer and theatrical 
pyrotechnic articles (Regeling aanwijzingen consumenten en theatervuur-
werk).
10.6.3 Consumer restriction and enforcement
The discretion granted under Article 6(2) served more than one purpose 
while the Directive’s requirements were transposed into Dutch law. Mak-
ing use of discretion was important from the viewpoint of storage. In fact, 
and as mentioned above, the Directive did not include any requirements 
concerning the storage or transport of fireworks. Hence, Member States 
could come up with own regulation in this regard. In the Netherlands, cor-
responding rules are closely connected to the type of fireworks which may 
be made accessible to consumers (Official Bulletin, 2009, 605, p. 47). As laid 
down in Dutch regulation, the net explosive content of fireworks for pri-
vate use (category 2 and 3 fireworks) are limited. Bangers, for instance, may 
contain no more than 2.5 gram of black powder while the corresponding 
amount is higher in European Standards (6 gram). Having to provide for 
storage (space) for these ‘heavier’ fireworks would have made it necessary 
to change Dutch storage regulation. Next to legal burdens, it would also 
have required investments into storage facilities to ensure the safe storage 
of heavier fireworks. To avoid all this, discretion under Article 6(2) was 
used to restrict access of these fireworks, for storage purposes, to Dutch ter-
44 See Article 3(1) under (b).
45 As established by the new Article 1A.1.4.
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ritory by making more detailed rules for the determination of category 2 
and 3 fireworks.46 In other words, discretion made it possible to continue to 
apply national rules and practices with regard to aspects of implementation 
and enforcement as stated by the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Envi-
ronment (Official Bulletin, 2009, 605, p. 42).
Alongside this objective, it was again the wish to retain current national 
practice, which motivated the Ministry in making those fireworks unavail-
able to consumers which fell outside the scope of national regulation, being 
considered as unsafe and dangerous (interview). The discretionary choice 
of how to transpose the Directive – deciding upon implementation forms 
and methods – also appeared to be helpful in tackling the problem of avail-
ability of very dangerous products, including illegal fireworks, to the public 
at large that given the Directive’s definition and categorisation of fireworks 
seemed to become more aggravated. The way Article 7(3) was transposed 
reflects this aspect. Article 7(3) restricts the placing on the market of pyro-
technic articles of category 4 fireworks as well as certain products from the 
categories of theatrical and other pyrotechnic articles – further specified in 
sub-points (a) and (b) – to persons with specialist knowledge. The provision 
was partially – as concerns category 4 fireworks – transposed by the new 
Article 1.2.2 which was an outcome of the collaboration between the Min-
istry of Infrastructure and the Environment and the Public Prosecution Ser-
vice (Official Bulletin, 2009, 605, p. 48). In line with Dutch practices, the pro-
hibition on making available professional and theatrical pyrotechnic articles 
concerned all stages of the product cycle, addressing next to manufacturers, 
also importers and distributors. However, in order to also keep products 
within category 2 and 3, understood as ‘professional fireworks’ away from 
consumers, use was made of the discretion flowing from Article 6(2) to jus-
tify restrictions and prohibitions on these products which should be further 
specified in a ministerial order for which the amended Fireworks Decree 
provided a legal basis.47 On similar grounds – i.e. to transpose Article 7(3) 
and to keep specific pyrotechnics out of consumers’ reach – discretion was 
used for the introduction of other prohibitions into chapter 3 of the Decree. 
It was also used to justify the continuation of restrictions emerging from 
chapter 2 on consumer fireworks.
The Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment did not in all of the 
foregoing cases decide single-handedly on how to make use of discretion 
but consulted the European Commission on particular questions. Mapping 
out a problem and reporting it to the Commission has been described as the 
typical Dutch way to settle issues during transposition (Jordan and Lieffer-
ink, 2004: 142). This approach also shows in the present case. Vis-à-vis the 
Commission, the Ministry did not make any secret of the fact that, in light 
of national cultural customs and fireworks traditions, it wanted to maintain 
46 See Appendix 1 of Regulation on the designation of consumer and theatrical pyrotechnic 
articles, Government Gazette, 2010, 11226.
47 Cf. Article 2.1.1. of the amended Fireworks Decree.
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national safety standards and that to this end, discretion should be used for 
keeping in place prohibitions on specific sorts of flash bangers and other 
fireworks of the categories 2 and 3 of the Directive.48 Taking Article 6(2) as 
a legal ground for enacting national restrictions was, however, not quite in 
line with the wishes of the Commission, which tried to encourage Member 
States to take such measures by basing them on the typology determined 
during the EU standardisation process. This way, the Commission wanted 
to ensure uniformity in restrictions to facilitate uniform enforcement as 
explained by the Commission civil servant interviewed. But since Article 
6(2) made part of the compromise struck in the Council, the Ministry’s use 
of discretion was, from a legal point of view, compatible with the Directive.
10.6.4 Minimum age and labelling requirements
The Directive included further discretionary provisions pertaining to age 
limits (Article 7) as well as labelling requirements (Article 12). No use of 
discretion was made in the former case. Apparently, it was neither seen as 
necessary to positively derogate from age limits for reasons of public order, 
security or safety, nor to negatively derogate from them in cases where peo-
ple dispose of or undergo vocational training. In the latter case (Article 12), 
the minimum requirements for labelling pyrotechnic articles and theatrical 
pyrotechnic articles were transposed by adding those not already included 
to the provisions of the Decree (Official Bulletin, 2009, 605, p. 37).
10.7 Analysis
Up to this point various case study findings regarding the transposition of 
the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive have been presented. They shall now be 
further discussed in the explanatory analysis in order to illuminate the role 
of discretion.
10.7.1 Discretion-in-national-law
The discretion-in-national-law expectation implies that the more discretion is 
available, the better the Directive is incorporated into national law. Does the 
case of the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive confirm this expectation?
The first thing to note is that – and as verified in the interviews – the 
Directive, granted only little discretion, and even if discretion was pres-
ent, it was not always used (e.g. derogation of age limits). And yet, dis-
cretion, in more than one respect, appeared to be a valuable ‘glue’ to stick 
48 This becomes evident from the Ministry’s letters on the subject of clarifi cation of Article 
6(2) of the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive which were sent to the European Commission 
in November 2007 and April 2008. These letters were made available to me by the senior 
policy offi cer interviewed.
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EU and national rules together. One should not forget that directives, by 
design, grant discretion. Freedom in choosing how to transpose the Direc-
tive certainly contributed to the fact that differences in defining catego-
ries of fireworks leading to incongruences between the Directive and the 
Dutch Fireworks Decree did not obstruct converting EU rules into national 
law; incorporating even incongruent definitions / categories of the Direc-
tive into national legislation did not lead to breaking down legal structures 
but allowed for relatively ‘harmless’ additions to already existing rules, 
thus leaving national legislation for most parts intact. The use of discre-
tion in transposing the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive seems to be like a text 
book example for illustrating the treaty considerations underlying the use 
of directives and therefore discretion: to shape EU integration by leaving 
intact Member States’ fundamental constitutional structures, in short, their 
national legal identities. To this end, discretion was consciously used as 
reflected in the explanations of the decisions and choices taken in transpos-
ing the Directive which were made explicit in both the explanatory memo-
randum to the transposition measure and in the interviews.
Especially the use of the Directive’s discretionary provision established 
in Article 6(2) as argued hereafter shows that discretion was used to shape 
solutions to overcome some incompatibilities between the EU and national 
legal arrangements. In order not to anticipate too much of the discussion, 
suffice it to say at this stage that discretion was used to alleviate discrep-
ancies between EU and national rules pertaining to the definition and cat-
egorisation of fireworks as well as to introduce or maintain restrictions and 
bans on fireworks deemed unsafe and illegal. This way, discretion served to 
compensate for the lacking ban on products within category 4 fireworks – a 
proposal, which while being favoured by the Dutch and the delegations of 
other Member States had not made it into the final Directive text. As this 
example illustrates, the availability of discretion apparently helped to avoid 
deficient transposition of directive provisions that conflicted with Dutch 
interests.
Nonetheless, while a facilitating effect of discretion on the transposition 
of the Directive can be detected, the overall case study findings do not lend 
support to the first expectation. For one, this is because, for the expectation 
to hold true, it is presupposed that more discretion is available for transpo-
sition. The empirical results, however, do not square with this part of the 
claim. Furthermore, even if, as empirically shown, discretion contributed 
to fitting the Directive into the Dutch legal framework, it needs to be con-
cluded that transposition was not achieved on time. In fact, the outcome of 
the Dutch transposition of the Directive was non-compliance with the lat-
ter’s rules.
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10.7.2 Discretion, administrative capacity and transposition actors
First of all, it is expected that administrative capacity raises the likelihood 
of proper transposition, but that this effect decreases as the degree of discre-
tion increases (expectation 8). Second, it is claimed that with more actors 
being involved in transposition the likelihood of deficient transposition is 
increased and that this effect becomes stronger as the degree of discretion 
increases (expectation 9).
Turning to expectation eight the following relevant considerations can 
be presented. As noted further up, the Directive’s technical complexity and 
lacking clarity flowing from parts of its content were mentioned by the Min-
istry as major reasons for failing to provide for the necessary transposition 
measures on time. This is interesting given the fact that – as established 
by the interviews conducted – the civil servant who transposed the direc-
tive had a profound knowledge of the dossier. The thorough motivation of 
choices as reflected by the explanatory memorandum to the key transpo-
sition measure as well as in the interview, do not point to a transposition 
process suffering from lacking knowledge of ‘how to do it’. In addition, the 
civil servant in charge had closely followed the negotiations on the Direc-
tive which was, as he himself put it, conducive for the subsequent transpo-
sition process. Being the one responsible for both negotiation and transposi-
tion activities on behalf of the Netherlands, intra-ministerial coordination 
problems can also be excluded as a source of difficulties. The fact remains, 
however, that the Directive was delayed. All things considered, it there-
fore seems that the positive effect of administrative capacity on transposi-
tion was not strong enough to lead to proper (timely) transposition. Being 
granted by small degrees, discretion did not play any decisive role in this 
regard. In other words, expectation 8 does not hold true in the present case. 
What about expectation 9 which explains deficient transposition as result-
ing from an interaction effect of the number of transposition actors and a 
larger margin of discretion? This appears to be a more plausible explana-
tion for transposition delay. While the Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment remained mainly responsible for transposition, it had to take 
into account the specific interests from the Dutch Public Prosecution Service 
and this collaboration was time-consuming, as mentioned in the interview, 
leading to a slowing down of the overall process. Since discretion was only 
granted by little degrees, it is not very likely, however, that it enforced this 
impeding effect and contributed to delay. All this leads me to conclude that 
while the number of actors involved in transposition carries some relevance 
in explaining why the Dutch transposition of the Pyrotechnic Articles Direc-
tive was delayed, delay is not explained by an interaction effect of this fac-
tor and discretion.
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10.7.3 Discretion, compatibility and disagreement
It is furthermore expected that compatibility between the EU directive and 
national rules raises the likelihood of proper transposition, and that this 
effect becomes stronger as the degree of discretion increases (expectation 
7). This does not remove the fact that if compatibility is poor, transposition 
might be slowed down despite discretion being granted. In the present case, 
three transposition measures were devised for transposing the Directive 
into Dutch legislation. Does this indicate incompatibility between EU and 
Dutch rules and was this one reason for the belated transposition?
First of all, it cannot be denied that the Directive did not match Dutch 
legislation in all aspects. After all, the Netherlands did not have any ex-ante 
approval system nor a national mandatory conformity marking compa-
rable to the EU’s CE marking. It seems, thus, that the Pyrotechnic Articles 
Directive challenged national policy goals and practices. In contrast to the 
Dutch legal situation, the Directive allowed for the availability of fireworks 
to consumers which were in the Netherlands considered to be too danger-
ous. Additionally, it implied a different approach to defining types of fire-
works. These two differences alongside the ex-ante approval system lacking 
in the Netherlands point to a policy misfit49 between EU and national rules. 
From a legal point of view, however, levels of misfit were rather low. Based 
on the facts presented regarding transposition by means of the (amended) 
Fireworks Decree, I would describe legal misfit as limited (Steunenberg 
and Toshkov, 2009: 960). Despite the fact that the definition of ‘limited legal 
misfit’ departs from the idea of more than two transposing acts – whereas 
in the present case three transposition measures were devised – the other 
elements of the definition nevertheless appropriately describe the present 
case: the Directive was transposed by means of second and third order acts 
regulation (order of council) and ordinances (ministerial orders). What’s 
more, these transposition measures amended already existing norms – 
those of the Fireworks Decree (amongst others national safety require-
ments). Another aspect which confirms that legal misfit can be considered 
as limited is presented by the fact that, as noted by the transposing Minis-
try, on the whole, the Fireworks Decree stayed largely unaltered. As fur-
thermore shown by the analysis, rules of the Directive were often added or 
weaved into national legislation (e.g. rules on theatrical pyrotechnic articles; 
essential safety requirements). All in all, legal misfit seemed to have played 
a minor role in causing delay. On the other hand, policy misfit regarding 
safety levels – flowing from differences between the Directive and Dutch 
legislation as regards the definition and therefore availability of fireworks – 
certainly prompted the Public Prosecution Service to get involved which, as 
49 The concept of policy misfi t implies a mismatch between EU measures and national 
measures as regards elements of policy: e.g. policy goals, regulatory instruments, stan-
dards and problem-solving approaches. Cf. Börzel, 2005, pp. 49-50, also Börzel and 
Risse, 2000.
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already mentioned, negatively affected the speed of transposition. This neg-
ative effect on transposition in the context of policy misfit could apparently 
not be compensated by positive effects from the interaction of good legal 
compatibility and available discretion. Put differently, even if EU and Dutch 
rules were quite compatible in legal terms and discretion facilitated to some 
extent the incorporation of the Directive into national law this joint effect 
alone did not suffice to make transposition timely. Therefore the expectation 
that compatibility together with discretion can contribute to proper transpo-
sition does not hold true in this transposition case.
Last but not least, the disagreement interaction expectation has to be 
addressed. It links the negotiation and transposition stages by positing that 
Member State disagreement with a directive’s requirement during the EU 
decision-making process raises the likelihood of deficient transposition, and 
that this effect becomes stronger as the degree of discretion decreases. With 
respect to the present case, it cannot be denied that the Dutch delegation 
was not completely satisfied with the Directive proposal. Above all, intro-
ducing the envisaged ex-ante approval system implied administrative and 
financial burdens. However, the case study findings do not give conclusive 
support to the idea that previous disagreements with this or other Directive 
requirements in combination with little discretion being granted to realise 
them on national ground had impeding effects on the Dutch transposition 
of the Directive. Hence, it cannot be claimed that expectation 6 is of any rel-
evance in the case under consideration here.
10.8 Conclusion
By way of conclusion, and similar to the outcome regarding the negotia-
tions on the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive, discretion played a relevant role 
in the Dutch transposition of this Directive. The case of the Pyrotechnic Arti-
cles Directive, in fact, leads to a new insight into the relevance of discretion. 
The Pyrotechnic Articles Directive has a small scope of discretion, and yet 
discretion facilitated the transposition of EU rules into Dutch law. This sug-
gests that discretion can have facilitating effects on national transposition 
even if it is granted by small degrees. Furthermore, the case study confirms 
the importance of taking into account other contextual factors which can 
interact with discretion and may account for transposition delay.

11.1 Introduction
In the following sections the Waste Framework Directive1 takes centre stage. 
Its content, purpose, and background are mapped out and linked to the 
broader context of EU environmental law-making. The negotiations and 
Dutch transposition of the Directive are analysed and the role of discretion 
in both processes put under close scrutiny.
11.2 The directive
EU rules on waste management had already been in place for more than 
three decades when the new Waste Framework Directive was adopted in 
November 2008. Its predecessor, the 1975 Waste Framework Directive,2 was 
one amongst the first legal measures taken at the EU level to protect the 
environment while at the same time it marked the beginning of EU legisla-
tion on waste. Before, waste management, and the responsibility for waste 
recovery in particular, had been in the hands of the Member States, with 
regulatory responsibility usually being vested at the local levels. But the 
diversity of national approaches to waste management started to obstruct 
the operation of the internal market (Oosterhuis et al., 2011: 350-351). The 
EU was lacking legislative competence in the area of environment by that 
time. Hence, the Directive was justified as necessary in the light of inter-
nal market integration. It was, however, also promoted to help improve the 
protection of the environment. In subsequent decades, EU waste legislation 
developed from a general legal framework, establishing laws and standards 
for landfills and incinerators, into a system addressing more specific issues 
such as waste recycling (Oosterhuis et al., 2011: 357). The Waste Framework 
Directive takes an overarching role in the body of EU waste legislation as 
shown in figure 4. Together with the Hazardous Waste Directive, the Direc-
tive lays down ground rules on which further waste management legisla-
tion is developed. In establishing these rules as well as key definitions for 
all other pieces of EU legislation relative to waste – it impacts all of them 
1 Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 
2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, OJ L 312, 22 November 2008, pp. 3-30.
2 See Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste, OJ L 194, 25 July 1975, pp. 
39-41. In the literature it is also referred to as Waste Framework Directive as it sets out 
the general lines for specifi c waste streams, elaborations on its provisions being provid-
ed by other directives. Cf. Oosterhuis et al., 2011, p. 362.
11 Waste Framework Directive
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either directly or indirectly (European Commission, 2005). The Directive is 
linked to a number of specific directives, addressing special waste streams 
as well as processing and disposal facilities, and, finally, legislation which is 
enshrined in EU regulations. With only six EU Member States negotiating 
the Directive back then in the early 1970s and given the fact that Member 
States’ legislation, in particular German, French and Italian law, served as 
blueprints for the EU measure, negotiations on the Directive were finalised 
within a year and therefore relatively swiftly (European Commission, 1995).
Figure 4: EU Waste Management
The same cannot be said about the negotiations on the 2008 Waste Frame-
work Directive. For some reasons which are explained below, these negotia-
tions were more cumbersome. The revised Directive was introduced as an 
important piece of EU waste legislation as it stood for a new approach to 
waste management. Its overall aim consisted in minimising the impact of 
waste on both human health and the environment, reflecting a shift from 
the Commission’s medium specific approach towards a thematic approach 
which focuses on the link between the environment and health (Lenschow, 
2010: 309). Core elements of the Directive concern the concept of a waste 
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hierarchy which prioritises waste prevention, and the idea of an entire life-
cycle of products and materials, meaning that EU rules take into account the 
latter’s production phase, and are not only confined to provide for regula-
tion of the final, waste, phase (Article 4). Moreover, the Directive extends 
the principle of producer responsibility for waste generation to include the 
post-consumer stage of a product’s life cycle (Article 8(1)) and promotes 
recycling and recovery by means of separate waste collection (Article 10(2)). 
In addition to that, it specifies goals for individual waste streams (Articles 
17-22). Finally, it seeks to strengthen Member States’ commitment to waste 
management and environment protection by obliging them to introduce 
national waste management plans and prevention programmes (Articles 28 
and 29).3
In fact, the 2008 revised Waste Framework Directive was not a direct 
successor to the first Waste Framework Directive adopted three decades ear-
lier. Changes within economic, social and technical circumstances, includ-
ing the rising public awareness of the negative implications of waste, were 
amongst the reasons for previous amendment and codification of the Direc-
tive in 1991 and 2006 respectively.4 In addition to that, by the end of 2005, 
the European Commission submitted a legislative proposal for a new Waste 
Framework Directive as a reaction to the problems of flawed implementa-
tion of EU waste legislation in the Member States. Deficient implementa-
tion was, however, not confined to EU waste legislation. During the 1990s 
it became increasingly clear to the Commission that this was a problem 
pertaining to EU environmental law as a whole. The treaty obliges Member 
States to finance and implement the environment policy (Article 174(4) TEC, 
now 192(4) TFEU). But while legislative output used to be high, implemen-
tation deficits have been a cause of concern and a reason for the reduced 
effectiveness of environmental measures (Jordan, 1999; Krämer, 2002: 
177-178; Lenschow, 2010: 308). At the turn of the century, it was the area of 
environment which was found to have the highest implementation deficit 
among all other EU areas including the single market, transport and con-
sumer affairs (Lenschow, 2010: 319). Bad implementation records seemed to 
oddly contrast with the EU’s commitment to promote environmental pro-
tection and improvement.
3 BIO Intelligence Service (2011) Implementing EU waste legislation for green growth, 
fi nal report prepared for European Commission DG ENV, Paris. Retrieved from: http://
ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/studies/pdf/Coherence_waste_legislation.pdf 
(accessed 23 November 2015).
4 See Council Directive 91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991 amending Directive 75/442/EEC 
on waste, OJ L 78, 26 March 1991, pp. 32-37 and Directive 2006/12/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on waste, OJ L 114, 27 April 2006, pp. 9-21.
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11.2.1 The area of environment
Lacking any legal basis in the treaties establishing the European Economic 
Community (EEC) (Lenschow, 2010), the environment is nowadays an area 
where the EU acts as a key legislative player. Environmental law covers all 
kind of aspects relating to the environment. It is based on a number of over-
arching principles (e.g. polluter pays, prevention and precaution principle) 
and uses various instruments which in recent times have taken the form 
of environmental agreements or market-based environmental policy instru-
ments like pollution permits (Krämer, 2002; Lenschow, 2010). This also 
applies to EU waste legislation and the 2008 Waste Framework Directive 
in particular, which underlines the importance of economic instruments in 
the management of waste.5 Among the more traditional (hard) law instru-
ments, the most frequently used is the directive in the field of the environ-
ment (Collins and Earnshaw, 1992: 226): by mid-2011 more than 400 envi-
ronmental directives had been adopted (Beijen, 2011). In the area of waste 
management, directives specify targets that Member States have to reach, 
introduce controls for the shipment or disposal of hazardous wastes, and 
aim to stimulate the use of cleaner technologies and encourage greater pro-
ducer responsibility (Weale et al., 2000: 2). As regards the Waste Framework 
Directive, it is a central piece of legislation in the area of waste; other EU 
measures pertain to air, water, soil, and noise, amongst others.
The relevance of environmental matters for the EU is reflected by its 
institutional set-up. In 1981 the European Commission Directorate Gen-
eral on the Environment was established, having as its aim the protection, 
preservation and improvement of the environment. It was followed in 1990 
by the founding of the European Environmental Agency6 which provides 
information and support to environmental actors in shaping environmental 
policies. Environmental matters have regularly ranked high on the agenda 
of the Environment Council, being made up of national ministers responsi-
ble for matters pertaining to the environment. In addition to that, the Euro-
pean Parliament displays a high level of commitment in the area, showing 
for instance in its efforts, during the 1990s, to make implementation issues a 
more prominent topic on the EU agenda. Furthermore, its Committee on the 
Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection has been described 
as ‘one of the committees most involved in legislative procedures’ (Len-
schow, 2010: 312). Also with regard to waste management, the proactive 
approach of the European Parliament has contributed to the development 
of legislation in this area. For example, during the preparation of the Com-
mission proposal for a revised Waste Framework Directive, the European 
Parliament stressed the importance of arriving at a clear distinction between 
the terms recovery and disposal of waste and underlined the necessity to 
5 The relevance of economic instruments is for instance highlighted in recital (42).
6 Taking up duties in 1994, the EEA was established four years earlier in accordance with 
Council Regulation (EEC) 1210/90.
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clarify the conceptual difference between waste and non-waste (European 
Parliament, 2004) – issues that were to become crucial matters in the later 
negotiations on the Directive.
The extension of the co-decision procedure to areas including the envi-
ronment through the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) has strengthened the role 
of the European Parliament. Since then it has been co-legislating on equal 
footing with the Council.7 The position of the European Parliament has fur-
ther been bolstered by the case law of the European Court of Justice, which, 
more generally, has enhanced the role of environmental law-making vis-à-
vis the EU’s internal market programme (Lenschow, 2010: 317-318).8 Both 
fields of EU activities have, however, developed in close connection with 
each other (Weale et al., 2000: 7).
Contrasting with the role of the European Parliament is the marginal 
role of EU advisory bodies such as the Economic Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions in environmental matters (Krämer, 2002: 161). 
Finally, public interests are relatively well organised and represented due to 
the institutionalisation of environmental interests at both EU and national 
levels where interest groups seek to influence EU environmental decision-
making as well as national implementation and enforcement by mobilising 
the public or by providing expertise (Lenschow, 2010: 318-319).
As witnessed with the development of environmental law-making from 
the early 1970s up to today, the environment has become an independent 
policy domain, whereas before, the objective to protect the environment was 
seen as a logical consequence of economic integration showing in the adop-
tion of regulatory measures against air and water pollution which were 
based on provisions relating to the internal market in the EEC and subse-
quent European treaties9 (Lenschow, 2010). At regular intervals the Euro-
pean Commission has set out objectives and principles in environmental 
action programmes, the first one being adopted in 1973. Important devel-
opments in the legislative sphere only set in, however, by the end of the 
1980s not least because of the growing concern about harmful consequences 
of both the economic development and waste growth for the environment 
(Lenschow, 2010: 306). For the establishment of the legal framework, the 
7 In fact, co-decision applied earlier but only to environmental measures related to the 
internal market. Environmental law-making not being linked to it, was still subjected 
to the principle of unanimity and consultation with the European Parliament. See Len-
schow, 2010, p. 307.
8 In the ‘Danish bottle case’, the Court ruled that the principle of free movement can be 
subordinated to Community environmental objectives; see case C-302/86, Commission 
v Denmark [1988] ECR 4607. Furthermore, the Court strengthened the European Parlia-
ment’s participation in legislative procedures as follows from the Titanium Dioxide case. 
See case C-300/89, Commission v Council [1991] ECR I-02867. Cf. Lenschow, 2010, p. 317.
9 See the ‘internal market provisions’ as laid down in Article 95 TEC (now Article 114 
TFEU), in particular Article 95(3): The approximation of national rules for the purpose 
of market integration should consider measures to ensure the protection of the environ-
ment.
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Single European Act proved decisive: it introduced qualified majority vot-
ing linked to internal market harmonisation (Article 100a). Additionally, 
it introduced into the EEC legal framework, by means of 130R-T (now art. 
191-193 TFEU), a title on the environment which was detached from the 
internal market provisions. Furthermore, the legal and institutional changes 
brought about by the Maastricht (1993) and Amsterdam (1999) treaties were 
important for the development of EU environmental law-making. While the 
former treaty established environmental protection as an EU objective (Arti-
cle 2 TEC) and further extended qualified majority voting in the council, 
the latter made co-decision applicable to environmental matters as referred 
to in Article 175 TEC (ex Article 130s, now 192 TFEU). Furthermore, the 
Amsterdam Treaty also emphasised the need for integrating requirements 
for the purpose of environmental protection and sustainable development 
into the Union’s policies and activities (Article 6 TEC, now 11 TFEU). In 
this respect, the European Commission stressed that waste management is 
essential in the EU’s drive to sustainable development and the Commission 
has consequently urged Member States to provide for more efficiency and 
consistency in the implementation of corresponding EU measures (Euro-
pean Commission, 2011).
It was already noted that the national implementation of EU environ-
mental law, including EU legislation on waste, has been beset with prob-
lems. To explain this shortcoming, various reasons have been identified 
(Collins and Earnshaw, 1992; Knill and Lenschow, 2000; Jordan and Lieffer-
ink, 2004; Börzel, 2007). The causes have largely been ascribed to features of 
the national implementation settings such as administrative shortcomings 
which refer to both the capacity and coordination problems of the imple-
menting authorities. National legal cultures are mentioned as another cause 
of problems in implementation, showing in the fact that Member States take 
different approaches to environmental regulation than foreseen by corre-
sponding EU legislation. Apart from these reasons, also lacking willingness 
on the part of the Member States to properly apply EU law as well as lack-
ing precision in the wording of directives, environmental ones in particular, 
have been identified as causing deficient transposition and misapplication 
(Krämer, 2002: 165-166; see also Falkner et al., 2005; Beijen, 2011). Willing-
ness and especially administrative capacity are prominent features that are 
used in the academic debate to distinguish between the so-called environ-
mental ‘leader’ and ‘laggard’ states (Börzel, 2003; Wurzel, 2008). This ana-
lytical distinction represents an attempt to explain the phenomenon of bet-
ter implementation performances of the economically advanced Northern 
European States vis-à-vis the poor implementation results booked by their 
less wealthy counterparts in the South. But it also makes obvious the simple 
fact that environmental interests differ between the North and the South 
of the EU’s territory, mostly due to differences of geography and climate 
(Lenschow, 2010). The Netherlands have traditionally been considered as 
an environmental leader or ‘green member state’ which takes advanced 
measures regarding a number of environmental issues, including the man-
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agement of waste. Additionally, it has a good environmental implementa-
tion record (Liefferink and Andersen, 1998; Liefferink and Van der Zouwen, 
2004).
There has been an increasing awareness amongst the EU institutions – 
above all the European Commission – that gaps in implementation related 
to EU waste legislation are symptomatic of the general problem of non-com-
pliance in the area of EU environmental law as a whole. Owing to this prob-
lem of non-compliance, the Commission has, since the late 1980s dedicated 
special attention to this matter in its environmental action programmes 
(Collins and Earnshaw, 1992).10 What about the Member States? As a matter 
of fact recognising that more environmental measures have not necessar-
ily been matched by better quality of the environment, Member States have 
not been sitting on their hands. Pooling together their respective experience 
and know-how in the framework of the European Network on the Imple-
mentation and Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL) (Krämer, 2002), 
Member States share the common wish to improve their environmental per-
formance. IMPEL is an informal forum for mutual exchange of experiences 
and best practices which was acknowledged as an important instrument in 
improving implementation by both the European Commission and Council 
in the course of the 1990s (IMPEL, 2010).11 Being made up of representatives 
of the Commission and national as well as local authorities and allowing for 
the exchange of experience and best practices, it has sought to strengthen 
both the ability and commitment of national implementers to obligations 
and objectives laid down in EU environmental law (Lenschow, 2010: 320). In 
the past, the IMPEL Framework has also been used for cooperation between 
Member States, including the Netherlands, regarding the implementation of 
obligations flowing from the revised Waste Framework Directive.12
10 4th Environmental Action Programme (EAP) (1987 – 1992) [COM(86) 485 fi nal], 5th EAP 
(1992-2002) [COM(92) 23 fi nal], and 6th EAP (2002-2012) [COM(2001) 31 fi nal].
11 See Commission and Council positions regarding the implementation and enforcement 
of Community environmental law: Communication from the Commission - Implement-
ing Community Environmental Law, COM(96) 500 fi nal, Brussels, 22 October 1996 and 
Council Resolution of 7 October 1997 on the drafting, implementation and enforcement 
of Community environmental law, OJEC, C 321, Brussels, 22 October 1997. See also 
‘About Impel. History, Mission and Achievements’ (2012), available at: http://impel.eu/
about/history/ (accessed 1 May 2015).
12 The Impel project focusing on Article 34(1) of the Directive (rules on inspections) has 
been based on a draft Action Plan of the European Commission which has aimed to 
combat illegal waste shipments by applying a consistent and uniform approach includ-
ing integrated controls at the various stages of generation, collection and shipment of 
waste. See ‘Impel Projects’ (2012), available at: http://impel.eu/projects/waste-sites-
phase-2/ (accessed 1 May 2015).
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11.2.2 Purpose and background to the directive
Deficiencies in the implementation of the Directive resulted in a number of 
court proceedings and rulings13 and not even the Directive’s amendment 
in 1991 did anything to alter this development. Implementation practice 
suggested that regional differences in interpreting and applying the Direc-
tive were still prevalent, creating situations of legal uncertainty, with vari-
ous problems for economic operators and competent national authorities 
as a result (European Commission, 2005a). To revise the Waste Framework 
Directive after it had been subjected to codification in 2006 was prompted 
by the Commission’s desire to establish the EU as a credible and reliable 
actor in the field of waste management (European Commission, 2005a). 
And there were other reasons and objectives motivating the proposal.
To start with, the Commission was aware that the problem of deficient 
implementation of the Waste Framework Directive was partly ‘homemade’, 
being grounded on the fact that the Directive displayed flaws: the text of 
the 1975 Directive lacked clarity and overlapped with other pieces of waste 
legislation which caused unnecessary regulatory and administrative bur-
dens (European Commission, 1995). Already in 2002 the Commission had 
pointed to the need of reviewing and elaborating on EU waste legislation.14 
Next to updating and revising already existing legislation – in line with the 
Commission’s better regulation programme15 aiming to simplify EU legisla-
tion – another goal was to shift the task of organising waste management 
from the national to the local levels. All these measures should contribute to 
more effective and consistent implementation, and hence alleviate problems 
with deficient transposition and practical application and enforcement of 
EU rules on waste management. Finally, the Commission proposal intended 
to answer the ongoing challenge posed by the growth in waste. By the end 
of 2005, at the time that the Directive proposal was submitted, high amounts 
of waste placed a heavy burden on recycling, landfill and incineration, mak-
ing it obvious that waste was increasing proportional to the growth of the 
economy (European Commission, 2005c). The Directive was intended to put 
a halt to this development by prescribing national waste prevention pro-
grammes which should break the link between economic growth and the 
environmental impacts associated with the generation of waste.16
Probably due to its key role in the EU’s corpus of legislation on waste – 
in setting the definitions and ground rules for all other pieces of EU legisla-
tion related to waste – the Commission’s proposal for a revised Waste Frame-
13 See infraction proceedings resulting from breaches of the 1975 and 1991 Waste Frame-
work Directives: case C-494/01, Commission v Ireland [2005] ECR I-3331 and case 
C-270/03, Commission v Italy [2005] ECR I-5233.
14 Cf. 6th EAP (footnote 234).
15 The Commission’s better regulation programme is closely linked to its better law-making 
initiative which preceded the programme. See Haythornthwaite, (2007) ‘Better Regula-
tion in Europe’, in S. Weatherill (ed.), Better Regulation, pp. 19-26. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
16 See Article 29(2) of the Directive.
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work Directive envisaged to revise and repeal the 1975 predecessor without, 
however, fundamentally changing its structure. The former Directive should, 
instead, be refined and the definitions clarified, in particular those that are 
of key importance for other pieces of EU waste legislation, above all expla-
nations pertaining to ‘waste’. The novel strategy established by the revised 
Waste Framework Directive was that, in contrast to earlier legislation, the 
focus was now on waste prevention and the recycling of waste and the long-
term goal of developing a European recycling society.17 In formal terms, 
the 2008 Directive represented a new directive repealing other waste direc-
tives on Hazardous Waste and Waste Oil (Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 
32392, no. 3, p. 3).18 Content-wise, however, the revision drew on the latter 
directives by integrating pertinent parts of them into one measure, thereby 
merging them with the latest framework Directive19 (European Commission, 
2005a, p. 3). Based on Article 175(1) TEC (on environment), the Commission 
tabled the proposal for a revised Waste Framework Directive for discussion 
in the Council of Ministers alongside the so-called thematic strategy on the 
prevention and recycling of waste which had already been announced in the 
Commission’s 6th environmental action programme. The strategy laid down 
guidelines for EU activities and ideas on how to improve waste management 
throughout the Union, with the overall aim of reducing waste, stimulating 
treatment activities like re-use, recycling, and the recovery of waste. The 
two instruments, the strategy and the Directive, should work complemen-
tary to each other: the thematic strategy established the Commission’s politi-
cal guidelines and provided an overview of its philosophy regarding waste 
management, while the objective of the Directive proposal was to translate 
the strategy into concrete legal measures which should serve to reduce gen-
eral environmental impacts resulting from the generation and management 
of waste as well as the use of resources. Moreover, Member States should 
take measures to prevent and reduce the production of waste, including its 
harmful effects and, additionally, they should carry out waste recovery activ-
ities by means of re-use, recycling and other recovery operations (Article 
1). Preparations of both measures, the thematic strategy and the Directive 
proposal, included several rounds of consultations involving experts and 
stakeholders from Member States as well as the drawing up of an impact 
assessment of the draft Directive (European Commission, 2005a; 2005b). But 
despite extensive preparations for working out a common basis, the negotia-
tions on the Directive were no easy matter.
17 As repeatedly stated in the Directive’s preamble and mentioned in Article 11(2) of the 
revised Waste Framework Directive.
18 Council Directive 91/689/EEC of 12 December 1991 on hazardous waste, OJ L 377, 31 
December 1991, pp. 20-27 and Council Directive 75/439/EEC of 16 June 1975 on the dis-
posal of waste oils, OJ L 194, 25 July 1975, pp. 31-33 are meant here. Since the Directive 
is, formally speaking, a new Directive, the terms ‘revised’ and ‘new’ are both used.
19 See Directive 2006/12/EC.
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11.3 Negotiations
Alongside the range of the objectives just mentioned, the Commission con-
sidered both the cross-border dimension of waste management and the aim 
of guaranteeing a fully functioning internal market as well-founded justi-
fications for the need to revise the Waste Framework Directive (European 
Commission, 2005a). The corresponding proposal was transmitted to the 
European Parliament and the Council on 26 December 2005 for adoption by 
the co-decision procedure (Article 251 TEC, now Article 294 TFEU).
Table 12: Timeline for negotiations on the Waste Framework Directive
21 Dec 05 Adoption by Commission proposal
05 July 05 Committee of Regions opinion
13 Feb 07 European Parliament opinion on 1st reading
20 Dec 07 Adoption of common position by Council
17 Jun 08 European Parliament opinion on 2nd reading
20 Oct 08
Approval by the Council of the European Parliament amendments 
at 2nd reading
19 Nov 08 Formal adoption by Council and European Parliament
On 20 October 2008 the Directive was adopted, at second reading and by 
a qualified majority with the Irish delegation abstaining (Council of the 
European Union, 2008b). Negotiations started off in the first months of 
2006, prior to the Council on the Environment in early March, and gained 
momentum in the second half of the year under the presidency of Finland. 
All in all, the negotiations took two and a half years, proving to be lengthy 
and difficult (see table 12).
The proposal was treated as a controversial issue (B-item) and remained 
as such on the Council agenda for the whole period of negotiations. As 
noted by the interviewee, all parties involved took great pains to avoid 
letting the negotiations on the Directive enter a third reading. The cum-
bersome nature of the process resulted from the fact that not only among 
Member States’ opinions on the proposal differed. Insights gained from 
the interview and the study of the negotiation documents revealed that 
the European Parliament and the Council held divergent views on specific 
aspects of the Directive. The overall conflict was sparked by the question 
whether or not the incineration of municipal solid waste could be consid-
ered as energy efficient and therefore as a recovery operation (Council of 
the European Union, 2007a, 2007b). Next to several other Member States, 
such a viewpoint on recovery operations was taken by the Netherlands who 
already had a corresponding policy in place. But unlike the Member States 
in the Council, the European Parliament did not believe that incineration 
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along the lines of high standards would in practice be feasible to realise in 
the entire EU and therefore feared that air pollution would increase as a 
result (interview). Be it as it may, the fact remains that from both the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Member States many suggestions were forwarded 
which resulted in substantial amendments of the proposed Directive. But 
what was the position of the Dutch Government towards the Commission 
proposal?
11.3.1 Dutch position
From the viewpoint of the Dutch Government, the Commission’s ini-
tiative to tackle the waste issue at European scale seemed to come at the 
right moment. In fact, the EU’s plans regarding a revised Waste Frame-
work Directive and Thematic Strategy on waste prevention and recycling 
reflected a number of points that had also turned out to be relevant in 
national debates, centring on the question of how to handle waste disposal. 
Cases in point include the need for waste prevention and the clarification 
of legislation for the purpose of practical application. Besides, the measures 
proposed by the Commission were found to be in line with the approach 
to both the waste management and the objectives of national projects and 
programmes, in particular the national waste plan (Landelijk Afvalbe-
heer Plan, LAP) setting out the agenda for Dutch waste management for 
the decade of 2002-2012 (Parliamentary Papers II 2005/06, 22112, no. 429, 
p. 33). What’s more, as it addressed a European-wide problem, the Dutch 
Government could well identify with the aspects of the Commission pro-
posal. As a matter of fact, the proposal picked up on aspects that played 
a significant role at the national level. Until the late 1980s waste had not 
ranked high on the political agenda of the previous Dutch Governments. 
But due to the low standards for the organisation of landfills and opera-
tion of incinerations causing damages to the environment, Dutch politicians 
felt compelled to change course. As a consequence, several measures were 
taken to alleviate the problems resulting from the failures of waste manage-
ment. Examples of these measures concerned the introduction of producer 
responsibility obligations in relation to the generation and management of 
waste and the foundation of a body for exchange of information between 
the national, regional and local authorities on waste-related questions.20 In 
spite of the fact that these measures brought about a temporary improve-
ment, they fell, however, short of permanently and effectively tackling the 
problem of increasing waste. Waste growth turned into an issue of national 
concern (Oosterhuis et al., 2011: 349). Notwithstanding the slight decrease in 
waste around the turn of the millennium, in 2008 the same amount of waste 
was reached as in 2000 (Oosterhuis et al., 2011: 367-368). Hence, the issue 
20 Meanwhile, operating under a different name, this consultation forum was founded in 
1990 under the name Afval Overleg Orgaan.
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of waste management became one of the most relevant ones for the Dutch 
Government (Backes et al., 2006).
Against this backdrop, it is not particularly surprising that the Directive 
proposal was seen in a positive light on the part of the Dutch Government 
and in particular by the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environ-
ment, chiefly being in charge of preparing and participating in the negotia-
tions on the proposal. Especially the idea of the Commission to modernise 
its approach to waste management, including the key definitions of ‘waste’, 
‘disposal’, and ‘recovery’ was approved of – not only by the Dutch Ministry 
but by most Member States as well as the waste industry: the clarification 
and simplification of legislation could contribute to the effectiveness of the 
measure and therefore be conducive to both environmental protection and 
legal certainty for economic operators. Moreover, the integration of waste-
related directives into one measure was expected to decrease administrative 
burdens, easing, for example, reporting obligations regarding the status of 
implementation of EU legislation (Parliamentary Papers II 2005/06, 22112, no. 
429, p. 31; 32). Furthermore, the Ministry pointed out that the Directive pro-
posal did not only match Dutch preferences because it emphasised the need 
for waste prevention. The proposal also promoted recovery operations, 
above all the re-use of certain waste, which was seen as an advantage for 
the Dutch industry in that sector (Parliamentary Papers II 2005/06, 22112, no. 
429, p. 30; 34). Since the 1980s re-use has formed an integral part of waste 
management in the Netherlands. It has formed an essential part in a specific 
sequence of waste management activities applied for the treatment of waste 
which was introduced by the Government to combat waste more efficiently 
(Van Dijk et al., 2001).21 This priority order of Dutch waste management 
activities resembled, in fact, the waste management hierarchy suggested by 
the Commission in its proposal for the revision of the Waste Framework 
Directive. Finally, the plans for revising this Directive appeared promising 
in economic respects. It might benefit the Dutch waste industry, and, in par-
ticular, those Dutch incineration plants with high energy efficiency. In line 
with Article 19(4) of the Directive proposal, these plants were expected to 
be classified as recovery plants, resulting in the extension and strengthen-
ing of the market position of the Dutch waste management industry within 
the European Community (Parliamentary Papers II 2005/06, 22112, no. 429, 
p. 30).
21 The Dutch order for waste management is known as ‘Ladder of Lansink’, including the 
following steps in waste treatment: prevention, element reuse, material reuse as well 
as useful application, incineration with energy recovery, incineration, and landfi ll. The 
‘ladder’ has been extended to take account of more waste treatment options meanwhile 
developed and is now referred to as ‘Delft ladder’. Cf. Van Dijk et al. (2001) ‘Strategy for 
reuse of construction and demolition waste role of authorities’, HERON 46(2): 89-94.
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11.3.1.1 Other positions
The revision of the Waste Framework Directive was widely supported and 
claimed by the Member States – waste growth and disposal were both mat-
ters of common concern. A few issues were nevertheless raised and from 
Member States’ reactions to specific aspects of the proposal, similarities 
but also differences of national approaches to the management of waste 
became obvious. For instance, several Member States including the Nether-
lands, Bulgaria, Italy, and Spain considered the definition of waste as ‘any 
substance or object which the holder discards or intends or is required to 
discard’ as too broad and lacking clarity. Furthermore, although the Com-
mission’s aim to simplify waste legislation was approved of, some Member 
States such as the Czech Republic, Italy, and Spain feared that this would 
decrease legislative quality and eventually have negative repercussions 
for the environment. In the context of simplification of legislation, also 
the repeal of the Waste Oils Directive was, for different reasons, seen by 
some Member States such as Hungary, Italy and Portugal as entailing risks 
whereas the United Kingdom and Finland fully supported the Commis-
sion’s steps in this regard.
Also the European Parliament was not entirely satisfied with the Com-
mission proposal. While the latter introduced the core idea of a waste man-
agement hierarchy prescribing a sequence of treatment operations in the 
detailed explanations of the proposal, an explicit reference to it in the sub-
stantive provisions of the Directive was missing and clarity lacking as to 
the conditions under which Member States would be able to depart from it 
(European Parliament, 2006, p. 64). The proposal was examined by two of 
its committees: the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food 
Safety and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. While the for-
mer did not have much to criticise about the Commission’s attempts to sim-
plify legislation, the latter took the view that the Commission had not fully 
succeeded in improving the Directive. Dissatisfaction was voiced regard-
ing the definitions and scope of the Directive (European Parliament, 2006, 
pp. 64-67). According to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, 
the definitions provided in Article 3 of the Directive raised concerns among 
both the Member States and waste sectors. It was feared that legal uncer-
tainty would be increased instead of being diminished. In its own words, 
the Committee took the view that the proposal ‘while seeking to remedy 
some deficiencies, has added others.’ To make up for this, the Committee 
added a number of additional definitions pertaining to key terms in waste 
management such as disposal and recovery. Additionally, it added defini-
tions related to environmental standards (e.g. best available techniques). 
These amendments should increase both the clarity and precision of the 
draft Directive (European Parliament, 2006, pp. 17-25). Furthermore, the 
European Parliament shared Member States’ concern that simplifying leg-
islation by means, for instance, of repealing the Hazardous Waste Direc-
tive – would be at the expense of high environmental protection standards 
and therefore have adverse effects on public health and safety. Its amend-
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ments to the proposal reflect the wish to see greater attention being paid 
to that matter. By suggesting, for example, to amend the Directive’s subject 
matter,22 the European Parliament put emphasis not only on waste preven-
tion but it also sought to underline the necessity to protect both the envi-
ronment and human health from the negative impacts of waste and waste 
treatment (European Parliament, 2006, p. 13). Likewise, the European Par-
liament’s suggestions regarding the procedure of re-classification of hazard-
ous waste as non-hazardous waste or the traceability and control of hazard-
ous waste – to mention just a few examples – were taken over in the final 
Directive (European Parliament, 2006, p. 34; 36).23
Finally, returning to the Member States, some of them criticised the pro-
cedural measures envisaged under the Directive proposal. This concerned, 
in particular, the Directive’s scope of implementing powers conferred to 
the Commission under the comitology procedure which was found as too 
broad according to a group of Member States including Denmark, France, 
Hungary, Finland, Portugal, and Latvia. It was advocated that the conferral 
of implementing powers to the Commission for further specification of par-
ticular aspects, such as the Directive’s scope and definitions, should be pre-
cisely circumscribed, if not replaced by the co-decision procedure, implying 
that the elaboration of directive requirements should be left to the Member 
States.
11.3.2 Flexibility
The latter aspect concerning the distribution of competences between the 
Commission and the Member States is linked to the issue of legislative dis-
cretion and in this regard it is relevant to note, that Member States where 
explicitly asked by the General Secretariat of the Council to share their 
views regarding the question whether or not the proposed measure pro-
vided appropriate flexibility for implementation.24 Opinions on this mat-
ter diverged. While some Member States held the view that the proposal 
made sufficient flexibility available (e.g. Hungary and Finland) others 
doubted that the Directive proposal granted enough discretion to Mem-
ber States (e.g. Spain, theUnited Kingdom). Then again there were those 
Member States that preferred to have more binding rules (Czech Republic). 
Poland and the United Kingdom represented the opposite ends of the spec-
trum: Poland was convinced of the general suitability of having uniform 
standards for waste management. It advocated the further harmonisation 
beyond what was suggested by the proposal to ensure legal clarity and to 
prevent misinterpretation and misapplication of EU rules on the manage-
22 See Article 1 of the fi nal Directive.
23 See Articles 7(4) and 17.
24 The corresponding question reads as follows: ‘Will the development of guidelines and 
common standards at EU level leave the appropriate fl exibility for Member States to 
implement measures at national level?’ Cf. Council of the European Union, 2006a, p. 5.
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ment of waste (Council of the European Union, 2006b, p. 31). The United 
Kingdom, on the other hand, disapproved of more harmonisation, doubting 
the conduciveness of minimum standards for encouraging waste recycling. 
Furthermore, it emphasised that the national authorities would be the more 
suitable actors to fulfil certain tasks such as assessing the risks entailed by 
recovery operations or imposing permit conditions for undertakings of 
waste treatment operations. These tasks were, however, amongst those that 
should, according to the proposal, be delegated to the Commission under 
the committee procedure (Council of the European Union, 2006b, pp. 47-48).
The Dutch Government did not express any disapproval regarding the 
scope of discretion which the Commission proposal envisaged to grant 
to Member States. On the contrary, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment found the proposed measure, including both the thematic 
strategy and Directive proposal, proportionate and in accordance with the 
subsidiarity principle. The Ministry pointed out that the proposal enabled 
Member States to take into account national, regional and local character-
istics by involving them in the drawing up of waste management plans 
and programmes. It apparently found that sufficient discretionary room 
was available for the implementation of the Directive (Parliamentary Papers 
II 2005/06, 22112, no. 429, p. 31). Discretion was additionally provided by 
the possibility to introduce stricter requirements regarding treatment opera-
tions for reasons of protecting the public health and the environment (Arti-
cle 25 later 27), and the view was taken that minimum harmonisation more 
generally might move standards for waste management within the EU 
upwards and therefore closer to those high standards already established 
in the Netherlands. This was expected to improve the latter’s market posi-
tion within the waste management sector (Parliamentary Papers II 2005/06, 
22112, no. 429, p. 33). Furthermore, the Dutch Government pointed out that 
both the trans-boundary character of waste management and the rulings of 
the European Court of Justice – the latter being considered as limiting the 
discretionary room for manoeuvre of national governments – would make 
the revision of EU legislation necessary and desirable (Parliamentary Papers 
II 2005/06, 22112, no. 429, p. 31). Finally, as pointed out in the interview, the 
Government’s approval of the proposal also stemmed from the fact that the 
proposed EU requirements largely matched with Dutch waste legislation. 
This match was partly the result of lobbying activities pursued by the Min-
istry of Infrastructure and the Environment to influence the Commission’s 
preparations of the Directive proposal (interview).
How did the European Parliament finally react to the proposed distri-
bution of competences? From its legislative resolution the picture emerges 
that it sought to ensure harmonisation where it considered it necessary for 
attaining the Directive’s objectives. To give an example, regarding the pro-
posed registration requirements for waste establishments and undertakings 
(Article 25), the European Parliament objected to the conferral of discretion 
upon Member States by pointing out that minimum standards might lead 
to diverging requirements throughout the EU. This, the European Parlia-
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ment pointed out, was ‘undesirable in the interests of harmonisation’ (Euro-
pean Parliament, 2006, p. 44). In order to have the same qualitative require-
ments for establishments and undertakings carrying out waste treatment 
operations applied by all Member States, it advocated the formulation of 
registration requirements instead of introducing minimum standards. More 
interesting, alongside some of the Member States, the European Parliament 
did not agree with the scope of implementing powers conferred upon the 
Commission. It took the view that the application of the comitology pro-
cedure should be confined to the technical adaptations of EU legislation, 
and hence should not concern other tasks beyond this area of responsibil-
ity. What’s more, the European Parliament saw the granting of discretion 
to the Commission as representing an ‘inappropriate encroachment on 
democratic decision-making’ (European Parliament, 2006, p. 65). To increase 
both the transparency and legitimacy of the proposed procedures, the Euro-
pean Parliament wished to reduce the scope of the comitology provisions 
by subjecting some of the aspects mentioned therein to decision-making by 
co-decision (such as the determination of criteria for recovery operations). 
Likewise, the local communities were considered to be more suitable actors 
than the EU-level committees, to decide upon certain matters of the Direc-
tive, such as the content and format of the envisaged waste plans. Finally, 
the European Parliament objected to the Commission’s scope for action 
regarding disposal operations and registration requirements for waste 
establishments and undertakings. According to the European Parliament, 
amending these requirements should not be left solely to the Commission. 
Only upon consultation with the Member States and relevant stakeholders 
(e.g. pyrotechnics industry), the Commission should be able to take action 
in this matter (European Parliament, 2006, pp. 65-66).25
11.3.3 Scope
Even though the Dutch Government generally supported the Commis-
sion proposal, one issue of concern to the Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment, and in particular the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and 
Water Management pertained to Article 2 regarding the scope of the pro-
posed Directive. The Article established that certain substances and objects, 
albeit falling under the definition of waste, were excluded from the frame-
work of the Directive proposal to ensure either their undisturbed use or 
25 Interestingly, in the later debate on the transposition of the Waste Framework Direc-
tive, criticism regarding the scope of implementing powers being conferred upon the 
Commission was also raised by domestic actors in the Netherlands. Members from the 
Dutch Democratic Party and representatives of the Dutch regional authorities (united 
in the Association of Dutch Municipalities) preferred the greater use of the co-decision 
procedure instead of applying the committee procedure (comitology) to elaborate the 
Directive. Cf. Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 32392 and VNG (2006) VNG standpunt. 
EU Thematische Strategie inzake afvalpreventie en afvalrecycling. Herziening EU kaderrichtlijn 
betreffende afvalstoffen, The Hague: Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten.
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because they were already addressed by other EU legislation. The Dutch 
authorities, however, were concerned that despite these exclusions from the 
Directive’s scope, not enough discretionary room would be left for the spe-
cific Dutch approach to deal with the consequences of floods and droughts 
by using non-hazardous sediments. For this reason the Dutch delegation, 
being joined by the Danish delegation, advocated the explicit exclusion of 
non-hazardous excavated sediments from the remit of the Directive to bring 
the proposal into alignment with national provisions (Council of the Euro-
pean Union, 2006b). In line with this request the final Directive establishes 
in Article 2(3) that ‘sediments relocated inside surface waters for the pur-
pose of managing waters and waterways or of preventing floods or mitigat-
ing the effects of floods and droughts or land reclamation shall be excluded 
from the scope of this Directive if it is proved that the sediments are non-
hazardous’.
11.3.4 Definitions
The Dutch Government shared the view of other Member States that the 
definition of waste, despite the Commission’s efforts to improve it, was still 
lacking clarity. For the Government the clarification of the term was, how-
ever, very important since insufficient clarity had caused problems for the 
Dutch authorities in the application of waste legislation, and the EU regula-
tion regarding the shipments of waste, in particular (interview).26 But this 
aim was only partly achieved by the proposed revision of the Waste Frame-
work Directive as pointed out in the interviews. In fact, if compared to pre-
vious definitions, the definition of waste provided by the Directive proposal 
had not undergone a fundamental change.27 Nevertheless, by specifying 
what was not or should not be part of the notion of waste, for instance by 
introducing the definitions of ‘by-products’ and ‘end-waste-status’ of prod-
ucts, some clarification was provided.28 These new terms were defined as 
follows: A substance or object generated by a production process may under 
certain conditions be regarded as by-product – and therefore not waste – 
if there is certainty about its further use or due to other conditions men-
tioned in the Directive (Article 5(1)). Waste ceases to be waste (with waste 
being defined as a substance or object the holder disposes of or intends or 
is required to dispose of) after having been subjected to a recovery or recy-
26 Cf. Regulation (EC) No. 1013/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
shipments of waste.
 The interviewee pointed out that the Ministry and the Dutch Council of State differed in 
their interpretations of the defi nition.
27 See the similar formulations of the defi nition in both 1975 Waste Framework Directive 
and its 1991 amendment. One difference between the former and the latter Directive 
should be mentioned. The 1991 amending Directive determined that categories of waste 
are further specifi ed by the Commission (comitology procedure) whereas the 1975 Direc-
tive leaves further clarifi cation to national legislation.
28 See Articles 5 and 6 of the revised Waste Framework Directive.
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cling operation. In addition, it ceases to be waste if it meets criteria which 
are developed in compliance with the conditions set out in the Directive 
such as, amongst others, the existence of a market or demand for the sub-
stance or object concerned.
It took a while and some efforts until agreement was reached on the 
final formulations of the relevant Articles. Member States were divided 
about the content of the two terms. What’s more, the Council and the 
European Parliament held different views on this subject (see for instance 
Council of the European Union, 2007c and Council of the European Union, 
2007d). To take the example of by-products, the Dutch delegation and the 
delegations of Italy, France, Poland, and the United Kingdom, amongst 
others, urged to formulate clear rules concerning this issue. The need was 
stressed for addressing it within the main part of the Directive instead of 
subjecting it to comitology. In addition to that, the Dutch delegation advo-
cated introducing another requirement which was expected to guarantee 
that by-products did not fall under the category of waste and could be used 
for other purposes (Council of the European Union, 2007c; 2007e).29 How-
ever, the Dutch request was not taken up. Instead of additional require-
ments clarifying the definition and uses of by-products, the Commission 
supported by, amongst others, Belgium, Denmark, Romania, and Finland 
favoured the drawing-up of interpretative guidelines. It was argued that 
these guidelines would take into consideration the relevant interpretations 
of the European Court of Justice on this issue. Furthermore it was pointed 
out that they would provide guidance to the national competent authori-
ties in deciding whether or not a certain material qualifies waste (Council 
of the European Union, 2007c, pp. 9-10). In general, these guidelines were 
considered as a better means to improve the legal certainty of waste legisla-
tion. The Commission, anticipating that a compromise on the definition of 
by-product would not necessarily provide for more clarity, had already pre-
pared a communication to this end (European Commission, 2007).
The Dutch delegation furthermore sought to achieve a sharper out-
line to the proposed definition and distinction of the terms ‘disposal’ and 
‘recovery’ offered by the Directive. These terms are used in a number of 
provisions such as those concerning permits for waste undertakings and 
the classification of incineration facilities as recovery or disposal opera-
tions.30 Due to already established national practice, the Dutch delegation 
strongly supported the idea that energy from waste should be included as a 
criterion for recovery. Contrary to this request, this criterion was, however, 
not part of the requirements for waste undertakings in obtaining a permit. 
Apparently, sufficient support was lacking for the Dutch request, possi-
bly owing to the fact that the Dutch initiative was seen by some Member 
29 This requirement included the introduction of an environmental license for the per-
mission and specifi cation of production processes. Cf. Council of the European Union, 
2007f, p. 10.
30 Cf. Article 19 of the Directive proposal and Article 23 of the fi nal Directive, respectively.
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States as putting their domestic industries at a disadvantage: making this 
criterion obligatory, would have led to the immediate shutdown of all non-
compliant plants (interview).31 Nevertheless, probably due to the wishes of 
the Dutch delegation and others, some specifications of recovery operations 
were eventually incorporated into the list of recovery operations provided 
in the Annex II to the Directive (Council of the European Union, 2006c). In 
the interview it was, however, underlined that a compromise on further 
important specifications of the definitions of recovery and disposal could 
not be achieved within the Council. This issue was therefore delegated to 
the Commission (Article 38 of the Directive).32 Apparently the delegation of 
discretionary implementing powers to the Commission served to avoid too 
lengthy debates on this matter. In the words of the civil servant interviewed, 
‘once the decision was made to let technicians discuss the issue under the 
comitology procedure, it no longer represented a controversial issue in the 
need to be solved within the Council negotiations.’
In its role as co-legislator also the European Parliament expressed its 
view on how to formulate rules on different waste treatment activities such 
as recovery, recycling, and the disposal of waste without, however, taking 
a clear stance, as it seems. The European Parliament acknowledged the rel-
evance of recovery and recycling in the treatment of waste from both an 
environmental and economic point of view. And yet, in the light of efforts 
towards the reduction of energy expenditures, and the possibility to pro-
duce energy from waste, it pointed out that the disposal of waste should not 
be excluded as a waste treatment activity but, instead, be considered, as an 
alternative to recycling operations (European Parliament, 2006, p. 67).
11.3.5 Waste prevention plans and programmes
The Commission proposal obliged Member States to establish waste pre-
vention plans and programmes.33 Waste management plans should include 
an analysis of the actual situation of waste management in the entire ter-
ritory of a Member State and the measures envisaged for the treatment 
of waste taking into account the priority order (prevention, reuse etc.) as 
defined by the proposed waste hierarchy. Waste prevention programmes, 
functioning as integral parts of these plans or individually, should state 
objectives for the purpose of waste prevention and assess those prevention 
measures that should be taken to achieve these objectives. Member States 
were furthermore required to determine specific qualitative and quanti-
31 See in this respect also the fi rst reading debate of the European Parliament. See Council 
of the European Union, (2007d).
32 The Article allows the Commission to develop interpretative guidelines and to specify 
corresponding parts of the Directive’s Annex that relate to this matter.
33 Corresponding rules were laid down in Article 26 (waste management plans) and Arti-
cles 29-31 (waste prevention programmes) corresponding with Articles 28, 29 and 30 of 
the later Directive.
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tative targets and indicators for monitoring and assessing the progress of 
individual measures (Article 30).
The requirement to draw up waste management plans and programmes 
met with different reactions in the Council of Ministers. Italy, Latvia and 
Lithuania – arguably those Member States with less administrative capacity 
and financial resources – took the view that the Commission’s plans were 
very ambitious. According to the Italian Government the envisaged require-
ment entailed high administrative burdens for Member States (Council of 
the European Union, 2006b, p. 20). Apparently, also the European Parlia-
ment shared this view. Its amendments to the corresponding provisions 
reflected its ambition to reduce red tape relating to the implementation of 
waste management plans and programmes. Another amendment of the 
European Parliament concerned the conferral of monitoring tasks to the 
Commission which it criticised, suggesting, instead, to give this task to local 
and regional authorities within the Member States as well as the European 
Environmental Agency (European Parliament, 2006, p. 48; 65).
Some Member States reacted positively to the proposed introduction of 
waste prevention plans and programmes. Finland, for example, considered 
it as essential in guaranteeing the effective management of waste (Council 
of the European Union, 2006b). Having national waste management plans 
already in place, the Netherlands probably shared this assessment because 
it engaged in similar practices. The Dutch Government, however, objected 
to one particular EU requirement: it disapproved of the idea to link waste 
prevention programmes to the achievement of quantitative targets. It held 
the view that by introducing such a requirement, differences between the 
Member States in terms of socio-economic conditions and the different 
levels of experience in waste management planning, were not sufficiently 
taken into account (Parliamentary Papers II 2005/06, 22112, no. 429, p. 34). 
Probably for the same reason, i.e. due to the insufficient consideration of 
national conditions, virtually all Member States found the requirement 
problematic and objected to it (Council of the European Union, 2007g, p. 
31). EU rules were eventually relaxed by amendments to the wording of the 
provision and by turning the obligation to determine specific qualitative or 
quantitative targets and indicators into an optional requirement (see Article 
29(3)).
While rejecting the setting of quantitative objectives, the Dutch Govern-
ment favoured the application of modern policy instruments in implement-
ing waste plans and programmes. The application of economic instruments 
was considered as guaranteeing low costs and high output. Economic 
instruments were already widely used at the national level, exemplified by 
the Dutch application of landfill taxes which was considered to be more effi-
cient in promoting waste prevention than the setting of quantitative targets 
(Parliamentary Papers II 2005/06, 22112, no. 429, p. 34). Also other Member 
States such as Denmark, Ireland and Finland, to mention a few, emphasised 
the advantages of economic instruments in terms of efficiency and flexibil-
ity (Council of the European Union, 2006b). Due to Member States’ support 
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for the application of economic instruments, it may not come as a surprise 
that this aspect was given greater prominence in the final draft Directive 
compared to the initial Directive proposal. In the final directive, the use 
of economic instruments is not only mentioned in relation to waste man-
agement plans.34 Economic instruments are, additionally, promoted with 
regard to the separate collection and treatment of waste oils, provided that 
national conditions allow for their application.35
Finally, Dutch preferences were matched regarding the review obliga-
tion to which waste management and programmes were subjected (Arti-
cle 30). The requirement to evaluate waste management plans and waste 
prevention programmes every five years diverged from the practice in the 
Netherlands which provided for six-year intervals between the relevant 
reviews.36 The final draft of the Waste Framework Directive shows that the 
initial review requirement was amended and brought into closer alignment 
with the Dutch legislation on this matter. The Dutch request to get more 
time to transpose EU requirements into national law than the 24 months 
envisaged for the formal implementation of the Directive was, on the other 
hand, not granted.
11.4 Analysis
Based on the descriptive analysis, it is assessed in the subsequent sections 
what kind of role discretion took in the negotiation process on the Waste 
Framework Directive. The explanatory analysis seeks to clarify whether or 
not and in what ways discretion affected the process by addressing a num-
ber of expectations that link discretion to features of both the negotiation 
process and the Directive proposal.
11.4.1 Discretion, policy area and compatibility
The first expectation to be addressed brings up the issue of EU influence 
in a policy area and the scope of discretion which a directive from that 
area affords to the Member States. The scope of discretion is assumed to be 
smaller if the legislative position of the EU rests on firm ground, meaning 
the EU’s institutional set-up is advanced and that it undertakes comprehen-
sive legislative action. While in formal terms the environment is character-
ised as a relatively young policy area since relevant EU legislative powers 
where only established by the Single European Act of 1985 (Collins and 
Earnshaw, 1992: 213), it has meanwhile turned into one of the most devel-
oped fields of EU law, the ‘vast majority of environmental policies [being] 
34 See Article 28(4) under sub-point (b).
35 See Article 21(2) of the Directive.
36 Each national waste management plan, (Landelijk afvalbeheer plan, LAP), has a dura-
tion of six years.
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made in Brussels rather than in the capitals of the member states’ (Börzel, 
2007: 227). This is remarkable given the long absence of a clear definition of 
the environment and anchoring of the EU’s legislative authority in the trea-
ties. It was further strengthened through the integration of the environment 
into the first pillar by the Treaty of Maastricht. Compared to other policy 
areas, environmental legislative output is one of the highest which mani-
fests the strong commitment of the main EU bodies, above all the European 
Commission and European Parliament, to the protection of the environ-
ment. Both the Commission and the European Parliament have been pro-
moting environmental protection for several decades being thereby being 
supported by rulings of the European Court of Justice in matters relating to 
the environment.
Is it, in the light of this strong foothold and commitment of the EU, not 
reasonable to expect that the Waste Framework Directive left only little dis-
cretion to Member States for the transposition of the Directive into national 
law?
At first sight, given the strong role of the EU in the realm of the envi-
ronment, there is much to be said for it. Moreover, the proposal entailed an 
increase in legislative harmonisation (more common definitions, extended 
requirements of national waste management plans) which naturally reduces 
the scope of discretion granted to Member States. It should thereby be noted 
that many Member States, including the Netherlands, were not averse to or 
even in favour of more harmonisation for reasons of environmental protec-
tion but also for achieving a truly internal market for the management of 
waste. These two objectives illustrate the linkage between the environment 
and the internal market and the fact that it was apparently acceptable to 
the Member States, to cede discretionary decision-making power in order to 
achieve the objectives just-mentioned.
And yet, some caution is in order here to avoid jumping to premature 
conclusions. It should, for instance, be kept in mind that the preparations, 
negotiation and implementation of the Directive all fell within the period 
when decision-making on environmental matters was not an exclusive 
competence of the EU but, instead, shared with the Member States. Jordan 
speaks in this context of the ‘paradoxical features’ of EU environmental pol-
icy (Jordan, 1999: 70), which consists in having, on one side, the opposition 
between supranational environmental ambitions to which Member States 
in their role as law-makers committed themselves, and, on the other side, 
Member States’ unwillingness to implement EU environmental law if it is 
seen as being incompatible with their national interests. In this respect, Jor-
dan also highlights the strong position of Member States and the double 
role they take within a directive’s life cycle, being policymakers and imple-
menters at the same time (Jordan, 1999). The previous points taken together 
can make it more understandable why the revised Waste Framework Direc-
tive leaves more discretionary room than might be expected in a policy area 
where it seems that, due to the firm legislative influence of the EU, rather 
little or no discretion is granted to Member States.
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What can be noted as regards the argument that compatibility between 
EU and national rules can provide one explanation for why a directive has 
a larger (or smaller) margin of discretion? In the present case, incompat-
ibilities between the revised Waste Framework Directive and the relevant 
Dutch legislation did not seem to have played a pertinent role. The Com-
mission proposal hardly included novelties that had to be introduced into 
the waste management system already established in the Netherlands. And 
even where incompatibilities between the European and Dutch systems 
arose, these were overcome by uploading Dutch preferences and hence, the 
incorporation of national arrangements into the legislative text as illustrated 
with regard to the Directive’s scope and waste management plans and pro-
grammes: the Dutch delegation succeeded in preserving its approach to 
coping with the consequences of floods and droughts. Furthermore, it man-
aged to keep in place economic instruments in waste prevention and man-
agement and, finally, it could avoid additional administrative burdens by 
aligning EU rules concerning the review of waste plans and programmes 
with its own legislation. This fits well into the general picture of the Nether-
lands which has been described as ‘particularly good at uploading general 
policy concepts and strategies to the EU level’ (Liefferink and Van der Zou-
wen, 2004: 142).
That being said, the empirical analysis does not lend support for the 
expectation that the less compatible the EU directive and already existing 
national legislation are, the more likely it is that discretion is incorporated 
into the directive (expectation 3). The expectation, however, makes highly 
sense if the argument is reversed: The high compatibility between the EU 
and Dutch waste management rules precluded the necessity to get more 
discretion incorporated into the Directive.
11.4.2 Discretion and political sensitivity
The descriptive analysis brings a number of aspects to light which provide 
the impression that discretion was, however, not irrelevant for the process. 
What’s more, the final Directive includes a number of discretionary provi-
sions in contrast to the initial Commission proposal with its very few may-
provisions. The fact is that the substantial amendments and elaboration of 
the legislative text through the contributions of both the Member States and 
the European Parliament resulted in the incorporation of additional provi-
sions, including discretionary ones, pertaining to issues such as the end-of-
waste status (Article 6), the principle of extended producer responsibility 
(Article 8), the treatment of waste oils (Article 21) and waste action plans 
and programmes (Articles 28 and 29), to mention a few. The relevance 
of discretion shows first of all in the fact that it was an aspect which was 
intensively discussed at the early stage of negotiations in connection with 
the question if the proposed Directive provided sufficient flexibility with 
a view to later implementation. In revising the bedrock of waste manage-
ment legislation, the European Commission apparently considered it to be 
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of utmost importance to stimulate both Member States’ cooperation on the 
proposal and willingness to apply EU rules ‘back home’ to avoid problems 
that had in the past obstructed the proper implementation of the Directive. 
To this end, the provision of a certain degree of flexibility was necessary, as 
it seems. As revealed by the analysis, Member States held different views on 
the Directive, reflected in the Council debates on the issue of by-products 
or concerning the further specifications of the distinction between recovery 
and disposal. This makes clear that, albeit being a matter of common con-
cern, waste management did not naturally represent a matter of uniform 
approach. The negotiations rather point to the diversity of Member States 
in dealing with waste resulting from different national circumstances in 
terms of, for example, geography, infrastructure, and seize of population. 
In other words, the diversity of legal systems and traditions caused differ-
ent reactions from the Member States, revealing distinct preferences and a 
different willingness to commit to a common supranational solution where 
one had to be found. This brings into play the expectation that political sen-
sitivity stimulates the incorporation of discretion into the draft text of the 
measure as a way out of tough negotiations and potential conflict (political 
sensitivity expectation). Put slightly differently, the more politically sensitive 
the directive’s policy issue is, the more discretion is incorporated into the 
directive. With a view to the negotiations on the Waste Framework Direc-
tive, it is not unlikely that political sensitivity and controversy characterised 
some debates in the Council, namely in cases where the national approaches 
to aspects of waste management differed but a common approach had to be 
agreed upon. After all, the empirical evidence which indicates that negotia-
tions were lengthy and controversial seems to substantiate this assumption. 
Besides, and as mentioned earlier, the final proposal includes several discre-
tionary provisions, including those addressed to the Commission, 37 and it is 
conceivable that they were incorporated to facilitate the reaching of a com-
promise such as regarding EU rules on waste prevention programmes.38 But 
even though it cannot be excluded that discretion came into play as a factor 
facilitating reaching agreements in the Council, the empirical results merely 
allow for speculation rather than that they provide, in my view, sufficient 
clear evidence of a direct link between discretion and political sensitivity. 
Therefore it is concluded that the insights provided do not justify conclud-
ing that the expectation under consideration applies to the case of the Waste 
Framework Directive.
37 See Article 38(1) delegating implementing powers to the Commission to develop guide-
lines for the interpretation of the defi nitions of recovery and disposal.
38 See Article 29(3) making the determination of qualitative and quantitative targets and 
indicators for waste prevention programmes optional.
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11.4.3 Discretion and European Parliament
As pointed out earlier, the European Parliament is known for being com-
mitted to environmental issues. It is finally interesting to have a look at its 
role in the legislative process and to see whether its position on the proposal 
for the revised Waste Framework Directives reflects any particular views on 
legislative discretion and whether or not Member States should be provided 
with it for transposition. In this context, it is expected that the greater the 
role of the European Parliament in decision-making is, the lesser discretion 
is granted to Member States (expectation 4).
To begin with, the position of the European Parliament was certainly 
not a minor one in the negotiations on the Directive. First of all, it acted as 
co-legislator and in this role it appeared to be strongly committed to get its 
preferences incorporated into the proposal. While disagreements between 
the Member States in the Council had already been settled at first reading 
stage, an early agreement between the Council and the Parliament was 
impossible (interview). The European Parliament was determined in get-
ting its amendments to the proposal translated into the final text. Negotia-
tions were only finalised at second reading after a number of informal meet-
ings, so-called trilogues had taken place, in which representatives of the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission had come together 
to reach an agreement on a package of amendments acceptable to both co-
legislators.39
While all this makes it safe to say that the European Parliament was an 
assertive actor in the negotiations, the analysis does not allow for a clear-cut 
answer to the question whether or not its impact on the negotiations meant 
a decrease in legislative discretion eventually made available to Member 
States. The justifications of the suggested amendments provided by the 
legislative resolution of the European Parliament in which the importance 
of harmonisation was emphasised, may suggest this. But it is also interest-
ing to note that among the 98 forwarded amendments, a few changes were 
included that implied the granting of discretion to Member States. Hence, 
while the European Parliament certainly did not support the generous con-
ferral of discretionary powers for the purpose of implementation, it is nev-
ertheless possible to assume that it accepted that some discretion was made 
available for transposition, knowing that this could help in bridging the gap 
between national differences in managing waste. Furthermore, its accep-
tance of additional discretion being built into the Directive may also have 
been prompted by the wish to increase the chances of the proper implemen-
tation of the revised Directive. This would perfectly fit the European Parlia-
ment’s image of the ‘greenest institution of the three EU bodies’ which it has 
39 Usually these trilogues are intended to reach compromise between the positions of the 
co-legislators during the fi rst or early second reading stage. See F. M. Häge and Michael 
Kaeding (2007) ‘Reconsidering the European Parliament’s Legislative Infl uence: Formal 
vs. Informal Procedures’, Journal of European Integration, 29(3): 341-361.
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gained, amongst others, by virtue of its painstaking efforts to give imple-
mentation issues a more prominent position in political debates (Lenschow, 
2010: 315-316).
Finally, in an attempt to provide another explanation relating to the rel-
evance and role of discretion, it does not seem to be far-fetched to believe 
that discretion facilitated compromise among Members of the European 
Parliament. Discussions on the proposal within the European Parliament 
reflected different views of its Members on the Directive (Council of the 
European Union, 2008a). Seen in this light, discretion was probably not only 
accepted because it provided Member States with the necessary flexibility 
to take into account national particularities. It may also have helped to rec-
oncile different interests within the European Parliament. Seen in this light, 
discretion may have enabled the European Parliament to speak with one 
voice and therefore to more successfully assert its preferences vis-à-vis the 
Council. While reflecting upon the European Parliament’s share in deter-
mining the margin of discretion provided by the Waste Framework Direc-
tive does not allow for more than mere speculation, the analysis brings into 
view that the European Parliament played a pertinent role in the negotia-
tion process, having a relevant impact on the content of the Directive.
11.5 Conclusion
Questions concerning the role of discretion in the negotiations on the 
Revised Waste Framework Directive cannot be solved by providing clear-cut 
answers. Some conclusive insights can be offered, however, by differentiating 
between basically two perspectives. Taking an individual country-approach 
and by adopting the Dutch perspective, it seems that discretion was rather 
irrelevant. Seeking more discretion was not a primary aim in the Dutch nego-
tiation strategy due to the apparently good match between the proposed 
Directive and national legislation concerning the management of waste.
When broadening the focus on the negotiations, to take more inter-
ests into account, the following conclusions can be offered. Due to the link 
between waste management and the internal market, the objective of more 
harmonisation implied by the Directive was shared by no small number 
of Member States since it was considered to improve the legal certainty of 
waste legislation and, additionally, seen as a guarantee of establishing fair 
competition on the Community market. Then again, taking other relevant 
factors of the process and proposal into account, it appears that preferences 
of Member States in the Council diverged and also the positions of the 
Council and the European Parliament on the proposal differed. On top of 
that, the final draft Directive includes a number of discretionary provisions. 
Having on the one hand preference divergence within the Council and 
between the co-legislators and, on the other hand, more discretionary provi-
sions included in the Directive than initially comprised by the Commission 
proposal, it seems reasonable to assume that discretion was not completely 
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irrelevant and facilitated the negotiations to some extent where otherwise 
achieving a compromise appeared to be difficult. However, due to the fact 
that a clear link between political sensitivity and controversy on the hand 
and, on the other hand, the granting of discretion could not be established, 
these considerations remain rather speculative.
The focus of the analysis now shifts from the negotiations on the Waste 
Framework Directive to the transposition of the Directive in the Nether-
lands.
11.6 Transposition
In the following sections the Dutch transposition of the revised Waste 
Framework Directive is mapped out. Insights into the process were gained 
from interviews and dossier research, both being carried out at the Minis-
try of Infrastructure and the Environment which was closely involved in 
the transposition of the Directive. In addition, insights were drawn from 
the study of the Dutch transposition legislation, in particular the amend-
ment to the Dutch Environmental Management Act, representing the main 
transposition measure. While the first part of the discussion describes in 
more general lines how transposition proceeded by mainly addressing the 
amendment to the Environmental Management Act, the focus subsequently 
shifts towards the transposition of certain Directive provisions. From both, 
the general and more specific accounts, insights into the role of discretion 
for transposition are derived and other factors dealt with that might have 
affected the process.
The revised Waste Framework Directive should have applied as from 12 
December 2010 (Article 40). By that time Member States were supposed to 
have fulfilled their transposition obligation by putting into effect the neces-
sary laws, regulations and administrative provisions required for compli-
ance. However, in many cases this obligation was not met. In fact, in Janu-
ary 2011 infringement proceedings were opened by the Commission against 
nearly all Member States and by October of the same year sixteen of these 
proceedings were still not closed and reasoned opinions addressed to Bel-
gium and Romania for failure to issue the required legislation (European 
Commission, 2011).
Turning to the Netherlands, it was already noted that the EU Directive 
and Dutch rules were quite compatible with each other. Several aspects of 
the Directive fitted well into the national waste management system which, 
in line with the Directive, already promoted a preferential order in waste 
treatment, the use of waste plans as well as environmental principles such 
as the ‘polluter pays’ to which the Directive paid specific attention linking it 
to the principle of extended producer responsibility (Articles 8 and 14) (see 
Seerden and Heldeweg, 2002). However, in spite of this obvious harmony 
between EU and national rules, transposition in the Netherlands did not 
proceed entirely smoothly. The Dutch authorities adopted the last transpo-
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sition measure only on 3 February 2011 (see table 13). But, since this delay 
was short, it did not lead to any serious action being taken by the Commis-
sion against the Netherlands.
Table 13: Fact sheet transposition Waste Framework Directive 
Transposition deadline: 12 Dec 10





Sort transposition measure (and number): Parliamentary act (1)
Order in council (2), 
ministerial decision (2)
In charge: Ministry of the Environment
Legal Framework: Dutch Environmental 
Management Act 1993
While timely transposition had initially been considered feasible if the first 
actions to this end were already undertaken during the negotiations, the 
Dutch delegation eventually requested more time for the formal implemen-
tation of the Directive. It was realised by then that adjusting national waste 
legislation to incorporate EU rules would have to include amending already 
existing statutes, mainly due to the further clarification of EU rules regard-
ing the definition of ‘waste’ and other terms (interview). Boiling down to an 
amendment by parliamentary act, involving the House of Representatives 
of the Dutch Parliament, this measure alone would take up to 18 months, 
and for this reason it was feared that the time allocated for transposition 
would not suffice (interview). But, as already mentioned above, the Dutch 
request was not met and therefore no more time available than the twenty-
four months granted for transposition.
In a statement to the Dutch Parliament the Minister explained the 
delay in transposition by pointing out that the Directive was a comprehen-
sive piece of legislation, requiring a revision of already existing legislation. 
According to the Minister, taking stock of all steps needed to formally imple-
ment the Directive had been time-consuming, making the involvement of 
other departments necessary since previously incorporated EU rules on the 
management of waste made part of national legislation subjected to the pur-
view of different ministries (Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 32392, no. 7, p. 
1). Looking at the timeline of the process, provided by the national transpo-
sition monitoring instrument ‘i-timer’ which shows all stages to be passed 
prior to the adoption of transposition legislation, it becomes obvious that a 
time lag had occurred between the treatment of the draft transposition mea-
sure in the Dutch Council of Ministers and its submission to Parliament. A 
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further study of the Directive dossier provided relevant insights explaining 
this time lag by pointing to political changes occurring in the Netherlands 
at the time of transposition. The change of the Dutch Government in 2010 
and the new composition of Parliament had caused a delay at the stage of 
examination of the draft transposition measure within the Council of Minis-
ters.40 This was also confirmed in the interviews.
The transposition of the Directive required the involvement of other 
domestic actors.41 The Dutch Council of State recommended reviewing the 
draft measure on a few points, including editorial issues and some content-
relatedaspects (Parliamentary Papers II 2009/2010, 32392 nr. 4).42 Both the 
opinions of the Council of State and the Dutch Parliament, which was also 
actively involved in the transposition of the Directive (Parliamentary Papers 
II 2010/11, 32392, no.14), resulted in a few minor revisions of the draft 
transposition measure which did not pose any particular difficulties for the 
transposing Ministry (interview). The parliamentary debate focused on the 
proposed amendment to the Environmental Management Act (and other 
statutes) and was held on 20 November 2010. The amending act was agreed 
by Parliament ten days later and then forwarded to the Dutch Senate before 
being adopted and entering into force in February 2011.
From the parliamentary debate it emerged that a few implications of the 
Directive triggered concerns among Members of Parliament which were also 
voiced by the Royal Dutch Association of Waste Management and Cleaning 
(NRVD43, 2010). With the revised EU rules in place, it was feared that source 
separation of waste would take the place of the well-proven national practice 
of post-consumer waste collection (Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 32392, 
no. 6, p. 8). The Minister, however, pointed out that transposition would take 
into account the discretion granted in this regard: under certain conditions, 
40 It was agreed with the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment that information 
provided by the dossiers would be treated confi dentially. Therefore no further indica-
tions concerning my sources are made here.
41 According to Article 73(1) of the Dutch Constitution, the Council of State delivers its 
opinion on draft legislation including proposals for lower-level regulations and ratifi ca-
tions of Treaties by Parliament. The Council’s opinion is non-binding but usually taken 
into account by the Ministry concerned. Statutes, including those amending statutes for 
the purpose of transposing EU law, are adopted by the Parliament acting as co-legislator 
alongside the government (Article 81 of the Dutch constitution).
42 In a nutshell, it was recommended by the Council of State to improve the transposition 
measure with a view to the term ‘waste’. According to the Council of State, transposition 
legislation could be brought even more in line with the Directive regarding this point. In 
addition, the Council of State recommended consulting the European Commission for 
clarifi cation of the Directive’s provisions concerning separate waste collection (Article 
11). It also advised to reconsider the implications of the transposition of the record keep-
ing requirement (Article 35) and to add further explanations to the explanatory memo-
randum of the transposition measure regarding the issue of transitional periods connect-
ed to the repeal of EU waste directives (Article 41). See Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 
32392, nr. 4.
43 NRVD stands for ‘Koninklijke Vereniging voor afval- en reinigingsmanagement’. See 
Letter of NRVD to Dutch House of Representatives, N/10/388/ MG, 6 July 2010.
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Member States were allowed to depart from EU waste management proce-
dures.44 This should make the continuation of national practices possible 
(Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 32392, no. 6, p. 7, p. 4-5).
Another point in the debate referred to the aspect of waste treatment by 
municipalities. Members of the Dutch Christian Union (CU), for instance, 
pointed out that national legislation on this matter did not provide for 
sufficient legal certainty and that a solution could be found by transpos-
ing the Waste Framework Directive in a way that would take this aspect 
into account. To this end, an amendment to the transposition measure was 
submitted (Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 32392, no. 9). It advocated mak-
ing waste treatment, alongside the collection of waste, a matter of exclu-
sive competence for municipalities. This should bring an end to the ongoing 
legal disputes between municipalities and waste companies. The Minister, 
however, preferred to exclude this topic from the transposition measure dis-
cussed and recommended to include it in other measures not related to the 
formal implementation of the Waste Framework Directive (Parliamentary 
Papers II 2009/10, 32392, no. 14). Arguably the Minister wished to avoid the 
addition of national extras to the transposition measure which might have 
delayed formal implementation and / or increased chances of legal incor-
rectness in converting EU rules into the national legal framework. All in all, 
the debate in Parliament led only to little changes of the proposed transpo-
sition measure. Amendments were confined to the transposition of the prin-
ciple of producer responsibility which was brought more in line with the 
relevant requirement of the Directive.45 Other changes were geared merely 
towards improving the legibility of the act.46
11.6.1 Transposition legislation
With its 28 pages, 49 recitals, 43 articles and Annex divided into five parts 
the revised Framework Directive represented a relatively comprehensive 
piece of EU environmental law. The articles are divided into seven chapters 
dealing in turn with: the subject matter, scope and definitions of the main 
terms used in the Directive (chapter I, articles 1-7), general requirements 
44 Article 4(2) includes this permission. The provision has been transposed by means of 
Article 10.29 of the Environmental Management Act which stays close to the text of the 
Directive.
45 See Article 8 ‘Extended producer responsibility’. By means of this Article, the Direc-
tive gives more weight to the principle of producer responsibility, making producers 
fully and not partly responsible for the organisational and fi nancial aspects of managing 
waste resulting from the manufacturing process of their products.
46 To avoid overlap and improve the quality of the amended Environmental Management 
Act, all criteria applying to the Dutch waste management plan were merged into one 
article. Finally, the separate collection of wastes from fruit, vegetables and other organ-
ic waste was shifted from the Act to lower-level regulation as the Parliament consid-
ered this to better match the Dutch system of waste legislation (Parliamentary Papers II 
2009/10, 32392, no.7, pp. 14-15).
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pertaining to environmental principles and treatment operations (chapter 
II, articles 8-14), waste management including the treatment of hazard-
ous waste (chapter III, articles 15-22), permits and registrations regarding 
establishments and undertakings dealing with waste (chapter IV, articles 
23-27), waste plans and programmes (chapter V, articles 28-33), inspec-
tions and records (chapter VI, articles 34-36) and the final provisions fixing 
a deadline for transposition and other issues related to the completion of 
the process (chapter VII, articles 37-43). The Directive also provides for an 
Annex: Annex I up to IV deal with details concerning waste disposal, waste 
recovery, hazardous waste, and waste prevention. Annex V is made up of a 
correlation table showing the relationship between the various articles and 
Annexes in each of the three Directives repealed and the new Directive.
The Dutch Environmental Management Act (Wet Milieubeheer, Wm) 
was one of the statutes that had to be amended for the purpose of trans-
posing the revised Waste Framework Directive.47 Having been established 
in 1993, the Environmental Management Act integrated the Act on Chemi-
cal Waste and the Act on Waste Products which were the first legislative 
instruments governing waste in the Netherlands, dating back to the 1970s 
(Seerden and Heldeweg, 2002). Comparable to the position of the Waste 
Framework Directive for EU waste legislation, the Environmental Man-
agement Act is a central piece of national waste legislation in particular, 
but also Dutch environmental legislation as a whole (Backes et al., 2006) 
addressing various aspects such as quality standards (chap. 5), environ-
mental impact assessments (chap. 7), enforcement of environmental law 
(chap. 18), public openness (chap. 19), to mention a few. A great part of the 
Dutch waste legislation is covered by Article 1.1 and chapter 10 of the Act. 
Article 1.1 includes all definitions of key terms and provisions pertinent to 
the application of the Environmental Management Act as a whole. Chap-
ter 10 titled ‘waste products’ focuses on various categories of waste and 
includes aspects such as the removal of different waste streams and waste 
matters with cross-border implications as exemplified by waste transport 
within the EU. The treatment of waste more specifically is largely addressed 
by framework legislation and hence, particular aspects are further spelled 
out by subordinate legislation (e.g. orders of council, ministerial decisions, 
environmental regulations of municipalities or provinces). This feature may 
account for the fact that, to cover all implications for national waste leg-
islation flowing from the revised EU Waste Framework Directive, several 
pieces of Dutch legislation had to be amended, including next to statutory 
amendments, also amendments of orders in council and ministerial orders. 
The specific structure of Dutch environmental law results from the fact that 
due to the decentralised unitary system which characterises the political 
and administrative landscape of the Netherlands, Dutch administrative law 
47 Alongside the Dutch Environmental Management Act, the Act on the Environmental 
Protection Tax (Wet Belastingen op Milieugrondslag) and the Economic Offences Act 
(Wet op de Economische Delicten) were subjected to amendments.
238 Part 3  Empirical aspects – negotiation and transposition analyses 
is described as ‘stratified regulation’.48 To give a concrete example: Chapter 
10.4 of the Act lays down rules on the management of household waste and 
other (commercial) waste. Minimum standards concerning the collection 
of this type of waste are, however, determined by lower-level regulation49 
which may also further specify the rules on this subject.50
To begin with, in the explanatory memorandum to the amendment 
regarding the Environmental Management Act the Ministry of Infrastruc-
ture and the Environment noted that in conformity with the ministerial 
instructions for the formal implementation of European Directives,51 the 
transposition measure contained no other rules than those laid down by the 
Directive (Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 32392, no. 3, p. 2). This reflects the 
general Dutch approach to transposition which is geared towards avoiding 
delay – not only can the incorporation of additional rules be in conflict with 
EU rules, it can also run the risk of being too time-consuming. Additionally, 
focusing on saving up time made all the more sense in the present case given 
the tight timeframe. A closer look at the transposition measure indicates that 
the so-called one-to-one transposition technique was applied in order to 
stay as close as possible to the provisions of the Directive. This transposi-
tion technique shall guarantee that national transposition remains confined 
to taking over the Directive text without adding any other requirements or 
terms or formulations of national law to the transposition measure.52
Alongside the wish to achieve timely transposition, the transposing 
Ministry intended to closely attune the transposition measure to the con-
tent of the EU Directive, especially regarding the additional and revised 
definitions included by it. This should guarantee the proper formal and, at a 
later stage, also the proper practical implementation and enforcement of the 
Directive’s requirements by the Dutch authorities. Additionally, it should 
contribute to the overall objective of the Directive to achieve a level-playing 
field for economic operators in the internal market on waste management 
(Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 32392, no.3, p. 4).
From the interviews with the civil servants involved in the transposi-
tion of the Directive, it became obvious that the Directive, in spite of the 
discretionary provisions it includes, was understood as a strict piece of EU 
legislation, leaving no considerable high degree of discretion. This observa-
tion contrasts with earlier findings resulting from the analysis of the nego-
tiations on the Directive and the coding exercise which indicate that the 
48 In Dutch this phenomena is referred to as ‘gelede normstelling’.
49 The Dutch ‘Waste Regulation’ (in Dutch: ‘Afvalstoffenverordening’) which is an order in 
council.
50 Cf. Article 10.24.
51 Cf. Instructions for drafting legislation, no. 331. This transposition technique is referred 
to in Dutch as ‘implementatie sec’ with ‘sec’ standing for ‘secuur’ meaning ‘precise’, 
describing the fact that the wording of EU rules is precisely taken over without adding 
any national extras.
52 Such an approach is characteristic of the re-word or re-writing method. Cf. Steunenberg 
and Voermans, 2006, p. 205.
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Directive grants a rather larger than smaller margin of discretion to Member 
States.53 The narrow interpretation of the Directive, including its discretion-
ary provisions, can be explained by the fact that it resulted from the particu-
lar Dutch approach to transposition (one-to-one transposition technique) 
and, more generally, from the Ministry’s adherence to particular ministerial 
instructions for the (formal) implementation of EU directives.54
11.6.2 By-products and end-of-waste status
A central idea underlying the revised Waste Framework Directive is that 
to achieve proper waste management – one of the Directive’s major con-
cerns – certain aspects of the definition of waste need to be clarified to avoid 
confusion in the identification and treatment of waste. As set out in the pre-
amble of the Directive, this includes the specification of those materials or 
substances that under certain conditions can be considered waste or cease 
to be waste.55 Such a conception finds its concrete expression in Articles 5 
and 6 on by-products and end-of-waste status. The two Articles have been 
incorporated into Article 1.1 of the Environmental Management Act except 
for those aspects that were delegated to the Commission.56 The extracts of 
the corresponding paragraph of the transposition measure read as follows:
Substances or objects are not regarded as waste if they are ‘by-products’ in the sense of Article 5 
of the Waste Framework Directive if these by-products meet the criteria laid down in that Article 
(…).57 Furthermore, with regard to the determination of the end-of-waste status Article 1.1 
provides that: If waste that has undergone a recovery meets the criteria as established by Articles 
6(1) and 6(2) of the Waste Framework Directive and makes part of the category of waste to which 
these criteria apply, it shall cease to be waste [italics added].58
53 This discrepancy seems to illustrate what was referred to in the theoretical chapter of the 
dissertation as the difference between ‘legislative discretion’ and ‘executive discretion’. 
While the former refers to the scope of discretion being established by the analysis of the 
legislative text, the latter denotes the scope of discretion left when specifi c circumstances 
of the national transposition context have been taken into account. These circumstances 
can reduce the scope of legislative discretion originally granted by the Directive.
54 Cf. Instructions for drafting legislation [Aanwijzingen voor de regelgeving], available 
at: http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0005730/geldigheidsdatum_07-12-2015 (accessed 
7 December 2015).
55 Cf. Recital (22) of the Directive.
56 See the transposition rules laid down in Article 1.1 under paragraphs 6 and 12 of the 
amended Environmental Management Act.
57 The exact wording is: ‘Als afvalstoffen worden in elk geval niet aangemerkt stoffen, 
mengsels of voorwerpen die bijproducten zijn in de zin van artikel 5 van de kaderrich-
tlijn afvalstoffen, indien deze bijproducten voldoen aan de in dat artikel gestelde voor-
waarden (...).’ Cf. Article 1(1) paragraph 6 of the amended Environmental Management 
Act (translation into English by myself).
58 The exact wording is: Indien afvalstoffen die een behandeling voor nuttige toepassing 
hebben ondergaan, voldoen aan de ingevolge artikel 6, eerste en tweede lid, van de kad-
errichtlijn afvalstoffen vastgestelde criteria en tevens behoren tot het soort afvalstoffen 
waarop die criteria van toepassing zijn, worden zij niet langer als afvalstoffen aange-
merkt (translation by myself).
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The formulation of the transposition measure reflects the one-to-one trans-
position technique but also the method of referring directly to the Directive, 
which, once again, shows the efforts of the transposing Ministry to stay as close 
as possible to the Directive text. There is, however, more to say about the way 
the Directive was transposed especially with a view to legislative discretion.
First of all, the condition that substances or objects shall only be con-
sidered as by-products if they meet all criteria listed by the Directive pro-
vides for a strict framework to assess whether or not a substance or object 
is a by-product or must be counted as waste. In other words, no discretion 
for transposition is left, at least not to the national authorities, since crite-
ria to identify more specific substances or objects as by-products are to be 
determined by means of a Commission implementing measure (committee 
procedure).59 In the words of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Envi-
ronment, the Directive did not provide for any decision-making compe-
tence to the national authorities for identifying other substances or objects 
as by-products or to formulate specific conditions beyond those defined by 
the EU legislature in Article 5(1) (Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 32392, no. 
3, p. 5).
Likewise, with regard to Article 6, the competence to establish criteria 
for determining whether or not waste ceases to be waste, was not vested 
in the hands of the national transposing authorities, such as the Ministry 
of Infrastructure and the Environment, but made subject to the commit-
tee procedure, and hence left to be determined at the EU-level. Only in the 
absence of any EU criteria and under the condition that applicable case law 
was taken into consideration, Member States were allowed to decide on a 
case-by-case basis whether or not the end-of-waste status applied (Article 
6(4)). Under these conditions, the availability of discretion for the national 
authorities remained limited. In this regard, the Ministry of Infrastructure 
and the Environment noted that discretion was not used because already 
existing national legislation was deemed sufficient.60 From the interview, 
however, it emerged that the Ministry’s policy and legal units held diverg-
ing views about the use of discretion granted by this provision. Apparently, 
the legal unit wanted to stick to a narrow reading of the Directive provision. 
The policy unit, by contrast, having participated in the negotiations in Brus-
sels, took the view that the provision provided for a broader interpretation 
of the competence granted, especially in respect of the term ‘case’: ‘Member 
States may decide case by case whether certain waste has ceased to be waste’ 
[italics added].61 Accordingly, it was argued that the permission should be 
59 Cf. Article 5(2) of the Directive and the corresponding rules in Article 1.1 under para-
graphs 6 and 12 of the amendment.
60 See comments made in the transposition table referring to the formal implementation of 
Article 6(4). Cf. Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 32392, no. 3 p. 10. The Ministry indicates 
that the national Waste Management Plan (LAP) as well as Article 10.14 (paragraph 1) 
provide for suffi cient possibilities to cover EU rules as laid down in Article 6(4).
61 See Article 6(4) of the Directive.
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understood as allowing Member States to determine the end-of-waste crite-
ria not only for a single waste product but for entire types of waste streams 
(i.e. the entire flow of waste materials from generation to disposition). The 
legal unit, however, preferred to stick to a strict interpretation of the EU 
rules and therefore wished to confine the determination of criteria to a sin-
gle waste product. The issue was eventually settled, once the Commission 
guidelines were published which supported the broad interpretation by the 
policy unit, leading the legal unit to adjust Dutch transposition legislation 
accordingly (European Commission, 2012, pp. 24-25).62
11.6.3 Discretionary provisions
The Directive includes other discretionary provisions. As already estab-
lished, these provsions do not only address the Member States. Next to 
Article 5(2), discretionary decision-making competence is delegated to the 
Commission under Article 27(1-3) and Article 29(4-5) on minimum stan-
dards for treatment activities and the determination of indicators for waste 
prevention measures, respectively. While these examples certainly indicate 
the increased scope of harmonisation implied by the Directive, the remain-
ing discretionary provisions are largely addressed at the Member States. 
Therefore it should be asked whether the Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment, when transposing the Directive, made use of discretion pro-
vided by these provisions.
Taking a closer look at the transposition table included in the amend-
ment, it becomes obvious that in the majority of cases, discretion was not 
used. National legislation in force63 was considered to already cover the 
content of the corresponding Directive requirements. This concerns the 
options regarding the deviation from the waste hierarchy (under Article 4), 
the determination of hazardous waste (under Article 7), the costs of waste 
management (under Article 14), the conditions and decisions specifying 
responsibility for waste management (under Article 15), the limitation of 
waste shipments from other Member States destined for recovery (under 
Article 16), the granting of permits for treatment operations (under Article 
23) and the obligations concerning record-keeping (under Article 35). In the 
remaining few cases discretion was used by supplementing certain lower-
level regulations already in place (exemptions from permit requirements; 
options in the treatment of waste oils with specific regard for national con-
ditions). To provide for the permissions under Article 8 and 18 (extending 
62 The competence to determine, by means of ministerial decision, the end-of-waste sta-
tus for waste streams – meaning a single waste product within this stream or the entire 
stream under the conditions mentioned in Article 6(4) of the Waste Framework Directive 
– had been delegated to the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. See Article 
1 paragraph 6 of the amendment to the Environmental Management Act, Parliamentary 
Papers II 2013/14, 33919, no. 2, p. 1 and no. 3, pp. 4-5.
63 National legislation has to be understood broadly in this context. Next to national laws, 
it concerns here lower regulation as well as national waste plans.
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producer responsibility, derogation from the ban on mixing hazardous 
waste), new articles were added to chapter ten of the Environmental Man-
agement Act, providing for corresponding EU rules.
11.7 Analysis
Based on the descriptive analysis offered in the preceding sections, transpo-
sition shall be further examined by assessing the expectations concerning 
the role of discretion and other relevant factors that possibly came into play 
once the Directive had to be converted into national law.
11.7.1 Discretion-in-national-law
Regarding the process of transposition, characteristics of European direc-
tives such as discretion have been found to slow down the pace of transpo-
sition, contributing, in particular, to a short-term delay of up to six months 
(Kaeding, 2008). While corresponding evidence is based on the analysis of 
directives from another area than examined here – EU transport legislation 
– this does not diminish the relevance of such a claim for the present case. 
After all, the focus of the analysis is on the role of discretion within trans-
position. In addition to that, the Dutch transposition of the revised Waste 
Framework Directive was finalised two months after the deadline revealing 
a short-term delay. Having said that, the question rises if discretion contrib-
uted to the delayed transposition of the Directive?
This question shall be answered, by taking a different path than the one 
chosen by others highlighting the purported negative effects of discretion 
on transposition. Seeking, in this dissertation, to put emphasis on a differ-
ent, more positive viewpoint on discretion, the analysis starts out with the 
expectation that if more discretion is available to transposition actors, the 
better the directive granting it, is incorporated into national law (expec-
tation 5). First of all, and as reflected by the Directive text, discretion was 
indeed available for national transposition. The analysis of the amend-
ment to the Environmental Management Act – the main measure of Dutch 
transposition legislation – however, shows that discretion remained largely 
unused. As can be derived from the considerations and decisions of the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment in transposing the Direc-
tive, hardly any use was made of discretion because national legislation was 
already found to meet EU requirements and to provide for the (discretion-
ary) options included by these requirements. Only a few discretionary pro-
visions were used in the formal implementation of the Directive. But in gen-
eral, the transposition of these provisions does not provide any conclusive 
evidence of the fact that discretion facilitated transposition. In fact, discre-
tion did not seem to have played a relevant role in the Dutch transposition 
of the revised Waste Framework Directive.
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11.7.2 Discretion, compatibility and disagreement
Another factor that may, alongside discretion, affect national transposition 
is the compatibility between the Directive and national legal arrangements. 
It is expected, according to the compatibility interaction expectation (E7), that if 
there is a good match between EU and national rules, more discretion being 
available to national actors can have a further strengthening effect on com-
patibility and therefore facilitate transposition. Does this claim have any rel-
evance for the present transposition case?
Starting with the compatibility between the Directive and Dutch leg-
islation, one may assume a high legal misfit. This seems to be implied by 
the relatively high number of transposition measures (five in total) and 
the fact that they did not only pertain to lower-level instruments but also 
included a parliamentary act (Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009: 960). And 
yet, taking into account the mere number of instruments obscures the fact 
that the amendments, in the present case, did not reflect a high incompat-
ibility. The fact that several transposition measures were necessary relates 
to the fact that the terminology in a number of national measures had to be 
adjusted due to the revised Directive. The descriptive analysis shows, how-
ever, that these adjustments were manageable and did not cause fundamen-
tal changes. What’s more, the high number of measures can be explained 
by the specific structure of Dutch environmental legislation, where rules on 
waste are spread over different legal instruments. Finally, legal incompat-
ibility is rendered unlikely owing to the fact that empirical evidence points 
to a rather high compatibility between EU and Dutch rules. This becomes 
obvious, first, from the fact that the use of discretion was not necessary in 
the absence of any meaningful incongruence between the Directive and 
national rules. Second, seen from the viewpoint of the Dutch waste man-
agement system, the Directive did not entail many novelties. On the con-
trary, it contained elements of previous EU legislation on waste and was 
largely compatible with already established Dutch practice (waste hierar-
chy, management plans, and environmental principles etc.), as noted by the 
interviewees. It is true that, nevertheless, already existing legislation had 
to be amended. But, in consideration of the previous points, these amend-
ments did not substantially change Dutch legislation. Hence, on the whole, 
misfit between the EU Directive and relevant national law seems to have 
been small, if not negligible. But in spite of the seemingly high compatibility 
between EU and national rules being conducive to the proper transposition 
of EU directives, this positive effect was not enforced by discretion since 
flexible arrangements provided by the Directive remained unused. There-
fore the compatibility interaction expectation (E7) is not found to carry any rel-
evance in the transposition of the Waste Framework Directive.
In spite of the compatibility of the Directive and relevant Dutch law, 
proper transposition was not achieved because the Netherlands did not 
meet the transposition deadline. Was the short-term delay resulting from 
this failure due to a combination of domestic disagreement with the con-
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tent of EU requirements and little discretion available for transposing the 
Directive into Dutch law? The descriptive analysis does not suggest this. 
Disagreement with the requirements of the Directive was not found to 
have played a role – neither at the negotiation nor transposition stage. This 
already precludes any possibility of a joint effect of disagreement and dis-
cretion impeding transposition. The applicability of the disagreement interac-
tion expectation (E6) can therefore be ruled out.
11.7.3 Discretion, administrative capacity and transposition actors
Two other factors that are linked to discretion and serve to explain trans-
position outcomes are administrative capacity and the number of actors 
in charge of transposition. It is claimed that administrative capacity raises 
the likelihood of proper transposition but that more discretion available in 
transposition undermines this positive effect (expectation 8). Based on the 
empirical results, it is safe to say that in the present case delay did not result 
from a problem with administrative capacity. From both the document anal-
ysis and interviews, the picture emerges that those civil servants involved 
in the EU- and national-level processes, happened to have profound knowl-
edge on the Directive dossier. Administrative capacity can, however, also 
be at stake if there are problems occurring within the transposing authority. 
In particular, this can be the case if there is a conflict or miscommunication 
between the policy and legal units of the ministry relating to the interpreta-
tion and application of EU rules. In the case at hand, preference divergence 
was found to play a role with regard to the determination of the end-of-
waste status and the permission granted to Member States under the cor-
responding provision (Article 6(4)). And yet, in the interview with the civil 
servants in charge of transposition, the different interpretation of this provi-
sion was not identified as a reason for the delay in formally implementing 
the Directive. Instead, and as confirmed by the interview partners and find-
ings derived from the analysis of the Directive dossier, the transition to a 
new Government and Parliament were considered as major reasons for why 
timely transposition had not been achieved.64 As to discretion, it is rather 
unlikely that it enforced the positive influence of administrative capacity on 
transposition. First, it should be recalled from the descriptive analysis that 
the Directive was not considered to be highly discretionary by the civil ser-
vants in charge of transposition. Second, discretionary provisions were not 
used. It can therefore be concluded that the capacity interaction expectation is 
without relevance for this transposition case.
Last but not least, transposition is expected to be influenced by a joint 
effect of discretion and the number of actors involved in carrying out trans-
position (expectation 9). To be more precise, it is claimed that with more 
actors involved, transposition is likely to be deficient and that this impeding 
64 It was agreed with the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment to treat the infor-
mation obtained from the dossier as confi dential.
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effect becomes stronger as the degree of discretion increases. The case study 
findings do not provide evidence in support of such a scenario because the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment was mainly in charge of 
transposing the Directive. Besides, the analysis of the transposition process 
does not bring into view any conflicts between the Ministry and other actors 
relating to the formal implementation of the Directive. The debate between 
the Minister and Parliament on this subject did not lead to any controversy 
and substantial amendments which could have caused further delay. At the 
ministerial level, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment was 
chiefly in charge of transposition which precluded that coordination prob-
lems between Ministries could give rise to difficulties contributing to defi-
cient transposition. These considerations already rule out any relevance of 
the expectation being considered here.
11.8 Conclusion
In contrast to the analysis of the negotiation process, a more conclusive 
answer can be provided as to the role of discretion in the national transposi-
tion of the revised Waste Framework Directive. In short, discretion did not 
come into play. First of all, it was hardly used to transpose the Directive 
into the corpus of national waste legislation. The reasons for this are, first, 
that owing to a high fit between the Directive and national law, discretion 
was not necessary to smooth out differences between EU and national legal 
arrangements. Second, the analysis has not provided proof of any inter-
action of discretion and other national-level factors such as compatibility, 
administrative capacity and number of transposition actors which affected 
transposition in a relevant way. In other words, while there is no evidence 
for the claim that discretion facilitated national transposition, there is also 
no substantial evidence in support of the contrary claim, namely that dis-
cretion impeded transposition. While one instance was brought to light 
where the use of discretion was subject of intra-ministerial preference diver-
gence about the way the Directive should be transposed, this instance was 
not found to have contributed to slowing down transposition. Instead, the 
empirical analysis brought to light another more decisive reason for the 
delay in transposition. Delay was caused in the present case by the politi-
cal situation in the Netherlands, the change of government and parliament 
in particular. In the words of Kaeding delayed transposition resulted from 
‘situational changes of the external environment’ (2007: 77) against which 
the Dutch transposition of the Waste Framework Directive was carried out.

12.1 Introduction
In 2003, as part of the simplification and better regulation process, the Euro-
pean Commission announced the revision of particular pieces of its regu-
lation on products (European Commission, 2003). This revision exercise 
included the Toy Safety Directive1 which had been adopted by the end of 
the 1980s in the context of the achievement of the internal market. The dis-
cussion in this chapter maps the content and history (purpose and back-
ground) of the succeeding Directive which revises EU rules on the safety of 
toys. The evolution of EU consumer law has previously been addressed in 
greater detail2 and for this reason only some fundamental points are reit-
erated. More attention is paid to the sub-domain of toy safety legislation. 
Next, this chapter traces the EU negotiations relating to the Directive with 
specific regard to the Dutch position on the Directive proposal. Finally, the 
transposition of the Directive in the Netherlands is addressed. Reconstruct-
ing the EU negotiations and national transposition of the Directive aims at 
illuminating the role of discretion in both these processes.
12.2 The directive
The first EU Directive regarding the safety of toys was adopted by the 
Council in the late 1980s.3 By that time, the Directive was the first piece of 
sector-specific legislation regarding toys. It also represented one of the first 
measures applying the new approach legislative technique to harmonisa-
tion and standardisation which has since 1985 characterised the EU’s way 
of drafting directives proposed in application of Article 95 TEU (ex. 100A 
TEC).4 As mentioned earlier, directives entailing the ‘new approach’ estab-
lish essential safety requirements for products while leaving the techni-
cal specifications of these requirements concerning technical standards to 
standardisation bodies mandated by the European Commission. Also the 
2009 Toy Safety Directive implies the new approach. Like its predecessor 
1 Directive 2009/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 on 
the safety of toys, OJ L 170, 30 June 2009, pp. 1-37.
2 See chapter 10, case study on the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive.
3 See Council Directive 88/378/EEC of 3 May 1988 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States concerning the safety of toys, OJ L 187, 16 July 1988, pp. 1-13.
4 See Council Resolution on a new approach to technical harmonisation and standards, OJ 
C 136, 4 June 1985, pp. 1-9.
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it furthermore acts on the principle that toys may only be placed on the 
market if they comply with the essential safety requirements to ensure that 
the use of these toys is not jeopardising the health and safety of those get-
ting in contact with them. From the Commission’s consultation of experts 
and the impact assessment conducted in the preparation of the Directive 
proposal, revising the 1988 Directive had emerged as the preferred option, 
as opposed to merely repealing the Directive or improving its application 
by means of soft law such as for instance Commission guidelines or rec-
ommendations (European Commission, 2008, p. 3). The revised Directive, 
albeit being in formal terms a new basic act, is based on the same idea than 
the first Toy Safety Directive: it aims to realise both the market integration 
and safety of toys. Additionally, it is intended to revise and especially clarify 
but not extend or substantially change already established EU rules. Two 
decades after the first Directive proposal had been launched, the Commis-
sion considered it high time to update EU toy safety legislation, following 
the wishes of both the experts and the wider public (European Commis-
sion, 2007a). This eventually led to the adoption of the revised Directive in 
2009 which repealed and replaced the 1988 Directive. The latter had only 
been modified once, by an amendment confined to the CE marking of toys.5 
Either Directives are based on Article 95 TEC (now 114 TFEU), covering the 
internal market provisions, and reflect the strong connection between con-
sumer protection and market integration.6 As put in the words of Garde, 
‘[t]he proper functioning of the internal market requires that goods in free 
circulation are safe’ (Garde, 2012: 182). Likewise, the 2009 Directive pur-
sues a two-fold aim: improving the internal market for toys and the safety 
of health of consumers, above all children, as the most sensitive amongst 
them. To this end the Directive lays down ‘rules on the safety of toys and 
on their free movement in the Community’.7 In revising virtually all safety 
aspects, it however differs from earlier legislation. It was intended to 
update and complete the essential safety requirements, including rules on 
electrical properties and requirements on suffocation and choking hazards. 
Furthermore, it determines additional hazards leading to requirements for 
noise, for laser, for activity toys, for speed limit, and for chemicals (Garde, 
2012: 183). Hence, the preparation, formulation and negotiations regarding 
the Commission proposal eventually brought about a Directive which rep-
resents a more elaborated, comprehensive and lengthier piece of legislation 
than the previous one.
5 See CE Marking Directive (Council Directive 93/68/EEC of 22 July 1993, OJ L 220, 30 
August 1993, pp. 1-22).
6 In a nutshell, EU measures for the approximation of national law are adopted with the 
objective to contribute to the establishment and functioning of the internal market there-
by ensuring that legislative proposals provide for a high level of protection of health, 
safety, the environment and consumers. See especially Article 95(1) and 95(3) TEC.
7 See Article 1 of the Toy Safety Directive.
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Toys are products that are designed for use in play by children under 
14 years.8 The Directive establishes obligations for Member States as well 
as economic operators. Its provisions are divided into nine chapters. The 
most relevant provisions are set out here in brief and listed in the overview 
below (table 14). To begin with, the safety of toys shall be guaranteed by 
all relevant economic operators: manufacturers shall ensure that toy prod-
ucts meet all applicable safety requirements; importers shall only place on 
the market compliant toys and distributors and retailers shall act with due 
regard to the essential safety requirements (chapter 2). Toys which meet 
these requirements are entitled to an ‘EC’ declaration of conformity, must 
bear the CE marking and may be sold throughout the EU. Compliance with 
harmonised standards provides a presumption of conformity. For the safe 
use of toy products, general warnings shall be displayed on toys or their 
packaging (chapter 3).
Table 14: Key elements of the Toy Safety Directive
Chapter Requirements
2 Obligations of economic operators (Art. 4-9)
  Ensuring compliance with the essential safety requirements
3 Conformity of toys (Art. 10-17)
  Presumption of conformity
  General warnings for safe use
4 Conformity assessment (Art. 18-21)
  Conformity assessment: self-verification or EC-type examination
5 Notification of conformity assessment bodies (Art. 22-38)
  Conformity assessment procedures by notified bodies & national 
notifying authorities
6 Obligations & powers of Member States (Art. 39-45)
  Market surveillance by national competent authorities 
7  Committee Procedures (Art. 46-47)
  Updates and use of chemicals and other substances in toys by 
Commission committees
8 Specific administrative provisions (Art. 48-51)
  The Commission shall provide a summary of the national reports on the 
Directive’s application
  Member States shall provide for rules on penalties of economic operators
8 See Article 2(2) of the Directive.
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Conformity assessments shall be carried out to establish the product’s com-
pliance with the applicable safety provisions. This can be done by means 
of self-verification or third-party verification (EC-type examination). Self-
verification is used in cases where harmonised standards cover all perti-
nent safety aspects of a toy. In such instances, the manufacturer must apply 
the existing harmonised standards and ensure that the toy is in conformity 
therewith. EC-type examination shall be carried out in case of lacking har-
monised standards or where the manufacturer believes that the nature, 
design, construction or purpose of the toy necessitates third party verifica-
tion (chapter 4). Notified bodies have the obligation to carry out the confor-
mity assessments; Member States have to guarantee that they work inde-
pendently. National notifying authorities, on the other hand, are obliged to 
carry out the assessment, notification and monitoring of the notified bodies 
/ conformity assessment bodies (chapter 5). The so-called ‘national compe-
tent authorities’ have to perform market surveillance including the evalua-
tion of toys assumed to present a health and safety risk. Market surveillance 
authorities shall take appropriate provisional measures to remove non-com-
pliant toy products from the market (chapter 6). The Commission is obliged 
to review these measures. It may update and decide upon the use of chem-
icals and other substances in toys by means of the committee procedure. 
Member States shall provide for rules on penalties of economic operators 
that do not comply with the Directive requirements (chapter 7).
Not only the content but also formal aspects indicate the increased com-
plexity of the Directive compared to its predecessor: the revised Directive 
comprises 37 pages, 48 recitals, 57 Articles, and an Annex of five parts which 
contrasts with the 13 pages, 21 recitals, 16 Articles and shorter Annex of the 
previous Toy Safety Directive. Like the latter, the revised Directive grants 
very little discretion. While it is not devoid of discretionary provisions, in 
fact very few of them are directly addressed at the Member States. Discre-
tion is only conferred upon Member States where they decide upon the lan-
guage of warnings and safety instructions to be used by the manufacturer 
within their territories. Discretion is furthermore granted with regard to the 
designation of the national authority assessing and monitoring the confor-
mity assessment bodies (notifying authorities) and finally Member States 
have discretion in shaping rules on penalties to be imposed on economic 
operators for infringements of safety rules.9 Several other discretionary pro-
visions are directed at economic operators and the Commission.10 Finally, 
a few discretionary provisions are addressed at national authorities acting 
on behalf of the Member States (notifying authorities, market surveillance 
authorities).11 It is noteworthy that in these latter cases, may-clauses seem 
to indicate discretion but, in fact, they are interpreted as imposing obliga-
9 Cf. Articles 11(3), 23(2), and 51.
10 See for instance Article 5 (manufacturer) and Article 46 (Commission).
11 See for example Articles 31 and 41.
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tions on Member States. This was established in the interviews with the 
Dutch civil servants involved in the dossier of the Toy Safety Directive.12 To 
give an example, the permission addressed at market surveillance authori-
ties to request a notified body to provide information relating to any EC-
type examination certificate which that body has issued or withdrawn,13 is 
understood as obliging Member States to ensure that market surveillance 
authorities may make that request. This case, in fact, illustrates the differ-
ence between legislative discretion granted by the Directive text and the 
actual discretion margin identified by national civil servants during the 
transposition process, previously referred to as administrative discretion 
(see chapter 2).
The Toy Safety Directive represents only one but an illustrative example 
of the EU’s product safety legislation which is a core part of EU consumer 
(protection) law.
12.2.1 The area of EU consumer protection law
As pointed out earlier, soft law measures in the form of Commission papers 
and Council Resolutions paved the way for the development of EU rules 
on consumer protection and product safety before any significant treaty 
changes such as the Single European Act (1987) or the Maastricht Treaty 
(1993) came into the picture. These soft law measures strengthened the posi-
tion of the EU as an actor in the realm of consumer law-making. Hence, 
prior to the anchoring of an explicit legislative competence regarding con-
sumer protection in EU primary legislation, the role of the EU in this field 
had not been a marginal one. By means of soft law, later key concepts of 
consumer law such as the ‘consumer’, ‘consumer rights’ and ‘consumer 
protection’ were elaborated. Furthermore, by means of soft law, the founda-
tion for more concrete EU action was established which, in the absence of 
any explicit legal basis, was mostly justified in connection with the opera-
tion of the internal market and the argument that negative repercussions for 
consumers from economic expansion should be avoided. In reality, reper-
cussions for both consumers and internal market projects were considered 
to be the result of the diversity of the various national legislations and the 
issue of toy safety was not an exception to this. In fact, the 1988 Toy Safety 
Directive was adopted to overcome the twofold problem of national safety 
systems: first of all, these systems entailed market barriers to the free move-
ment of toy products. Second, the different safety regimes reduced the effi-
12 In the coding exercise, by contrast, these provisions were identified as permissions 
granted to the Member States (for national authorities are considered as acting on their 
behalf).
13 See Article 41(1) of the Directive.
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ciency of consumer protection against unsafe toys and revealed the general 
lack of toy safety throughout the EU (RPA, 2004).14
Meanwhile, EU consumer protection law has grown out of its infancy 
and continues to develop. Only recently, the European Commission has 
announced new objectives and strategies for ‘A European Consumer Agenda 
– Boosting confidence and growth’. It floats the Commission’s idea of enhanc-
ing consumer participation and trust in the market by adapting its policies 
and proposals to economic developments and novelties such as the ‘digital 
single market’ as well as the increase in online trading (European Commis-
sion, 2012).15 In addition to that, it calls for the better application of EU con-
sumer protection legislation in the Member States to make consumer rights 
fully come into play (European Commission, 2012).
Regarding the development of EU consumer protection law, the instance 
of the Toy Safety Directive is a case in point. The 1988 Directive should bring 
about improvements concerning the marketing of toys manufactured in or 
imported into the EU, aiming to minimise the risk of toy-related dangers 
and achieving long-term health benefits. But its standards had meanwhile 
become outdated against the backdrop of technical developments and further 
market expansion. The proposed revision leading to the adoption of the Toy 
Safety Directive in 2009 was a direct response to this, showing the particular 
importance that the EU attached to this issue. Apparently, the need was felt 
on the part of the EU, to act given the fact that toys repeatedly headed the list 
of notifications of dangerous goods submitted through the EU’s RAPEX sys-
tem16 (Garde, 2012: 182; Weatherill, 2013: 274-75). Still in 2013, toys were the 
second most notified product category surpassed only by clothing (RAPEX, 
2013).17
The revision of the Toy Safety Directive pursued another objective: it 
should be brought in proper alignment with other legislation related to the 
safety of products (European Commission, 2008).18 This, again, draws atten-
tion to the development of the wider framework of EU safety legislation. 
14 RPA stands for ‘Risk and policy analysts’ and includes a report on the situation of the 
safety of toy products within the EU issued by the European Commission Enterprise 
Directorate General. Cf. Risks & Policy Analysts Ltd. (2004) Study on the Impact of the 
Council Directive 88/378/EEC on the Safety of Toys. Final Report Prepared for the European 
Commission.
15 See also Cf. Weatherill, 2013, p. 254.
16 RAPEX is the rapid alert system for non-food dangerous products set up to promote 
rapid exchange of information between Member States and the European Commission 
about measures taken for the prevention or restriction of the marketing or use of prod-
ucts that are supposed to jeopardise consumers’ health and safety.
17 See 2013 ‘RAPEX report’, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/
alerts/main/index.cfm?event=main.listNotifi cations (accessed 8 June 2015).
18 Regarding chemicals in toys, compliance was for instance sought with the EU’s gen-
eral chemicals legislation, including Regulation EC No 1907/2006 of 18 December 2006 
concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals 
(REACH) and establishing a European Chemicals Agency.
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A case in point is the General Product Safety Regulation,19 adopted by the 
European Parliament and the Council in 2001. It is based on a similar oper-
ating principle than the revised Toy Safety Directive. The General Product 
Safety Regulation introduces general safety requirements that apply to all 
consumer products which are placed on the EU market. It prohibits all those 
products from being marketed which entail a risk for the health and safety 
of EU consumers, either caused by dangerous substances or unsafe con-
struction. Another example of EU product safety legislation is the new leg-
islative framework for the marketing of products and corresponding instru-
ments, its fundaments being established by means of a legislative package. 
This new legislative framework particularly aims to improve the working of 
the internal market for products. Amongst others, this shall be achieved by 
advancing already existing systems of market surveillance and conformity 
assessments within the EU.
The previous measures aim to further harmonise relevant national laws 
and the revision of the Toy Safety Directive should also be seen in this light. 
As was mentioned above, enhanced legislative harmonisation represents 
the third route adopted by the Commission to further integration in the area 
of consumer law, alongside the application of soft law and the justification 
of consumer protection measures in the light of internal market. Higher lev-
els of legislative harmonisation are reflected by both the old and revised 
Toy Safety Directives, since they include total harmonisation requirements. 
Moreover, and with respect to the revised Toy Safety Directive, by introduc-
ing additional common definitions and minimum requirements for enforce-
ment activities this Directive entails a still larger degree of legislative har-
monisation than its predecessor. In fact, the modification of the initial Toy 
Safety Directive reflects the trend of positive integration through stronger 
market regulation. This is expressed by the shift from minimum harmonisa-
tion to full harmonisation of EU toy safety measures which was prompted 
by the Commission’s wish to achieve better national implementation 
records and quality of EU toy safety legislation implemented and applied 
within the Member States (European Commission, 2008, p. 2).
12.2.2 Purpose and background to the directive
The revision of the 1988 Toy Safety Directive was already announced by the 
European Commission in its Consumer Policy Strategy covering the period 
of 2002 to 2006 (European Commission, 2002). In reviewing EU toy safety 
regulation, the Commission sought input from experts and the wider pub-
lic and consultation rounds were carried out in 2003 and 2007, respectively. 
19 See Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 
2001 on general product safety, OJ L 11, 15 January 2002, pp. 4-17.
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An Expert Group on Toys20 safety was set up in which national authorities 
and stakeholders from industry, consumer- and standardisation organisa-
tions were asked to exchange views about the functioning of the Directive 
within Member States. The outcomes of the consultation process confirmed 
the Commission’s view that the Directive needed some modification (Euro-
pean Commission, 2008, pp. 3-4).
The subsequent legislative proposal was drawn up along the lines of the 
Commission’s policy for better regulation and simplification being targeted 
at EU legislation in several regulatory areas. In a nutshell, EU legislation 
should be codified, modernised and recast (European Commission, 2003, 
p. 25). By launching the better regulation and simplification programme, 
the Commission intended to facilitate the understanding and use of EU 
legislation for European businesses and citizens in areas closely related to 
the internal market, including the safety of toys (European Commission, 
2008). A number of shortcomings had emerged during the application of 
EU toy safety legislation. First of all, technical progress had brought into 
view potential safety gaps owing to outdated EU safety rules concerning 
the use of toys triggering increased concern amongst consumers. Hence, the 
identified need to update and complete the safety requirements, in partic-
ular in areas such as noise and chemicals in toys (European Commission, 
2008). Commission preparations for a legislative proposal were paralleled 
by external events which seemed to underline the urgency of the envisaged 
revision. In 2007 toy products manufactured in China were identified as 
posing a risk to human health and the safety of children in particular. Toxic 
chemical substances in dangerous quantities such as excessive lead levels as 
well as too loose pieces of metals getting detached from toys, entering the 
respiratory tract and causing suffocation had been identified as the biggest 
risks (Garde, 2012: 186). These events prompted the Commission to urge 
the Chinese authorities to improve the safety of consumer products, toys 
in particular. Moreover, it pressed for better domestic enforcement of toy 
safety legislation in the Member States (European Commission, 2007b). In 
its view, coherent and effective enforcement and market surveillance had 
only been insufficiently realised by Member States, making the introduction 
of common EU minimum requirements all the more necessary (European 
Commission, 2008, p. 7). Differences in the national implementation of EU 
safety rules were also found problematic and seen as posing obstacles to 
the internal market, causing high administrative costs and legal uncertainty. 
In addition, diverging application of EU safety rules was considered to put 
the proper health and safety protection of consumers at risk. Next to these 
acute deficiencies relating to the implementation of toy safety legislation, 
the Toy Safety Directive was found to lack clarity regarding, for instance, 
the responsibilities of each economic operator in the entire toy production 
20 The Expert Group has been operating since 2003 and offi cially being registered since 
2006. It has been working under the direction of the European Commission’s Enterprise 
and Industry Directorate-General.
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chain (production, supply, and distribution) (Coumans, 2010: 35; Garde, 
2012: 183). In fact, critique came from an arguably unexpected side: some 
linguists had used the Directive as a prime example to draw attention to 
what they considered to be a more general problem of EU legislation: the 
insufficient clarity of EU directives caused by their poor linguistic quality 
(Cutts, 2001; Cutts and Wagner, 2002).
Deficiencies of toy safety legislation and its improper application by 
Member States thus formed the background for the formulation of a num-
ber of concrete goals presented by the Commission in its proposal for a 
revised Toy Safety Directive. Put in a nutshell, revising the previous Toy 
Safety Directive should be targeted, in particular, at the essential safety 
requirements on certain hazards pertaining to chemicals in toys. It should 
clarify the Directive’s scope (completing the product list by toys not yet 
covered), definitions and concepts (such as ‘toys’, ‘economic operators’, 
responsibilities of manufacturers and importers, market surveillance obliga-
tions of Member States and others) and improve its practical implementa-
tion and enforcement by means of common minimum standards to facilitate 
the application of EU rules (by economic operators and national authori-
ties). Finally, the revision of the Directive should serve to achieve greater 
consistency with other consumer-related legislation. In short, the revised 
Toy Safety Directive should improve the enforcement and efficiency of the 
Directive (European Commission, 2008). The Commission’s plan accord-
ing to which all these objectives should have been reached by the year 2004 
could not be realised.21 The preparation of a corresponding legislative pro-
posal took longer than expected and was only concluded in 2008. One year 
later, on 18 June 2009, the revised Toy Safety Directive was adopted at first 
reading and under the co-decision procedure. The Austrian and German 
delegations abstained from voting.
12.3 Negotiations
Even if the Directive was adopted later than the Commission had wished 
for, it seems that its proposal did not lead to protracted negotiations. After 
all, negotiations were concluded within less than one year and a half. The 
proposal was negotiated as an A-item throughout the entire period22 and 
agreement on it reached at lower levels of the Council (within the working 
party on technical harmonisation and the Permanent Representatives Com-
21 Finalising the codifi cation, modernisation and recast of Council Directive 88/378/EEC 
on the safety of toys had been scheduled for 2004 as mentioned in the Commission’s 
communication about its simplifi cation programme just mentioned.
22 As earlier explained, ‘A-items’ are directive dossiers which are not controversial and 
usually treated at lower levels of the Council, at working party level or in Coreper, in 
contrast to B-items that are politically sensitive and require discussion by the Ministers 
in the Council.
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mittee (Coreper)), suggesting the absence of debates on politically sensitive 
issues. Whereas the first Toy Safety Directive was adopted by the Council 
acting alone, the revised draft Directive was negotiated under the co-deci-
sion procedure (Article 251 TEC) putting the European Parliament into the 
position of co-legislator and thus on an equal footing with the Council. 
Against the background of large imports of unsafe products from China, 
the European Parliament had already stressed the importance of stricter 
requirements for industrial products such as toys prior to the submission of 
the Commission proposal (European Parliament, 2007).
The proposal for the revised Toy Safety Directive was further examined 
and amendments proposed by the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Internal Market in collaboration with the Consumer Protection Committee 
on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. As a result, a legislative 
resolution and common position of the European Parliament on the Com-
mission proposal was adopted by mid-December 2008 (see table 15). The 
European Parliament recognised the need for modernising outdated EU 
rules on toy safety and agreed with the Commission’s aims to modernise 
and clarify the safety requirements and enforcement regime. At the same 
time, it urged to bring the Commission proposal still more in line with the 
aforementioned new legislative framework on the marketing of goods. To 
this end it forwarded 79 amendments which it considered to be ‘technical 
adjustments’, pertaining to both the substantial and procedural aspects of 
the proposal as well as the key elements of the new approach technique it 
implied. More concrete, the European Parliament submitted amendments 
concerning the Directive’s definitions, the obligations for market players 
and conformity assessment bodies, the presumption of conformity rules on 
the CE marking, the notification procedures, and the envisaged procedure 
for formal objection to harmonised standards (European Parliament, 2008, 
pp. 79-80).
Table 15: Timeline for negotiations on the Toy Safety Directive 
25 Jan 08 Adoption by Commission proposal
18 Jun 08 Committee of Regions opinion
17 Sep 08 European Economic and Social Committee opinion
18 Dec 08 European Parliament opinion on 1st reading
11 May 08 Approval by the Council of the European Parliament position at 1st 
reading
18 Jun 08 Formal adoption by Council and European Parliament
What may have contributed to the relatively swift negotiations was that the 
draft Directive built on already existing rules. Hence, it did not imply a fun-
damental change to EU safety legislation but aimed to improve it. In addi-
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tion to that, the Directive proposal seemed to entail a number of advantages 
for the Member States, not only in economic terms but especially as regards 
the safety of toys. To this end, the proposal introduced a few novelties 
(Garde, 2012: 184). To begin with, and as set out in the recitals and Annex 
to the draft Directive,23 substances classified as carcinogenic, mutagenic or 
toxic for reproduction (CMR) were made subject to limitations, even bans 
– provided that amounts of these substances, considered to be dangerous 
for consumers, were included in components of toys accessible to children. 
Moreover, stricter rules in the form of labelling requirements and prohi-
bitions were foreseen in the proposed Directive with respect to allergenic 
substances and certain fragrances.24 Finally, the revised Directive sought to 
remove the risk of choking by tightening up rules concerning toys put in the 
mouth and by extending them to the use of children above 36 months.25
In a letter to the House of Representatives of the Dutch Parliament, the 
Dutch Government supported the Commission’s initiative, being joined by 
other Member States (Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 21501-30, no. 196, p. 
15). In its detailed assessment of the legislative proposal the Dutch Govern-
ment recognised the benefits of the proposed Directive, pointing itself to 
the twin advantage for both industry and citizens (Parliamentary Papers II 
2007/08, 22112, no. 623, p. 12-13). To start with, it agreed with the aim to 
ensure a common level of consumer protection on EU territory (Parliamen-
tary Papers II 2007/08, 22112, no. 623, p. 14). Apparently, the Dutch Govern-
ment was aware of the need for more (EU) action to tackle the problem of 
unsafe toys circulating on the European market. The occurrence of safety 
issues was certainly not to its surprise. Already prior to the 2007 incident 
with Chinese toys, Dutch enforcement authorities had noted an increase of 
toy-related accidents from 119 (in 1999) to 3,681 (in 2000) and 5,428 (in 2001) 
(RAP, 2004, p. 28).26 Furthermore, alongside improvements of the safety of 
toys, the Dutch Government expected higher quality and safety standards 
to strengthen the market position of the European toy industry, thus includ-
ing its own (Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 22112, no. 623, pp. 13-14). The 
Government therefore endorsed the envisaged minimum harmonisation 
entailed by the Directive’s enforcement requirements (Parliamentary Papers 
II 2007/08, 22112, no. 623, p. 15).
23 See the proposed recitals (16), (32), and Annex II on particular safety requirements 
regarding chemical properties.
24 This is in tune with Council Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation 
of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic products, OJ L 262, 27 September 
1976, pp. 169-200.
25 As pointed out in recital (18) of the proposal.
26 These fi gures come from a 2004 report on the impact of the revision of EU toy safety leg-
islation issued by the European Commission. It addresses, amongst others, toy-related 
accidents in Member States, including, alongside the Netherlands, also Belgium, Den-
mark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
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The potential benefits of the Commission proposal, did, however, not 
blind the Government to the production costs and administrative burdens 
that stricter and additional safety requirements would incur, especially 
for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Garde, 2012: 185-186), 
representing virtually the totality of toy companies within the European 
Union (RAP, 2004, p. 12). Corresponding concerns were indeed voiced by 
representatives from the Dutch toy industry during a consultation meet-
ing in June 2008 which was organised by the Ministry of Health, Welfare 
and Sport. The Government urged to seek the input from relevant national 
stakeholders regarding the Commission initiative (Parliamentary Papers II 
2007/08, 22112, no. 623, p. 13; 18). To this end, the Ministry made use of the 
so-called Regular Consult Food and Non-Food Law,27 a discussion panel for 
the exchange of views on new legislation between the stakeholders and the 
Ministry, including proposals for EU law. The panel consisted of members 
of business and consumer organisations, as well as representatives of the 
Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority28 – in charge of 
supervising and enforcing toy safety rules. Issues raised in this context con-
cerned the costs expected to arise from the implementation of the Directive 
and, in order to ensure the better practical application of EU safety rules, 
the clarification of the relationship of the revised Directive with other con-
sumer-related legislation. From the stakeholder feedback it becomes obvi-
ous that the proposal met with agreement (Ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Sport, 2008).29
The positive domestic reaction to the proposal and the positive impli-
cations it seemed to imply for the Netherlands and other Member States, 
do not remove the fact that it also raised discussions revealing the differ-
ent views of Member States on certain aspects of the Directive during the 
2008 negotiations under the Slovenian and French presidencies. On closer 
examination, it seems that the Dutch delegation did not have many objec-
tions to the content of the Directive, in contrast, for instance, to the delega-
tion of Germany. This seems to imply that the Dutch delegation took a more 
reserved role in the negotiations on the Directive. Its comments, which very 
rarely included own suggestions but rather aimed to support other dele-
gations, were mostly confined to the technical aspects of the Annex to the 
Directive and hardly addressed its substantive provisions.
27 In Dutch referred to as ‘Regulier Overleg Warenwet’, ROW (Regular Consult Food and 
Non-Food Law). ROW is a discussion panel for examining, together with stakeholders, 
EU legislative proposals related to food and non-food matters. Also otherwise proposed 
legislation within the ambit of the Dutch Commodities Act is discussed in its frame-
work.
28 In Dutch referred to as Netherlandse Voedsel en Waren Autoriteit.
29 See Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, ‘Report of the stakeholder (ROW) meeting’, 2 
June 2008; provided to me by the Ministry civil servants.
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12.3.1 Definitions
The proposed definitions of the key terms used in the Directive caused 
further debates and revealed different views held by the Member States. 
Whereas the old Directive hardly offered any clarifications of key terms and 
concepts, except for the term ‘(functional) toys’,30 the Commission proposed 
the inclusion of fifteen new definitions under Article 2. These definitions 
were, however, substantially amended and more definitions added dur-
ing the negotiations (Council of the European Union, 2008a, pp. 15-21) not 
only on the initiative of the Member States but also at the request of the 
European Parliament (European Parliament, 2008, pp. 14-18). Obviously, the 
technical changes and the increased diversity of products required not only 
an update of the product safety requirements but also revealed the need 
expressed by the Member States (and Members of Parliament) to introduce 
and clarify new terminology. It was therefore suggested in the Council to 
include additional definitions of relevant terms into the draft Directive: 
‘CE-marking’ – according to the proposal of France, Hungary, Portugal and 
Romania, ‘conformity assessment procedure’ and ‘market surveillance’ at 
the request of Hungary. Furthermore, suggestions were made for the defi-
nition of the term ‘manufacturer’ by the United Kingdom and Portugal.31 
Germany, again, preferred to further specify the sort of toys, suggesting 
that definitions for ‘oral contact toys’ and ‘dermal contact toys’ should be 
included. Eventually, these suggestions were not followed but other distinc-
tions between toys introduced instead.32
What about the Dutch preferences regarding the definitions provided 
by Article 2? Except for one suggestion being forwarded, no further requests 
for amendments were made by the Dutch delegation. The exception to this 
relates to the concept of toys. Article 2(1) in combination with the product 
list provided by Annex I to the draft Directive excluded several products 
from the scope of the Directive, not considering them as ‘toys’. Falling 
under these exclusions were ‘decorative objects for festivities and celebra-
tions’ which implied that balloons were not conceived of as toys. Under 
Dutch law, by contrast, ‘balloons’ are counted as toys. In addition, Dutch 
law provides for certain safety rules relating to the use of certain chemi-
30 See Article 1 and Annex IV on further specifi cations of, amongst others, warnings.
31 Agreement was fi nally reached on the Portuguese proposal. See defi nition under point 
3, Article 2 of the revised Directive: ‘“manufacturer” means any natural or legal person 
who manufactures a toy or has a toy designed or manufactured, and markets that toy 
under his name or trademark’.
32 The revised Directive takes other aspects as distinctive features to differentiate between 
different sorts of toys. This is indicated by the defi nitions of functional, aquatic, activity, 
and chemical toys. See Article 2.
260 Part 3  Empirical aspects – negotiation and transposition analyses 
cal substances in balloons.33 For the sake of ensuring that own legislation 
and therefore safety standards could be preserved, the Dutch delegation 
requested to include balloons into the scope of the Directive (Parliamentary 
Papers II 2007/08, 22112, no. 623, p. 17).34 The final product list was, how-
ever, not adjusted to the wishes of the Dutch delegation. On the other hand, 
the product list does also not explicitly exclude ‘balloons’ from the Direc-
tive’s scope. What’s more, it seems that the Dutch request was not com-
pletely ignored. This follows from the fact that safety rules were strength-
ened by the introduction of a prohibition into Annex II addressing the 
particular safety requirements for chemical properties of toys. It forbids the 
use of harmful amounts of nitrosamines and nitrosable substances which 
previously used to be applied in products such as rubber toy balloons.35
12.3.2 Essential safety requirements
The preamble of the draft directive underlined the need to update EU safety 
requirements for toys by taking due account of the technical developments 
having emerged since the adoption of the first Directive in 1988.36 The revi-
sion of the essential safety requirements fell within the exclusive compe-
tence of the Commission and boiled down to a more detailed treatment of 
the requirements which were not only addressed in the Annex, as had pre-
viously been the case, but also in Article 9 of the proposed revision.37
33 Based on Article 3 of the Commodities Act, conferring particular powers of rule-making 
to the Minister, the latter had issued a policy rule concerning standards for the safety of 
balloons (Beleidsregel inzake normen ten aanzien van veiligheid van ballonnen, Govern-
ment Gazette, 2006, 62).
 As stated by the Minister when updating this measure, this policy was intended to warn 
against the use of balloons containing hazardous quantities of cancer-causing substanc-
es, in particular nitrosamines or nitrosatable substances. See Government Gazette, 2010, 
5934.
34 Given the earlier request issued by the Netherlands and Germany, the Commission 
referred the issue to the European scientifi c committee which delivered an opinion in 
December 2007. See Scientifi c Committee on Consumer Products (SCCP) (2007), Opinion 
on the presence and release of nitrosamines and nitrosatable compounds from rubber balloons, 
SCCP/1132/07, Brussels: European Commission.
35 Hazards are caused from placing toy products in the mouth. Hence, it is the migration 
limit of these nitrosamines and nitrosable substances that is further specifi ed to indi-
cate potential harmful effects. The relevant rule laid down in the Annex to the revised 
Directive is in line with the opinion of the European scientifi c committee (see previous 
footnote) as pointed out by the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport. Dutch policy rules 
were brought in line with the migration limits of the revised EU Directive. Cf. Govern-
ment Gazette, 2010, 5934.
36 See recital (3).
37 In fact, according to the legislative technique of the new approach, the technical speci-
fi cations of products meeting the essential requirements in harmonised standards are 
determined by European standardisation bodies, the European Committee for Stan-
dardisation (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation 
(CENELEC) mandated by the European Commission. See recital 2, Articles 45, and 46 of 
the Directive proposal.
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Most importantly, the safety requirements should ensure that toys did 
not ‘jeopardize the safety or health of users or third parties when they are 
used as intended or in a foreseeable way, bearing in mind behaviour of 
children.’38 Member States were to guarantee that only those toys would 
be placed on the market that complied with the essential safety require-
ments during the period of their use.39 In this regard, the envisaged elabo-
ration of the requirements listed in the Annex 2 of the draft directive trig-
gered debate, especially on the chemical properties of toys (Council of the 
European Union, 2008b, pp. 72-81). A major issue was the question of how 
to deal with fragrances in toys (Council of the European Union, 2008b). 
Member States were divided as to the questions of how to distinguish 
between natural and artificial fragrances, whether or not fragrances should 
be banned from the inclusion in toys, and if banning of fragrances should 
be exhaustive or only apply to particular fragrances (Council of the Euro-
pean Union, 2008b, pp. 72-80)? The Dutch delegation advocated adopting a 
stricter approach to fragrances in toys. Like Austria and France, it favoured 
the introduction of a ban not only on artificial fragrances – as envisaged by 
the proposal – but also on natural substances seen as causing allergy (Coun-
cil of the European Union, 2008b, p. 77). Furthermore, enhancing the essen-
tial safety requirements for toys should not only be confined to fragrances. 
It should, additionally, take into account other allergy-causing substances 
such as colouring agents, preservatives, stabilizers (Parliamentary Papers 
II 2007/08, 22112, no. 623, p. 17). Finally, the Dutch delegation wished to 
amend the Directive’s preamble by adding an explanation concerning the 
criteria used for setting migration limits of chemical elements in toys. This 
request was probably prompted by the wish to provide for more transpar-
ency and clarity of EU legislation (Council of the European Union, 2008b, p. 
81). The final Directive provides for such an explanation,40 demonstrating 
that the Dutch request was apparently taken into account.
Raising the safety standards of toys was at the heart of the European 
Parliament’s resolution and chemical properties therefore also a key mat-
ter looked into during the European Parliament’s discussions on the pro-
posal. This is expressed by a number of the forwarded amendments. For 
instance, migration limits for chemicals from toys which are expected to 
be frequently put in the mouth were among the concerns addressed by the 
European Parliament. In this regard, the European Parliament supported a 
strict application of these limits in line with EU rules on materials and arti-
38 Cf. Article 9(2).
39 See Article 9(1) and 9(3) of the proposal.
40 Recital (22) of its preamble states that ‘[l]imit values for arsenic, cadmium, chromium VI, 
lead, mercury and organic tin, which are particularly toxic, and which should therefore 
not be intentionally used in those parts of toys that are accessible to children, should be 
set at levels that are half of those considered safe according to the criteria of the relevant 
Scientifi c Committee, in order to ensure that only traces that are compatible with good 
manufacturing practice will be present.’
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cles intended to come into contact with food.41 This request was met.42 Fur-
thermore, in line with the wishes of the European Parliament, the final draft 
Directive puts more emphasis on the need to update and adopt new essen-
tial safety requirements in the face of risks posed by certain chemical sub-
stances (CMR43 compounds, allergens and metals).44 With a view to CMR 
substances, the European Parliament welcomed the measures envisaged by 
the draft directive but proposed to tighten them up, especially regarding 
the conditions for the exceptional authorisation of their use. These condi-
tions should be equally strict for all categories of CMR substances identi-
fied45 and the use of these substances only granted upon evaluation by the 
relevant Scientific Committee mandated by the Commission (European Par-
liament, 2008, pp. 66-67; 81). In addition to that, and in line with requests by 
some Member States, including the Netherlands, the European Parliament 
favoured a stricter approach to allergenic substances, supporting the ban-
ning of them (European Parliament, 2008, pp. 70-72; 81). Its suggestion to 
exclude more allergenic fragrances from the use in toys than included in the 
initial Commission proposal was taken up, as reflected by the final Annex 
to the Directive.46
12.3.3 Warnings
The proposed provisions on warnings also called for a broader debate 
(Council of the European Union, 2008b, pp. 28-29; 86-89). In contrast to pre-
vious legislation47 the issue was given more weight in the proposed text for 
the revised Directive. Next to the Annex, the proposal also addressed this 
issue in Article 10. In line with the Commission’s aim to minimise hazards 
resulting from the use of toys, new and more stringent requirements were 
introduced in the Article and further substantiated in Annex 5 to the Direc-
tive, including categories of general and specific warnings relating to par-
ticular sorts of toys. Member States were given discretion in obliging manu-
facturers to present warnings and safety instructions in their own official 
language(s) when placing toy products on their market.48 Most importantly, 
41 These EU rules are laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on materials and articles intended to come 
into contact with food and repealing Directives 80/590/EEC and 89/109/EEC, OJ L 338, 
13 November 2004, pp. 4-17.
42 Cf. recitals (23), (24), Article 46(2), and Annex II, chemical properties under point 7.
43 To recall from above, CMR stands for ‘carcinogenic, mutagenic or toxic to reproduction’.
44 See the European Parliament’s amendment no. 5 concerning recital (16) of the Directive 
proposal. European Parliament, 2008, p. 8. This amendment was taken over in the fi nal 
agreement. See recital (21) of the revised Directive.
45 Depending on their expected risk potential three categories of CMR substances were 
identifi ed. CF. European Commission, 2008, p. 4.
46 Cf. Annex II regarding particular safety requirements, point 11, under ‘chemical proper-
ties’.
47 See Annex IV of the 1988 Directive on toy safety.
48 See Article 10(3).
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as stipulated by the proposal, warnings should specify user limitations (e.g. 
minimum and maximum ages for users) and manufacturers should mark 
these limitations on the toy in a clearly legible and accurate way. Regarding 
this latter aspect, Sweden supported by the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, 
Malta and Romania pointed to the need of defining the minimum size of the 
letters in the wording of warnings. The European Parliament made corre-
sponding amendments as reflected in its common position on the proposal 
(European Parliament, 2008, p. 106). Other Member States, like Malta, criti-
cised the proposed requirements as inefficient for not drawing users’ atten-
tion to residual risks inherent in toys.49 Next to the obligation of indicating 
age limits provided for by the proposal, Poland preferred the inclusion of 
the maximum weight which a toy can stand. France and Hungary wished 
to see warning requirements included for magnetic toys. Germany, by con-
trast, rejected the latter proposal (Council of the European Union, 2008b, p. 
89). France forwarded a proposal for another warning requirement concern-
ing balloons stipulating that a pump should be used to inflate balloons in 
order to preclude harmful exposure to cancer-causing chemical substances 
such as nitrosamines included in rubber balloons. Interestingly, it based its 
proposal on similar legislation in the Netherlands50 and Germany provid-
ing for corresponding rules. Even though the French request for amend-
ment was not followed to the letter, the final Directive imposes a ban on 
products containing the substances referred to in its request, provided that 
certain conditions are met.51
The Dutch delegation had a specific request regarding EU rules on par-
ticular warnings specified in the Annex to the draft directive. The Commis-
sion proposal introduced certain warning requirements regarding the use 
of toys by children less than three years of age, excluding from this require-
ment, those toys that ‘on account of their function, dimensions, characteris-
49 It seems that this request was somewhat taken into account. In contrast to the Commis-
sion proposal which remained silent on this issue, recital (29) of the revised Directive 
refers to residual hazards in toys: ‘Where a hazard cannot be suffi ciently minimised by 
design or safeguards, the residual risk [italics added] could be addressed by product-
related information directed at the supervisors, taking into account their capacity to 
cope with the residual risk.’
50 This refers to the aforementioned policy rule, see footnote 33. The 2006 policy rule also 
provided for the requirement to place, in all cases, warnings on the packaging of bal-
loons, including the recommendation addressed at consumers to avoid contact with the 
mouth, and instead, to use a pump for infl ating balloons. For the 2010 update of the pol-
icy rule, resulting from the transposition of the Directive, agreement was reached with 
domestic industry during another ROW meeting. The updated policy rule was issued 
by the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport to ensure complete conformity with EU 
rules on nitrosamines and nitrosable substances had to be notifi ed to the European Com-
mission under Directive 98/34/EC (on procedures concerning information on techni-
cal standards and regulations). It should be noted that the Ministry did not remove the 
recommendation from the text of the warnings despite the Commission’s comment that 
it would not be necessary to have it displayed on all packages containing balloons. See 
Government Gazette, 2010, 5934.
51 See Annex II and under point 8 of the section on chemical properties of toys.
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tics, properties or other cogent grounds, are manifestly unsuitable for chil-
dren under 36 months’. The Dutch Government, by contrast, preferred an 
explicit prohibition on the placing of corresponding warning requirements 
(Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 22112, no. 623, p. 17) and put forward a cor-
responding suggestion for the sake of this (Council of the European Union, 
2008a, p. 30). The European Parliament took a similar position on this mat-
ter. Being dissatisfied with the rules proposed by the Commission, in par-
ticular regarding warnings against toys ‘obviously designed or intended 
for children of a certain age group’, it pointed out that ‘[all] too often toys 
that are obviously intended for babies and very young children are marked 
with a warning that they are unsuitable for children under 36 months. By 
doing this, the manufacturer is trying to sidestep strict safety rules and to 
evade any possible liability. This is irresponsible and must be forbidden’ 
(European Parliament, 2008, p. 81). For that purpose, the Dutch delegation 
suggested amending Article 10 accordingly (European Parliament, 2008, p. 
104). However, in spite of the wishes of the Dutch delegation and the Euro-
pean Parliament, the final Directive does not introduce such a ban, possi-
bly due to Member States’ objection to it, being prompted by fears that it 
would impose too much of a burden on national enforcement authorities. 
Finally, another request of the European Parliament was made in the light of 
the subsidiarity principle. The European Parliament underlined the need to 
provide warnings and instructions for the use of toys in a language under-
standable by the consumers (European Parliament, 2008, p. 32; 82; 84). As a 
result, the final Directive allows Member States to impose such a require-
ment on manufacturers.52
12.3.4 Obligations for economic operators
EU directives in the area of consumer law and the internal market typi-
cally establish obligations for economic operators. Chapter two of the pro-
posal laid down those obligations that should fall under the framework of 
the new Toy Safety Directive (Articles 3 through 8). Article 8, for instance, 
obliges economic operators to notify the market surveillance authorities 
about other economic operators in the toy supply chain. More concrete, they 
shall indicate from whom they have been supplied with toys and to whom 
they themselves have supplied toys. Furthermore, the relevant provision 
stipulated that ‘economic operators should ensure to have in place appro-
priate systems and procedures which allow for this information to be made 
available to the market surveillance authorities on request, for a period of 10 
years’. This provision was one of the very few which the Dutch delegation 
sought to amend. Whereas it had initially agreed with the ten-year commit-
ment of availability, it changed course in the later negotiation rounds, advo-
cating together with Hungary, Malta and Italy, a shorter period of five years 
52 See Article 11(3) of the fi nal Directive.
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(Council of the European Union, 2008b, p. 26). It is possible that the Dutch 
efforts to change the proposal accordingly were geared towards achieving a 
more frequent identification and documentation of responsible market play-
ers in toy supply in order to uphold own high safety standards. It seems 
that a common agreement on this issue did not swiftly materialise, leading 
the Dutch and Irish delegation to suggest that ‘documentation should be 
available from first placing on the market and then 7 years after a toy has 
ceased production’ (Council of the European Union, 2008c, p. 30). The final 
directive includes, however, the original proposal (ten-year availability).
12.4 Analysis
The foregoing descriptive analysis has mapped out the negotiation process 
on the proposal for a revised Toy Safety Directive seeking to draw particu-
lar attention to the position of the Netherlands on the latter. The focus now 
shifts to the explanatory analysis and the role of discretion in the negotia-
tions.
12.4.1 Discretion and policy area
To start with the first expectation, it implies that the less a policy area is 
influenced by the EU in institutional and legal terms, the more discretion 
is granted to Member States. This does not seem to match the case of the 
Toy Safety Directive. After all and as established earlier, integration of con-
sumer protection law with the EU is well advanced. It shows in the pro-
gressive approximation of national legislation to the EU acquis in the field 
of consumer protection. It is also expressed by an increasingly stronger 
pull towards full harmonisation exerted by the Commission, not least by 
means of the new approach which realises the full harmonisation of prod-
uct standards as well as the new legislative framework on the marketing of 
products which is largely implemented by EU regulations and hence, rules 
which are directly applicable in the Member States. All this points to a high 
density of EU rules in the area of consumer law and the (revised) Toy Safety 
Directive seems to exemplify this, being a complex and detailed Directive 
with references embedded in the context of other EU consumer-related 
legislation. In addition to that, its own history illustrates the strong influ-
ence which the EU exerts in the area of product safety legislation. After all, 
introducing and revising the essential safety requirements falls within the 
exclusive competence of the EU. As a result, both the first and the revised 
Toy Safety Directives establish full harmonisation requirements. In addition 
to that, the revised Directive also introduces common requirements in the 
realm of enforcement, which traditionally is an area resting in the hands of 
the Member States. Taking all these points into account, the reverse of the 
policy area expectation appears to be much closer to the facts of the present 
case: high EU influence leading to very little discretion left for the Direc-
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tive’s formal implementation. Indeed, and as confirmed by the results of the 
coding exercise: the Directive grants a small margin of discretion. Having 
said this, it seems plausible to assume that the role of discretion in the nego-
tiations was marginal. But before jumping to conclusions, the other expecta-
tions of the analytical framework are addressed one by one for the sake of 
providing a consistent and complete analysis.
12.4.2 Discretion and political sensitivity
Where the content of a Directive includes politically sensitive issues, more 
discretion is incorporated into the Directive (expectation 2). The Directive, 
however, grants hardly any discretion which already points to the little rel-
evance of this expectation for the present context. Furthermore, the Com-
mission proposal included EU rules that built upon already existing ones 
and were proposed with the intention to update but not fundamentally 
change previous legislation. Such modifications are in general associated 
with less resistance from and controversy among Member States than the 
introduction of a new subject matter for regulation (Kaeding, 2007; Masten-
broek, 2007: 36-37). Besides the fact that Member States’ attempts to find a 
common position on the terminology used in the Directive as well as the 
essential safety requirements (especially the chemical properties of toys) led 
to some discussion revealing different views, the analysis does not deliver 
any indicators that preference divergence and / or disagreement, among 
Member States, for instance, about the level of harmonisation stirred up hot 
debates stalling the negotiations on the Directive. What’s more, it should be 
born in mind that the aspects addressed in the negotiations were mostly not 
about new substantial requirements but rather related to technical require-
ments. Hence, in political terms, there was very little at stake. At least this 
can be said with some certainty from the viewpoint of the Netherlands and 
due to the overall smooth progress of the negotiations it is likely that it also 
applies in the case of other Member States. Indicators of a relatively unprob-
lematic EU decision-making process are the short length of negotiations and 
the adoption of a final agreement at first reading, alongside the fact that 
the dossier was officially not identified in the Council negotiations as being 
controversial (A-item). All this seems to confirm the view that political sen-
sitivity, controversy and more discretion resulting from the previous two 
did not carry any relevance in the negotiations on the revised Toy Safety 
Directive.
12.4.3 Discretion and compatibility
The proposal for the revision of EU toy safety rules built on earlier EU leg-
islation on this subject matter. Hence, Member States were already famil-
iar with the EU toy safety requirements, having them already implemented 
into their national legal orders. This makes it less likely that compatibility 
between EU and national rules represented a problematic issue (expectation 
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3). At least, and confined to the position of the Netherlands on the Directive 
proposal, no fundamental discrepancies were brought to light as regards the 
EU and Dutch safety rules on toys. There certainly were a few minor issues 
that the Dutch delegation sought to change to its own benefit, trying to 
uphold (own) high safety standards. This was, for instance, reflected by its 
requests concerning the use of fragrances in toys, its wish to introduce a ban 
on the placing of specific warning requirements on toys, and its position 
on the obligation for market players to identify economic operators (more) 
frequently. But even if the Dutch Government wished to (slightly) change 
a few technical aspects of the Directive proposal, this does not provide any 
evidence for legal incompatibility between the EU Directive and national 
law. What’s more, it seems safe to assume that, if EU and Dutch rules had 
considerably differed, the Dutch delegation had presumably been more pro-
active in forwarding requests and proposing amendments. As confirmed by 
the interview partners, there was no reason for disapproval with the pro-
posed revision of EU safety rules. Neither did they include fundamentally 
new issues, nor did they seem to incur high implementation efforts – except 
for costs to be borne by the toy industry which, on the longer run, were, 
however, expected to be compensated by market gains owing to the avail-
ability of safer and high-quality standard products for the market. As noted 
by the interviewee of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport involved 
in the negotiations, a few aspects for improvement were brought up by the 
Dutch delegation during the negotiations on the proposal. But only to dem-
onstrate that Dutch interests were adequately identified and represented in 
Brussels. What’s more, as noted by another interviewee, a senior civil ser-
vant at the same Ministry, in the light of the fact that, at the Ministry, the 
overall acceptance with safety rules concerning products ‘made in Brussels’ 
is high, especially as regards toy safety legislation, seeking more discretion 
for the national implementation of EU law has become a void issue. This 
may also explain why the Dutch delegation took a seemingly reserved role 
in the negotiations, submitting hardly any requests for amendments.
12.4.4 Discretion and European Parliament
Turning from the Dutch delegation, finally, to the European Parliament and 
its role within the negotiations and its perspective on discretion, the follow-
ing findings can be presented. For sure, if compared to the negotiations on 
the first Toy Safety Directive where the European Parliament had no say in 
the matter given the fact that its role was confined to deliver a (non-bind-
ing) opinion on the proposal according to the applicable consultation proce-
dure, it had a stronger position in the case of the negotiations on the revised 
2009 Toy Safety Directive. Here it acted as co-legislator in the corresponding 
decision-making process. In addition, its influence in the formulation of EU 
legislation seems to have left its traces in the text for the revised Directive. 
A cursory, comparative look at both – the proposed changes mentioned 
within the European Parliament’s legislative resolution and the final deci-
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sion-making outcome – brings to light that most amendments found their 
way into the revised Directive by being entirely taken over or slightly 
adjusted. At the same time, these amendments do not point to any attempts 
of the European Parliament to reduce the already limited margin of legisla-
tive discretion (expectation 4). In fact, the European Parliament suggested 
the granting of discretion to Member States to ensure compliance with the 
subsidiarity principle as regards the determination of the language of warn-
ings on toys. Taking an overall view, based on the previous descriptive 
analysis and the considerations just made, leads to the conclusion that the 
European Parliament played a relevant role in the legislative process on the 
Directive, presenting itself therein as a supporter of stricter safety require-
ments – a role that it had already taken in its 2007 resolution to the Commis-
sion prompted by the incident with unsafe toys from China. The analysis, 
however, does not provide any evidence that the European Parliament used 
its influential position in the negotiations to alter the already meagre mar-
gin of discretion entailed by the Directive proposal. Being a proponent of 
legislative harmonisation in matters relating to the internal market, there 
was also no need for the European Parliament to advocate the conferral of 
more discretion upon Member States.
12.5 Conclusion
The facilitating role of legislative discretion in EU decision-making on direc-
tives does not come into play in the present case. In fact, the negotiations 
on the Toy Safety Directive illustrate well under which circumstances leg-
islative discretion does not seem to hold great significance. First of all, in a 
political area where particular issues are already largely determined by EU 
law, seeking discretion has ceased to be among Member States’ preferences. 
This is especially the case if Commission proposals introduce updates of 
already established rules instead of novel matters that require more imple-
mentation efforts in the Member States and may therefore trigger more 
debate in the Council. Moreover, if aspects of the Directive under negoti-
ation pertain to technical matters which exclude the likeliness of political 
sensitivity and resulting controversy among Member States, discretion is 
not needed to facilitate reconciling divergent national interests. Finally, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the acceptance of EU rules expressed by 
the Netherlands and, possibly, other Member States, is higher where EU 
objectives include establishing common (high) levels of product safety stan-
dards. These standards determine the marketing success of products, espe-
cially if they are used primarily by children which are, after all, the most 
sensible group of consumers. Having looked into the negotiation process on 
the Toy Safety Directive, the transposition of the Directive into Dutch law 
shall receive specific attention hereafter.
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12.6 Transposition
While the formal implementation of the revised Toy Safety Directive was 
due to 20 January 2011, the deadline for the practical application of EU safety 
rules for toys was set at 20 July 2011.53 Hence, the Directive provided for a 
transitional period, taking into account that the toy industry needed time to 
adjust to the new safety rules. Additionally, the deadline for the application 
of the Directive’s chemical safety requirements (part three of Annex 2) was 
set at 20 July 2013. By that time the European standardisation bodies were 
supposed to have finalised developing harmonised standards. Meanwhile, 
toys complying with the corresponding parts of Directive 88/378/EEC were 
still allowed to be placed on the market.
The Directive was transposed in the Netherlands by virtue of the 2011 
Toys Commodities Act Decree, and hence, without any intensive partici-
pation of the Dutch Parliament.54 Likewise, the first Toy Safety Directive 
had been formally implemented by means of subordinated legislation. But 
the latter’s transposition had required five transposition measures instead 
of one.55 Since the adoption of the revised 2009 Toy Safety Directive, the 
Commission and its Expert Group on Toys have sought to assist Member 
States in the implementation of the Directive – by means of roadshows and 
explanatory guidance documents, which are partly drawn up in the Chinese 
language since many toy products are manufacturer in and imported from 
China (e.g. European Commission, 2013).56Assistance pertains in particular 
to the application of those EU rules that cause uncertainty among economic 
operators, such as for instance the technical documentation requirements, as 
noted by Coumans with regard to the Directive’s application by the Dutch 
toy industry (2010: 35).
In any case, and with regard to the Directive’s formal implementation 
in the Netherlands, so far it has not prompted any objections from the Com-
mission. This contrasts with, for instance, Germany, which has only recently 
53 See Article 54 of the Directive.
54 ‘Besluit van 21 januari 2011, houdende vaststelling van het Warenwetbesluit speelgoed 
2011’. Cf. Offi cal Bulletin, 57, 2011. As noted earlier, the adoption of orders of council (or 
governmental decrees) does not require the involvement of the Dutch Parliament.
55 These measures included new and amending lower-level instruments.
56 In line with the Commission’s overall aim to improve the effectiveness of warnings in 
preventing accidence, this document provides guidance regarding the Directive’s warn-
ing requirements aiming to ensure that the information on instructions and warnings is 
understandable and accessible to consumers of toys.
270 Part 3  Empirical aspects – negotiation and transposition analyses 
received a reasoned opinion for not complying with the chemical require-
ments of the revised Directive (European Commission, 2014).57,58
12.6.1 Transposition measure
As in the case of the first Toy Safety Directive, the revised Directive was 
incorporated into the legal framework of the Dutch Commodities Act (see 
table 16).59 The Dutch Commodities Act has since 1935 provided a legal 
framework for ensuring that products (food, electronic, games, toys etc.) 
do not pose risks for the safety of consumers. Meanwhile, the Act has been 
modified several times. Within this legal framework rule-making by means 
of secondary legislation is allowed and the regulatory power established to 
transpose European directives concerning product safety.60
Table 16: Fact sheet transposition Toy Safety Directive 
Transposition deadline: 20 Jan 11
Publication transposition legislation: 17 Feb 11
Sort transposition measure (and number): Order in council (1)
In charge: Ministry of Health
Legal Framework: Dutch Food and Non-Food Law, 1935
Commodities Act Decree on Toys 1991
In so doing, the Dutch Commodities Act represents the basis for a num-
ber of sectoral decrees including those that serve to transpose EU legislation 
such as the Commodities Act Decree on Toys adopted in 1991,61 transposing 
the first Toy Safety Directive. This Decree covered safety rules for both toys 
and other goods for kids. The new Toys (Commodities Act) Decree, adopted 
57 In May 2014 the General Court of the European Union had already largely confi rmed the 
Commission’s decision by which Germany was requested to change its national legisla-
tion concerning limit values for certain metals which were found not to be consistent 
with the chemical requirements of the revised Directive. Meanwhile the case has been 
closed. Cf. Case T-198/12 Germany v Commission.
58 More details on Member States’ implementation performances were not available. The 
relevant Commission report was not yet published by the time this part of the disserta-
tion was written.
59 Commodities Act (Warenwet), Offi cial Bulletin, 1935, 793.
60 See Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 of the Commodities Act.
61 The Decree is also referred to in the following as ‘Toys (Commodities Act) Decree’, or 
just ‘Toys Decree’. In Dutch it is known as ‘Warenwetbesluit Speelgoed’ and published 
in the Offi cial Bulletin, 1991, 269.
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to transpose the 2009 Toy Safety Directive, repeals its 1991 predecessor.62 
Albeit including more Articles than the previous Decree (19 vs. 12), the new 
Decree does not anymore contain provisions pertaining to goods for kids 
other than toys. This is due to the fact that these rules do not fall within the 
remit of the revised Toy Safety Directive and were therefore incorporated by 
the transposing Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport into another Decree 
under the framework of the Dutch Commodities Act which relates to the 
general safety of products.63 This transposition approach illustrates the 
Ministry’s efforts to remain in line with the Directive and to avoid the inclu-
sion of any national extras into the transposition measure, adhering strictly, 
to the corresponding ministerial instructions for the transposition of EU law 
into Dutch law.64
Since the Toy Safety Directive is a comprehensive piece of EU legisla-
tion, the following sections are used to map out, by means of a few exam-
ples, how the Directive was transposed into Dutch law. Such an approach 
is preferred to a long and detailed description of the transposition measure. 
It ensures better readability of the analysis and, in addition, brings out the 
most important aspects, providing an insight into the methods and tech-
niques applied by the Ministry to transpose the Directive into the national 
legal framework.
12.6.1.1 Terms and scope
The definitions of the Directive’s key terms and rules concerning its scope 
were transposed into Article 1 of the Toys Decree. Reference is thereby 
largely made to the corresponding explanations provided by the Toy Safety 
Directive.
12.6.1.2 Obligations of economic operators
The obligations for manufacturers were translated into Article 3 and 4 of the 
new Toys Decree. In fact, the two Articles merely list the relevant Directive 
provisions as well as the Annex that manufacturers are supposed to take 
into account (see Article 3.1 Toys Decree). The same approach, i.e. direct 
62 The repeal of the previous Decree resulted in the ipso jure termination of a few ministeri-
al decrees and instructions that the Ministry had issued under the previous Toys Decree, 
including the instructions concerning standards for toys as developed by the Nether-
lands Standardisation Institute (NEN). These standards would, however, continue to be 
published in the Government Gazette or could be obtained from NEN. Furthermore, since 
harmonised standards were to be determined by EU standardisation bodies, it was no 
longer deemed necessary by the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport to introduce them 
within the framework of the Toys Decree. Cf. Offi cial Bulletin, 2011, 57.
63 This Decree incorporates rules of the EU Product Safety Directive (2001/95/EC) into 
Dutch law. In contrast to the EU Toy Safety Directive, Directive 2001/95/EC covers rules 
concerning goods for kids.
64 This refers to the earlier-mentioned Instructions for drafting legislation, no. 331 in par-
ticular.
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referencing to the relevant Directive provisions, was applied regarding the 
obligations for importers and distributors (see Article 5 and 6 Toys Decree).
12.6.1.3 Safety Instructions and warnings
The Directive’s requirements relating to the safety instructions and warn-
ings for the use of toys are transposed by means of Article 7 of the Toys 
Decree. The Ministry made use of discretion provided by the Directive in 
establishing that information on the safety of toys and warnings has to be 
provided in the Dutch language.
12.6.1.4 Presumption of conformity and CE marking
Article 8 of the Decree is almost a literal translation of the Directive’s Arti-
cle 13, setting out the presumption of conformity with the essential safety 
requirements (harmonised standards) as laid down in Article 10 and Annex 
II to the Directive. According to Article 9 of the Decree, toys being placed on 
the market have to be affixed with a CE mark indicating compliance with 
EU safety standards. The general principles of the CE marking and rules 
and conditions for affixing it to toys are laid down in Article 9 of the Decree 
which establishes that toys being placed on the market have to bear a CE 
marking in correspondence with Article 16(1) and (2) as well as Article 17 of 
the Directive.
12.6.1.5 Conformity assessment procedure
Article 12 of the Decree transposes the EU rules concerning the conformity 
assessment procedure and bodies involved therein. Article 12.2 requires 
from conformity assessment bodies compliance with the Directive’s Arti-
cles 26(2) to 26(11), Article 31(5), and Article 36 (performance and condition 
requirements as well as information obligations). Article 12.3 of the Dutch 
Toy Decree literally translates the Directive’s presumption of conformity 
requirement for national conformity assessment bodies.65
12.6.1.6 Market surveillance
Article 13 of the Decree relates to the Directive’s rules on market surveil-
lance. Officials, in the meaning of Article 25 of the Commodities Act those 
that are appointed by national ministers to carry out market surveillance 
tasks,66 together with conformity assessment bodies as well as economic 
operators shall act in accordance with Articles 41, 42 and 45 of the Directive 
(laying down the obligations concerning market surveillance).
The description of the transposition measure clearly illustrates that the 
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport closely followed the structure and 
wording of the Directive while transposing it into the Dutch legal frame-
65 Cf. Article 27 of the Toy Safety Directive.
66 They are appointed by the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport, the Minister of Eco-
nomic Affairs or the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality. Cf. Article 25 of 
the Act.
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work. While incorporating the revised EU safety rules into Dutch law 
(including those established in the Annexes to the Directive), one-to-one 
transposition was accompanied by the method of direct referencing. Nearly 
all Articles of the Decree cite the relevant Directive provision or literally 
translate the rules contained by them. In fact, to properly understand trans-
position legislation of the Toy Safety Directive requires reading the former 
in conjunction with the latter. This corresponds to already established prac-
tice as was noted by the Ministry. Owing to the international dimension of 
the toy sector, economic operators involved in the toys business regularly 
consult the Directive’s safety rules (Official Bulletin, 2011, 57). While largely 
staying close to the Directive text when transposing its requirements into 
Dutch law, additional wording was added to the new Toys Decree, only in a 
few cases, namely where national peculiarities had to be taken into account, 
such as for instance with respect to the language requirements concerning 
safety instructions and warnings. Last but not least, it becomes evident from 
the Dutch transposition measure that the Ministry applied the method of 
dynamic referencing, meaning that the transposition measure directly refers 
to the directive, including its future amendments. The application of this 
method is reflected by Article 14 of the new Toys Decree: any amendment 
to the Directive shall apply to the application of precisely this transposition 
measure.
12.6.2 Reactions to the measure
In August 2010, prior to the publication of the new Toys Decree, another 
meeting was held between the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport and 
representatives from the toy sector and consumer organisations. This meet-
ing took place under the already-mentioned framework of the Regular Con-
sult Food and Non-Food Law (ROW). The issues discussed pertained to 
the costs caused by the implementation of the Directive and the removal of 
the provisions concerning goods for kids from the scope of the Toys Decree 
resulting from the Directive’s formal implementation into Dutch law. The 
participants of this meeting opined that the proposal lacked clarity with 
regard to the question of costs: while it was obvious to all of them that the 
Directive’s enforcement requirements entailed administrative and financial 
burdens, the exact amounts of the implementation costs turned out to be 
hard to predict and remained unclear.67 The revised EU rules and, in partic-
ular the way they were transposed by means of the new Toys Decree, never-
theless met with broad approval by stakeholders (Ministry of Health, Wel-
fare and Sport, 2010).68 The content of the transposition measure was only 
67 While later on, in the explanatory memorandum to the Decree, attempts were made to 
calculate costs, the Ministry, however, acknowledged that fi gures could not be provided 
with certainty. Offi cial Bulletin, 2011, 57, p. 8.
68 Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, ‘Report of the stakeholder (ROW) meeting’, 2 
August 2010, provided to me by the Ministry.
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slightly amended at the request of the Dutch association of toy suppliers 
and with regard to Article 10.3 of the Decree: to avoid further administrative 
burdens for the toy industry sector, it was agreed with the Ministry that the 
Decree would provide for the possibility to draw up technical documenta-
tion and correspondence in English as an alternative to Dutch.69 While one 
participant expressed the view that having to consult two legal documents 
might cause inconvenience in the application of EU safety rules, the major-
ity of stakeholders shared the opinion that directly referring to the relevant 
provisions of the Directive, would help to avoid misinterpretation and mis-
application of EU rules (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 2010). Be it 
as it may, the discussion did not lead to any fundamental amendments to 
the Toys Decree.
In the Netherlands, as with any adoption of governmental decrees (as 
well as parliamentary acts), the draft transposition measure was submitted 
to the Council of State to obtain its non-binding opinion. While stakehold-
ers agreed with the draft Decree, the Council of State did not approve of the 
transposition technique the Ministry had applied in formally implementing 
the Directive (Council of State, 2010).70 The Council of State held the view 
that the method of direct referencing was flawed in that it did not provide 
for sufficient legal certainty for economic operators, and consumers, in par-
ticular, to whom the Directive was also directed. It therefore advised the 
Ministry to review the measure and to provide for clear and legible trans-
position legislation. The Ministry took a different view by rejecting, first, 
that the Directive was directed at consumers, and second, by arguing, to the 
contrary, that transposition legislation provided for sufficient clarity. With 
a view to consumers, it additionally pointed out that they would gain cer-
tainty about the safety of products by means of the CE marking affixed to 
toy products. Based on this argumentation, the Ministry did not follow the 
opinion of the Council in this particular respect.
The Decree was published in the Dutch Official Bulletin by mid-February 
2011 and therefore a few weeks after the transposition deadline.71 Transpo-
sition occurred, thus, with a very short delay. Nevertheless, the question 
may be asked why there was a time lag after all. The government originally 
proceeded from the assumption that transposition would be timely (Parlia-
mentary Papers II 2010/11, 21109, no. 197, p. 7). This was also confirmed in 
69 This was in line with the Directive. According to Article 20(5) of the Directive technical 
documentation and correspondence ‘shall be drawn up in an offi cial language of the 
Member State in which the notifi ed body is established or in a language acceptable to 
that body.’
70 Cf. Council of State, ‘Advice W13.10.0541/III’, 23 December 2010; available at: https://
www.raadvanstate.nl/adviezen/zoeken-in-adviezen/tekst-advies.html?id=9573 
(accessed 22 June 2015).
71 It became effective on 20 July 2011. General practice of ministries in the Netherlands is 
to let legal acts enter into force only twice annually - usually on 1 January and 1 July 
(known as common commencement days). This approach is applied to prevent citizens 
from being confronted with new legislation too frequently.
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the interview with the civil servants involved in the transposition process. 
The interview partners could not identify any specific grounds for why 
timely transposition was not achieved. They were convinced that transposi-
tion was delayed for minor reasons. Explaining such a brief delay may be 
less intriguing and complex than in case of longer delays. In the words of 
the interviewees, ‘it might have been a rather trivial reason which caused 
delay in the transposition of the revised Toy Safety Directive, such as a 
delayed signature or a misplaced document on a wrong pile that eventually 
retarded the process.’ This is certainly not far-fetched to think given the fact 
that processes such as the transposition of European directives by national 
civil servants are not automated. Hence, human errors can occur and there-
fore not be ruled out as one of the reasons for deficient transposition. This, 
however, does not answer the question concerning the role of discretion and 
other factors in the transposition of the revised Toy Safety Directive. The 
subsequent explanatory analysis therefore tackles this question.
12.7 Analysis
This section builds upon the previous discussion of the Dutch transposition 
of the revised Toy Safety Directive. Factors that are assumed to influence 
transposition are addressed, including discretion, and examined in respect 
of their relevance in the present transposition case.
12.7.1 Discretion-in-national-law
It seems that, on the basis of the above-made observations, there is much 
to be said for the point that expectations about the role of discretion in the 
transposition process seem to carry little relevance in the present context.
As established before, the Toy Safety Directive grants hardly any dis-
cretion which already makes redundant to consider whether with more 
discretion available, the Directive was better (timely and / or legally cor-
rect) transposed into national law (expectation 1). The reasons for the mea-
gre levels of discretion shall be briefly recalled: harmonisation of EU toy 
safety legislation is well-advanced. Safety rules are ‘made in Brussels’ leav-
ing hardly any discretion for transposition. Additionally, harmonisation is 
preferred by the Member States, and arguably also by business and con-
sumer organisations due to the advantages it entails for all of these groups: 
common standards and legal clarity, alongside the free circulation of toys 
as well as high safety and consumer protection throughout the EU. In this 
context, seeking discretion for own policies, certainly within the Directive’s 
limits, in order to give transposition a truly ‘national touch’, loses all rel-
evance. Where it is accepted by national actors that Brussels ‘sets the tone’ 
like in the case of the Dutch transposition (and negotiations) regarding the 
Toy Safety Directive, considerations relating to the preservation of national 
peculiarities while incorporating the Directive into national law, have 
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ceased to be relevant. If little discretion is available after all, as shown by the 
present transposition case, it is used for pragmatic reasons: providing safety 
and warning instructions that are easy for the consumer to understand. Tak-
ing the foregoing into consideration, the discretion-in-national-law expectation 
does not carry much relevance in the present case. It is, in this context, how-
ever, interesting to note that the discretionary choice of transposition forms 
and methods by the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport reflects a certain 
approach to transposition. Whereas the first Toy Safety Directive was trans-
posed by copying out EU rules, this technique has meanwhile been replaced 
by direct and dynamic referencing – as evidenced by the transposition of 
the revised Directive. Thus, it seems that, in the course of time, the Dutch 
transposition of EU safety rules on products, at least concerning toys, has 
become a matter of routine and acceptance: EU rules are ‘simply’ taken over 
in the transposition measure.72
12.7.2 Discretion, administrative capacity and transposition actors
With the certainty that the Directive afforded very little discretion to Mem-
ber States for transposing its provisions into Dutch law, those expectations 
evidently become irrelevant that predict certain effects resulting from more 
discretion being available for transposition. More concrete, it can be ruled 
out that transposition was facilitated by an interaction effect from more dis-
cretion and administrative capacity (expectation 8). Nor did the combina-
tion of more discretion, and the number of actors transposing the Directive, 
lead to a negative interaction effect contributing to deficient transposition 
(expectation 9). Considering each national-level factor on its own further-
more does not offer much explanatory power with a view to the transposi-
tion outcome. To begin with, administrative capacity was not a problem-
atic issue. The analysis of the transposition documents and the information 
obtained from the interviews do not provide any meaningful indicators of 
lacking knowledge or administrative coordination problems in transposi-
tion. The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport acted alone in transposing 
the Directive, and on the basis of the analysis no serious disagreements or 
conflict between the political units involved in the negotiations and the 
legal units transposing the Directive, could be established. Having one 
Ministry in charge of transposition, also excludes controversy as a cause for 
delay, resulting from divergent views among the transposition authorities 
on how to incorporate the Directive into national law.
72 In this regard it is interesting to note that with the most recent amendment to the Dutch 
Commodities Act a legal basis was introduced (Article 13c) which establishes that for all 
EU directives transposed within the framework of the Dutch Commodities Act, dynamic 
referencing shall apply. See Offi cial Bulletin, 2015, 235. This was mentioned to me by one 
of the interviewees.
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12.7.3 Discretion, compatibility and disagreement
Discretion and compatibility between EU and national rules are not only 
considered to be relevant factors that are linked with each other in EU nego-
tiations on directives. They can also be connected in the national transposi-
tion of directives according to the compatibility interaction expectation (E7). It 
is expected that compatibility between the EU directive and national rules 
raises the likelihood of proper transposition, and that this effect becomes 
more positive with increasing degrees of discretion available for transposi-
tion. In the present case, the Toy Safety Directive and relevant Dutch legisla-
tion were, indeed, largely compatible. The analyses of both the negotiation 
and the transposition processes do not provide for any pertinent indicators 
of lacking compatibility between EU and Dutch rules. It is possible that 
the situation was different with respect to the first EU Toy Safety Directive 
adopted in 1988 which required five transposition measures to be incorpo-
rated into national law. The revised Directive, by contrast, was transposed 
by means of one Decree, its rules being incorporated relatively easily into 
already firmly established national legislation: the Dutch Commodities 
Act. Assessing the compatibility between EU safety rules and Dutch legal 
arrangements on the basis of the four-fold classification of misfit, provided 
by Steunenberg and Toshkov (2009), allows concluding that the legal mis-
fit between the Directive and national law was small. It is therefore likely 
that low incompatibility, and therefore a rather good compatibility between 
EU and national rules, contributed to a relatively smooth transposition of 
the Directive. What about the role of discretion which is the second factor, 
alongside compatibility, addressed by the expectation? The Directive text 
leaves no doubt that the Toy Safety Directive is not a discretionary piece of 
EU legislation. This being said, it becomes evident that a facilitating joint 
effect resulting from compatibility and discretion can be excluded as hav-
ing affected the transposition of the Directive. And yet, it cannot be said 
that discretion is completely irrelevant in the present case. The simple fact 
that it is inherent in directives, due to the choice of implementation forms 
and methods offered by them to transposition actors, is a relevant point. 
The descriptive analysis shows that the methods and techniques chosen 
in transposing the Directive, have contributed to the fact that the Directive 
was smoothly incorporated into national legislation – even in the absence of 
high levels of discretion. As pointed out in the explanatory memorandum to 
the Toys Safety Decree, and as confirmed by the interviewees, the method 
of direct referencing made it relatively unproblematic to transpose EU rules 
while at the same time misinterpretation (and later misapplication) could be 
avoided. In addition to that, using this technique, and especially the method 
of dynamic referencing, ensures the swift adjustment of safety rules when-
ever future amendments of the Directive are required.
Finally, another expectation that carries little relevance in the present 
case refers to both the negotiation and transposition stages, and implies that 
disagreement between the EU directive and national rules raises the likeli-
278 Part 3  Empirical aspects – negotiation and transposition analyses 
hood of deficient transposition, an effect which becomes more pronounced 
if the degree of discretion decreases (expectation 6). First of all, and as noted 
when analysing the EU decision-making process, the content of the Directive 
was largely in line with the Dutch preferences. It is true that Dutch requests 
were not always accommodated such as in respect of the introduction of a 
ban regarding the placing of particular warnings on toys, to mention one 
example. On the other hand, the Dutch Government was, on the whole, sat-
isfied with the proposal, as was also confirmed in the interviews conducted.
12.8 Conclusion
The relevance of discretion in the case of the Toy Safety Directive is very 
limited but, on the other hand, also not entirely negligible. Discretion was 
not necessary for ironing out disparities between EU and national rules, 
neither at the negotiation nor transposition stage. It can, however, not be 
denied that discretion through the choice of implementation forms and 
methods, comes to bear in the present case. It made it possible for the Min-
istry of Health, Welfare and Sport to use a well-proven approach to trans-
position, involving certain techniques and methods as well as the consul-
tation of national stakeholders. Stakeholder involvement in transposition 
may enhance national compliance at later implementation stages: when the 
Directive has to be practically applied and enforced, entailing that stake-
holders take an active role in the implementation of the Directive. In a nut-
shell, transposition could be shaped in a way that, in the eyes of the actors 
concerned, would ensure the proper formal implementation of the Directive 
into national law. Discretion was not a deciding but a supporting factor in 
this process, ensuring that the Directive requirements could be incorporated 
into the Dutch legal system without much difficulty.
13.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the EU Return Directive which seeks to establish a 
common approach towards returning illegally staying third-country nation-
als within the European Union. The negotiations and transposition of the 
Directive are analysed to examine the role of discretion in these processes.
Illegal or irregular immigration from non-EU countries is one of the big-
gest challenges the EU currently has to tackle. How to deal with the wave of 
immigrants that embark on the journey to Europe where they enter the ter-
ritory illegitimately, being determined to stay at all costs but with little or no 
chance that this plan comes true? Today more than ever, it seems, this ques-
tion is at the heart of the European integration process. Arguably, irregular 
migration and the general question of how to cope with all the people that 
like to enter and stay on EU territory, is one of the biggest crises the Euro-
pean Union faces, now and in the future. But the question of irregular immi-
gration had been a pressing topic for some years already. For the year 2007, 
estimates by the European Commission concerning irregular third-country 
nationals staying in the European Union amounted to between 4 and 8 Mil-
lion whereas more modest figures, between 2 and 4 Million (roundabout 0,4 
and 0,8 percent of the whole EU population) – have been presented in aca-
demic research (Düvell and Volmer, 2011). Whether there are less or more 
irregular residents, the fact remains that the European Union is an economi-
cally and politically attractive destination for many who have no legal right 
to stay. Far from staying inactive, the EU has taken measures in response 
to this development, arresting 200.000 irregular immigrants in the first half 
of 2007, of which nearly 90.000 of them were subjected to return measures 
(Hanna, 2008).1 And yet, in 2014, still 276.113 migrants entered the EU irreg-
ularly. This represents an increase of 138% compared to the same period in 
2013.2
1 P. Hanna ‘EU illegal immigration law faces knife-edge vote’, in Reuters 17 June 2008.
2 Cf. ‘Irregular Migration & Return’, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/
what-we-do/policies/irregular-migration-return-policy/return-readmission/index_
en.htm (accessed 6 July 2015). 
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13.2 The directive
In fact, return policy has been promoted for more than a decade as a corner-
stone of EU immigration policy and, in particular, as an essential part of an 
integrated return management system entailing the uniform application of 
relevant EU legislation. Such a system has been a primary aim of the EU, 
at least on paper, ever since.3 The first decisive step towards realising this 
aim was the EU’s 2008 Return Directive which seeks to establish a common 
approach to terminating illegal stays.4 While the Directive has been charac-
terised as an instrument of ‘more vigorous action against illegal immigra-
tion’ (Schieffer, 2010: 1507), it shows at the same time the efforts of the EU, 
to avoid forced returns and facilitate the voluntary departure of irregular 
residents. What exactly does the Return Directive entail?
The Directive is a comprehensive piece of legislation, comprising 30 
recitals and 23 Articles which are divided into five chapters. The Direc-
tive lays down detailed arrangements for the various aspects related to the 
return of third-country nationals found to be illegally present in the terri-
tory of a Member State. Chapters 2 through 5 address the key elements of 
the EU return procedure, consisting of the ‘termination of illegal stay’, ‘pro-
cedural safeguards’ and ‘detention for the purpose of removal’. The overall 
objective of the Directive is to establish EU-wide common standards and 
procedures for returning illegally staying third-country nationals,5 while at 
the same time observing fundamental human rights throughout this pro-
cedure (Article 1). The Directive is applicable to third-country nationals 
whose stay on the territory of a Member State is illegal while those enjoying 
the Community right of free movement6 are not part of its scope (Article 
2). ‘Illegal stay’ applies when immigrants do not or have ceased to fulfil 
the requirements of Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code or other condi-
tions for entry (Article 3). The Directive lays down common minimum stan-
dards and allows Member States to provide for more favourable provisions 
as long as they are compatible with the Directive (Article 4). In any event, 
Member States have to comply with the principles of non-refoulement7 as 
well as the best interests of the child, family life and state of health (Article 
5). The return of irregular migrants is established as a phased process. Ille-
3 Cf. Council conclusions - Laeken (2001) and Seville (2002).
4 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Decem-
ber 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally 
staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24 December 2008, pp. 98-107.
5 Third-country nationals are hereafter also referred to as ‘non-EU nationals’.
6 As defi ned in Article 2(5) of Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules gov-
erning the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 105, 13 
April 2006, pp. 1-32.
7 The principle entails that no (true) victim of persecution may be extradited to their per-
secutor, to respect the best interest of children, family life and the health of the person 
concerned.
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gal stays are ended by means of a return decision (Article 6). Any return 
decision shall provide for a voluntary departure period of between seven 
and thirty days, which under certain conditions, may be modified (Article 
7). Only under particular circumstances, stricter measures against irregular 
migrants shall be applied. They shall be removed (Article 8), subjected to an 
entry ban (Article 11) or a detention order (Article 15-17). Member States are 
obliged to provide for decisions related to return in written form as well as 
to offer appeal and review procedures for non-EU nationals (Articles 12 and 
13). In emergency situations, Member States may derogate from the judi-
cial review and detention requirements (Article 18). The Directive affords 
Member States a relatively wide margin of discretion, in particular through 
chapter II which includes the most important operational and discretionary 
provisions.
13.2.1 Immigration law and return8
The Return Directive is the first legal measure in the area of irregular immi-
gration falling under the co-decision procedure and application of qualified 
majority voting in the Council. This new decision-making regime marked 
a turning-point in the development of EU immigration policies and the 
wider scope of the justice and home affairs area (JHA). While the intergov-
ernmental legal nature of asylum and migration remained unaltered by the 
Maastricht Treaty (1993), a new institutional and legislative framework for 
this area was established by the Amsterdam and Nice treaty revisions (1999; 
2003), together with the aim of creating an Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (Hailbronner, 2010: 2-3).9 The corresponding legal arrangements con-
firmed that the EU was about to become an active player in the formulation 
and coordination of policies in justice and home affairs, which previously 
representing the third pillar of the EU treaty framework, had mainly been 
shaped by intergovernmental cooperation. But these changes happened at 
a very gradual pace since a number of JHA matters continued to be subject 
of unanimity and consultation of the European Parliament and were there-
fore still largely decided by the Member States.10 Evidently, this was not 
the case with illegal immigration, at least not to the same extent as in other 
8 Due to the earlier, more detailed outline in chapter 9 concerning the Blue Card Directive, 
the treatment of the justice and home affairs area shall be brief but complemented by 
insights into the evolution of EU immigration, and in particular return policy.
9 To this end a new title was entered into the Treaty establishing the European Commu-
nity headed ‘Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of 
persons’. The aim of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is thus to guarantee that 
the European Union is fi rmly grounded on security, rights and free movement realised 
by a set of home affairs and justice policies designed to achieve this goal. Its establish-
ment proceeded gradually, shaped by various programmes adopted by the Council of 
the European Union in the period 1999-2014.
10 The transitional arrangements should grant both the Member States and the Commis-
sion an adequate time frame for preparing necessary changes in law. Cf. Article 63 TEC.
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sub-domains of the JHA area, since the Council of the European Union 
eventually established that matters related to illegal immigration should be 
decided by qualified-majority voting and co-decision with the Parliament.11 
It, thus, seems that Member States acknowledged the particular urgency of 
the matter and need for a common strategy in tackling irregular migration.
Nonetheless, asylum and migration as matters of common interest 
appeared relatively late on the EU’s agenda. This was mainly due to the 
persistent unwillingness of Member States to share their sovereign pow-
ers, resulting in a prevalence of loose intergovernmental arrangements and 
measures adopted by simple cooperation, common positions or actions – all 
of which were, in any case, decided without much influence of the EU. Only 
the establishment of the Schengen area and a more advanced cooperation 
since the late 1980s moved this development in another direction (Hailbron-
ner, 2010: 1). It was at that time that both the upsides and the downsides of 
the abolition of checks at internal borders and the free movement of per-
sons (confined to EU citizens) became obvious. In dealing with one of these 
downsides, illegal immigration was addressed since 1986 within the frame-
work of the ad hoc working group on immigration that had been founded 
to combat illegal immigration. In fact, this ad hoc working group showed 
the first definite outlines of a more intensive collaboration between Member 
States at the EU level and it exceeded the narrow confines of inter-state dia-
logue. Decision-making under its framework, however, was mainly in the 
hands of EU and Member State officials and took place at a great distance 
from the public. This form of supranational cooperation was therefore per-
ceived as lacking both transparency and legitimacy (Guild, 1999; Lavenex 
and Wallace; 2005; Kostakopoulou, 2007).
Another ten years passed until Member States agreed on a more seri-
ous commitment which exceeded short-term perspectives and ad hoc pro-
grammes, and included policies addressing illegal immigration and the 
managing of returning immigrants. The 1999 European Council in Tampere 
marked the starting signal for a coherent approach in the field of immigra-
tion and asylum. As was signalled by the summit, common efforts should 
be geared towards the establishment of a comprehensive Community Immi-
gration and Asylum Policy. Within its framework the voluntary return of 
(illegal) immigrants should be promoted.12 Since then, various ideas and 
programmes have been elaborated and presented to put such an approach 
into practice, showing the determination of both the Commission and the 
Council to make return policy an integral part of EU immigration policy. 
11 As followed from the Council’s 2004 passerelle decision the old decision-making regime 
applied to matters of legal migration but not to illegal migration. See Recital (7) and 
Article 1(2) of Council Decision of 22 December 2004 providing for certain areas cov-
ered by Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty establishing the European Community to be 
governed by the procedure laid down in Article 251 of that Treaty (2004/927/EC), OJ L 
153M, 7 June 2006, pp. 485-486.
12 Cf. Council conclusions – Tampere (1999).
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Based on a 2001 Commission action plan (European Commission, 2001), the 
Council developed and agreed on a common approach to combat illegal 
immigration and human trafficking which includes return as well as read-
mission policies as integral and vital elements in fighting illegal immigra-
tion. The plan of the Council, in turn, provided ground for a Commission 
Green paper which further explored various issues linked to the return of 
non-EU nationals (European Commission, 2002a). Regarding the manage-
ment of return, the Commission gave consideration to both voluntary and 
forced return options and addressed aspects that were later on addressed 
by the Return Directive such as appeal and review options for irregular 
migrants in return procedures. The Commission paper did not represent 
a fully-fledged proposal but, instead, invited reactions from stakeholders 
(European Commission, 2005)13 which were used for mapping out more 
concrete steps towards a Community Return Policy on Illegal Residents 
(European Commission, 2002b) leading eventually to the adoption of the 
Council Return Action Programme (Council of the European Union, 2002). 
The Return Action Programme emphasised the need for Member States 
to advance mutual collaboration and cooperation with third countries for 
facilitating return and readmission of illegal immigrants. Further Council 
programmes were inspired by it: At Stockholm (2001),14 the notion of a fair 
and voluntary return and aim of ensuring fundamental rights protection in 
asylum and migration policies was re-endorsed, drawing on the content of 
the earlier adopted The Hague programme (2005).15 During the European 
Council meeting at The Hague the aim was set to have in place an instru-
ment on common standards and procedures for returning illegally staying 
third-country nationals, which at the same time guaranteed respects for 
human rights and dignity.
This latter goal was sought to be realised by the adoption of the Return 
Directive which had been preceded by other legal measures addressing cer-
tain aspects of cooperation in the field of return (see table 17).
13 As noted in the proposal for the Return Directive, the group of stakeholders participat-
ing in the consultation process included representatives of the Member States, candidate 
countries, countries of origin and transit of illegal migratory movements, other countries 
of destination, international organisations, regional and municipal authorities, non-gov-
ernmental organisations, and academic institutions. See COM(2005) 391 fi nal.
14 See Council conclusions - Stockholm (2001).
15 The Hague programme (2005/C 53/01).
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Table 17: Development of EU return procedure 
2010 European Council, The Stockholm Programme (2010-2014) - An open and 
secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens
2008 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States 
for returning illegally staying third-country nationals
  Council European Pact on Immigration and Asylum
2005 European Council, The Hague Programme (2005-2010): Strengthening 
Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union
2004 Council Decision 2004/573/EC of 29 April 2004 on the organisation of joint 
flights for removals represent first important legal milestones
  Council Decision 2004/191/EC setting out the criteria and Council adopted 
its Return Action Programme of 28 November 2002
2003 Council Directive 2003/110/EC of 25 November 2003 on assistance in cases 
of transit
2002 Green Paper of the European Commission on a Community Return Policy 
2001 Directive 2001/40/EC on mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion 
of third-country
  Common policy on illegal immigration 
1999 European Council, The Tampere Programme (2000-2005): Member States 
decide to set up a common European asylum system and a joint European 
immigration policy 
Not being the first legislative act in this context, the Return Directive was 
nevertheless a decisive one. As a measure which should not only comple-
ment already existing EU instruments, the Directive stood out because of its 
‘horizontal application dimension’: its requirements should be applied hori-
zontally and therefore to any third-country national not or no longer fulfill-
ing the conditions for entry, stay or residence in a Member State.16 What’s 
more, the Directive represented the first step towards harmonisation of dif-
ferent national standards and procedures in the area of return.
Return and readmission are nowadays key components of EU immigra-
tion policies.17 Since the adoption of the Return Directive, the EU has steadily 
continued its legislative activity in this field. The adoption of not only further
16 Cf. recital (5) of the Directive’s preamble.
17 Cf. ‘Return and Readmission’, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/
what-we-do/policies/irregular-migration-return-policy/return-readmission/index_
en.htm (accessed 6 July 2015).
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directives but also regulations18 seems to illustrate the deepening of collabo-
ration of Member States as well as the rising influence of the EU. Greater EU 
impact, however, does not remain undisputed in an area not belonging to 
the traditional fields of EU action. This is a fact which has repeatedly been 
illustrated, not least through the negotiations on the Return Directive but 
also more recently by debates about systematic external border checks and 
the reintroduction of border controls in the Schengen area as requested by 
several Member States to combat terrorist acts and cope with immigration 
(Barigazzi, 2015; Hasselbach, 2015).19
13.2.2 Purpose and background to the directive
The proposal for a Directive on common standards and procedures in Mem-
ber States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals was sub-
mitted as part of a package of measures in the field of immigration and asy-
lum (European Commission, 2005).20 By tabling this proposal the European 
Commission sought to respond to the call from the European Council’s dec-
laration of The Hague summit meeting. Member States had agreed on the 
need for concrete measures to realise the common objective of an effective, 
fair and human policy on removal and return of irregular migrants.21 More-
over, the Commission justified the need for a common EU-wide approach 
to returning non-EU nationals, by pointing to the cross-border dimen-
sion of irregular immigration, becoming particularly evident in cases of 
apprehension and return. The Commission proposal took special account 
of Member States’ wishes to introduce minimum standards to guide them 
in procedures, geared towards the removal of illegally staying residents. It 
addressed a range of crucial components that should become part of an EU 
immigrant-return policy. Starting out with provisions on the return decision 
and removal order, it contained rules on the use of coercive measures, the 
application of temporary custody and issuing of re-entry ban, thereby pro-
viding for a common minimum set of legal and procedural safeguards to 
warrant effective protection of the interests of the individuals concerned. 
Provisions regarding family relationships and the best interest of the child 
as well as judicial remedies for third-country nationals22 furthermore 
18 See for instance the Schengen Borders Code Regulation (EU) No 610/2013, the Con-
vention implementing the Schengen Agreement, Council Regulations (EC) No 1683/95 
and (EC) No 539/2001 and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EC) No 810/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council.
19 J. Barigazzi, ‘EU to tighten border controls in wake of attacks. Commission asked to pro-
pose new Schengen rules by end of year’, in Politico 20 November 2015. C. Hasselbach, 
‘Migration: A new age of isolation for Europe?’, in Deutsche Welle 13 June 2015.
20 The other measures concerned three Commission Communications, on Integration, on 
Regional Protection Programmes, and on Migration and Development.
21 The terms ‘migrants’ and ‘immigrants’ are used interchangeably. The same applies to the 
terms ‘irregular’ and ‘illegal’ stay.
22 See Articles 5 and 12.
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underlined the Commission’s intention to achieve an adequate treatment of 
returnees, one which should respect human rights and international law. To 
this end, the proposal conceptualised return as a two-phase process, includ-
ing a return decision providing irregular migrants with the option of vol-
untary departure which, only, in a next step, should be followed by an act 
ordering their removal.
Not in all respects did the proposal fully realise what had been envis-
aged in the run-up to its submission. It did not include rules on the safe-
guarding of public order and security by means of expulsion or removal 
of irregular migrants, for the reason that, amongst others, this aspect was 
already covered by other EU legislation (European Commission, 2005, pp. 
4-5). This does not change the fact that the Commission proposal, never-
theless, foresaw the use of coercive measures, temporary custody and 
entry bans.23 The proposal also stayed behind the original expectation 
that it would provide for full harmonisation by means of a common legal 
framework. It is true that the proposal’s long-term objective was to achieve 
adequate and similar treatment of irregular migrants throughout the EU, 
including the additional objective of facilitating the work of national author-
ities, allowing enhanced co-operation among Member States in matters of 
return. It, additionally, strived for, and eventually realised, the possibility 
for Member States to apply more favourable provisions to third-country 
nationals falling under its scope (Schieffer, 2010: 1507).24 But exactly this lat-
ter aspect shows that the Directive did not imply the full harmonisation of 
national return procedures but, instead, established a minimum harmonisa-
tion approach to return management which precluded the entire alignment 
of national rules, implying, instead, the continuation of national, albeit lim-
ited, legal divergence throughout the EU.
13.3 Negotiations
The Commission proposal was submitted on the basis of Article 63(3)
(b) TEC (now Article 79(2)(c) TFEU) and examined at length at lower and 
higher levels25 within the Council and under successive Presidencies.26 
Finding a common position on the proposal was apparently difficult and 
only achieved after more than three years of negotiations (see table 18).
23 Cf. Articles 9 and 14.
24 See Article 4 of the proposal.
25 Including amongst others: working Party on Migration and Expulsion, Working Party: 
Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) involving senior 
level offi cials and the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper).
26 Negotiations started in 2006 under the Presidency of Austria, followed by Finland, Ger-
many and Portugal in 2007 as well as Slovenia and France in 2008.
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Table 18: Timeline for negotiations on the Return Directive
01 Sep 05 Adoption by Commission proposal
27 Apr 07 Committee of Regions opinion
18 Jun 08 Adoption of the directive at first reading by European Parliament 
08 Dec 08 Approval by the Council of the European Parliament position at 1st 
reading
16 Dec 08 Formal adoption by Council and European Parliament
It was certainly not facilitated by the fact that a compromise had to be struck 
not only among EU Member States. Also the Schengen associates (non-EU 
Members) Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein had to be taken 
on board.27Additionally, negotiations were more protracted due to disagree-
ments between the Council and the European Parliament which, acting as 
co-legislator, had a relevant role to play at the negotiation table (Baldaccini, 
2009; 2011; Lutz, 2010). Due attention was paid to the Commission proposal 
by three of its Committees: the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home being chiefly responsible for formulating the European Parliament’s 
position on the proposal which was adopted in September 2007. The Com-
mittee was herein supported by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on Development. According to Baldaccini, it was evident from 
the outset of the negotiations that the positions between the Council and the 
European Parliament differed considerably which precluded the possibility 
of an early compromise between the two:
For Member States the objective was that common standards could facilitate the work 
of national authorities handling return operations […]. The European Parliament, on the 
other hand, was more concerned with the situation of persons who may be the subject of 
a return decision and removals taking place within a legal framework that respects fun-
damental rights and contains adequate safeguards and procedural guarantees (Baldaccini, 
2009: 125).
In addition to preference divergence, communication and interaction 
between the co-legislators was lacking which hardened their respective 
positions and furthermore obstructed finding a common agreement. Finally, 
disagreements between Members of the European Parliament had further, 
retarding effects on the progress of negotiations. While some Members of 
Parliament took a pragmatic approach by seeking realistic solutions, others 
27 Their participation in the negotiations and implementation of the Directive was required 
given the fact that the Directive entailed a development of provisions of the Schengen 
acquis within the meaning of the respective association agreements of these countries 
with the EU. More concrete, the Directive is applicable to third-country nationals who 
do not or do not anymore meet the entry conditions established by the Schengen Bor-
ders Code (Regulation (EC) No 562/2006).
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seemed to pursue a more ambitious agenda, underestimating or ignoring, 
however, the uncompromising stance of the Council on aspects of their con-
cern (Lutz, 2010: 19-20).28
Shifting the focus to the Council, the negotiations were marked by the 
demands of Member States for more flexible arrangements. The arrange-
ments proposed by the Commission were found too rigid to be embed-
ded into national legal structures (Council of the European Union, 2006a; 
2006b). While the subject matter of the Directive was in everyone’s inter-
est, the way the Commission had given substance to it was hardly to the 
satisfaction of the Member States and drew their criticism in a number of 
respects. How did in particular the Dutch Government react to the Commis-
sion proposal? In fact, the Dutch Government was among its sharp critics. 
While subscribing to the need for common rules to more efficiently manage 
the return of non-EU nationals staying illegally on EU territory, the Govern-
ment considered the proposal to be flawed due to its lack of sufficient dis-
cretionary room for the Member States. Given the fact that the proposal did 
not entirely match corresponding legislation applicable in the Netherlands 
and, additionally, proposed new elements, which hence would have to be 
introduced into national legislation (return decision and entry ban require-
ments), discretion was apparently seen as an important means to cope 
with the (formal) implementation of the Directive (Parliamentary Papers II 
2005/06, 22112, no. 397, pp. 16-18).
For this reason, the Dutch delegation did not hesitate to frequently inter-
fere in the negotiations on the proposed Directive by forwarding numerous 
requests for amendments, and by explaining its position on the Commis-
sion proposal in more detail in a paper addressed at all other Member State 
delegations in the Council. This position paper reflected its wish to bring 
the Commission proposal more in line with own legislation (Council of the 
European Union, 2006c). Viewed from the outside, the Dutch delegation 
seemed to take a relatively hard stance, at times. This becomes, for instance, 
obvious from the fact that it objected to the idea that measures for return 
should not be applied in cases of illness of the third-country national con-
cerned or for humanitarian reasons (Council of the European Union, 2006b, 
p. 2).29 According to its own statement, this approach was not motivated 
by the desire to impair the safeguards proposed for third-country nation-
als. It was, instead, motivated by the concern of the Dutch Government that 
the Directive would have far-reaching consequences for the statutory pro-
cedure in the Netherlands. The Dutch delegation therefore wished to focus 
28 The different positions of Members of the European Parliament on the Commission pro-
posal are also refl ected by the fact that the Parliament’s report included a minority opin-
ion rejecting the report as a whole. This rejection was mainly caused by the Directive’s 
provisions concerning detention which were viewed as incompatible with a fair and 
human approach to irregular third-country nationals in return procedures. See European 
Parliament, 2007, p. 29.
29 In spite of the Dutch opposition, the Article remained virtually unchanged. See Article 
6(4) of the fi nal Directive.
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on the technical design of the Directive (Council of the European Union, 
2006c, p. 2), arguably to bring the latter more in line with own legislation. 
During the negotiations, the Dutch delegation succeeded in asserting not all 
but some national preferences. For instance, along the lines of a proposal it 
had forwarded, EU rules concerning the issuing of return decisions in case 
of pending procedures were reformulated. This resulted in a better match 
between EU and national rules on this matter (Council of the European 
Union, 2006b, p. 4).
13.3.1 Scope and definitions
The criticism voiced by the Dutch delegation was mostly targeted at issues 
that more generally triggered intensive debates in the Council, relating to 
the key operational provisions of the Directive’s chapter two and three. 
But there were also some general issues with which Member States did not 
entirely agree.
At the first meeting of the Working Party on Migration and Expul-
sion in November 2005, several Member States expressed the view that the 
draft Directive offered ‘excessive rights and guarantees’, indicating that it 
went too far in respect of the envisaged (favourable) conditions for irregu-
lar immigrants staying on their territories (Council of the European Union, 
2006d, p. 2). In particular, Member States were not willing to grant these 
rights and guarantees to those third-country nationals that had been refused 
entry in a transit zone of a Member State but who should nevertheless be 
treated according to standards laid down by the Directive proposal.30 The 
Netherlands, Czech Republic, and Germany were amongst those Member 
States which objected to this requirement. As a result, the provisions regard-
ing the Directive’s application area were considerably changed in the course 
of the negotiations. According to the final Directive, Member States are 
allowed to entirely exclude certain categories of irregular migrants from the 
Directive’s scope of applicability, including those that are subject to crimi-
nal law cases. This way, Member States ensured that the Directive would 
not harmonise matters of criminal law or extradition (Schieffer, 2010: 1511-
1513).31 Hence, Member States adopted a minimalist approach towards har-
monisation, seeking to avoid closer alignment with EU law. Being on the 
one hand keen to have in place harmonised return conditions for the effi-
cient removal of irregular migrants, Member States seemed, on the other 
hand, unwilling to accept too far-reaching harmonisation, even though this 
might ensure better legal and procedural safeguards for the protection of 
particular groups of irregular migrants (Baldaccini, 2009; 2011). In any case 
it can be considered as detrimental to the Directive’s objectives that the 
agreed exclusions from the Directive’s scope allowed for different applica-
tion possibilities by Member States. This was likely to cause legal diversity, 
30 See Article 2(2) of the Directive proposal.
31 See Article 2(2) of the fi nal Directive.
290 Part 3  Empirical aspects – negotiation and transposition analyses 
and was therefore not conducive to the result to be achieved: the introduc-
tion of common standards and procedures for the return of irregular third-
country nationals (Schieffer, 2010: 1512). Owing to the interference of the 
European Parliament, however, the Directive eventually provided for some 
level of protection of those irregular migrants that were excluded from its 
remit. In this regard, the Directive establishes that protection shall become 
effective in a number of aspects pertaining to the return procedure: with a 
view to Member States’ application of coercive measures, as well as under 
circumstances concerning the postponement of removal, and in respect of 
pending return procedures and requirements concerning detention.32
Several Member States also questioned the use of the concept of ‘illegal 
stay’. The Dutch, Polish, and Swedish delegation wondered whether asy-
lum seekers whose application was rejected, could be considered as falling 
under the Directive’s scope (Council of the European Union, 2006d, p. 3). 
Especially the Netherlands made no secret of the fact that they disapproved 
of the horizontal dimension of the Directive which made EU rules appli-
cable to any illegal immigrant (Council of the European Union, 2006d, p. 2). 
The Commission, on the other hand, argued that alongside some general 
standards that were applicable to all returnees, the Directive’s substantive 
provisions would imply differentiation in treatment (Council of the Euro-
pean Union, 2006d, p. 2). Nonetheless, the envisaged horizontal applica-
tion of the Directive was repeatedly criticised by the Dutch delegation. This, 
however, did not result in any changes being made to the Directive in this 
respect.
13.3.2 Return decision
The Dutch delegation forwarded several suggestions for amendments, 
especially during the debates about the return decision (Article 6). The pro-
posed return decision represented one of the more controversial issues and 
the corresponding provisions were considerably redrafted during the nego-
tiations. First of all, many Member States criticised the Article on the return 
decision for its lack of flexibility. It appeared that issuing a return decision 
for any illegally staying immigrant as envisaged by Article 6(1) was not 
compatible with a number of national legal frameworks. From the Dutch 
perspective, national rules and practices worked differently compared to the 
system laid down by the Directive proposal. The Directive proposal foresaw 
that illegal residence should be terminated by issuing a decision entailing 
the return of migrants with irregular status. But applicable legislation in the 
Netherlands did not provide for a separate act ordering the return of this 
group of migrants. For this reason the Dutch delegation sought to relax this 
requirement. To this end it forwarded an amendment to Article 6(1) which 
put emphasis on the applicability of already existing national legal arrange-
32 The relevant requirements are set out in Articles 8(4), 8(5), 9(2)(a), 14(1)(b) and (d) as 
well as in the Articles 16 and 17.
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ments. Accordingly, the obligation to issue a return decision to any illegal 
immigrant as envisaged by the proposal should apply ‘unless the illegal-
ity and / or the obligation to leave the territory and / or the authority to 
remove arise from national legislation [italics added]’ (Council of the Euro-
pean Union, 2006e, p. 5). Furthermore, in the context of the debates on the 
provisions concerning the return decision, the Dutch delegation repeated 
its request for differentiation in treating irregular migrants and forwarded a 
proposal to this end. The proposal suggested distinguishing between three 
categories of returnees: non-EU nationals that illegally entered a Member 
State’s territory (illegal entrants), unsuccessful asylum seekers, and third-
country nationals that legally entered but whose stay had ceased to be legal 
(so-called ‘overstayers’). The Directive’s legal and procedural safeguards 
should only apply to the latter category of migrants. Illegal entrants should 
not be granted a voluntary departure period at all. In addition, and to guar-
antee an efficient procedure involving less administrative burdens, neither 
overstayers nor illegal entrants should receive a decision related to resi-
dence, return and / or removal (Council of the European Union, 2006c: 4). 
The Dutch request for treating groups of illegal immigrants differently was 
shared by other delegations such as the Estonian, Italian, Polish and Swed-
ish delegations (Council of the European Union, 2006d, p. 7; see also 2006a). 
Germany shared the view that it should be possible to directly implement 
the return decision as well as to require the immediate departure of illegal 
residents in particular cases (Council of the European Union, 2006a, p. 2). 
Views differed, among the Member States, on the length of the voluntary 
departure period. While Poland favoured a period of two weeks, the Neth-
erlands, Germany and Belgium agreed with the proposed maximum of four 
weeks. In the view of the Dutch delegation this would promote voluntary 
return (Council of the European Union, 2006a, p. 2).
The proposed two-step approach which consisted in the first step, to 
issue a return decision and, in a second step, a removal order (Article 6(3)), 
met with strong criticism. Member States criticised that this requirement 
was not compatible with national rules and practices, and that it caused 
too much red tape, eventually leading to delay in the return of irregular 
migrants (Schieffer, 2010: 1522). For the Netherlands the proposed EU rules 
were highly inconvenient. A few years before the negotiations, the Dutch 
law on aliens had undergone a fundamental reform which had resulted in 
concentrating the three separate decisions on residence, return and removal 
in one, the so-called ‘decision with multiple consequences’, in order to 
accelerate asylum and return procedures (Winter and Bolt, 2007: 4-5). The 
Dutch efforts had been geared towards streamlining the activities related 
to return, with the result that the procedure as a whole had become simpler 
and more efficient. This apparently led to a decrease of the total number of 
procedures, while at the same time it increased the clarity of rules for their 
application. This was confirmed by a 2000 evaluation report on the Dutch 
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Aliens Act.33 Seeking to preserve its own system and being convinced of 
its efficiency, the Dutch delegation sought to amend EU rules, by suggest-
ing an additional, new Article which would allow Member States to retain 
regulations similar to those applicable in the Netherlands, in cases where 
the rejection or withdrawal of a residence permit included both decisions on 
return and removal. Acknowledging the existing differences between Mem-
ber States in managing the return of irregular non-EU nationals, the Nether-
lands, additionally, suggested that Member States applying a system simi-
lar to that proposed by the Directive, should be able to retain their national 
rules (Council of the European Union, 2006c, p. 6). Alongside the Nether-
lands, also other Member States, including Greece, Portugal, and Lichten-
stein, wished to maintain their national legal arrangements already in place. 
The Commission, however, argued that the proposed rules concerning the 
return of irregular migrants provided for enough flexibility. In this regard 
it pointed to the permission allowing Member States to decide whether to 
issue return decisions and removal orders together or by means of sepa-
rate acts (Council of the European Union, 2006a, p. 4). And yet, concessions 
were made to the Member States, showing in the fact that the final Directive 
allows Member States to adopt a separate administrative or judicial deci-
sion or act ordering the removal of the third-country national concerned.34
13.3.3 Entry ban
The provisions concerning the removal of third-country nationals illegally 
staying on the territory of a Member State caused intensive debates in the 
Council and were considerably redrafted as a result (Schieffer, 2010: 1526-
1530). But even more controversial was the proposed EU-wide entry ban 
which reflected a coercive approach to those irregular migrants who dis-
obeyed EU or national immigration rules. National practices appeared to 
differ considerably from the proposed EU rules. Member States such as 
the United Kingdom and Sweden criticised the mandatory character of the 
Article, requesting for the imposition of an entry ban to be an option but 
no obligation for Member States (Council of the European Union, 2006f, p. 
2). The proposal furthermore established that the time frame for an entry 
ban should not exceed five years.35 Instead of a maximum duration, Poland, 
however, preferred to have a minimum length of applicability for entry 
bans. Germany, on the contrary, was in favour of an unlimited entry ban 
which should apply by default and only be withdrawn under certain condi-
tions. It was herein supported by Switzerland and several other Member 
33 See the report by the Evaluation Committee Aliens Act 2000 [Commissie Evalu-
atie Vreemdelingenwet 2000] (2006), available at: https://www.wodc.nl/onder-
zoeksdatabase/voorbereiding-nulmeting-evaluatie-vreemdelingenwet-2000.
aspx#publicatiegegevens (accessed 8 July 2015).
34 CF. Article 8(3) of the fi nal Directive.
35 Cf. Article 9(1) of the proposal.
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States, including the Netherlands. Moreover, drawing on the ideas of the 
initial Commission proposal (European Commission, 2005, p. 8), the Neth-
erlands together with Spain, Ireland, Hungary and Poland advocated the 
automatic issuing of re-entry-bans to facilitate processes and ease burdens 
in the administration (Council of the European Union, 2006g, p. 2). The 
Commission followed up on this request. To register entry bans, the second 
Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II)36 should be used and the 
Commission committed itself to propose at the next review of the system a 
corresponding obligation for Member States. In doing so the Commission 
sought to accommodate Member States’ preferences and to address espe-
cially Dutch concerns (Council of the European Union, 2007a, p. 19). These 
were probably caused by the fear that without using an official EU registra-
tion system, there would be only insufficient transparency and exchange of 
information between the Member States regarding the entry bans already 
imposed by all of them, reducing the efficiency of the entry ban regime as a 
result.
Another, persistent concern, of the Dutch delegation was the require-
ment to issue return decisions in writing.37 It seemed to imply unnecessary 
burdens and, above all, did not match the Dutch rules and practices (Coun-
cil of the European Union, 2007b, p. 32). Besides, it was found incompatible 
with the proposed definition of the return decision in Article 3(d) which did 
not imply the obligation for Member States to use a written format. In spite 
of this critique, the requirement remained in place.38 Discretion was instead 
granted to Member States in respect of the obligation to provide all irreg-
ular migrants with a translation of the key elements of a decision related 
to return. Accordingly, Member States were allowed to exclude from this 
measure migrants that had illegally entered national territory and stayed 
unauthorised.39
13.3.4 Remedies
The proposal foresaw a number of procedural safeguards, amongst them 
the right for irregular migrants to an effective judicial remedy against deci-
sions related to return and / or removal orders before a court or tribunal. 
The judicial remedy should either lead to the suspension of the decision or 
entail the right for non-EU nationals to apply for suspension of the enforce-
ment until the endorsement of the decision or ending of the suspension. 
Furthermore, Member States were obliged to provide for legal and linguis-
36 By means of SIS II competent national authorities can issue and consult alerts on persons 
supposed of having been involved in a serious crime or lacking the right to enter or stay 
in the EU.
37 See Article 11(1) of the proposal.
38 Cf. Article 12(1) of the fi nal Directive.
39 See Article 12(3) of the fi nal Directive.
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tic assistance as well as legal aid to those not having the means to afford it.40 
These provisions, and in particular the latter aspect concerning the provi-
sion of legal aid to those unable to afford it, represented the most conten-
tious issues between the Council and the European Parliament in the nego-
tiations on the Directive. In fact, it was only due to the persistence of the 
European Parliament that Member States were eventually obliged to make 
legal aid available to those irregular migrants lacking sufficient financial 
means (Baldaccini, 2011: 11-12).
A number of Member States, including the Netherlands, opposed the 
obligation to provide for judicial remedy against a court or tribunal, arguing 
that it should be sufficient to lodge an appeal in front of an administrative 
body and that the proposed EU rules did not match those national legal 
systems which only allowed Court access in very few cases. Apparently, 
this objection was taken into account. The final Directive establishes that 
not only a competent judicial but also administrative authority or compe-
tent body can review decisions related to return.41 In addition, free legal aid 
would be granted on request but only under certain conditions, one of them 
being, as requested by the Dutch and Spanish delegations, that the provi-
sion of free legal aid would be in accordance with relevant national legisla-
tion (Council of the European Union, 2006g, p. 6).42
EU requirements regarding remedies were also criticised in the particu-
lar case of detention.43 From the viewpoint of the Netherlands as presented 
in its position paper (Council of the European Union, 2006c), the Article 
was in various respects incompatible with national legislation which, for 
instance, did not include a maximum period for the detention of illegally 
staying third-country nationals (Parliamentary Papers II 2005/06, 22112, 
no. 397, p. 18). Next to this incongruence between EU and Dutch law, the 
Netherlands considered the obligation to ensure confirmation of a deten-
tion decision within 72 hours by a national court as particularly detrimental 
and as a ‘disproportional burden for the judiciary’ (Council of the European 
Union, 2006c, p. 5). While endorsing the need for judicial review, it brought 
into consideration the fact that international law, in particular the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (ECHR), merely stipulated to have decisions reviewed within short 
time, without, however, prescribing any exact period for judicial reviews 
to be carried out. Still more important, the Dutch delegation argued that 
EU proposals would undermine recent efforts that had been undertaken to 
amend national law. These efforts had been carried out upon requests by the 
40 See Article 12 of the draft Directive.
41 See Article 13(1) of the fi nal Directive.
42 See Article 13(4).
43 Initially, detention was referred to as ‘temporary custody’ but it was changed during the 
negotiations into ‘detention’ upon the request of the European Parliament who found 
it a more suitable term to describe the content of the Article. See European Parliament, 
2007, p. 7.
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Dutch judiciary and with the aim of lifting burdens which previous legisla-
tion had imposed.44 To preserve its own rules seemingly challenged by EU 
law, the Dutch delegation forwarded an amendment which was, however, 
worded in rather broad terms, being motivated by the intention to seek the 
support of other delegations (Council of the European Union, 2006c, p. 6).
The Dutch request had no immediate effect, but was followed by 
another slightly different suggestion for amendment which was forwarded 
by the Dutch delegation at a later stage of the negotiations. According to 
this suggestion, third-country nationals should have, at all times, the possi-
bility to appeal against a detention decision in front of a competent judicial 
authority. But the time needed to process the appeal should not be deter-
mined by the Directive. As put in the words of the Dutch delegation, judi-
cial review should be carried out ‘within a reasonable time limit laid down 
in the national legislation’ (Council of the European Union, 2008, p. 25). In 
this way, the Dutch delegation sought to ease EU rules and make them more 
compatible with own legislation.
The Dutch suggestion was not directly taken over, but it seems that 
it had some impact on the reformulations of the relevant provision. For 
instance, the requirement of having a detention decision issued by an 
administrative authority reviewed within 72 hours from the start of its 
application was dropped and reference instead made to a ‘speedy judicial 
review of the lawfulness of detention to be decided on as speedily as pos-
sible from the beginning of detention’. As an alternative, the third-country 
national should be informed about and granted the right to take relevant 
proceedings that should provide for the speedy judicial review of the law-
fulness of the detention decision with an outcome shortly after the launch 
of proceedings.45 To facilitate a final compromise and to secure a quali-
fied majority in the Council, the Commission assured the Member States 
of financial support from the European Return Fund to cope with financial 
burdens flowing from the implementation of the provision on free legal aid 
(Schieffer, 2010: 1537).
Rules relating to detention were very controversial not only within the 
Council where Member State disagreement was mostly the result of the 
highly divergent national rules and practices in this respect (Baldaccini, 
2011: 12; Schieffer, 2010: 1542). It was also a matter on which the opinions 
of the two co-legislators diverged. In contrast to the Council, the European 
Parliament disapproved of the detention requirement, preferring a less strict 
approach towards irregular migrants. The European Parliament succeeded 
in partly asserting corresponding preferences as evidenced by the fact that 
44 Taking effect from 1 September 2004, the reviewed procedure put an end to the so-called 
‘ten-day-review’: this former review system implied judicial review of the custodial 
measure within ten days, which, as it seems, heavily increased the workload for the 
Dutch judiciary up to a point that it became unbearable and infeasible for the latter to 
cope with it.
45 Cf. Article 15(2)(a) and (b) of the fi nal Directive.
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the obligation to keep irregular migrants in detention was amended: The 
obligation for Member States to make use of the detention procedure upon 
having applied all other available and less coercive measures was eventu-
ally turned into an optional measure (Baldaccini, 2011: 12).46
Despite this successful outcome for the European Parliament, its overall 
impact has been assessed as limited in scope (Baldaccini, 2009; 2011). And 
yet, this does not change the fact that it undertook great effort to influence 
the negotiations on the Return Directive. To this end, it kept on forwarding 
amendments and sought to assert its preferences in a number of informal 
trilogue meetings during the ‘hot phase of negotiations’ between summer 
2007 and spring 2008 (Lutz, 2010: 23; see also Schieffer, 2010: 1506). Granted, 
its efforts to influence the content of the Directive produced mixed results. 
On the one hand, the European Parliament succeeded in changing the 
Directive proposal in a way that resulted in more emphasis being put on a 
fair, human and transparent approach to which Member States had previ-
ously committed themselves. In this regard, the Directive obliges Member 
States to take due account of a number of key principles of international 
and human rights law47 in the implementation of the Directive. Addition-
ally, upon the request of the European Parliament new provisions were 
incorporated including specific obligations for Member States with regard 
to the return and removal of unaccompanied minors, detention of minors 
and families as well as effective monitoring requirements regarding forced-
return procedures.48 On the other hand, while the European Parliament’s 
amendments left here and there traces in the operational part of the Direc-
tive (chapters 2 and 3), many of its amendments to the substantive provi-
sions were not taken into account. It therefore seems that Member States’ 
interests prevailed. For instance, the European Parliament could not pre-
vent the incorporation of Article 18 which allows Member States in emer-
gency situations – in the presence of an exceptionally large number of irreg-
ular migrants and the absence of administrative capacities and facilities – to 
derogate from the Directive’s requirements regarding remedies and deten-
tion which imply a rather favourable approach to irregular migrants. The 
European Parliament also failed in realising its objective to become more 
involved in the implementation of the Directive. Its request to appoint an 
Ombudsman from its own ranks, who should ensure that return procedures 
were carried out in an efficient and human way in collaboration with the 
Member States, was not incorporated.49
46 Compare Article 15 of the Directive proposal with Article 14 of the fi nal Directive.
47 See Article 5 addressing the non-refoulement, best interests of the child, family life and 
state of health, which was amended along the lines of its proposal. See European Parlia-
ment, 2007, p. 11.
48 See Articles 10 and 17 of the fi nal Directive.
49 See Article 16a inserted by amendment 69 of the European Parliament’s report on the 
Commission Proposal. See European Parliament, 2007, p. 25.
Chapter 13  Return Directive 297
Having discussed EU decision-making on the Return Directive, includ-
ing the Dutch position on the proposal, the following sections aim to shed 
light on the role of discretion in the negotiation process.
13.4 Analysis
Recital (12) of the Return Directive addresses the situation of those migrants 
whose illegal stay has officially been established but who have not yet 
been removed. The recital stipulates that national authorities should pro-
vide these migrants with a written confirmation of their situation to pre-
pare them for administrative controls and checks. The Directive continues 
to stipulate that ‘Member States should enjoy wide discretion [italics added] 
concerning the form and format of the written confirmation and should also 
be able to include it in decisions related to return adopted under this Direc-
tive’.
The explicit mentioning of discretion in the Directive, as illustrated by 
this example, very rarely happens.50 It may give a foretaste of the essential 
role that discretion played during the negotiations on the Return Directive. 
The analysis brings to light further insights showing the relevance of discre-
tion in the negotiations. Member States’ general assessment of the Directive 
as providing for too little flexibility and their subsequent search for more 
discretion – reflected in the change of mandatory into optional require-
ments or the incorporation of additional may-clauses into key provisions 
– show that discretion played a vital role in Member States’ considerations 
about the Directive proposal. This was also confirmed by the civil servant 
involved in the negotiations. The position taken by the Dutch delegation on 
a number of aspects illustrates this point well.
13.4.1 Discretion and policy area
According to the first expectation addressed, where more discretion is 
granted to Member States, the association is that the EU has little leverage 
over decision-making and is institutionally not as firmly anchored as in 
other more Europeanised areas. This expectation certainly holds true for the 
present case. The coding exercise and literature on the negotiations confirm 
that the Directive contains a high margin of discretion. The interviewees, 
who were involved in the negotiations as well as transposition of the Direc-
tive, agreed with this observation but additionally pointed out that some of 
the Directive’s Articles are of more prescriptive nature than may be expected 
50 At least that can be said with certainty for the directives which have been closer exam-
ined in the framework of this study and which cover more policy areas than those exam-
ined in the case studies.
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at first sight.51 In any case, the Return Directive grants a rather wide than 
narrow scope of discretion to Member States. This may not be too surpris-
ing given the fact that EU influence in the area of justice and home affairs, 
and illegal immigration in particular, remained limited for some time. The 
history of the policy area illustrates that integration in the area evolved 
gradually and from small steps, gaining momentum in the late 1990s with 
the communitarisation of important aspects of immigration and asylum law, 
including illegal immigration as established by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(1999). Only then most matters of justice and home affairs were moved from 
an area where the EU merely exercised supportive competence to the first 
pillar, with illegal immigration eventually being subjected to the Community 
method – albeit under the condition that competence was not exclusively 
exercised by the EU but in observance of the principle of subsidiarity.
Against this background, the case of the Return Directive emerges as a 
prime example illustrating the expected link between discretion and policy 
area. In a nutshell, where more discretion is granted, the influence of the 
EU in legislative and institutional terms is limited. And yet, at the same 
time it has to be kept in mind that the negotiations on the Return Directive 
marked a watershed in the history of EU law-making on irregular migration 
because of the fact that the Directive was the first measure in this field to be 
decided by co-decision, giving the European Parliament greater leverage in 
legislative decision-making. However, since co-decision was applied for the 
first time, the implications of the increased influence of EU institutions in 
decision-making on matters of irregular migration may not have immedi-
ately become visible. The negotiations on the Return Directive rather sug-
gest that Member States succeeded in retaining considerable decision-mak-
ing competence regarding the various aspects addressed by the Directive. 
This does not remove the fact that, in the longer run, legal and institutional 
influence of the EU is likely to become more important, suggesting that the 
link between discretion and policy area as it now stands will change: with 
greater EU leverage in decision-making, less discretion will be made avail-
able to Member States for the implementation of EU law where it concerns 
matters of (irregular) migration.
The present case is furthermore interesting in terms of the relationship 
between discretion and policy area because it illustrates the sometimes par-
adox nature of EU integration. The repeated commitments of the Member 
States to a common approach in the area of return policy in the run-up to 
the negotiations on the Directive stand in sharp contrast to their attempts 
to retain as much decision-making competence as possible by seeking more 
discretion for implementation. This tension was also inherent in the Direc-
tive proposal. As Schieffer neatly puts it, providing for the minimum har-
monisation clause in Article 4 was based on the ‘tacit understanding that, 
and contrary to the wording of the title and art. 1, the Directive sets out 
51 For instance, as regards EU requirements concerning entry bans and detention (Articles 
11 and 16).
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minimum rather than common standards’ (2010: 1519). In this regard, dis-
cretion has been assessed negatively, being associated with a strict approach 
to the interpretation of the Directive’s requirements and seen as stimulating 
efforts to minimise safeguard requirements to the disadvantage of irregular 
migrants (Baldaccini, 2009; 2011). Whether this critique is justified or not 
remains to be seen. In any case, the Directive, albeit being discretionary, has 
also caused a more positive echo. In this context, it has been noted that the 
Directive has beneficial effects for the status of irregular migrants. Based 
on European case law relating to the interpretation of certain provisions of 
the Directive, it is argued that the latter has contributed to strengthening 
the legal position of third-country nationals and that it has the potential to 
lead to more equal rights or at least standards of protection before courts 
(Crosby, 2014: 136-137).
13.4.2 Discretion, political sensitivity and compatibility
Not only discretion’s relevance was made explicit during the negotia-
tions on the Return Directive. Also the reasons for why it played a vital 
role became quite evident. Without doubt, the Directive’s subject matter is 
politically sensitive as shown by the fact that its scope and the proposed 
elements of the return procedure (return / removal decisions, entry ban, 
and detention), caused debates and represented one reason for why nego-
tiations dragged on. More concrete, the political sensitivity of the Directive 
resulted from the fact that it addressed the domain of immigration control 
and therefore an area that formerly used to entail the exercise of sovereign 
state power. Guild brings it to the point: The control of the nation state over 
the admission, residence and expulsion of aliens is a fundamental attribute 
of national sovereignty which has been affected by the development of the 
European Union, reaching a crucial (turning) point with the communitari-
sation of decisive aspects of immigration and asylum law with the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. In an area of transferred competence, 
where decision-making competences have been ceded to the EU level, the 
Member States can no longer adopt rules which are inconsistent with Com-
munity law (Guild, 1999: 61-62; 68). What’s more, while immigration in 
general may raise concerns about its consequences for national welfare sys-
tems, in the particular case of the Return Directive, Member States feared 
the administrative and legal burdens of the proposed return procedure, as 
illustrated especially by their rejection of the two-step approach in manag-
ing the return of irregular migrants and their objection to the provisions 
on legal remedies. Member States were concerned that they would have to 
change already existing national regimes governing the residence, return 
and removal of irregular migrants. Against this background discretion was 
sought as a ‘way out’ of political sensitivity and controversy (expectation 
2). The conflict about the two-step approach in returning irregular migrants 
was off the table after Member States had been afforded discretion in decid-
ing whether or not to issue two separate orders, removal or return, or one 
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that combines the removal and the return decisions. Including more discre-
tion into the Directive proposal eased legislative decision-making also in 
other respects. Discretion granted in the form of may-clauses and deroga-
tions from, for instance, judicial review and detention requirements in emer-
gency situations, helped secure the approval of Member States on contro-
versial items of the Directive (legal and procedural safeguards for irregular 
migrants). The same was achieved by explicitly taking into account national 
legal orders in the (re-)formulation of Directive provisions. Furthermore, the 
incorporation of discretion into the Directive mitigated gaps between EU 
and national rules (expectation 3). It becomes obvious from the negotiations 
that the proposed EU rules were repeatedly perceived as being incompat-
ible with national rules. Next to the Netherlands many other Member States 
took this view, seeking therefore, to maintain own national legal arrange-
ments as evidenced, for example, with respect to the provisions regarding 
the return decision. Member States’ input into the negotiations was appar-
ently made with a deliberate view to their domestic rules and practices. The 
Dutch delegation sought to translate such wishes into action by forward-
ing a position paper including corresponding amendments drafted in a way 
that reflected the recognition of the considerable legal diversity of national 
laws in this respect. At the same time the delegation’s written statement 
promoted the approach, applied in the Netherlands, to the management 
of returning irregular migrants. This has to be seen, hence, as an attempt 
to upload or translate national legal arrangements into the Directive text. 
However, in the end, seeking more discretion and getting it incorporated 
into the Directive, turned out to be the more effective solution to cope with 
both incompatibility and legal diversity.
13.4.3 Discretion and European Parliament
Alongside the Council, where compromises had to be struck, also the role of 
the European Parliament has to be considered, since it was another key actor 
in the negotiations on the Directive. While a greater role of the European 
Parliament in legislative decision-making has been linked to the support of 
legislative harmonisation and, consequently, less discretion being granted 
to Member States (expectation 4), the present analysis does not deliver con-
clusive evidence in support of this expectation. According to its own state-
ment, the European Parliament sought to strengthen its role as a ‘champion 
of human rights and humanity’ and therefore strongly supported the estab-
lishment of mandatory minimum standards to ensure fair and human treat-
ment of returnees and an approach to return that precluded the use of dis-
cretion to proceed with a forced return (European Parliament, 2007, p. 27; 
31). On the one hand, this shows the European Parliament’s determination 
to fulfil its self-imposed role of being a fighter for human rights. The Direc-
tive, on the other hand, ‘merely’ introduced minimum standards, which 
were, however, accepted by the European Parliament. Albeit promoting a 
more ambitious approach regarding harmonisation, the European Parlia-
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ment was apparently aware of the fact that a Directive proposal exceeding 
the minimum harmonisation approach would have had no chance of suc-
cess in the Council. In other words, the European Parliament in principle 
agreed with the tacit understanding that the Directive would establish 
minimum instead of common standards. The amendments forwarded by 
the European Parliament were geared towards bringing the Commission 
proposal more in line with the principle of proportionality and respect for 
human rights (European Parliament, 2007, p. 37) but regarding discretion, 
there was no clear rationale developed. In other words, the results of the 
analysis do not show that the European Parliament sought to reduce the 
margin of discretion granted to Member States for implementation. The lack 
of a coherent strategy may relate to the fact that the European Parliament 
made its first appearance on the negotiation scene as co-legislator on issues 
of irregular migration, which suggests that it had not yet much experience 
in exercising its new role. But discretion was also not necessarily perceived 
as negative. Where it served to realise its human rights objectives and its 
promotion of a case-by-case approach taking into account the specific cir-
cumstances of individual cases, the European Parliament even preferred the 
incorporation of additional discretion into the proposal. This is, for instance, 
evidenced by its request to leave it to the discretion of the Member States to 
impose return decisions (European Parliament, 2007, p. 46).
13.5 Conclusion
The analysis has brought to light that discretion played an essential role in 
the negotiations on the Return Directive. In fact, this case is a good example 
for illustrating the potential that discretion is expected to unfold in decision-
making processes under particular circumstances. With a view to the nego-
tiations on the Directive, discretion facilitated decision-making and striking 
a compromise on the Commission proposal. Discretion contributed to over-
coming political controversy in the Council while at the same time, from the 
perspective of Member States, and with a view to implementation, it offered 
the prospect of being able to mitigate effects from a lack of compatibility 
between EU and national rules as well as to reduce administrative and legal 
burdens expected to result from the implementation of the Directive into 
national law. Finally, even though some may consider discretion as encourag-
ing Member States to adopt restrictive measures on matters related to immi-
gration, it should be born in mind that discretion contributed to the adop-
tion of the first harmonisation instrument concerning the return of irregular 
migrants. Seen in this light, discretion facilitated the introduction of mini-
mum standards in an area, which back then was barely influenced by the EU. 
Did discretion also have a positive impact on the transposition of the Return 
Directive in the Netherlands? The subsequent descriptive analysis seeks to 
provide insights that shall serve to answer this question and help to find 
out which other factors mattered in the Dutch transposition of the Directive.
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13.6 Transposition
Despite the many controversial issues on which the negotiating parties had 
to agree, the Return Directive was finally approved and adopted at first 
reading on 9 December 2008 with the Belgian delegation abstaining. The 
Directive had to be transposed by 24 December 2010, except for the legal aid 
provision of Article 13(4) for which the deadline had been extended by one 
year to accommodate Member States’ preferences and to ensure their sup-
port for the final compromise text (Schieffer, 2010: 1550). The United King-
dom, Ireland and Denmark did not participate in the adoption of the Return 
Directive and are not subject to its implementation or bound by it. This is in 
accordance with their respective positions established by the Protocols to 
the Treaty of Amsterdam.52
The Directive was met with strong criticism worldwide, attracting the 
attention of the media including the Dutch news (BBC News, 2008; Zoon, 
2008).53 Various non-governmental organisations, heads of governments 
of Latin-American countries, as well as the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights denounced a number of the Directive’s measures, especially 
the conditions and length of detention and entry bans which they criticised 
as being inhuman and criminalising irregular migrants (Schieffer, 2010: 
1506; Baldaccini, 2011: 135; UN Human Rights, 2008).54 Negative publicity 
was also caused by the fact that the Directive’s transposition was problem-
atic in numerous Member States of which only four notified full transpo-
sition before the deadline. Without doubt, national transposition perfor-
mances left much to be desired (European Commission, 2011), leading to 
twenty infringement proceedings being issued against Member States,55 
including the Netherlands. Meanwhile nearly all of these proceedings have, 
however, been closed, (European Commission, 2014). This does not change 
the fact that deficient transposition undermined the Directive’s objectives 
and the direct effect of certain provisions resulting in action being taken by 
the European Court of Justice (Rafaelli, 2011).56
52 The protocols include their opt-outs from Title IV TEC regarding Visas, asylum, immi-
gration and other policies related to free movement of persons.
53 BBC News, ‘Q&A: EU immigration policy’, in BBC News 14 October 2008; C. Zoon, 
‘Latijns-Amerika beraadt zich op sancties vanwege Terugkeerrichtlijn, Europa keert 
geschiedenis de rug toe en criminaliseert migratie’, in De Volkskrant 24 juni 2008.
54 See ‘UN experts express concern about proposed EU Return Directive’, available at:
 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=8440&LangID=E (accessed 14 July 2015).
55 This follows from the Commission’s powers under Article 258 TFEU.
56 According to the Court, the transposition measures adopted by Italy referring to the pro-
visions on detention were undermining the Directive’s objectives. The Court recognised 
the direct effect of the relevant Articles 15 and 16. See case C-61/11 PPU El Dridi, judg-
ment of 28 April 2011.
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13.6.1 Process and measures
The Netherlands notified full transposition in the course of 2012, hence with 
more than a year delay (European Commission, 2014, p. 12).57 Additionally, 
the delay in the formal transposition of the Directive had as a consequence 
that transposition was also legally incorrect, leading to a number of cases 
being brought before national courts. This concerned, in particular, infringe-
ments of provisions with direct effect and, as a consequence, the relevant 
cases centred on state liability for breach of EU law (Cornelisse, 2011).58 
Moreover, Dutch courts as well as legal experts questioned the adequacy 
and legal correctness of the draft transposition measures especially with a 
view to the formal implementation of the Directive’s provisions on deten-
tion (Cornelisse, 2011; see also Van Riel, 2012).
Critique at the domestic level was not confined to judiciary and legal 
circles. The way the requirements of the Return Directive should be incorpo-
rated into national law as envisaged by the Minister for Immigration, Integra-
tion and Asylum Affairs,59 Leers, was questioned by national interest groups 
(Amnesty International the Netherlands, 2011; VluchtelingenWerk Neder-
land, 2011)60 and caused political debates between the Minister and Parlia-
ment which was involved in the transposition process, since the Directive 
required for statutory change alongside an amendment to the Alien Decree 
and some additional measures, including regulation at the lower level (see 
table 19).
57 By 24 December 2010 when the deadline for transposition ended - except for the legal 
review provisions of Article 13(4) - the Netherlands had only partially implemented 
the Directive by means of already existing legislation. The Minister made an offi cial 
announcement of the Directive’s partial implementation Cf. Government Gazette, 2011, 
4082. By the end of September 2011 the Commission opened an infringement proceed-
ing against the Netherlands due to non-compliance with the Return Directive. Cf. ‘EU 
law monitoring - European Commission – Netherlands’, available at: http://ec.europa.
eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/eu-law-and-monitoring/infringements_by_coun-
try_netherlands_en.htm (accessed 15 July 2015).
58 Direct applicability of directive provisions, like in the present case, follows if three criteria 
are met. These criteria were established by case law: the directive’s result must entail the 
granting of individual rights, it must be feasible to detect the content of these rights from 
the relevant directive provisions and, fi nally, a causal link must exist between non-compli-
ance of the Member State concerned and the negative implications of it for the individuals 
affected. See: Van der Burg and Voermans, 2015, pp. 48-50; Hailbronner, 2010, p. 22.
59 Hereafter referred to, in short, as Minister for Immigration and Asylum.
60 Amnesty International (2011), ‘Vreemdelingendetentie in Nederland: Het moet en kan 
anders’, available at: https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/fi les/public/1110_vreem-
delingendet.pdf and VluchtelingenWerk Nederland (2011) ‘Jaarverslag 2011’, available at: 
http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/artikel/jaarverslag-2011 (both accessed 20 July 2015).
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The main bone of contention between Parliament61 and the responsible 
Ministry was that transposition included the criminalisation of the offence 
against the prohibition of re-entering the Netherlands.62 Such an offence 
should be made punishable by a maximum of six months’ imprisonment 
or a monetary penalty in category three.63 Even if the Directive allowed 
for coercive measures to be taken as a last resort in returning irregular 
migrants,64 the criminalisation of the offence against the prohibition of re-
entering the Netherlands was not seen as justified by it.
Table 19: Fact sheet transposition Return Directive 
Transposition deadline: 24 Dec 10





Sort transposition measure (and number): Parliamentary act (1)
Order in council (2), 
Ministerial decision (1)
[Announcement (1)]
In charge: Ministry of Justice
Legal Framework: Dutch Alien Act 2000
Dutch Alien Decree 2000
On the contrary, it was considered to be legally incorrect – because the 
Directive did not include any corresponding obligation. In addition, it was 
found to conflict with the national approach of one-to-one transposition65 
entailing that no other requirements should be laid down in national law 
than those provided for by the Directive (Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12, 
32420, no. 14, p. 86). Not only that, in the light of case law of the Euro-
61 The measure had been subjected to further scrutiny by the General Committee for Immi-
gration and Asylum of the House of Representatives and the Standard Committee for 
Immigration and Asylum of the Dutch Senate.
62 Cf. Article 66a under paragraph 7 of the Dutch Alien Act in conjunction with Article 197 
of the Dutch Penal Code [Wetboek van Strafrecht].
63 Before 1 January 2014 monetary penalty in category three boiled down to an amount of 
6.700 Euro which is currently 8100 Euro. Cf. Article 23 of the Dutch Penalty Code. See 
also Van Riel, 2012, p. 73. It should be noted that these amounts differ from the one that 
was mentioned in the plenary debates (3800 Euro). See Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12, 
32420, no. 14.
64 Cf. Article 8(4) of the Return Directive.
65 In Dutch referred to as ‘EU-implementatie sec’. Cf. Instructions for drafting legislation 
no. 331.
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pean Court of Justice66 the envisaged criminalisation of the offence against 
the prohibition of re-entering was considered to run counter to a fair and 
human treatment of irregular migrants. What’s more, the view was taken 
that all means provided for by the Directive should be exhausted before 
such a severe measure was applied. Finally, the added value of the mea-
sure was questioned since, in fact, it was expected to prolong the stay of 
the third-country national arrested given the fact that removal of the per-
son concerned was only possible upon completion of the sentence imposed 
(Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12, 32420, no. 14, p. 68). The Minister, by con-
trast, held the view that the measure would not undermine but strengthen 
the Directive’s objective to foster effective return (Parliamentary Papers II 
2011/12, 32420, no. 15, p. 86). To support his argument, the Minister referred 
to the advice of the Dutch Council of State on a previously submitted trans-
position measure (Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12, 32420, no. 15, p. 86; Leer-
kes and Boersema, 2014: 12-13). This transposition measure, which repre-
sented a draft amendment to the Dutch Alien Act, had been devised under 
the former Minister Ballin and the Council of State had taken the view that 
in light of the relevance of the principle of loyal cooperation and the neces-
sity to ensure the effectiveness of the Directive, the measure should provide 
for sanctioning measures in respect of an offence against the prohibition of 
re-entering the Netherlands (Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 32420, no. 4, p. 
5; Ederveen, 2011: 17).
One year prior to the debates between the Minister and the Dutch Parlia-
ment on the transposition of the Return Directive, in October 2010, a change 
of government had occurred coinciding with the transposition of the Direc-
tive, and including the transfer of the responsibility for asylum and migra-
tion matters from the former Ministry of Justice (now Ministry of Security 
and Justice) to the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and, more 
precisely, to a Minister without portfolio for Immigration, Integration and 
Asylum (European Migration Network, 2012: 11).67 After the fall of the for-
mer Dutch cabinet the envisaged transposition measure – an amendment to 
the Dutch Alien Act – was declared controversial and transposition not fur-
ther pursued. Transposition therefore came to a standstill for virtually two 
months before being taken up again (Everdeen, 2011: 18). With the change 
of Ministry also came a change of approach towards transposition. Minis-
ter Leers, from the Christian-democratic political party (CDA) interpreted 
the Return Directive differently and stricter than his predecessor and party 
colleague Ballin (Parliamentary Papers II 2010/11, 32420, no. 9; see Everdeen, 
2011; Dörrenbächer et al., 2015). Under Minister Leers, the proposed amend-
ment to the Dutch Alien Act was substantially amended (Advisory Com-
66 Cf. Case El Dridi (footnote 416) and case Achughbabian C-329/11, judgment of 6 Decem-
ber 2011.
67 A study commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
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mittee on Migration Affairs 2011; Committee Meijers, 2011),68 the measure 
for pursuing the offence against the prohibition of re-entering the Nether-
lands included as well as the imposition of the entry ban made obligatory 
(whereas the Directive made it optional) (Zwaan, 2011b: 268).
By amending both the Dutch Alien Act and Decree for the purpose of 
transposing the Return Directive, the Minister sought to use already exist-
ing legislation to the most possible extent in order to leave the structure of 
the Dutch law on aliens largely intact (Official Bulletin, 2011, 664, p. 11). The 
Minister’s transposition strategy was targeted at the inclusion of the sub-
stantially new elements which the Directive introduced – the return deci-
sion and the entry ban – into the Dutch Alien Act. In addition, more detailed 
rules should be established by means of the Dutch Alien Decree and other 
lower-level instruments69 (Official Bulletin, 2011, 664, p. 11).
The aim of leaving the national legal framework largely unaltered 
and implementation costs low while converting EU rules into the body 
of national legislation becomes obvious in several ways. To begin with, 
the return decision was merely added to Article 27 of the Alien Act which 
comprised rules governing the application of the decision of multiple con-
sequences in matters of immigration. As a result, the scope of the decision 
was extended by an additional consequence: the obligation for migrants 
identified as having an irregular status, to return to their country of origin. 
The obligation for the non-EU national to return was established as a con-
sequence of two possible scenarios: if the application for the renewal of the 
residence permit was refused, or in case that the residence permit would 
be withdrawn.70 The entry ban was not merely added to already existing 
national rules but required the creation of additional rules, established by 
the new Article 66a of the Dutch Alien Act. In transposing other require-
ments of the Directive concerning this aspect, use was also made of already 
established Dutch rules, policy rules in particular, which were considered as 
being a suitable part of transposition legislation, expected to cover parts of 
the Directive. To ensure compliance with the general transposition obliga-
tion to provide for legally binding transposition measures, these policy rules 
received the status of general binding rules (Official Bulletin, 2011, 664, p. 11).
68 See Commissie Meijers ‘Notitie Strafbaarstelling overtreding inreisverbod’, CM1018 24, 
December 2010, and the Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (ACVZ): ‘Briefadvies 
tweede nota van wijziging implementatie Terugkeerrichtlijn’, ACVZ/ADV/2011/002, 
17 januari 2011. According to the assessments of the national committees of experts in 
the area of immigration law on which the Parliament’s critique was partly based, the 
amendments under the new Minister were so far-reaching, that it would have been a 
more logical course of action if the Minister had tabled a new legislative proposal for the 
purpose of transposition.
69 This refers to the use of the Dutch Alien Circular and Alien Regulation 2000 for further 
clarifi cation of rules established in the Dutch Alien Act.
70 Cf. Articles 27 and 45 of the Dutch Alien Act.
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The civil servants involved, on behalf of the Netherlands, in the EU 
negotiations and subsequently transposing the Directive into Dutch law, 
pointed out in the interview that the transposition of the Directive’s require-
ments was complex. In particular, the issue of how to convert EU rules into 
the Alien Decree was not considered as having been an easy matter, which 
may explain the late adoption of the amendment to the Decree by the end 
of 2011. But also the adoption of the amendment to the Alien Act took some 
time. Apparently in spite of the achievements made in the EU negotiations 
by bringing the proposal more into line with the Directive, its transposition 
turned out to be more complex than initially expected. This was confirmed 
by the interview partners.
13.6.1.1 Scope
The Directive allows Member States to exclude specific groups of illegally 
staying third-country nationals from its scope in specific border cases and 
criminal law cases.71 Exclusion concerns third-country nationals that have 
been refused entry into the territories of the Member States based on the 
Schengen Borders Code72 – a requirement that affects a larger group of peo-
ple being excluded from the Directive’s remit. Furthermore excluded from 
the Directive’s scope is the group of third-country nationals that have been 
intercepted and apprehended when irregularly crossing the external border 
of a Member State by land, air, sea, without subsequently being permitted 
to stay. Finally, the application of the Directive is not mandatory as regards 
non-EU nationals who are subject to extradition procedures and expul-
sions for criminal law reasons. If Member States decide not to apply the 
rules of the Directive, they are expected to apply their own national legisla-
tion. This latter option was applied by the Dutch Government which, thus, 
made use of discretion in transposing the relevant Directive requirements 
(Official Bulletin, 2012, 103). Applying the Directive in this way was fully 
in line with the Government’s wishes to leave existing national rules and 
practices unchanged. In this regard, it was pointed out by the transposing 
Ministry that the possibility to exclude certain groups from the Directive’s 
scope matched with the spirit of the Dutch law on aliens. Hence, discretion 
71 See Article 2(2).
72 Article 13 in combination with Article 5 specifi es the conditions of entry into the EU’s 
territory and refusal of access.
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was apparently used to achieve a good match between the Directive and 
national law (Government Gazette, 2011, 4082).73
13.6.1.2 Voluntary departure period
In giving the illegally staying third-country national the possibility to leave 
the Netherlands within four weeks, Article 62.1 of the Alien Act transposes 
the Directive’s requirement to provide for a voluntary departure period 
between seven and thirty days once a return decision has been issued.74 The 
Directive obliges Member States to extend the voluntary departure period 
by paying regard to the relevant circumstances of the individual case, 
including social and family circumstances of irregular migrants.75 This obli-
gation has been transposed by means of Article 62.3 of the Alien Act but fur-
ther specifications have been provided by lower-level measures. According 
to these specifications, extension of the voluntary departure period is only 
granted if the third-country national provides the authorities with the docu-
ments that are necessary to realise the voluntary departure procedure.76 The 
EU Directive, however, does not impose such a requirement. For this rea-
son, the corresponding Dutch transposition of EU rules was found to be in 
disharmony with the Directive (Van Riel, 2012: 71).
The Article affords Member States some discretion which was used by 
the Ministry by imposing certain conditions on the third-country national 
for the period of voluntary departure77 such as the duty to regular reporting 
to the authorities, to stay at a certain place within the Netherlands and to 
submit certain documentation including, amongst others, travel and iden-
tity documents as well as a deposit of an adequate financial guarantee.78 
73 The matter of exclusions was subsequently transposed by means of orders in council, 
which, as underscored by the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State, could 
only be a temporary solution since the corresponding rules needed to be laid down 
in statutory law. To this end, the current Minister has submitted a legislative proposal 
in January 2015. Cf. Parliamentary Papers II 2014/15, 34128, no. 2 & 3. Interestingly, in 
contrast to the previous approach by Minister Leers, this proposal does not foresee the 
broad use of discretion granted by the Directive. At the same time, like his predecessor, 
the current Minister takes the view that the way the Directive is transposed is in line 
with the intention to incorporate EU requirements by staying in tune with Dutch law. Cf. 
Parliamentary Papers II 2014/15, 34128, no. 3, p. 7.
74 See Article 7(1) of the Directive.
75 See Article 7(2) of the Directive.
76 Cf. Article 6.3 of Alien Regulation.
77 See Article 7(3) of the Directive.
78 Article 4.51b Article 5.1 and the new provision 4:52a and 4:52b of the Alien Decree.
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Furthermore, the transposing Ministry made use of the option, pro-
vided by the Directive, to either shorten the voluntary departure period 
or to decide that no voluntary departure period should be granted to the 
third-country national concerned, which according to the Directive, is only 
possible under specific circumstances: first, in case of risk of absconding – a 
condition which was further specified in Dutch transposition legislation,79 
second, if an application for legal stay was rejected on the grounds of being 
unfounded or fraudulent or, third, if the third-country national concerned 
was found to pose a risk to public policy, public security or national secu-
rity.80 These EU rules were transposed by means of already existing legisla-
tion as well as by revising provisions of the Dutch Alien Act.81
With a view to the transposition of these requirements, two aspects of 
the way the Dutch Ministry transposed EU rules have been criticised. First, 
according to Dutch transposition legislation, an application for legal stay is 
rejected and the period for voluntary departure refused or shortened if the 
application includes incomplete or faulty information.82 Faulty or incom-
plete information, however, has another meaning than the term ‘fraudulent’ 
used in the Directive. According to the European Court of Justice ‘fraudu-
lent’ implies deliberately offering wrong or insufficient information (Van Riel, 
2012: 70).83 The provision of incomplete and faulty information, by contrast, 
does not necessarily result from a deliberate act. Hence, Dutch transposi-
tion appears to be disproportionate. The same seems to hold true regard-
ing another ground which Member States can use to justify changes to the 
requirement of providing irregular migrants with an appropriate period for 
voluntary departure. The Directive establishes that these changes are pos-
sible if the person concerned poses a risk to public policy, public security or 
national security. The Dutch transposition of this requirement established 
that departing from the voluntary departure period set out in the Direc-
tive, is not only justified for reasons of ‘national security’ but also where it 
follows from ‘public order’ issues. The Directive does not, however, refer 
to the notion of ‘public order’ as constituting a ground for departure from 
EU rules.84 What’s more, the public order criterion is used in Dutch law to 
justify the shortening of the voluntary departure period, whereby the mere 
suspicion that a third-country national committed a crime suffices to depart 
79 Reasons to believe that a risk of absconding exists have to be based on objective criteria. 
See Article 3(7) of the Directive. These criteria are established in Article 5.1b Alien Decree 
whereby, according to the Dutch Minister, considerable discretionary room was used. Cf. 
Offi cial Bulletin, 2011, 664, p. 20.
80 See Article 7(4) of the Directive.
81 Cf. 62.4, 31.2d, e, k and 62.2 (new) of the Alien Act.
82 See Art. 62.2 under b Alien Act.
83 See for instance case C-285/85, Germany v Commission of the European Communities 
[1987] ECR I-3203.
84 See Article 31.2 under k Alien Act. Additionally, Van Riel points to the fact that the 
notion of ‘public order’ has not yet been further clarifi ed by the European Court of Jus-
tice. See Van Riel, 2012, p. 70.
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from the Directive (Van Riel, 2012: 70).85 The strict interpretation of EU rules 
in this respect does not seem to match the Directive’s spirit and objective to 
promote voluntary instead of forced returns.86
13.6.1.3 Entry ban
Return decisions shall be issued together with an entry ban in the absence 
of any period being granted for voluntary departure or in case of non-com-
pliance of the third-country national with a return decision that has already 
been issued. In all other cases, it is up to the Member States to decide 
whether or not they wish to impose an entry ban.87 EU rules have been 
transposed accordingly by means of the new Article 66a which was added 
to the Dutch Alien Act. The Directive does not only grant discretion with 
respect to the circumstances under which entry bans may be issued but also 
provides for the possibility to refrain from issuing, withdrawing or sus-
pending an entry ban for, amongst others, humanitarian reasons or in indi-
vidual cases.88 Discretion has been used by establishing that the Minister 
can decide to refrain from imposing an entry ban on humanitarian grounds 
or other reasons.89 These circumstances were further specified by means of 
lower-level regulation.90 The fact that this aspect was not regulated by statu-
tory law drew criticism from the Dutch Parliament (Parliamentary Papers I 
2011/12, 32420, no. 10, p. 39). Moreover, legal experts in immigration mat-
ters questioned91 whether this way of transposing the entry ban provisions 
left enough room to take into account the specific circumstances of individ-
ual cases to which EU rules would have to be applied92 (Van Riel, 2012: 72).
13.6.1.4 Detention
The Directive’s provisions regarding the detention of irregular migrants for 
the purpose of removal as well as the conditions of detention93 have almost 
entirely been transposed by already existing legislation. As established by 
the Directive, in the absence of other less coercive measures, detention of 
irregular migrants is allowed, but only for return / removal purposes and
85 This can be derived from the Dutch Alien Circular 2000, part (A) which further specifi es 
Dutch rules concerning the shortening of the departure period on the basis of Article 
62.2 Alien Act.
86 See recital (10) of the Directive.
87 Cf. Article 11(1) of the Directive.
88 See Article 11(3).
89 Cf. Article 68 of the Alien Act.
90 Cf. Article 6.5.2 of the Dutch Alien Decree. This clarifi cation resulted from the debates in 
Parliament. In a letter to the Dutch Senate the Minister indicated that he would under-
take corresponding steps. Cf. Parliamentary Papers I 2011/12, 32420, H, p. 2-4.
91 This becomes evident from assessments by the Committee Meijers and the Advisory 
Committee on Migration Affairs (ACVZ). See footnote 68.
92 See recital (6) underlining that decisions under the framework of the Directive shall be 
taken on a case-by-case basis as well as recital (22) which refers to the best interests of 
the child and respect for family life as promoted by international human rights treaties.
93 See Articles 15 and 16.
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in particular when there is a risk of the person absconding or if the per-
son hampers the preparation of the return or removal process. In any case, 
detention shall last as short as possible.94 Most of the Directive’s provi-
sions have been transposed by Article 59 of the Alien Act which was hardly 
changed, except for the fact that the maximum lengths of detention which 
the Directive prescribes were added to already established national rules: 
Detention may last up to six months which may be extended by another 
twelve months under exceptional circumstances.95 The conditions under 
which detention of illegally staying third-country nationals may become 
applicable (risk of absconding, procedure being hampered) were added to 
the Dutch Alien Decree.96 Article 59 of the Alien Act, however, also estab-
lished that detention of irregular migrants is possible for reasons of public 
order and national security – circumstances which the Directive does not 
include. National courts questioned the legal correctness of transposition 
in this respect also in light of European case law specifying the conditions 
of detention for illegally staying third-country nationals and clarifying that 
Member States cannot invoke grounds of public order or public safety for 
detaining a person under the Return Directive (Cornelisse, 2011: 14).97 The 
transposing Ministry seems to have solved the issue by incorporating the 
Directive’s grounds for detention into the Dutch Alien Decree, killing two 
birds with one stone: Hence, by making use of lower-level instruments such 
as the Decree, Article 59 of the Alien Act did not need to be changed. At 
the same time, completeness of transposition was ensured regarding the 
grounds for detention which have to be made applicable under the frame-
work of the Return Directive.
13.6.2 Parliamentary debates
In conformity with the Dutch legislative process, the proposal for amend-
ing the Alien Act for the purpose of transposing the Return Directive was 
examined by both the House of Representatives and the Senate98 of the 
Dutch Parliament and debates with the Minister took place in October and 
94 See Article 15(1) of the Directive.
95 See Article 15(5) and 15(6) of the Directive which have been transposed by Article 59.5 
and 59.6 of the Alien Decree.
96 Cf. Article 5.1a of the Alien Decree.
97 Cf. Kadzoev case C-357/09 PPU, judgment of 30 November 2009 - [closed].
98 Shortly before the debates the draft transposition measure had been subjected to further 
scrutiny by the General Committee for Immigration and Asylum of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Standard Committee for Immigration and Asylum of the Senate.
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December 2011 respectively.99 Given a delay of meanwhile almost one year 
that had resulted in a reasoned opinion from the European Commission, 
the Minister asked for a speedy treatment by Parliament which should be 
concluded before the Christmas break.100 In fact, the need for a speedy treat-
ment illustrates the time lag between the adoption of the Directive and the 
parliamentary consultations. That so much time had lapsed was according 
to the Minister due to the fact, that transposition was much more complex 
than was initially thought and that, additionally, adjustments of the trans-
position measure in light of both the advice of the Council of State (Gov-
ernment Gazette, 2012, 1231) and European case law as well as the Minis-
ter’s responses to parliamentary questions had required additional time 
(Parliamentary Papers I 2010/11, 32420, no. 10, p. 87). That a relatively fast 
parliamentary process was realised in the end does not obscure the fact 
that Members of Parliament were dissatisfied with some aspects of the 
proposed measure. The national Parliament was not intensively involved 
in the EU negotiations on the Directive but it showed great interest once it 
participated in its transposition (interview). While the government coalition 
of Christen Democrats (CDA) and Liberal Democrats (VVD) with support 
of the right-wing PVV (Freedom Party) backed the Minister’s proposal, it 
was criticised by several other parties in Parliament, including the Chris-
ten Union (ChristenUnie, CU), the Social Democrats (PvdA) and still more 
left of the party spectrum, by the Dutch Democrats (D66) and the Greens 
(GroenLinks). In spite of their different party affiliations, disapproval was 
based on similar reasons. The common view was that the draft measure was 
disproportionate and ineffective and therefore counterproductive to the 
Directive’s objective of fostering voluntary departure and a generally fair 
and human treatment of irregular migrants (Parliamentary Papers II 2010/11, 
32420, no. 14 & 15).
The criminalisation of the offence against the prohibition of re-enter-
ing the Netherlands mentioned above was not the only reason for this 
view. The Minister was reproached for what seemed to several Members 
of Parliament a restrictive interpretation of the Directive showing in the 
99 Usually the plenary debates in the House of Representatives carry much more political 
weight. Debates in the Senate, by contrast, are confi ned to questions of legal technique 
and quality of draft legislation. In the particular case of immigration, matters are politi-
cally sensitive and, as the involvement of the Dutch Senate in the case at hand shows, at 
times political and legal issues intertwined. That is why the descriptive analysis takes a 
closer look at the plenary debates not only in the House of Representatives but also the 
Senate.
100 In a letter to the President of the Senate, the Dutch Minister for Immigration and Asylum 
informed that on 29 September 2011 the European Commission issued a reasoned opin-
ion against the Netherlands due to the absence of notifi cation of national transposition 
measures. If non-compliance persisted, the Commission would start an infringement 
proceeding against the Netherlands before the European Court of Justice and impos-
ing a fi ne of about 3 925 000 Million Euro. Cf. Parliamentary Papers I 2011/12, 32420, A. 
See European Commission, ‘Met reden omkleed advies’ (reasoned opinion), 2011/0285, 
Brussel, 29 September 2011.
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Minister’s choice to make use of the possible maximum length regarding 
detention, whereas, in their view, he could have opted for shorter periods 
in support of the Directive’s objective of voluntary return (Parliamentary 
Papers I 2010/11, 32420, no. 10, p. 38; 42). Moreover, the fact that accord-
ing to Dutch transposition legislation detention of irregular migrants was 
made possible for reasons of national security and public order, and there-
fore based on more grounds than established by the Directive, made critics 
in Parliament believe that the Minister gave preference to detention over the 
speedy return of irregular migrants (Parliamentary Papers I 2010/11, 32420, 
no. 10, p. 50-51). Transposition as proposed by the Minister was, however, 
not only found to hamper an effective return procedure. It was also con-
sidered detrimental to the Directive’s objective of providing returnees with 
sufficient procedural safeguards. The view that was held by some Members 
of Parliament was that the Minister’s transposition measure was geared 
towards a rather coercive return procedure whereas the Directive implied 
a stepwise approach to voluntary return in line with the principle of pro-
portionality and by taking due account of specific circumstances of indi-
vidual cases as well as European case law providing further guidance in 
the application of EU rules on return. It was criticised in Parliament that 
such an approach was not explicitly laid down in the draft transposition 
measure and that also other crucial aspects were not established by statu-
tory law but by lower-level instruments which from the viewpoint of legal 
certainty and democratic control gave grounds for concern (Parliamentary 
Papers I 2010/11, 32420, no. 10, p. 41). For instance, according to Parliament 
the Directive’s rules concerning the position of vulnerable groups (e.g. 
handicapped or elderly people) or those that should for humanitarian rea-
sons be excluded from measures of return should be included into the Alien 
Act (Parliamentary Papers I 2010/11, 32420, no. 10, p. 41; Parliamentary Papers 
II 2010/11, 32420, no. 14, p. 69). The Minister rejected all points of criticism 
by giving the following arguments to justify his approach. First, where the 
Directive implied choices, these had been used to transpose the Directive 
while staying in line with the Dutch legislation on aliens. Furthermore, he 
argued that it was not necessary to follow the Directive’s rules to the letter 
and that his approach was justified by the fact that already existing national 
legislation and regulations covered large parts of the Directive and could 
therefore be used to transpose its requirements into Dutch law (Parliamen-
tary Papers II 2010/11, 32420, no. 15, p. 97). Where aspects of the Directive 
were not yet regulated by national law, like in the case of the maximum 
lengths for detention, transposition remained close to the Directive’s text 
(Parliamentary Papers I 2010/11, 32420, no. 10, p. 78). Second, the Minister 
argued that opting to regulate a number of aspects by lower-level instru-
ments, i.e. by means of delegated legislation, instead of statutory law, was 
compatible with the system and structure of the Dutch Alien Act and would 
offer sufficient flexibility to transpose future amendments of EU rules on 
return more efficiently since lower-level regulation (orders of council, min-
isterial decisions) would be faster adjusted than statutory law (Parliamentary 
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Papers I 2010/11, 32420, no. 10, p. 80-81). While acknowledging the need for 
efficient government decision-making, Members of the Dutch Parliament 
requested the Minister to specify transposition law regarding the stages and 
elements of the return procedure where the Minister intended to make use 
of the discretion granted by the Directive (Parliamentary Papers I 2010/11, 
32420, no. 10, p. 88). But on the whole, the Minister’s explanations and jus-
tifications did not take the wind out of the sails of the critics in Parliament 
who still forwarded several amendments. These suggestions for amend-
ments, however, did not bring about any substantial adjustments to the pro-
posed transposition measure. In addition, the proposed transposition law 
was supported by a majority of the Dutch House of Representatives101 as 
well as by the Senate after consultations between the Minister and the Sen-
ate in December 2011 (Parliamentary Papers I 2011/12, 32420, no. 12, p. 25).102
After having outlined in detail the transposition measures and process, 
it is considered time to move from description to explanation and to look 
into the role of discretion and other factors expected to affect the national 
transposition of directives.
13.7 Analysis
From the viewpoint of discretion the insights into the plenary debates about 
the draft transposition measure are highly relevant. A number of the issues 
addressed above, directly relate to the following aspects which are fur-
ther looked into hereafter: how the Minister intended to use the discretion 
granted by the Directive, for what reasons and how this use was assessed 
by Parliament. Addressing these aspects in more detail serves to shed light 
on the role of discretion in the transposition of the Return Directive.
13.7.1 Discretion-in-national-law
The first and obvious point is that discretion played a relevant role in the 
transposition of the Return Directive. This point notwithstanding, the mat-
ter becomes more complex when considering in more detail the role of all 
101 Alongside the coalition government and the PVV, also the Reformed Political Party 
(SGP) supported the proposal. Most amendments were rejected, some withdrawn. See 
Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12, 32420, letter to the Senate ‘Overview of votes in the 
House of Representatives’, 2 November 2011.
102 As mentioned earlier, in the Netherlands the House of Representatives has greater politi-
cal signifi cance than the Senate. The Senate has to be understood as ‘chambre de réfl ex-
ion’, focusing largely on the legal quality of draft legislation. In considering formal law 
(bills) the House of Representatives has more powers than the Senate which has no right 
of amendment and can, in principal, only reject or accept a proposal. Due to the differ-
ent scope of decision-making competences, the Dutch bicameral system is considered as 
asymmetric Cf. Breeman and Timmermans, 2012, p. 153; p. 166.
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relevant factors, above all discretion, in explaining the Dutch transposition 
performance and its outcome.
To this end, several expectations are addressed, starting with the one 
linking a smooth transposition process and compliance with EU law to the 
availability of higher levels of discretion granted by the Directive for the 
sake of implementation (expectation 5). The Return Directive does include 
a number of facultative provisions and therefore grants a rather wide scope 
of discretion which was largely used by the transposing Ministry to incor-
porate the requirements of the Directive into Dutch law. But does that mean 
that transposition was facilitated and transposition carried out in a timely 
and legally correct way? Based on the descriptive analysis the immediate 
answer is ‘no’. After all, the Dutch transposition was not timely and legal 
correctness challenged by national courts – due to infringements of provi-
sions with direct effect, resulting from belated transposition. What’s more, 
due to the delay in transposition, the Netherlands faced an infringement 
proceeding by the Commission. This being said, it can be concluded that 
having a wider scope of discretion available for transposition, did not result 
in timely transposition as predicted. Did discretion, on the other hand, 
impede the transposition of the Return Directive? Without intending to 
exclude too readily this possibility, the analysis of the transposition process 
brings other factors into play that contributed to slowing down the formal 
implementation of the Directive. First, there is the change of government 
in October 2010 and the different course taken by the new Government in 
transposing the Directive thereafter. This change in the political circum-
stances led to a turning point in the transposition of the Directive because 
prior to it, the first steps in transposing the Directive had been made: the 
draft amendment to the Alien Act had been assessed by the Council of State 
and preparations for parliamentary debates were under way.103 With the 
new Government in place transposition, however, was put on hold for two 
months, and when the process was ‘restarted’ the deadline for transposing 
the Directive had already expired. What’s more, transposition was certainly 
not helped by the fact that the new Minister adopted a different approach in 
transposing the Directive than his predecessor. Other reasons for the delay 
were mentioned by the Minister himself: the complexity of transposition 
had been underestimated – as confirmed in the interviews – and adjust-
ments following from further advice of the Council of State and European 
case law were time-consuming, and additionally contributed to the delay in 
transposition.
Whereas discretion does not seem to have played a facilitating role in 
achieving timely transposition, viewed from another angle, it was neverthe-
less relevant for the formal implementation of the Return Directive in the 
103 Cf. Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12, 32420, no. 7. It should, however, be noted that by that 
time, more than 1.5 years had passed since the adoption of the Directive which points 
to a slow pace of progression of transposition already prior to the political changes in 
October 2010.
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Netherlands. The analysis shows that in translating the Directive’s scope 
and operational provisions – return decision, entry ban, voluntary departure 
period and detention of irregular migrants – into the national legal frame-
work, discretion was used to convert EU rules with the lowest possible 
impact for already existing Dutch legislation on aliens. Maintaining national 
rules and practices vis-à-vis irregular migrants was a priority of the Minister 
as can be derived from his line of reasoning presented in Parliament. The 
approach adopted by the Minister, however, seems to have taken too little 
account of the Directive’s objectives and spirit. Therefore the preservation 
of national rules – at all costs as it seems – met with criticism, also because 
it seemed to make Dutch transposition prone to legal incorrectness (Corne-
lisse, 2011; Everdeen, 2011; Zwaan, 2011b: 272). In this context, discretion 
was perceived negatively, as shown by the debates in Parliament. From the 
viewpoint of Parliament discretion was used by the Minister to realise his 
restrictive approach towards irregular migration being reflected in minimal-
ist choices regarding the Directive’s provisions, including those establishing 
favourable conditions for irregular migrants such as legal and procedural 
safeguards.
13.7.2 Discretion, transposition actors and disagreement
Does the disagreement of Members in Parliament with the Minister’s draft 
transposition measure, including the Minister’s use of discretion, offer evi-
dence in support of the expectation that the involvement of more than one 
actor in transposition has adverse effects on the process if also more dis-
cretion is available (expectation 9)? First of all, it is indisputable that with 
Parliament being involved in the transposition of the Return Directive, 
controversy emerged about the way the process should be carried out. This 
supports the expectation that the process was slowed down as a result of 
the joint effect of discretion and the number of transposition actors. On the 
other hand, parliamentary treatment went relatively swift. This was most 
likely due to the evident time constraints – the deadline of transposition 
had expired more than half a year earlier – and the fact that the Minister 
had urged Parliament to rapidly process the Directive dossier. In addition, 
while voicing criticism regarding the Minister’s course in transposition, 
those Members of Parliament who disapproved of the proposed transposi-
tion measure could not put a halt to the process. While several parties in 
Parliament rejected the proposal in the final vote, they were in the minority. 
Taking the foregoing into consideration, the adverse effect on transposition 
resulting from the interaction of parliamentary involvement and availability 
of a wider scope of discretion is considered to be small. In other words, the 
actor interaction expectation does not fully apply but partially holds true.
Taking a step back to the EU level, disagreement with the content of the 
Directive, expressed by the Member States during the Council negotiations, 
is also expected to influence transposition performance under certain con-
ditions. More precisely, the disagreement interaction expectation (E6) implies 
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that Member State disagreement with a directive’s requirement raises the 
likelihood of deficient transposition of corresponding EU rules. This effect 
becomes more positive as the degree of discretion decreases. As argued 
in the descriptive analysis of the negotiation process, the initial Commis-
sion proposal did not correspond with Dutch preferences in a number of 
respects due to a lacking match between EU and Dutch rules in the area of 
return management. Owing to the fact that the Dutch return procedure had 
been revised only a few years prior to the negotiations and that, addition-
ally, it had proven its worth, the efforts of the Dutch delegation were geared 
to bringing the proposal closer in line with the legal arrangements on which 
its own return management system was based. This was crowned with suc-
cess in a few respects: the two-step approach was abandoned, the legal rem-
edies requirement relaxed. In addition, the Directive includes a number of 
discretionary provisions which enabled the transposing Ministry to make 
own choices in transposition. But it is exactly the Directive’s high margin of 
discretion which stands in contrast to the small discretion margin on which 
the expectation under consideration is based. The conclusion therefore is 
that the expectation does not have any relevance in explaining the deficient 
transposition of the Directive.
13.7.3 Discretion and compatibility
A relevant fact remains that despite some changes being made to the Direc-
tive during the negotiations, EU and Dutch rules concerning the return 
of irregular migrants still did not match in a number of respects once the 
Directive had to be (formally) implemented by the Dutch authorities. This 
is a relevant aspect given the fact that discretion and compatibility are 
expected to interact, thereby affecting transposition. To put it in more con-
crete words: expectation 7 posits that compatibility between the EU direc-
tive and national legislation raises the likelihood of proper transposition, 
and that, additionally, this effect becomes more positive as the degree of dis-
cretion increases. Hence, discretion may facilitate transposition if there also 
is a good match between EU and national law. As earlier established, during 
the EU negotiations the Dutch Government achieved to bring the Directive 
proposal more in line with the Dutch legal system. In spite of this achieve-
ment, transposition did not proceed smoothly. It turned out to be more com-
plex once it got under way at the national level. In addition, in the course 
of the process, adjustments had to be made to the transposition measures, 
not only in following up the advice of the Council of State but also due to 
European case law concerning the (formal) implementation of the Direc-
tive. All this seems to indicate that the incompatibility between the Direc-
tive and national law was greater than expected by the Dutch Government 
prior to the actual transposition of the Return Directive.104 This observation 
104 I wish to add that, in my view, complexity does not necessarily imply incompatibility, 
but in the present case it seems that both are linked to each other.
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is supported by the concept of legal fit used in the dissertation to assess the 
incompatibility between EU and national law. Based on this conceptualisa-
tion, EU and national rules show a mismatch of a moderate to high scope:105 
transposition made it necessary to adopt more than two legislative acts 
of a higher order106 which did not merely replace existing legislation but 
required that amendments were made to it, although the Minister was keen 
to limit the implications from transposition for national legislation. Seeking 
to keep the Dutch law on aliens intact even if this rather emphasised than 
minimised the incompatibility between national and EU rules, and the fact 
that the Minister used discretion to achieve this end, lends support to the 
idea that low compatibility and discretion taken together impeded timely 
transposition. These findings, on the other hand, do not square with the 
core idea of the expectation that proper transposition is achieved through 
compatibility and discretion interacting and facilitating it. Hence, the expec-
tation, as it stands, is not supported by the empirical evidence.
13.7.4 Discretion and administrative capacity
Finally, in line with expectation 8, the question rises if the Dutch transposi-
tion was impeded by lacking administrative capacity, which by interacting 
with a wide margin of discretion, is expected to have retarding effects on 
the pace of transposition. The administrative authority mainly responsible 
for the transposition of the Directive was the Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations, and more in particular the Minister for Immigration 
and Asylum and the ministerial departments assisting him. Insights gained 
from the analysis of the transposition documents as well as the interviews 
with the civil servants involved in both the negotiations and transposition 
of the Directive delivered no evidence of insufficient knowledge among 
transposition actors. Nor did the empirical analysis yield any proof of coor-
dination problems between the policy and legal units involved in the Direc-
tive dossier. Hence, the expectation linking discretion and administrative 
capacity is not found to hold true.
105 To recall: ‘High misfi t is registered when a directive requires the adoption of many (more 
than two) legislative acts, when these acts are of a higher order (laws and regulations) 
and when the transposition measures are mostly extensive amendments rather than new 
acts. A moderate degree of misfi t is observed when many, high order acts are adopted 
but the acts are new and do not replace existing legislation.’ Cf. Steunenberg and Tosh-
kov, 2009, p. 960.
106 Alongside the amendment of the Alien Act and Decree, another (temporary) order in 
council was required to transpose the Directive.
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13.8 Conclusion
Discretion played a relevant role in the Dutch transposition of the Return 
Directive. It was used by the Minister in his attempt to preserve national 
rules and practices in dealing with third-country nationals staying ille-
gally on the territory of the Netherlands. Preserving the national legal sys-
tem, and therefore already established rules and practices towards irregu-
lar migrants, is apparently not unique to the Netherlands. This kind of 
approach to the transposition of the Return Directive was also applied in 
other Member States (Zwaan, 2011a; 2011b). In the Netherlands the use of 
discretion served to fit the provisions of the Directive into the national legal 
framework. But how discretion was exercised by the Minister in transpos-
ing the Directive was not fully supported by Parliament. The Minister’s 
transposition approach sparked parliamentary debate which, while prob-
ably slightly delaying the process, is rather negligible in explaining the 
long-term delay in the formal implementation of the Directive. What can 
be established is that with a view to the parliamentary debate, discretion 
was associated by opposition representatives in Parliament with the imposi-
tion of restrictive measures by the Dutch Government. What’s more, while 
discretion did not enter into play by strengthening the positive effects of 
compatibility between EU and national rules, it seems to have negatively 
affected the formal implementation of the Directive, contributing to the 
long-term delay in transposition. Finally, the analysis brought to light that 
transposition was further slowed down by additional factors which relate to 
the political circumstances accompanying the incorporation of the Directive 
into Dutch law. These concern the change of government and the adoption 
of a different approach to transposition as well as the complexity of the pro-
cess, which was only fully realised by those in charge once transposition 
had to be carried out in practice.

14.1 Introduction
In the following sections the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive1 
takes centre stage which has been adopted to combat air pollution in the 
EU. This chapter begins by briefly tracing the development of EU environ-
mental law-making and policy. The focus then moves on to the processes 
of negotiations and the transposition in the Netherlands, paying specific 
attention to the Dutch position towards the Directive. Next to the descrip-
tive analyses of the events, the explanatory analyses shed light on the role 
of discretion.
14.2 The directive
Environmental pollution is a threat to both human health and the envi-
ronment. It shows in different ways and environmental sectors (water, air, 
noise, waste, soil etc.). Pollution can have various reasons. In seeking to 
identify its causes, experts make a distinction between point sources and 
diffuse sources of pollution. As regards the pollution of water, for instance, 
discharges from industry or fish farms are referred to as ‘point sources’, 
meaning in plain language, ‘stationary locations or fixed facilities from 
which pollutions are discharged’ in contrast to pollution from ‘diffuse 
sources’, i.e. pollution which has no specific point of discharge.2 Agriculture 
and forestry are examples of diffuse source pollution in the area of water 
and soil pollution.
Diffuse sources in air pollution have been linked to the storage and dis-
tribution of petrol. Petrol is composed of a complex combination of volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs), including benzene which is known to cause 
cancer. VOCs easily evaporate into the air where they cause problems of pol-
lution. The EU’s Stage I Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive3 was adopted with 
1 Directive 2009/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 
2009 on Stage II petrol vapour recovery during refuelling of motor vehicles at service 
stations, OJ L 285, 31 October 2009, pp. 36-39.
2 See the Agency’s defi nition of ‘point sources’, available at: http://www.eea.europa.eu/
themes/water/water-pollution/point-sources and ‘diffuse sources’, available at: http://
www.eea.europa.eu/themes/water/water-pollution/diffuse-sources (both accessed 22 
June 2015).
3 See European Parliament and Council Directive 94/63/EC of 20 December 1994 on the 
control of volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions resulting from the storage of pet-
rol and its distribution from terminals to service stations.
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the aim of reducing petrol and VOC emissions, respectively, during the stor-
age and distribution of petrol between oil terminals and service stations by 
means of storage installations at terminals to avoid evaporative losses from 
tanks. Additionally, the Directive establishes measures for the loading and 
transport of petrol to ensure that any vapours are recovered and returned to 
the tanker or terminal where they can be redistributed. Very importantly, to 
achieve a more consistent and efficient application of EU rules, the Directive 
includes harmonised technical specifications for the design and use of the 
installations and other equipment referred to in the Directive.
In 2009 a follow-up measure was adopted which should tackle another 
diffuse source related to petrol: Evaporation during refuelling of passenger 
cars at service stations. The overall aim of Directive 2009/126/EC, in short, 
Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive, is to ensure the recovery of petrol 
vapour that would otherwise be emitted into the air during the refuelling 
of vehicles at service stations. Next to the risks of petrol described above, 
the 2009 Directive draws particular attention to the harmful effects of ben-
zene. Benzene does not only cause cancer but also stimulates the formation 
of ground-level ozone, popularly known as ‘smog’, entailing great hazards 
for human health and the environment. In justifying the legislative proposal 
for the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive, the European Commis-
sion underlined that the Directive would contribute to higher air quality 
standards in limiting emissions of benzene and formation of ground-
level ozone. Specific equipment for petrol pumps in service stations were 
expected to ensure the recovery of at least 85% of petrol vapour (European 
Commission, 2008a).
The recovery of petrol vapour and corresponding technical issues may 
possibly lead one to think of the Directive as a comprehensive legal docu-
ment. Yet, rather the reverse is the case. Including 19 recitals and 12 Articles, 
the Directive does not appear to be a long or complex document; instead it 
is a rather short and simply structured piece of legislation. This is in contrast 
to many other environmental directives which have more complex struc-
tures reflected by a high number of articles which are divided into chap-
ters as well as detailed obligations set out in articles, provisions, and points. 
In addition, these more complex environmental directives often include an 
Annex with elaborations on particular requirements that Member States 
have to take into account when implementing the directive.
The Directive’s subject matter is the reduction of petrol vapour emitted 
during refuelling (Article 1). To this end, service stations shall be equipped 
with stage II petrol vapour recovery systems4 which, as set out in Article 2, 
are defined as ‘equipment aimed at recovering the petrol vapour displaced 
from the fuel tank of a motor vehicle during refuelling at a service station 
and which transfers that petrol vapour to a storage tank at the service sta-
tion or back to the petrol dispenser for resale’. The obligation for Member 
4 Hereafter they are also referred to in short as ‘stage II systems’ or ‘stage II equipment’.
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States to ensure that stage II vapour recovery systems are installed at new 
as well as existing service stations is laid down in Article 3 which also speci-
fies further conditions for installations. Article 4 determines that stage II 
systems shall recover 85 % of emissions as a minimum, and between 0.95 
and 1.05 in case that petrol vapour recovered is transferred to a storage tank 
at the service station. To guarantee its proper functioning, stage II systems 
shall be subjected to periodic checks and consumers informed about their 
use at service stations by means of a sticker, for instance (Article 5). In addi-
tion and as established by Article 6, Member States are obliged to provide 
for rules on penalties applicable when national provisions adopted pursu-
ant to the Directive are violated. They shall notify these rules to the Com-
mission no later than 1 January 2012, coinciding with the deadline for Mem-
ber State transposition (Article 10). The Commission is obliged to review 
Member States’ implementation of the Directive as laid down in Article 7.
The results of the coding exercise make clear that the Directive does not 
afford Member States much discretion for implementation. Besides, when 
asked about the Directive’s discretion margin, the Dutch civil servant who 
was involved in the EU negotiations on the Directive shared the view that 
the Directive hardly includes discretionary provisions.
One aspect that contributes to the lack of discretion is that the Directive 
is of a rather technical nature and therefore did not require the granting of 
a wider scope of discretion. If looking at the actual wording of the Direc-
tive, only Article 8 explicitly grants discretion. This Article provides Mem-
ber States with the possibility to adopt harmonised standards with regard to 
Article 4 (minimum requirements for efficiency of vapour recovery systems) 
and Article 5 (periodic checks) and, except for these two Articles, it allows 
for the technical upgrading of all other Articles to ensure consistency with 
EU harmonised standards by means of a committee procedure (comitology), 
which is further determined in Article 9.5
14.2.1 The area of environment – air pollution6
The EU has been a longstanding active player in the area of environment and 
shown firm commitment to its protection long before its actions upgraded to 
policies by means of a legal fundament through the Treaty on the European 
Union (1993). From early on, air and atmospheric pollution ranked high 
among its environmental concerns. The EU’s strategy has been to control, 
5 As earlier explained, the committee procedure, however, implies that Member States 
share implementing powers with the Commission which in fact curtails their discretion-
ary room.
6 This outline is based on the study of policy documents referred to in the subsequent 




environment/enveco/mbi.htm (all accessed 29 June 2015).
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prevent and reduce emissions of harmful substances into the atmosphere. 
The Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive together with its preceding 
counterpart (Stage I) are clear instances of this latter approach, aiming to 
limit pollutants. In several other ways, the EU has contributed to achieving 
better ambient air quality, for instance, by improving fuel quality as well as, 
in line with EU environmental policy integration, by introducing require-
ments for the protection of the environment in EU policy-making relating to 
sectors other than the environment (e.g. transport and energy).7
Generally speaking, EU measures in the area of environment were ini-
tially taken with the primary aim to improve the functioning of the internal 
market. Hence, EU rules that had the beneficial ‘side effect’ of countering 
air pollution, were taken in the first place with an eye to remove potential 
trade barriers and competitive distortions caused by different air quality 
standards applicable in the Member States to certain products such as vehi-
cles. In the course of time, awareness of environmental problems, and their 
transboundary dimension in particular, among both the public and political 
decision-makers, increased. A series of command-and-control measures, i.e. 
direct regulation by means of EU directives or regulations instead of eco-
nomic incentives8 and market-based instruments9 used later on – have since 
the 1970s proven the EU’s continuous attention and efforts to ensure better 
air quality. Applying the so-called ‘roadmap approach’, EU plans and objec-
tives for fighting air pollution were set out in Commission communications 
and subsequently translated into EU framework legislation and daughter 
directives. A case in point is the EU Ambient Air Quality Directive, which 
prior to its adoption in 1996, had been addressed by the Commission in its 
fifth and sixth environmental action programmes, where the content and 
objectives of this Directive were further set out.10 The Directive, which has 
meanwhile been revised (2008), sets basic principles and an overall frame-
work for action by introducing quality objectives for ambient air as well as 
common methods and criteria for the assessment of air quality. Addition-
ally, the Directive has provided a firm basis for a number of directives in the 
area of air quality which, as substance-specific directives or daughter direc-
tives, are closely linked with it.
7 Article 6 TEC (now Article 11 TFEU) lies down that ‘Environmental protection require-
ments must be integrated into the defi nition and implementation of the Union’s policies 
and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.’
8 See for instance Harrington, W. and R. D. Morgenstern (2004), ‘Economic Incentives ver-
sus Command and Control’, Resources 152: 13-17.
9 Market-based instruments are also referred to as economic instruments such as environ-
mental taxes, targeted subsidies, or tradable permit systems like the EU trading scheme 
on greenhouse gas emissions. 
10 See COM(92) 23 fi nal and COM(2001) 31 fi nal.
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All in all, in the field of air pollution, the EU has dealt with a number 
of matters ranging from ambient air quality to pollution from emissions 
from power stations, plants and vehicles.11 In fact, EU policy on air quality 
and pollution is still in continuous development. More recently, the EU has 
started to review its overall approach with the 2005 thematic air pollution 
strategy (European Commission, 2005). It reflects the EU’s determination to 
ensure that air quality levels do not result in unacceptable impacts on, and 
risks to, human health (European Commission, 2001). This is an objective 
which has been re-endorsed in the Commission’s currently running seventh 
environmental action programme.12 The thematic air pollution strategy 
defines priorities, its major concern being with the reduction of the most 
harmful pollutants and with risk prevention to protect the most vulnerable 
group from the effects of air pollution. More important in the present con-
text, however, is the fact that it focusses on reducing air pollutants such as 
ozone. By adopting the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive, amongst 
other measures, the EU has sought to put this plan into practice.
While EU legislation on air quality and protection has certainly not 
remained without results – reductions of emissions from industrial plants, 
power stations and motor vehicles attest to its success – other problems 
persist such as the formation and increase of ground-level ozone. Unlike 
ozone layers in the stratosphere, which function as protective shield against 
harmful UV radiation, ground-level ozone in high concentrations is a harm-
ful substance to human health and, moreover, to agriculture, vegetation 
and building materials. Against the background of increasing ozone values 
exceeding EU limits for health, the Commission identified the need for leg-
islative action. Its proposal for a directive for stage II petrol vapour recovery 
during the refuelling of petrol cars at service stations was presented to the 
public as an important step in its fight against air pollution, which the Com-
mission considered as a factor essentially contributing to the shortening of 
average life expectancy and causing premature deaths (European Commis-
sion, 2008a).
14.2.2 Purpose and background to the directive
Hence, reducing ground-level ozone and emissions at source more gener-
ally were key motives of the Commission in proposing to make the installa-
tion of stage II petrol vapour recovery equipment at service stations a legal 
requirement. As with most of its proposals, the Commission’s initiative did 
not come out of the blue since corresponding intentions had been revealed 
11 Cf. Council Directive 96/62/EC of 27 September 1996 on ambient air quality assessment 
and management, OJ L 365, 31 December 1994, pp. 24-33 and Directive 2008/50/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and 
cleaner air for Europe, OJ L 152, 11 June 2008, pp. 1-44.
12 COM(2012) 710 fi nal. Supplementing as well as updating already existing legislation, it 
sets objectives and proposes measures for a timeline of 15 years.
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in the thematic strategy on air pollution and the revised directive on ambi-
ent air quality.13 The idea for the EU-wide use of stage II systems was taken 
in line with the EU’s broader objective to tackle the root of the problem: 
emissions of volatile organic compounds contained in petrol known to con-
tribute to the formation of ozone.
To this end, the EU pursued the approximation of national laws regard-
ing measures against air pollution by emissions from motor vehicles (pas-
senger cars).14 Another measure was targeted at minimising evapora-
tion losses throughout the process of storage and distribution of motor 
fuels – the later Stage I Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive – which in turn 
announced follow-up steps regarding the recovery of petrol vapour related 
to the refuelling at service stations15 (Oosterhuis et al., 2011: 621). Such 
a measure turned out to be necessary – not only to combat ground-level 
ozone. The envisaged Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive should help 
offsetting negative effects from the increase of volatile organic compounds 
emissions triggered by another directive16 with which the EU intended to 
encourage greater use of bioethanol in petrol in order to render petrol and 
diesel less environmentally damaging (European Commission, 2008b).
Submitting its proposal under the environment procedure laid down 
by Article 175 TEC (now 192 TFEU), indicates that the matter did not fall 
within an area of exclusive EU competence. The Commission justified EU 
action by underlining the cross-border dimension of air pollution problems, 
and petrol vapour in particular, which could only efficiently be dealt with 
by a common and coherent approach (European Commission, 2008b, pp. 
5-6). This approach should be geared towards petrol vapour recovery dur-
ing refuelling, and the installation of stage II equipment be realised prior to 
2020 to achieve a significant reduction of hazardous substances such as ben-
zene and ground-level ozone. Besides this primary goal, the proposal was 
also based on economic considerations: In tune with the EU’s Lisbon Strat-
egy and general internal market objectives it should stimulate the demand 
and development of Stage II vapour recovery technologies (European Com-
mission, 2008b, p. 2). While the Commission did not ignore that its proposal 
entailed costs to be borne by the Member States, it underlined the economic 
13 See recital (17) of Directive 2008/50/EC.
14 Council Directive 91/441/EEC of 26 June 1991 amending Directive 70/220/EEC on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to measures to be taken against 
air pollution by emissions from motor vehicles, OJ L 242, 30 August 1991, pp. 1-106.
15 As stated in its preamble: ‘Whereas further action will be needed to reduce the vapour 
emissions during refueling operations at service stations (…)’.
16 Directive 2009/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
amending Directive 98/70/EC as regards the specifi cation of petrol, diesel and gas-oil 
and introducing a mechanism to monitor and reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
amending Council Directive 1999/32/EC as regards the specifi cation of fuel used by 
inland waterway vessels and repealing Directive 93/12/EEC, OJ L 140, 5 June 2009, pp. 
88-113.
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chances lying in innovation and business opportunities (European Commis-
sion, 2008b).
The Commission apparently sought to present a proposal that was 
based on sound scientific knowledge, economic assessments, and reli-
able and recent environmental information. For this purpose consultation 
rounds were held involving stakeholders from a range of organisations, 
including oil industry associations, Stage II PVR equipment manufacturers, 
independent service station operators and motoring organisations as well 
as non- governmental organisations representing environmental and trans-
port interests (European Commission, 2008b, pp. 3-4). Moreover, an impact 
assessment was carried out from which the view emerged that the instal-
lation of Stage II vapour recovery systems at service stations was the most 
suitable means to reach the envisaged objectives, also as regards the fea-
sibility to realise the technical requirements and achieve cost-effectiveness 
(European Commission, 2008c).
14.3 Negotiations
Not even a year passed between, on the one hand, the submission of the 
proposal in December 2008 and negotiations kicking off shortly later, and 
the conclusion of the negotiations, on the other hand. The European Par-
liament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety 
voted in favour of the proposal on 31 March 2008 and the proposal’s adop-
tion in plenary by the European Parliament soon followed on 5 May 2009. 
Most of the latter’s amendments, 21 in total, were taken into account and a 
few informal meetings (trilogues) between representatives from the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council and the Commission advanced interest rec-
onciliation.17 On 25 September 2009 a final agreement was struck and the 
Directive adopted at first reading with no Member State abstaining and co-
decision and qualified majority voting applying in the Council (Council of 
the European Union, 2009a). A relatively short negotiation process and com-
promises already reached in the Council’s preparatory bodies – in the work-
ing party on the environment and the Permanent Representatives Commit-
tee (Coreper) – made further debate at the level of ministers unnecessary, 
and point to the smooth progress of negotiations (see table 20).
17 These meetings are usually set up with the aim of reaching agreement between the two 
bodies at a directive’s fi rst reading.
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Table 20: Timeline for negotiations on the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive
04 Dec 08 Adoption by Commission proposal 
05 May 09 European Parliament opinion on 1st reading
13 May 09 European Economic and Social Committee opinion
25 Sep 09 European Parliament opinion on 1st reading 
21 Oct 09 Formal adoption by Council and European Parliament
For a number of Member States, the Directive proposal did not bring any 
decisive changes (Oosterhuis et al., 2011). In many Member States petrol 
vapour recovery equipment was already installed at many service sta-
tions for the same purpose as pursued by the proposed Directive.18 There-
fore the Directive did not contain many novelties for the Member States, 
and certainly not for the Netherlands. Here, stage II systems had already 
been made obligatory for service stations19 in 1996 on the basis of two 
Decrees,20,21 adopted within the framework of the Dutch regulation on envi-
ronmental management on sites. The Dutch Government, being aware of 
the link between emissions of volatile organic compounds at petrol filling 
stations and the growing amounts of harmful (ground-level) ozone, realised 
that it was important to tackle the cause(s) of the problem. To this end and 
prior to the initiatives of the EU, the Government had since the late 1980s 
taken several measures to get a grip on petrol vapour emissions,22 including 
enforcement activities to guarantee the installation of stage II petrol vapour 
recovery systems by service stations (Oosterhuis et al., 2011: 623-624). This 
18 Hereafter the petrol vapour recovery equipment or system is also referred to, in brief, as 
‘Stage II (PVR) system(s)’.
19 Service stations which have started to operate after 1 juli 1995 and have a throughput 
greater than 500 m3 / year.
20 Cf. the Dutch Environmental Management Petrol Stations Decree adopted in 1991 
[Besluit tankstations milieubeheer] and the Decree on motor vehicle re-establishments 
under environmental management [Besluit herstelinrichtingen voor motorvoertuigen 
milieubeheer]. At the time of negotiations on the Directive proposal regarding Stage 
II petrol vapour recovery systems this obligation was laid down in Article 3.20 of the 
Dutch Activities Decree.
21 See Dutch Environmental Management Petrol Stations Decree, especially Annex 2.2, 
which sets down rules on the ‘Dampretour Stage-II’ that largely correspond with the 
EU’s Stage II petrol vapour recovery systems. The Decree was adopted within the frame-
work of the Decree on general rules governing the environmental management of sites 
[Besluit algemene regels voor inrichtingen milieubeheer]. Having been adopted on 19 
October 2007 (Offi cial Bulletin, 2007, 415), it has undergone a number of amendments and 
extensions and is, since 1 January 2013, offi cially referred to as ‘Activities Decree’ [Activ-
iteitenbesluit milieubeheer].
22 For instance, it had ensured the commitment of a group of tank storage and trans-ship-
ment companies to reduce their VOC emissions. Additionally, it had adopted a control 
strategy in respect of hydrocarbon emissions increasing the concentration of volatile 
organic compounds. See Oosterhuis et al., 2011, p. 623.
Chapter 14  Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive 329
yielded successful results.23 Being, however, a transboundary problem – air 
pollution does not stop at national borders – sound solutions could not be 
provided by national action alone. Consequently, like other Member States, 
the Netherlands were convinced that the problem of (transboundary) air 
pollution would require a common approach within the framework of EU 
environmental law. Such an approach appeared to be not only acceptable 
but even desirable from the Dutch point of view.
Due to its strong economic productivity, the Netherlands contributed 
to the problem of environmental pollution. At the same time, in combina-
tion with its small size and central location on the European continent, the 
Netherlands were also inevitably exposed to an ‘import’ of air pollution 
from abroad. While, apparently not for nothing, the Netherlands have been 
characterised as ‘an open economy in the polluted core of the Continent’, 
it has also been viewed as a Member State that is committed to the imple-
mentation of EU environmental standards and gives preference to common 
instead of unilateral action, acting in the belief that supranational collab-
oration entails both environmental and economic benefits (Liefferink and 
Andersen, 1998: 267-268).
Against this background, it may not come as a surprise that the Dutch 
Government took a positive attitude towards the Commission proposal 
which it found proportionate and in line with the principle of subsidiar-
ity. The proposed measures were not considered exceeding the EU’s compe-
tences but, instead, viewed as a proper means to tackle the cross-boundary 
problem of increasing ground-level ozone and carcinogenic benzene, result-
ing in the refuelling of vehicles at tank stations. Viewed from the perspec-
tive of its own national legal framework, the proposal was found to support 
the line of approach and efforts already undertaken in the Netherlands to 
cut down volatile organic compounds, and petrol vapour emissions in par-
ticular. Since its own legislation provided for requirements in the spirit of 
the proposal, the central idea of the Government was that national legisla-
tion should serve as a blueprint for upcoming EU rules. Otherwise, imple-
menting the Directive could entail higher costs, especially for service station 
operators, in case that it would become necessary to replace already operat-
ing stage II systems on Dutch territory (Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 22 
112, no. 782, p. 5). Since, as set out in the Directive proposal, stage II systems 
were not expected to yield much better results than already operating ones, 
and due to the fact that investments had previously been made into already 
existing stage II systems,24 this was seen as an unnecessary financial burden 
23 To mention one example of VOC emissions reductions, between 1980 and 1998 VOC 
emissions related to petrol storage and the distribution of petrol dropped by more than 
80 percent. This decrease was not only due to national measures but also resulted from 
the EU’s Stage I Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive that had meanwhile been implement-
ed. Cf. Oosterhuis et al., 2011, p. 624.
24 Investment had, for instance, been made in research on the feasibility and effi ciency of 
Stage II petrol vapour recovery systems, including possibilities to achieve certain levels 
of petrol vapour recovery (interview).
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which should be avoided. Against this backdrop, the Dutch Government 
decided to direct its efforts in the negotiations towards bringing the pro-
posal in closer alignment with corresponding national legislation (Parlia-
mentary Papers II 2008/09, 22 112, no. 782, p. 3; 5).
The fact that the Commission proposal became subject to several 
changes during the negotiations makes evident that not only the Nether-
lands but also other Member States saw the need for some modification of 
the proposed Directive.
14.3.1 Service stations
Negotiations mainly took place in the first half of 2009 with the Council 
presidency being represented by the Czech Republic. Pretty soon broad 
support for an initial Council position on the proposal was found (Coun-
cil of the European Union, 2009b) but at the same time, some outstanding 
issues required further debate.
Article 3 of the Directive proposal addressed Member States’ obligation 
to ensure that service stations are equipped with the stage II vapour recov-
ery system. It further explained under which conditions service stations 
should be equipped with such a system and distinguished between new 
and existing service stations: ‘any new service station shall be equipped 
with a stage II petrol vapour recovery system if its actual or intended 
throughput is greater than 500 m3 per annum. However, all new service 
stations situated under permanent living quarters or working areas shall 
be equipped with a stage II petrol vapour recovery system irrespective of 
their actual or intended throughput.’25 As for existing service stations, any 
of them with a throughput greater than 500 m3 per annum, undergoing 
a major refurbishment, should be equipped with a stage II petrol vapour 
recovery system at the time of the refurbishment.26
These requirements met with different reactions from Member States 
and underwent some changes during the negotiations. For instance, Bul-
garia, Germany, and Austria found that still more service stations should be 
obliged to install stage II petrol vapour recovery systems. Belgium, Spain 
and Romania, on the other hand, objected to the introduction of additional 
minimum thresholds for service stations situated under permanent liv-
ing quarters or working areas (Council of the European Union, 2009c) but 
could not prevent their inclusion. By further specifying the group of new 
as well as existing service stations falling under the obligation to use stage 
II equipment,27 the scope of exclusions was actually narrowed down. In 
addition to that, Article 3(4) was added exempting service stations exclu-
sively used in association with the construction and delivery of new motor 
25 Cf. Article 3(1) of the proposal.
26 Cf. Article 3(2).
27 Cf. Article 3(1)(b) and 3(2)(b) of the Directive.
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vehicles from the installation requirement (Council of the European Union, 
2009d).
Member States also expressed different views on Article 3(3) which fore-
saw installation by no later than 31 December 2020 at any service station 
existing on the territory of a Member States, having a throughput in excess 
of 3000 m3 per annum.28 The delegation of the United Kingdom preferred a 
slightly higher threshold of 3500 m3, whereas Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Austria sought to get lower thresholds accepted. 
While the deadline was eventually changed, the throughput rate was not.
Views on the installation deadline differed. Denmark and Lithuania 
preferred the installation of stage II equipment before 2020. Other Mem-
ber States, including Greece, Ireland, Finland and the United Kingdom, by 
contrast, firmly rejected any changes to that date. Also the Netherlands ini-
tially disagreed with any changes being made to the deadline, but it finally 
approved of a more flexible requirement later on in the negotiations, join-
ing those Member States that did not voice any particular preferences in 
respect of the proposed measures (Council of the European Union, 2009c). 
The European Parliament was in favour of forwarding the deadline to 31 
December 2018 (European Parliament, 2009) and eventually successful in 
asserting this claim.
14.3.2 Minimum level of petrol vapour recovery
Determining which service stations should – under what conditions and 
until when – install EU vapour recovery systems, the Commission proposal 
also laid down minimum levels of petrol vapour recovery. Stage II systems 
able to achieve a certain petrol vapour capture efficiency were associated 
with the delivery of a high environmental benefit and facilitation of trade 
in petrol vapour recovery equipment.29 According to the rules as proposed 
in Article 4, recovery should cover 85% of emissions. A higher threshold 
lying in the range of 95% and 105% was envisaged in case that the recov-
ered vapour petrol was transferred to a storage tank at the service station. 
These requirements did not spark off much discussion in the Council as evi-
denced by the fact that the Article did not undergo any substantial changes. 
However, the requirements did not meet the full approval of the European 
Parliament which preferred setting the minimum threshold higher, requir-
ing that stage II systems were to achieve a 90% or greater recovery. But the 
request of the European Parliament was not granted. Its acceptance of the 
proposed minimum levels was nevertheless assured by accommodating its 
preference to set earlier deadlines for the installation of stage II systems and 
overall implementation of the Directive (European Parliament, 2009, p. 11; 
pp. 14-15; Council of the European Union, 2009e).
28 Cf. Article 3(3).
29 As noted in recital (6) of the proposal.
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With regard to the Netherlands, it should be pointed out that Dutch legis-
lation only prescribed a 75 % recovery of petrol vapour emissions.30 Inter-
estingly enough, the Dutch delegation did not object to the higher thresh-
old, despite its wishes to create greater alignment between EU and national 
rules. In this context, the civil servant of the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
the Environment pointed out that the Netherlands benefitted from the fact 
that two testing methods had been developed on Dutch ground to capture 
two different points in time during the refuelling process. With these test-
ing methods petrol vapour capture efficiency at both half load and full load 
could be established, resulting in two minimum levels: 75% for half load 
and 90% for full load. Taking into account the latter percentage, in practice 
the stage II systems being operative in the Netherlands already provided for 
the necessary recovery percentages of petrol vapour emissions. In my view 
this may be one explanation for why the Dutch delegation did not invest 
more efforts into changing this aspect of the proposal.
14.3.3 Periodic checks and consumer information
Article 5(1) of the proposal foresaw annual controls of stage II petrol vapour 
recovery systems, in particular regarding their petrol vapour recovery 
capacity.31 For those service stations equipped with an automatic monitor-
ing system, mandatory controls had to be carried out at least once every 
three years. The Article also laid down requirements for automatic monitor-
ing systems which should include automatic faults detection and automatic 
mechanism to stop operations of stage II systems after a week in case the 
fault was not remedied.32 These requirements were hardly altered during 
the negotiations but they were nevertheless points of debate. The German 
delegation, for instance, demanded to make automatic monitoring systems 
mandatory for all service stations. Austria’s proposal did not go as far as 
that. It wished that automatic monitoring procedures of stage II systems 
should become mandatory but only for a particular group of service sta-
tions, namely those situated under permanent living quarters or working 
areas (Council of the European Union, 2009b, p. 2). But neither of the two 
requests was eventually followed, probably because they implied high 
implementation costs which other Member States would not be able or will-
ing to bear.
From the perspective of Dutch law which provided for periodic checks 
only once in three years,33 the proposal implied an increase in enforcement 
efforts due to higher inspection frequency (Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 
22 112, nr. 782, p. 4). Interestingly enough, however, the Dutch delegation 
30 Cf. 2.2.7 of the Annex to the Environmental Management Petrol Stations Decree.
31 At that point it was still referred to as ‘hydrocarbon capture effi ciency’ but later changed 
into ‘petrol vapour recovery capacity’.
32 Cf. Article 5(2).
33 Cf. Annex 2.2.9 of the Dutch Environmental Management Petrol Stations Decree.
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did not seem to see this as a reason for seeking to change EU rules. It is 
conceivable that given the far-reaching demands of other Member States 
such as Austria and in particular Germany, the requirements as proposed 
by the Commission were perceived by the Dutch delegation as offering the 
best solution. While the requirement pertaining to periodic checks was not 
altered, the scope of the Directive was changed by extending it to include 
an additional provision following an amendment of the European Parlia-
ment.34 Initially, the Article provided for rules on periodic controls of stage 
II vapour recovery systems only. To enhance transparency and consumer 
information, the European Parliament, however, suggested that service sta-
tions should display a certificate attesting to its disposal of stage II petrol 
vapour recovery systems, making the issue more transparent for consumers 
(European Parliament, 2009, p. 13).
Despite the relatively swift pace of negotiations, the foregoing discus-
sion makes evident that the Commission proposal was modified, resulting 
from Member States’ requests and the intervention of the European Parlia-
ment. The European Parliament’s amendments included alongside minor 
also some more substantial changes, advocating greater coherence of legis-
lation on petrol vapour recovery (for instance as regards the definition of 
the term ‘petrol’) as well as the extension of the Directive’s scope, which ini-
tially referring to ‘passenger cars’ only, eventually included the refuelling of 
‘motor vehicles’. In addition, its amendments were geared, as noted above, 
to forwarding the deadlines for installing stage II petrol vapour recovery 
systems and the (formal) implementation of the Directive.35 Furthermore, 
the European Parliament achieved the inclusion of additional requirements 
for Member States – ensuring the provision of consumer information by ser-
vice stations and the introduction of review and evaluation requirements to 
be met by the European Commission regarding Member States’ implemen-
tation.36
14.4 Analysis
Having sketched the negotiation process regarding the Stage II Petrol 
Vapour Recovery Directive, including the position taken by the Netherlands 
on the Commission proposal, the question that still needs to be answered is: 
what does the descriptive analysis reveal about the role of discretion in EU 
decision-making?
34 See Article 5(3).
35 Whereas the proposal prescribed transposition to be fi nalised by 30 June 2012, the dead-
line was eventually forwarded to 1 January 2012. See Article 10.
36 As established by Articles 5(3) and 7 of the fi nal Directive.
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14.4.1 Discretion and policy area
The EU’s role in the area of air quality and pollution control is – comparable 
to its overall role in the field of environment – an influential one. This is 
evidenced by its continuous attention to the problem of air pollution and 
action since the beginning of its appearance on the environmental stage four 
decades ago. Since then, the EU has not only re-confirmed but also proved 
its commitment to fight for better air quality by showing an intense legisla-
tive activity. It has developed framework legislation and provided for its 
elaboration through a number of legal measures, tackling air pollution from 
different angles. One of these angles has been presented here: the fighting of 
air pollution by motor vehicles, in particular when they are refuelled at ser-
vice stations. Furthermore, as shown in the discussion of the purpose and 
background to the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive,37 and as illus-
trated by its content, coping with air pollution has become subjected to the 
discipline of harmonisation resulting in hardly any discretion being granted 
to Member States. The first expectation under consideration here, therefore, 
does not apply, at least not if it draws on the idea that the less a policy area 
is influenced by EU legislative competence, the more discretion is conferred 
upon Member States. In fact, the opposite is found to apply in the present 
case: the more the EU is influential in legislative terms the less discretion is 
conferred upon Member States. Hence, as illustrated by the negotiations 
on the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive, discretion did not play 
any pertinent role. This is due to the fact that the Directive’s subject matter 
implied a high level of legislative harmonisation, which was accepted by 
the Member States because clear economic and environmental benefits were 
associated with it.
14.4.2 Discretion, political sensitivity and compatibility
Higher discretion margins of European directives are thought to be con-
nected with political sensitivity and a lack of compatibility between the pro-
posed EU and national rules (expectations 2 and 3). The descriptive analysis 
of the negotiations on the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive does 
not provide any evidence in support of these expectations. Without want-
ing to ignore the fact that the Commission proposal triggered debate on 
the conditions for installing stage II equipment or the question of how effi-
cient such equipment should be in recovering petrol vapour, none of these 
points was of a sensitive and highly political nature. If this had been the 
case, the incorporation of discretion to reconcile different interests would 
have been conceivable. Instead, the Commission proposal offered hardly 
37 It was obvious long before its adoption, that the Directive would include EU harmon-
ised methods and standards, also due to the fact that it was intended to supplement the 
technical specifi cations for the storage of petrol which had (already) been harmonised at 
the EU level by the Stage I Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive.
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any discretion and did not undergo any changes as to this aspect during 
the negotiations. Moreover, the analysis does not deliver any indicators of 
relevant incompatibility between EU rules and those applied in the Neth-
erlands regarding petrol vapour recovery at service stations. This may 
also explain why the Dutch delegation was not very active in forwarding 
amendments or supporting suggestions of other delegations. In case that 
differences between the Directive requirements and own legislation were 
identified they were apparently viewed as negligible or not crucial (e.g. pet-
rol vapour recovery efficiency, periodic checks). All this suggests, in fact, 
that the compatibility between the Directive and Dutch law was high which 
was also confirmed by the civil servant involved in the negotiations. A good 
match between EU and national legal arrangements has been explained in 
the literature on EU environmental policy-making as a result of Member 
States’ attempts to influence the Commission by means of contacts at expert 
level or national position papers that are send to the Commission in the 
conceptual and preparatory phase of a legislative proposal. Such strategies 
have, in particular, been ascribed to the ‘green’ Member States: the Nether-
lands, Germany and the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) 
that are known to have influenced EU environmental decision-making by 
such means in the 1990s (Liefferink and Andersen, 1998). According to the 
interviewee, however, the Dutch Government did not embark upon this 
path in the case of the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive. While he 
confirmed that the Netherlands and the Commission were communicating 
and exchanging information relating to the Dutch petrol vapour recovery 
systems at the time the Directive proposal was prepared, he took the view 
that this was due to the Commission’s initiative to seek further input from 
Member States, including the Netherlands, to develop EU legislation on this 
subject matter. It seems more important, though, to bear in mind that the 
compatibility between the EU Directive eventually proposed by the Com-
mission and Dutch legislation was high.
14.4.3 Discretion and European Parliament
Shifting the focus finally to the European Parliament, it is expected to have 
an impact on the margin of discretion granted to Member States, which it 
is expected to reduce, at least if acting as co-legislator in decision-making. 
From the analysis above, it becomes obvious that the European Parliament 
had an influential role in the negotiations on the Stage II Petrol Vapour 
Recovery Directive. Nearly all its amendments to the Commission proposal 
were incorporated into the Directive. Thus, it achieved to repeatedly assert 
its preferences, i.e. regarding the Directive’ scope, and the deadlines of sub-
stantial requirements. Despite its seemingly strong position in the negotia-
tions, the analysis does not offer conclusive findings regarding its attitude 
towards the granting of discretion for implementation. Hence, evidence 
which supports or rejects the European-Parliament-matters expectation is lack-
ing. It can, however, be concluded that the expectation does not carry much 
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relevance in the present case, since the initial Commission proposal as well 
as the final Directive hardly grant any discretion. Furthermore, the analysis 
does not indicate that discretion featured prominently during the negotia-
tions: Member States’ positions in the Council debates do not reveal that it 
was of particular importance to them.
14.5 Conclusion
No need for beating around the bush. The role of discretion in the nego-
tiations on the Stage II Vapour Recovery Directive is irrelevant. It does not 
come to the fore as facilitating ‘glue’ to unify differing Member States’ posi-
tions. This is possibly due to, as the analysis suggests, the absence of both 
political sensitivity regarding the Directive’s content and incompatibility of 
EU and national rules which are associated with the incorporation of more 
discretion into EU directives. Additionally, the lack of discretion may result 
from the fact that legislative harmonisation was preferred for economic 
reasons. A further outcome is that where there is firm legislative influence 
exercised by the EU, and technical matters are the primary issues addressed 
by the directive under negotiation, discretion becomes irrelevant. In other 
words, it does not come into play as a factor which ensures a smooth prog-
ress and successful conclusion of negotiations.
After having looked into the EU decision-making process, the transposi-
tion of the Directive in the Netherlands is addressed. How did the incorpo-
ration of the Directive’s requirements into Dutch law proceed and by which 
factors was it affected? Was discretion one of the factors that played a role in 
the transposition of the Directive?
14.6 Transposition
In the Netherlands, the transposition of the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recov-
ery Directive did not require any statutory changes but remained con-
fined to the adjustment of national regulations which was carried out by 
means of subordinated legislation. The formal implementation of the Direc-
tive’s requirements was in the hands of the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
the Environment, which transposed the Directive on time, i.e. prior to the 
deadline for bringing into force the transposition measures necessary to 
comply with the Directive, set at 1 January 2012 (see table 21).38 Due to the 
fact that the Directive was converted into Dutch law by means of subordi-
38 See Article 10 of the Directive. With the entry into force on 31 December 2011, the Min-
istry of Infrastructure and the Environment noted, however, that neither the common 
commencement dates could be observed nor the default period of three months between 
notifi cation and the entry into force of transposition legislation. CF. Offi cial Bulletin, 2011, 
552, p. 20.
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nated legislation, the Dutch Parliament did not play a decisive role in the 
national transposition process. Transposition legislation consisted of two 
amendments, taking the form of an order in council as well as a ministerial 
decision.39 These measures included the very few changes that the Direc-
tive brought about in Dutch law, and more precisely, for the Dutch Activi-
ties Decree and Regulation. In a nutshell, the Activities Decree provides 
for rules to be observed by companies and relates to various aspects of the 
environment.40 It is intended to establish general rules applicable to a broad 
range of companies and facilities. Its wide application area shall reduce 
administrative burdens for public authorities and business (interview). The 
Activities Regulation specifies further details of the general rules estab-
lished by the Activities Decree. These specifications pertain to definitions 
and procedural provisions. Furthermore, the Activities Regulation includes 
rules which shall ensure the proper treatment of air, soil, and water, to men-
tion a few, by companies performing business activities supposed to affect 
the environment.
Table 21: Fact sheet transposition Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive 
Transposition deadline: 01 Jan 12
Publication transposition legislation: 29 Nov 11
16 Dec 11
Sort transposition measure (and number): Order in council (1),
ministerial decision (1)
In charge: Ministry of Justice
Legal Framework: Dutch Alien Act 2000
Dutch Alien Decree 2000
39 Environmental Management Activities Decree [Activiteitenbesluit milieubeheer] and the 
Living Environment Law Decree [Besluit omgevingsrecht] (Offi cial Bulletin, 2011, 552) 
and Regulation amending the regulation on general rules for the environmental man-
agement of sites, in short referred to as ‘Activities Regulation’ [Regeling tot wijziging 
van de Regeling algemene regels voor inrichtingen milieubeheer (delivery of liquid fuels 
en gecomprimeerd aardgas)] (Government Gazette, 21136).
40 This information was obtained from the website Kenniscentrum InfoMil launched by 
Rijkswaterstaat, the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management and 
part of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, available at: http://www.
infomil.nl/onderwerpen/integrale/activiteitenbesluit/activiteitenbesluit (accessed 1 
July 2015).
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14.6.1 Transposition measures
According to the transposing Ministry, the Directive requirements were 
embedded into the national legal framework without fundamentally chang-
ing its structure and terminology (Official Bulletin, 2011, 552, p. 10).
Drawing on the above discussion of the negotiation process, Dutch legisla-
tion differed from EU requirements in three respects: the application area, 
the minimum level of petrol vapour recovery and the frequency of inspec-
tions. Ironing out these differences resulted in modifications of chapter 3 
and 4 of the Activities Decree, entailing a few structural and textual but no 
fundamental amendments. The Directive’s substantive provisions41 were 
largely transposed by means of Article 3.20 of the Activities Regulation. All 
in all, it contains, however, only very few substantial changes for Dutch leg-
islation on stage II petrol vapour recovery systems: It provides for the new 
requirement, addressed at both new and already existing service stations to 
install stage II systems in case that these stations have an actual or intended 
throughput greater than 100 m 3 / year and are situated under permanent 
living quarters or working areas.42 Article 3.20 furthermore introduces the 
new minimum level for petrol vapour recovery foreseeing a return of 85% 
of petrol vapour emissions instead of the previous 75%. The latter measure 
was, in principle, a simple codification of existing practice: as noted above, 
the Dutch method applied for testing recovery at full load already ensured 
compliance with the required minimum level of 85%, prescribed by the 
Directive. In transposing the relevant Directive provision, the other testing 
method was dropped, in tune with the wish of the Dutch Government to 
reduce regulatory pressure and costs incurred so far by the application of 
two testing methods (interview). Finally, Article 3.20 of the Activities Regu-
lation contains rules for the obligation to provide for periodic checks and 
consumer information.
14.6.1.1 Scope
Due to differences between the Directive and national legislation result-
ing from the concepts of petrol and liquid fuels, respectively, as well as the 
Directive’s scope, chapters 3 and 4 of the Activities Decree had to undergo 
some changes.43 Both chapters contain, amongst others, rules specifying 
the conditions regarding the delivery of liquid fuels and natural gas for 
road transport. The Directive, however, has a smaller scope which is con-
fined to petrol whereas chapters 3 and 4 cover more than one liquid fuel. 
Equally important to note is that, unlike the Decree, the Directive, in refer-
ring to motor vehicles in general, does not distinguish between captive and 
non-captive uses in the provision of liquid fuels nor does it define differ-
41 This concerns Articles 3 through 5 of the Directive.
42 Cf. Article 3(1)(b) and 3(2)(b) of the Directive.
43 To be more concrete, this concerned chapters 3.3.1 and 4.6 of the Activities Decree.
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ent groups of facilities falling under its remit.44 In this regard, the amend-
ments carried out for the purpose of transposition illustrate the efforts of the 
transposing Ministry to leave national legislation intact. By merely shifting 
requirements between chapters and adding a few editorial changes, the dif-
ferences between EU and national rules were balanced out. The key require-
ments of the Directive were eventually brought together in chapter 3 of the 
Directive, regulating henceforth the delivery of fuel liquids and compressed 
natural gas for motor vehicles whereas chapter 4 addresses the delivery of 
the same products albeit for purposes of road transport excluding motor 
vehicles (Official Bulletin, 2011, 552, pp. 9-10).
14.6.1.2 Periodic checks
The transposition of Article 5 of the Directive, in particular the requirement 
to provide for annual inspections of stage II petrol vapour recovery systems, 
entailed another change to the Dutch legal framework. The EU requirement 
implied a higher inspection frequency than so far applied in the Nether-
lands. The relevant requirements were transposed by means of Article 3.20 
and 6.22a of the Activities Regulation.45 The inspection tasks however, 
remained with the same independent national inspection service previously 
in charge. Continuing to adhere to national practice was possible due to the 
discretion granted by the Directive. As explicitly stated by recital (12) of the 
Directive’s preamble, Article 5 implies that Member States may ‘decide that 
checks are to be performed by one or more of the following: official inspec-
tion services, the operator itself or a third party’.46
A final point to be made relates to the rules specifying the inspection 
activities. To establish these rules under the framework of the Activities 
Regulation followed from the consideration that this would be in accor-
dance with the structure of the relevant national legislation to provide for 
the elaboration of general rules by means of secondary lower-level instru-
ments. Additionally, the chosen approach was expected to contribute to 
proper transposition, and in particular, to the smooth and swift incorpora-
tion of possible future amendments of EU rules concerning stage II petrol 
vapour recovery systems47 due to the very few requirements following from 
amendments to ministerial orders as opposed to decrees or parliamentary 
acts (Official Bulletin, 2011, 552, p. 12).
44 The Activities Decree distinguished between A, B, and C facilities on the basis of differ-
ent criteria.
45 The relevant requirements were transposed by means of Article 3.20 and 6.22a of the 
Activities Regulation.
46 Discretion is refl ected here by the principle of institutional autonomy. See section 7.3.2.
47 Such as the expected introduction of an EU testing method for period checks of stage II 
systems.
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14.6.2 Reactions to the measures
The transposition of the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive in the 
Netherlands has not given any grounds for complaints so far. The transpo-
sition of the Directive proceeded in a timely and legally correct fashion.48 
Furthermore, it should be recalled from the analysis above that the Directive 
was largely in line with Dutch air pollution policy and law-making, espe-
cially regarding the objective to reduce VOC emissions. Interestingly, the 
transposing Ministry did not link the advantages of EU rules to the fact that 
the Directive prescribed the installation of stage II vapour recovery systems 
in certain service stations, as expressed earlier by the Dutch Government, 
but largely ascribed the benefits of the measure to the likely increase of 
automatic monitoring systems, expected to ensure that previous and per-
sistent efforts of the Dutch Government to reduce VOC emissions had not 
been in vain (Official Bulletin, 2011, 552, p. 13).
The consultation of national stakeholders during the negotiation and 
transposition stages did not bring any fundamental changes for the Dutch 
strategies applied in both processes. The group of stakeholders included rep-
resentatives of large and small fuel pump companies, technical experts from 
the Dutch Standardisation Institute (NEN) as well as representatives from the 
Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management.49 These stake-
holders largely agreed with the content of the Directive and the proposed 
transposition measures. As noted in the interview, what may have strength-
ened domestic support is the fact that the Directive did not contain essen-
tial novelties requiring substantial changes of already established Dutch law 
regarding stage II petrol vapour recovery systems. The only aspect which was 
not met with great enthusiasm by the owners of small service stations was 
the requirement to install automatic monitoring systems – even if this was 
not mandatory for Member States. And yet, despite the fact that their installa-
tion would entail costs, automatic monitoring systems were found important, 
being supposed to help avoid higher inspection frequencies (interview). The 
Directive’s inspection regime eventually did not trigger any severe resistance. 
Probably, this was because, the Directive implied no structural burdens but 
one-off costs, which were, additionally, expected to be outweighed by the 
long-term decrease in administrative burdens – not least as a result of a mod-
ernisation of inspection activities. It appeared that the Dutch industry asso-
ciations were more concerned about the preservation of already established 
national practices which were considered to work well and should therefore 
48 The analysis of the implementation process has not delivered any results giving rise to a 
contrary conclusion. Member States’ implementation of the Directive should have been 
reviewed by the Commission by 31 December 2014. The implementation report based 
on this review was, however, not yet available by the time of writing this part of the dis-
sertation.
49 The Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management (Rijkswaterstaat, 
RWS) is the executive agency of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environ-
ment. It assists in ensuring the proper implementation of environmental rules.
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be continued. In this context, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environ-
ment was requested to keep in place rules allowing for the written documen-
tation of period checks and test results regarding stage II petrol vapour recov-
ery systems.50 This request being granted, the transposition measure was 
changed accordingly (Official Bulletin, 2011, 552, p. 13; interview).
To conclude, transposition of the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery 
Directive in the Netherlands was carried out without great difficulty. The 
Directive, however, was not transposed properly everywhere in the EU. 11 
infringement cases out of 63 cases initiated by the Commission in the field 
of the environment in the year 2012 referred to the late transposition of the 
Stage II Vapour Recovery Directive (European Commission, 2013).
Having outlined how the transposition of the Directive was carried out 
in the Netherlands has provided a number of relevant insights. These are 
used in the following step to answer the questions which factors influenced 
the formal implementation process and whether or not discretion was a rel-
evant one among them.
14.7 Analysis
When it comes to the role of discretion, two observations immediately 
spring to mind: First, the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive hardly 
grants any discretion. Second, discretion was not found to have played any 
essential role in the negotiation strategy of the Dutch delegation. It was nei-
ther sought by Member States to ensure the availability of sufficient flexibil-
ity for the implementation of the Directive. Nor did discretion facilitate leg-
islative decision-making in reconciling different interests. That being said, 
why should discretion have been relevant in the process of transposing the 
Directive into national law?
14.7.1 Discretion-in-national-law
‘Discretion was not relevant’, could be the first answer in replying to this 
question, bearing in mind that the discretion-in-national-law expectation 
does not carry any relevance. After all, compliance with the Directive was 
achieved in spite of the fact that only meagre discretionary room was avail-
able for transposition and not, as expected, due to a high margin of discre-
tion. In this regard, it can be established that the Netherlands benefitted from 
the fact that legally binding requirements for the installations of stage II pet-
rol vapour recovery systems at service stations had already been in place 
prior to the Commission proposal addressing this subject matter. What’s 
more, it has emerged that the Directive has been modelled along the lines of 
already established legislation in the environmentally progressive Member 
50 Cf. Article 3.22 of the Activities Regulation.
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States, including the Netherlands. Finally, the Dutch Government supported 
the harmonisation of national laws in this area, since it was considered to 
ensure environmental and economic benefits. Considering all this, it is there-
fore safe to say that discretion was not of importance in the present context.
14.7.2 Discretion, compatibility and disagreement
Furthermore the transposition analysis does not provide any evidence that 
discretion entered into play by interacting with compatibility (expectation 7). 
While it is true that the EU Directive and Dutch law where highly compat-
ible, is not very likely that discretion enforced this positive effect as it was 
virtually absent from the Directive. What’s more, due the seemingly high 
fit between EU and national legal arrangements, discretion had no impor-
tant role to play in facilitating the incorporation of EU requirements into 
the national legal framework. Empirical evidence underlines the good fit 
between EU and national rules. Assessing the legal compatibility between 
these two by using the four-fold classification of misfit51 confirms this view, 
leading to the conclusion that even a small legal misfit did not arise. Finally, 
where small differences existed, these were overcome rather easily as exem-
plified by the ‘new’ minimum level of petrol vapour recovery which simply 
needed to be codified while it was already realised in practice.
Another expectation is that Member State disagreement with a direc-
tive’s requirement increases the likelihood of deficient transposition, and 
that this effect becomes stronger the smaller the directive’s scope of dis-
cretion is (expectation 6). Given the previous considerations, however, an 
interaction effect of little discretion and disagreement with EU rules can be 
ruled out. Even if the Directive grants very little discretion, the analysis of 
the negotiation process shows that agreement with its content on the part of 
the Dutch Government was high.
14.7.3 Discretion, administrative capacity and transposition actors
The last two expectations that need to be assessed, link discretion with the 
administrative capacity of the transposing authority and the number of 
actors involved in transposition (expectations 8 and 9). In considering the 
first one, it can be noted, that neither intra-ministerial problems nor lack-
ing transposition knowledge emerged from the analysis as impeding factors 
in transposition. Based on these findings it is reasonable to conclude that 
administrative capacity contributed to the proper transposition of the Direc-
tive. However, the effect was not reduced by discretion, simply because the 
Directive did not provide for considerable flexibility. The capacity interaction 
expectation is therefore ruled out. Regarding the actor interaction expectation, 
it does not carry any relevance in the present transposition case; for one, 
51 Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009, p. 960.
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because of the absence of a high margin of discretion; and second, due to 
the fact that aside from the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment 
no other relevant actors were involved in the transposition of the Directive. 
Last but not least, the results of the empirical analysis do not indicate any 
disagreements or domestic conflicts about the way the Directive should be 
transposed into national law.
14.8. Conclusion
Since none of the expectations about the potential effects of discretion on 
national transposition apply in the case at hand, it can be concluded with 
certainty that discretion was irrelevant for the transposition of the Stage II 
Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive. Apparently, discretion was not needed 
to ease transposition in the absence of any serious disagreement between 
transposition actors and legal incompatibilities between EU Directive and 
national law that could have jeopardised the smooth progress of transposi-
tion. Nevertheless, it should not be disregarded that there were a few legal 
disparities between the EU and national legal arrangements, pertaining to 
the Directive’s scope, the petrol vapour capture efficiency of stage II sys-
tems as well as the periodic checks of these systems, which were however 
rather small. What’s more, these small differences were ironed out during 
the transposition of EU rules into Dutch law. While this was not achieved 
by using discretionary provisions and wording – for which the Directive 
did not provide anyway – it was turned out to be possible through the dis-
cretionary choice of forms and methods considered to be the most suitable 
for integrating the Directive into a well-established legal framework. Discre-
tion may not have been a decisive factor in achieving compliance with the 
Directive. But in any case, it can be ruled out that discretion impeded the 
transposition of the Directive in the Netherlands.

15.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to bring together the findings from the analysis 
of each of the six transposition cases previously discussed in order to look 
into discretion in a comparative fashion. Processes at the EU and national 
level with regard to two directives from different policy areas are compared 
as to the role of discretion in both of these processes. Thus, three directive 
pairs are analysed: the Blue Card Directive versus the Pyrotechnic Articles 
Directive, the Waste Framework Directive versus the Toy Safety Directive, 
and finally the Return Directive versus the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery 
Directive.
Taking a glance at the case study results, they seem to confirm the 
mixed record that has been ascribed to the effects and the role of discretion 
by implementation studies. Starting with the migration directives, it can be 
noted that discretion was relevant for both the EU negotiations and transpo-
sition processes, either by having facilitating or impeding effects. The trans-
position outcomes in the two cases, however, differed. Whereas the Blue 
Card Directive was properly transposed, transposition of the Return Direc-
tive was considerably delayed. With regard to the EU level, both cases con-
firm the facilitating effect of discretion in leading to compromises in nego-
tiations. The analyses also bring to light that transposition was delayed with 
regard to the consumer protection directives, without however showing 
that discretion was involved in causing delays. As for the Toy Safety Direc-
tive, delay was very short whereas the transposition of the Pyrotechnic Arti-
cles Directives was only completed six months after the deadline. Discretion 
did not appear to play a decisive role in these transposition cases. Yet in the 
negotiations on the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive it was not entirely irrel-
evant, whereas in the case of EU decision-making on the Toy Safety Direc-
tive it was not a pertinent factor. Finally, a more consistent picture arises 
from the analyses of the environmental directives, the Waste Framework 
Directive and the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive. The case stud-
ies show that discretion was not of relevance. The Waste Framework Direc-
tive does include some discretion but the case study results do not prove 
that it was of great importance for EU negotiations. The same applies in this 
regard to the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive. The results are even 
more clear-cut with a view to the transposition processes. In neither case 
did discretion carry any relevance. On the other hand, it played a pertinent 
role in EU negotiations. This became evident in three of the cases analysed. 
It showed very clearly in the transposition of the two migration directives 
but also, to some extent, with respect to the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive. 
15 Discretion under comparison
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In this latter case, however, discretion did not decisively affect transposi-
tion, presumably because of other factors at play.
As table 22 shows, it cannot be disputed that discretion can be of rel-
evance to EU decision-making on directives and their transposition into 
national law. In order to develop a still better understanding about the cir-
cumstances under which discretion can be expected to unfold facilitating 
effects and to clarify the functions it plays in decision-making processes 
regarding directives, more order must be brought into the case study find-
ings. To this end the subsequent discussion is organised according to a com-
parative framework.
Table 22: Role of discretion (P = relevant, – = irrelevant)
Directive EU negotiations Dutch transposition 
Blue Card P P
Pyrotechnic Articles P –
Waste Framework – –
Toy Safety – –
Return P P
Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery P P
15.2 Comparative framework
EU and national decision-making processes regarding the directives anal-
ysed are examined to establish how and why they are similar or different 
with due regard to the relevance and role of discretion. The comparative 
analysis takes into account that different effects have been ascribed to vari-
ous degrees of discretion, especially higher ones that are granted to Member 
States. Owing to this fact, each of the three directive pairs, displayed in table 
23, includes a directive that grants more and one that grants less discretion – 
as established previously by means of the coding and calculation exercises.
Table 23: Directives for paired comparison
1 Blue Card Directive &
Pyrotechnic Articles Directive 
Migration &
Consumer Protection
2 Waste Framework Directive &
Toy Safety Directive 
Environment &
Consumer Protection
3 Return Directive &
Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive 
Migration &
Environment
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The comparison of the EU negotiation processes takes due account of 
the factors that have previously been identified as being relevant to the 
process, also because they constitute the circumstances that encourage or 
discourage the granting of discretion to Member States. The national level 
analyses are organised in line with the most similar systems design that was 
presented earlier. Thus, each paired comparison of the national transposi-
tion process takes into consideration that alongside discretion, other fac-
tors with explanatory power exist for the observed transposition outcomes. 
These factors, which might also affect transposition, I sought to keep con-
stant in order to single out discretion as the explanatory factor of primary 
interest, for explicit evaluation as to its effects on transposition. Similar to 
the EU-level analyses, comparative light is shed on discretion, and other 
factors it is claimed here to be related with in affecting transposition.
The EU- and national-level analyses are structured along similar lines as 
the individual case studies, and thus, centre on the expectations previously 
developed. Each of the nine expectations is discussed individually and with 
a view to all three directive pairs (see table 24). Following such a structure 
is motivated by the wish to present comparative results in a clear way and 
to avoid redundancy. For the same reason, I slightly depart from the paired 
comparison in the discussion of the first expectation. Here, I deem it more 
suitable to discuss directives from the same area together and to contrast 
them, in a subsequent step, with the other directives and policy areas.
Table 24: Framework for comparison
Directive pair 1,pair 2, pair 3
E1 Discretion & policy area E5 Discretion-in-national-law
E2 Discretion & political sensitivity E6 Discretion & disagreement
E3 Discretion & compatibility E7 Discretion & compatibility 
E4 Discretion & European Parliament E8 Discretion & administrative capacity
E9 Discretion & transposition actors
EU-LEVEL ANALYSIS NATIONAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS
15.3 EU-level analysis
15.3.1 Discretion and policy area
The policy area matters
The starting point for the analysis of the relationship between discretion 
and policy area is the idea that in those areas that are characterised by less 
EU involvement, decision-making competences are distributed in favour 
of the Member States. Consequently, corresponding directives grant more 
discretion to Member States. Where the EU, on the contrary, has a firm 
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influence, less discretion is granted to Member States. Firm EU influence 
is reflected by qualified majority voting and co-decision procedure, as well 
as by advanced institutional development and other non-legal activities by 
which the EU impacts the national structures and practices of its Member 
States. Having a firm influence in a policy area means, in other words, that a 
policy area is Europeanised to quite some extent, and that legislative instru-
ments, such as directives, aim at higher levels of harmonisation, and thus, 
grant less discretion to Member States. Considerable EU leverage in a policy 
area also suggests that Member States have meanwhile accepted the leading 
role of the EU in deciding and enacting legislation.
By mapping out the historical evolution of the three policy areas it was 
shown that the distribution of competences between the EU and its Member 
States has evolved differently. The Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed 
in Maastricht (1992) made both consumer protection and the environment 
first pillar issues, and therefore subject to greater legislative influence of 
EU institutions if compared to the two intergovernmental pillars, Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA), the latter including migration policy. Regarding migration-related 
issues, Member States were keen to retain national decision-making powers 
and only reluctantly surrendered them to the supranational level. What’s 
more, while under the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), competences in the area 
of migration were finally moved to the first supranational pillar, specific 
legal arrangements kept the EU’s influence still limited.1 Qualified major-
ity voting and co-decision were only applied to the fields of irregular and 
legal migration later on: with repect to the former JHA sub-domain shortly 
before, and regarding the latter JHA sub-domain only with the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009).
Migration and consumer protection
Looking first at the field of migration and the wider JHA area it partakes, 
what stands out is the long-lasting intergovernmental cooperation of Mem-
ber States outside the EU framework. Despite expressing their commitment 
at European Council meetings to common objectives in the area of migra-
tion and asylum, progress towards harmonisation remained limited. Both 
negotiations on the Blue Card Directive and the Return Directive demon-
strate the difficulty in going beyond mere lip service to defining and apply-
ing common solutions for legal and irregular migration issues. The out-
comes of the negotiations reflect the strong position of the Member States 
in securing for themselves a wide scope of discretion. In the case of the Blue 
Card Directive, albeit being the first EU legislative act in the area of legal 
migration, the unanimity and consultation procedure put a quick end to an 
ambitious Commission proposal which implied more harmonisation than 
1 Referring to the shift from voting by unanimity and consultation to qualifi ed majority 
voting and co-decision as further specifi ed in Article 67(1) of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
and Council Decision (2004/927/EC) activating the passerelle clause.
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Member States were willing to accept. The same holds for the Return Direc-
tive, which was, unlike the Blue Card Directive, adopted by qualified major-
ity voting in the Council and co-decision by Parliament and the Council. 
The Commission proposal included a number of explosive issues that pre-
cluded acceptance by the Member States where EU rules were considered to 
interfere with national competences. This was exemplified by discussions 
about the Directive’s operating provisions on, for instance, return decision, 
voluntary departure, and entry ban. On the whole, both migration direc-
tives confer considerable discretion upon Member States.
Unlike in the area of migration but similar to the environment, the EU 
became a legislative actor in its own right in the area of consumer protection 
under the Maastricht Treaty. In addition, being closely linked to the EU’s 
core policy, i.e. the internal market, EU consumer law was, in fact, provided 
with a raison d’être which manifested itself in the promotion of consumer 
interest and protection, initially by means of EU soft law (Council Resolu-
tions, Commission papers). Once legislative competence was gained, EU 
consumer law was more readily subjected to legislative harmonisation. It is 
therefore not too surprising, that the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive affords 
Member States little discretion for the purpose of transposition. The latter 
point fully applies to the Toy Safety Directive. As regards the revision of 
the requirements for toys or the conditions of their placing on the market, 
these were subjected to the exclusive competence of the EU. What’s more, 
common requirements in the realm of enforcement furthermore cut down 
discretionary room left to the Member States. There was virtually no discre-
tion available for the transposition of the Directive.
…and the area of environment
What about the area of environment if compared to the fields of con-
sumer protection and migration? Two directives from this area have been 
addressed in the case study analyses: the Waste Framework Directive refer-
ring to waste (treatment) and the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive, 
addressing the impact of air pollution on human health and the environ-
ment. The Waste Framework Directive includes some discretionary provi-
sions but was found by transposition actors to be a tightly defined piece of 
legislation, and therefore not considered as providing considerable discre-
tion. The Toy Safety Directive presents a clearer case: coding and calculation 
exercises led to the conclusion that the Directive grants a small scope of dis-
cretion and this finding was shared by the interviewees. Similar to the area 
of consumer protection and unlike migration, sketching the history of the 
development of EU environmental integration has shown that the EU has 
gained a strong foothold in this field. This is evidenced by a firmly devel-
oped legal and institutional framework. With consumer protection, environ-
mental integration shares at least three aspects: the early linkage with the 
EU’s internal market project, which provided the impetus for further EU 
environmental integration – economic expansion brought up environmental 
concerns and stimulated law-making. Furthermore, as in the former case, 
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the European Commission was actively shaping integration long before EU 
legislative competence was established, by means of, amongst others, envi-
ronmental action programmes, and market-based policy instruments. Look-
ing at the level of law-making, both areas of consumer protection and espe-
cially the environment, show a high legislative output, mostly in the form of 
directives but regulations are also frequently used. Being a relatively young 
EU policy area, the scope of legislation is much smaller in the area of migra-
tion but also here directives are the primary instrument of regulation.
To sum up, the analyses of the six directives confirm a pattern which 
reflects a particular relationship between the conferral of discretionary 
decision-making competence upon Member States and the EU policy area 
in the context of negotiations. In policy areas where the EU has less influ-
ence in terms of its institutional and legal development, more discretion is 
made available to Member States. This was confirmed by the two transposi-
tion cases involving migration directives. The inverse relationship, meaning 
more EU influence resulting into less discretion being granted, was shown 
by the analyses of the consumer protection and environmental directives.
15.3.2 Discretion and political sensitivity
BLUE CARD VERSUS PYROTECHNIC ARTICLES
Political sensitivity matters
Variation of the directive’s discretion margin is associated with the political 
sensitivity of the directive’s subject matter. The more politically sensitive the 
directive’s policy issue is, the more discretion is incorporated into the direc-
tive to secure agreement among Member States.
In case of the Blue Card Directive the political sensitivity expectation 
was clearly found to hold true. The Directive relates to the area of justice 
and home affairs, and in particular legal migration. By means of an EU 
admission scheme, the Directive lays down the conditions and rights of resi-
dence in the first and second Member State which non-EU nationals seek to 
enter. Making part of the JHA area and being the very first EU measure to 
regulate labour migration, the directive addresses a sensitive field for har-
monisation of national laws. It affects a fundamental part of national deci-
sion-making competence which had already been used in various Member 
States, including the Netherlands, to translate national preferences into 
distinct national admission procedures for non-EU migrants. In relation to 
these national admission procedures the proposed EU admission scheme 
was eventually rendered into a mere supplement. This was a result of Mem-
ber States’ objections leading to controversy which was overcome only by 
the incorporation of various discretionary provisions (minimum harmoni-
sation and derogation arrangements). Already existing legal diversity pre-
cluded individual attempts to export own legal arrangements to the EU 
level. EU decision-making on the Blue Card Directive provides an illustra-
tive example of how EU law challenges national legal orders and practices.
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The negotiations on the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive show similari-
ties in this latter respect, albeit to a much lesser extent. Political sensitivi-
ties were caused by concerns about the preservation of national cultural 
practice and traditions regarding the marketing and use of pyrotechnic 
articles. This was exemplified by the incorporation of the so-called Malta 
clause. Still more important was, with regard to discretion, the granting of 
permission to restrict the free circulation of pyrotechnic under specific con-
ditions.2 This way Member States could retain their national legal arrange-
ments for the sale of fireworks to consumers which for safety reasons was 
considered to be important. Responding to the political sensitivities of the 
Member States that had become apparent at the preparation stage, the Com-
mission had incorporated discretion into the legislative proposal for the 
Pyrotechnic Articles Directive right from the start. This is remarkable given 
the Directive’s subject matter and objective: ensuring the free movement of 
pyrotechnic articles and to this end, the creation of a legislative framework 
at the Community level based on minimum safety requirements for these 
articles and the harmonisation of information provisions regarding the safe 
handling and use of pyrotechnic articles. Seen in this light, political sensitiv-
ity and the granting of discretion may not be so readily associated with the 
negotiations on a directive, which, like the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive, 
addresses a sector in an advanced state of harmonisation (product safety /
internal market). It may also come as a surprise, because EU internal-market 
related directives usually seek to establish a level-playing field for domes-
tic industries, as well as a predictable legal framework from which both 
business and consumers shall benefit. Therefore these directives are usu-
ally hardly discretionary since this might encourage derogation by Member 
States from common rules and thus undermine the principle aim EU law 
actually pursues.3
But even though discretion can be considered as resulting from the 
Commission’s efforts to tackle political sensitivities, strictly speaking, the 
political sensitivity expectation as it stands here does not fully apply to the 
negotiations on the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive. First of all, the expec-
tation implies a higher discretion margin but the Directive’s scope of dis-
cretion is small which may be due to the fact that political sensitivity, in 
contrast to the negotiations on the Blue Card Directive, remained limited. 
Second, whereas the idea is that additional discretion is incorporated into 
a Directive proposal during the negotiations, in the present case, discre-
tion made already part of the Commission’s initial proposal. For these rea-
sons, the expectation only partially applies. Two decisive conclusions can 
nevertheless be drawn. First, the case of the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive 
suggests that also in policy areas where legislative harmonisation has pro-
gressed very far, political sensitivities and controversy can still arise from 
2 See Article 6(2).
3 Derogation from measures concerning the free movement of goods in the EU is kept lim-
ited and only possible under certain conditions. See Article 36 TFEU (ex Article 30 TEC).
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differences of national legal systems and practices and possibly impede 
negotiations. Second, in such cases discretion can pave the way out of 
stalled negotiations.
What can be concluded from this comparison? The political sensitivity 
expectation fully applies in the case of the Blue Card Directive, whereas it 
does not entirely hold true for the negotiations on the Pyrotechnic Articles 
Directive. In contrast to this latter case, political sensitivities carried more 
weight in the negotiations on the Blue Card Directive, leading to the grant-
ing of considerable margins of discretion to Member States. And yet, politi-
cal sensitivities also mattered, albeit differently, in the negotiations on the 
consumer protection directive: they were anticipated by the Commission 
already during the preparation of the legislative proposal and tackled by 
incorporating discretion into the legislative text. They therefore did not 
feature prominently in the subsequent decision-making process. Besides, 
due to the advanced harmonisation of EU product safety legislation – of 
which the proposed Directive represents a case in point – it was much 
more unlikely that political sensitivity would spark off many discussions 
about the proposed EU requirements. All the same, it is a fact that discre-
tion facilitated compromise and contributed to the successful conclusion of 
both negotiation processes. In this context, it should be underlined that, as 
explicitly stated by the interviewees, without discretion being granted to 
Member States, neither of the two Directives would have been adopted.
WASTE FRAMEWORK VERSUS TOY SAFETY
Political sensitivity does not matter
How relevant were political sensitivity and discretion in the negotiations on 
the environmental and consumer protection directives when placed next to 
each other? A comparative look at the Waste Framework Directive and Toy 
Safety Directive leads to different conclusions than in the cases above.
The Waste Framework Directive establishes measures for the protection 
of the environment and human health. It seeks to reduce adverse effects 
from waste management and to improve the efficiency of resource reuse. 
Interestingly, originating from the realm of environmental protection law, 
which is strongly Europeanised, the Directive includes a number of dis-
cretionary provisions. At the same time, the interviewees described the 
Directive as a rather tightly-defined piece of legislation, considering it to 
imply only limited discretion. This observation actually fits into the con-
text of already advanced harmonisation in the area. What’s more, also in 
the present case, national waste management systems had already been 
aligned to some extent with EU law. Hence, while representing a newly-
designed instrument, the Waste Framework Directive nevertheless builds 
upon an already existing EU legislative framework. This may explain why 
politically delicate issues apparently did not play a decisive role in trigger-
ing the granting of additional discretion to Member States. As shown in 
the analysis, however, the scope of further harmonisation was discussed 
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prior to the formal decision-making process, reflecting the different views 
taken by the Member States. Disagreement regarding key terms (‘waste’, 
‘by-products’, ‘recovery’ versus ‘disposal’) additionally revealed different 
national approaches to the management of waste. That being said, it cannot 
be excluded for sure that the scope of harmonisation did not trigger debate 
and political sensitivity, leading to more discretion being built into the legis-
lative text, especially since the Directive included more discretionary provi-
sions than the initial proposal tabled by the Commission. The fact remains, 
however, that the empirical analysis did not provide sufficiently conclusive 
evidence for the existence of the expected relationship between political 
sensitivity and discretion.
The Toy Safety Directive provides a clearer picture in this regard. Lay-
ing down rules on the safety of toys and their free movement within the 
EU, it shows the typical linkage between consumer protection and inter-
nal market objectives. More importantly, it is almost completely devoid of 
any discretionary provisions and has been characterised accordingly in the 
interviews. This has to do with the rather technical nature of the Directive 
and the fact that, being a new approach directive, it entails the total har-
monisation of technical standards which, for economic and safety reasons, 
turned out to be rather in line with Member States’ preferences. Moreover, 
the Toy Safety Directive did not imply radical innovations; similar to the 
Waste Framework Directive, it, represented on the one hand, a new legis-
lative act in formal terms, but, on the other hand, it modified and further 
elaborated rules on the safety of toys which had been established at the EU 
level earlier on. In the light of the foregoing and due to the absence of any 
contrary evidence, it is reasonable to say that the claim discussed here does 
not have any relevance for the case of the Toy Safety Directive.
In a nutshell, taking a comparative look at the Waste Framework Direc-
tive and Toy Safety Directive, the conclusion is drawn that in neither case 
did the alleged relationship between political sensitivity and discretion 
have a bearing on the negotiation processes under consideration here.
RETURN VERSUS STAGE II PETROL VAPOUR RECOVERY
Political sensitivity matters – political sensitivity does not matter
What about political sensitivity and discretion as regards the negotiations 
on the Return Directive and Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive4? Did 
these two directive features come into play? The relevant findings in this 
respect are that the negotiations on the migration directive were protracted 
whereas in the case of the environmental directive compromise was reached 
relatively swiftly. In addition, the Return Directive grants considerable dis-
cretion if compared to the Stage II PVR Directive which virtually grants no 
4 Hereafter, it is referred to, in short, as ‘Stage II PVR Directive’.
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discretion. The Directives’ subject matters obviously had quite opposing 
effects on the negotiations.
The Return Directive seeks to establish common standards and proce-
dures for EU countries for returning illegally staying third-country nation-
als. The final agreement on the Commission proposal was only achieved 
with great effort after lengthy and cumbersome negotiations. The Stage II 
Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive shall ensure that harmful petrol vapour 
displaced from the fuel tank of a motor vehicle during refuelling at a service 
station is recovered by using stage II systems. Negotiations on this Directive 
proceeded quickly and smoothly.
If discretion is made available to Member States, this can affect the nego-
tiations on an EU directive in a positive way. The underlying consideration 
is, then, that the prospect of having more leeway for transposing the Direc-
tive in a way Member States see fit, especially as concerns politically sensi-
tive, controversial issues, is conducive to reaching agreement in the Coun-
cil. Deadlock in negotiations can thus be avoided. The Return Directive is 
a case in point. The political sensitivity of the Directive and the controversy 
it triggered during the negotiations are explained by the fact that the Direc-
tive’s requirements interfered deeply with national legal systems. This is evi-
denced by the EU’s effort to establish common rules in the area of immigra-
tion control and the return of irregular migrants, and therefore in a domain 
previously making part of national decision-making authority. As a conse-
quence, Member States were reluctant in giving parts of their national deci-
sion-making powers to the EU institutions, and thus keen to keep legislative 
harmonisation within limits. This is exemplified by the controversial debate 
on the horizontal application of the Directive and its proposed scope, the lat-
ter issue being eventually settled through the granting of discretion: by offer-
ing Member States the possibility to exclude certain categories of irregular 
migrants from the Directive’s scope, including those subject to criminal law 
cases, their approval of this part of the Directive was approved. At the same 
time, and important from the Member State perspective, far-reaching har-
monisation of national criminal laws was avoided. Other contentious issues, 
pertaining to key elements of the Directive, such as the return decision or 
procedural safeguards, were solved in a similar way.
Quite the opposite holds true for the negotiations on the Stage II PVR 
Directive since the Directive did not entail any issues, causing political sen-
sibilities. This is not to say that the Member States simply rubber-stamped 
the Directive’s text. Some adjustments were made during the negotiations 
following Member States’ objections, for instance, regarding the condi-
tions for equipping service stations with stage II petrol vapour recovery 
systems. Other crucial aspects of the proposal were largely left unaltered 
(e.g. minimum level of petrol vapour recovery, periodic checks). What’s 
more important, none of these points sparked off heated debates between 
the Member States. First, this is due to the fact that the Directive provisions 
largely include technical requirements and hence no issues on which, politi-
cally speaking, reaching agreement was difficult to achieve. Second, for 
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the Netherlands and several other Member States the installation of stage 
II systems in service stations did not entail any radical changes as similar 
systems were already in use. Additionally, the introduction of these systems 
did not come as a surprise but had been anticipated by Member States as a 
follow-up measure to the previous measure regarding petrol vapour recov-
ery during the storage of petrol at terminals and its subsequent distribution 
to service stations.5
All in all, this comparison makes clear that whereas political sensitivi-
ties leading to the granting of discretion highly mattered in the negotia-
tions on the Return Directive, this does not hold for EU decision-making on 
the Stage II PVR Directive. Discretion did not play any relevant role in the 
negotiations on this latter Directive. This is also evidenced by the fact that 
both the proposal and final version of the Stage II PVR Directive have a very 
small discretion margin. The case of the Return Directive, by contrast, is 
illustrative of discretion’s positive effect on the EU negotiations: as far as 
this decision-making process is concerned, discretion helped to overcome 
disagreement and facilitated compromise regarding key elements of the 
Directive.
15.3.3 Discretion and compatibility
BLUE CARD VERSUS PYROTECHNIC ARTICLES
Compatibility matters – compatibility does not matter
Another expectation considers the aspect of compatibility between a Euro-
pean Directive and national law. Being the country selected for the empiri-
cal analysis, the focus is on the legal arrangements in the Netherlands. It 
is expected that the less compatible the EU directive and already existing 
national legislation are, the more likely that discretion is incorporated into 
the directive.
The empirical findings show that compatibility between EU and 
national arrangements played a role in both negotiation processes – albeit 
in different ways. Starting with the Blue Card Directive, the corresponding 
Commission proposal included a number of disparities from the viewpoint 
of Member States’ laws. Above all, this concerns the proposed EU admis-
sion scheme, which was supposed to become exclusively applicable in the 
Member States, implying the replacement of already existing or planned 
national admission schemes. Next to it, there were a number of other issues 
of obvious legal incongruence between the Directive and national laws, 
pertaining to the envisaged validity of the Blue Card, the key terms used 
in the legislative text, the admission criteria, including those concerning 
unregulated and other specific professions. Incompatibilities were in most 
of the cases alleviated by the incorporation of discretion. Especially impor-
5 Stage I Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive (94/63/EC). See footnote 15, chapter 14.
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tant in this regard were the derogation and harmonisation clauses, allowing 
Member States to preserve their national admission schemes as well as – by 
means of references to national legal orders and practices added to the pro-
posed text of the Directive – the explicit acknowledgements of national legal 
approaches.6 Empirical evidence from the analysis of the negotiations on 
the Blue Card Directive, thus, substantiates the claim that greater incompat-
ibility between EU and national law results into the incorporation of more 
discretion into the text of an EU directive.
The same cannot be clearly concluded regarding EU decision-making 
on the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive. Incorporating wide discretionary 
provisions was precluded by the fact that, being a new approach direc-
tive, addressing product safety and internal market aspects, a higher level 
of harmonisation was already implied by the Commission proposal. This, 
however, does not change the fact, that the Directive included rules that 
were different from those in the Member States. This becomes evident in the 
debates about the restrictions on the availability of pyrotechnic articles to 
consumers by means of a ban on certain category 4 fireworks and the pro-
posed definitions and categorisation of pyrotechnic articles more generally. 
These EU requirements revealed legal differences between the EU Direc-
tive and Member States’ laws. Like in the Netherlands, where pyrotechnic 
articles used to be defined according to the purpose of their use instead, as 
determined by the Directive, taking product features as defining character-
istic (hazard and noise levels). In this way, the Directive implied a wider 
scope of pyrotechnic articles, making also those products available to con-
sumers, which under the Dutch Fireworks Decree were considered as too 
dangerous and unsafe for private use. In this case, granting discretion, by 
permitting the free movement of pyrotechnic articles to be limited, reduced 
the legal incompatibility between the relevant EU and national rules. And 
yet, lacking compatibility still persisted. The proposed ex-ante approval sys-
tem7 implied a different policy approach than applied in the Netherlands 
with its system of ex-post controls of pyrotechnic products (market surveil-
lance). Having to establish pre-market approval systems from scratch, the 
Directive entailed considerable policy misfit from the Dutch viewpoint. 
Being the only Member State lacking ex-ante control systems, the Nether-
lands was, however, not in the position to prevent their introduction.
Summing up the comparative results, the expected link between com-
patibility and discretion holds true for EU decision-making on the Blue 
Card Directive. It does not apply with regard to the negotiations on the 
Pyrotechnic Articles Directive. Regarding the Blue Card Directive, the una-
nimity rule in the Council reflecting Member States’ strong position in nego-
tiations, as well as their common aspiration for more flexible EU require-
6 For instance, Article 5 including references such as ‘as provided for in national law’, ‘as 
determined by national law’.
7 This refers to the CE Marking Conformity Assessment Procedures.
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ments, were conducive to the incorporation of discretion in overcoming 
legal incompatibility.
WASTE FRAMEWORK VERSUS TOY SAFETY
Compatibility does not matter
Was a lacking match between EU and national rules, a problematic issue in 
the negotiations on the environmental and consumer protection directives?
In case of the Waste Framework Directive, empirical evidence from the 
analysis of the EU decision-making process allows for drawing the conclu-
sion that mismatch between EU and Dutch rules can be ruled out. In spite of 
the fact that negotiations were not smooth, not least because of a disagree-
ment between the Council and European Parliament, compatibility issues 
were not so profound that they triggered fierce debates among the Mem-
ber States. In addition, compatibility between the Directive and Dutch law 
was high. The Netherlands already had an advanced system in place for 
the efficient and environmentally sound management of waste, which was 
not challenged, but rather in harmony with the core elements of the Direc-
tive, such as the waste management hierarchy and application of life-cycle 
framework in waste treatment. Furthermore, little differences between EU 
and national rules which resulted from the proposed scope and aspects of 
waste management plans and programmes were ironed out by means of 
getting Dutch preferences incorporated into the Directive.
Similar conclusions as to the compatibility between the Directive and 
Dutch law can be drawn from the case study findings pertaining to the Toy 
Safety Directive. Approval on the part of the Dutch Government was high as 
mentioned by the interviewees. Furthermore, where EU requirements were 
not fully in line with Dutch preferences, for instance, in respect of fragrances 
in toys, this did not concern legal compatibility but was rather related to 
technical aspects. The Dutch delegation only sought to change some minor 
issues to bring EU rules still closer to national legislation, and, in particular, 
own safety standards, but furthermore largely agreed with the suggestions 
for rules as forwarded by the Commission in its legislative proposal.
To conclude, the comparison of the negotiation processes on the Waste 
Framework Directive and Toy Safety Directive does not deliver any evi-
dence proving justification of the compatibility expectation. Or put in another 
way: the expectation that more incompatibility has as a consequence the 
granting of more discretion to Member States does not hold true for the two 
cases considered.
RETURN VERSUS STAGE II PETROL VAPOUR RECOVERY
Compatibility matters – compatibility does not matter
Assessing the final directive pair regarding the link between legal compat-
ibility and discretion yields the following results. To begin with, insights 
into EU decision-making on the Return Directive show that lacking compat-
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ibility played a role with a view to the granting of discretion. There were a 
number of incompatibilities between Member States’ laws and major ele-
ments of the Directive such as its provisions on the return decision, entry 
ban and legal remedies. In the debates on the return decision, Member 
States established a direct link between compatibility and discretion, criti-
cising the lacking flexibility of the Directive’s provisions for the fact that 
issuing a return decision for any illegally staying immigrant8 was not com-
patible with their legal frameworks. From the viewpoint of the Netherlands, 
the return decision and entry ban requirements were new elements in the 
return procedure and consequently, had to be introduced into Dutch law on 
aliens. What’s more, certain EU requirements were challenging national law 
which had only recently been reformed. The two-step return procedure, for 
instance, which did not match with the more straightforward approach of 
the Dutch ‘decision with multiple consequences’, and the proposed rules on 
legal aid were considered by the Dutch Government as re-introducing bur-
dens for the judiciary that had effectively been reduced by previous changes 
to national law. Legal diversity among Member States’ laws made it, how-
ever, difficult for the Dutch delegation to export national arrangements to 
the EU level for aligning the proposed Directive more with national rules, 
for instance, as concerns the judicial review of decisions related to return. 
Only through building flexibility into the Directive text, hence by granting 
discretion to Member States, some incompatibility between EU and national 
rules was eventually removed and Dutch preferences partly accommodated 
(e.g. optional two-step approach, relaxing safeguard provisions).9
In the light of the foregoing, there is thus a clear link between lacking 
compatibility and the granting of additional discretion for national imple-
mentation. In this respect, the Stage II PVR Directive strongly contrasts 
with the Return Directive, since it did not imply any severe mismatch from 
the perspective of relevant Dutch law. After all, with regard to the Nether-
lands, but also some other Member States, the Commission proposal partly 
reflected the domestic legal situation already present for the recovery of pet-
rol vapour. Additionally, case study findings suggest that the Commission 
took national legislation, including Dutch law, as a template for its proposal 
on the Stage II PVR Directive which furthermore explains legal compatibility 
between EU and national rules. Finally a good match between EU and Dutch 
rules can be concluded from the absence of efforts on the part of the Dutch 
delegation to frequently forward amendments or support suggestions of 
other delegations in aiming to change the content of the proposed Directive.
In a nutshell, clear results can be obtained from comparing the negotia-
tion processes on the two Directives. The compatibility expectation can be 
empirically substantiated as regards the negotiations on the Return Direc-
tive, but not with regard to decision-making on the Stage II PVR Directive.
8 As proposed by Article 6(1).
9 See Articles 8(3) and 12(3).
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15.3.4 Discretion and European Parliament
BLUE CARD VERSUS PYROTECHNIC ARTICLES
No discretion-reducing influence of the European Parliament
Next to the Commission forwarding the proposals for directives and Mem-
ber States negotiating them in the Council of Ministers, the descriptive anal-
yses of the negotiation processes paid attention to the European Parliament, 
being as co-legislator in most of the cases analysed, another key player in 
EU decision-making. Especially if the European Parliament acts in this latter 
role, it is expected to impact the scope of discretion which is finally granted 
to Member States for the national implementation of the directive negoti-
ated. Assuming that the European Parliament, on the whole, takes a rather 
integrationist approach in EU decision-making, and hence, promotes legis-
lative harmonisation, it is posited that the greater its role in the legislative 
process, the less discretion is granted to Member States.
To begin with, the European Parliament’s role in the negotiations on the 
Blue Card Directive differed from its role in the negotiations on the Pyro-
technic Articles Directive. In the former case, it had only marginal influence 
due to the applicable decision-making rules: consultation procedure and 
unanimity voting. The consumer protection directive, by contrast, was co-
decided by both the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, giv-
ing the latter EU institution far more leverage in decision-making as com-
pared to the case of the migration directive.
Being merely in the position to give a non-binding opinion, chances for 
the European Parliament to have a decisive impact on the Blue Card Direc-
tive’s scope of discretion were certainly small. Analysing its position on the 
proposed Directive nevertheless could have brought to light a negative atti-
tude of the European Parliament towards the conferral of broad discretion 
upon Member States. Interestingly, however, the case study results do not 
support this expectation. On the one hand, endorsing a common approach 
to labour migration, the European Parliament did not approve of any sub-
stantial deviation from EU rules which would have implied legal diversity 
instead of uniformity. And yet, on the other hand, for reasons of subsidiar-
ity, it approved of some discretion being granted to enable Member States to 
retain control over the access of migrants to their national labour markets.
Acting as co-legislator, it may be assumed that the European Parliament 
reduced the scope of discretion available to Member States when a com-
mon agreement on the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive had to be found. As 
likely as this may seem within a context, where the European Parliament 
had a much greater say in EU decision-making than in case of the Blue Card 
Directive, the case study analysis does not provide evidence justifying this 
claim. While legislative harmonisation was supported to achieve the Direc-
tive’s internal market objective, at the same time, also the granting of discre-
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tion was approved by the European Parliament where it was considered to 
advance the Directive’s product safety objectives.10
In the light of these comparative findings, the overall conclusion is that 
regardless of whether or not its position as decision-maker was weaker or 
stronger, it was not the strategy of the European Parliament to limit Mem-
ber States’ discretion.
WASTE FRAMEWORK VERSUS TOY SAFETY
No discretion-reducing influence of the European Parliament
Turning to the Waste Framework Directive and Toy Safety Directive, did 
the European Parliament in the corresponding negotiation processes seek to 
reduce the scope of discretion given to Member States for the implementa-
tion of a revised EU legal framework on waste as well as, with regard to the 
latter Directive, rules on the safety and free movement of toys?
The empirical findings suggest that the European Parliament, in its 
capacity of co-legislator, was an assertive actor in both negotiation pro-
cesses. With regard to the Waste Framework Directive, the European Parlia-
ment did not readily give in to the Council. A final compromise between the 
co-legislators was only struck after Member States had reached a common 
agreement. As for its position on the conferral of discretionary powers upon 
Member States, no conclusive evidence was found to support the expecta-
tion that it sought to minimise discretion. The importance of a harmonised 
approach in the implementation and application of EU waste management 
rules was emphasised. However, the amendments of the European Parlia-
ment also included a number of discretionary provisions. Probably due to 
the fact that previous implementation of the Directive had been beset with 
problems, the European Parliament sought to enhance Member State com-
pliance, by supporting the granting of some discretion for implementation, 
thereby acknowledging the differences of Member States’ waste manage-
ment systems.
With regard to the Toy Safety Directive, empirical results seem to indi-
cate that the European Parliament had some leverage on the Directive’s con-
tent for many of its amendments found their way into the final text. Simi-
lar to the case of the Waste Framework Directive, the European Parliament, 
however, did not entirely reject the granting of discretion to Member States 
but acknowledged the necessity of it for giving effect to the subsidiarity 
principle.11 On the whole, however, discretion did hardly play any role dur-
ing the negotiations. The Directive, implying a new approach to harmonisa-
10 This concerns Article 6(2) limitation on free movement clause, and Article 7(2) setting of 
minimum ages regarding private and vocational use.
11 Cf. Article 11(3) of the fi nal Directive regarding the determination of the language of 
warnings on toys.
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tion and standardisation, included a wide scope of harmonisation.12 Hence, 
from the outset, it merely provided Member States with a narrow margin of 
discretion for implementation.
All things considered from a comparative perspective, the empirical 
analysis could not establish the credibility of the expectation under consid-
eration. There are no conclusive findings providing proof of a link between 
more impact of the European Parliament on legislative decision-making 
and the reduction of discretion granted to Member States.
RETURN VERSUS STAGE II PETROL VAPOUR RECOVERY
No discretion-reducing influence of the European Parliament
Finally, what about the Return Directive and Stage II Petrol Vapour Recov-
ery Directive and the role of the European Parliament in determining the 
scope of discretion granted to Member States in EU decision-making on 
these two legislative acts?
Again, both Directives were adopted jointly by the European Parlia-
ment and Council under co-decision, the Return Directive being the first 
major piece of EU migration law subjected to these decision-rules. Har-
monising national return systems to ensure a fair and human treatment of 
thrird-country nationals was supported by the European Parliament, and 
may suggest that the latter sought to reduce discretion for implementation.
The case study analysis, however, did not deliver any conclusive evi-
dence to corroborate this expectation. It cannot be denied that the Euro-
pean Parliament supported the harmonisation of national laws as exempli-
fied with regard to the proposed detention requirements where a common 
approach should guarantee fair and human treatment of returnees and pre-
clude forced returns. Overall, however, it did eventually not live up to its 
own aspirations. Due to its ‘beginner status’ in co-legislating migration mat-
ters with the Council, and therefore scarce experience with this activity, its 
attempts to influence the content of the Directive met with mixed success. 
In addition, from the empirical findings no consistency can be deduced 
regarding the European Parliament’s approach to reduce discretion. What’s 
more, the same reasons that motivated the European Parliament to advocate 
a fair and human rights-based approach to the return of irregular migrants 
also triggered its support for discretion. This was reflected by its request to 
make the obligation of issuing a return decision optional for Member States.
The analysis can be kept short as regards the Stage II PVR Directive. 
Also here, no link could be established between the influence of the Euro-
pean Parliament on legislative decision-making and the scope of discretion 
being conferred upon Member States. As noted earlier, discretion was in 
principle irrelevant. The Directive mostly included technical provisions and 
left hardly any discretion for Member States from the outset. Moreover, the 
12 In particular, owing to its total harmonisation requirements (essential safety standards), 
and minimum enforcement requirements.
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European Parliament’s position on the Directive proposal does not provide 
any evidence to suggest that it impacted in any way the scope of discretion.
Viewed from a comparative angle, the case study findings provide no 
justification of the claim that the European Parliament was determined to 
reduce the scope of discretion being granted to Member States. Hence, in 
none of the three paired comparisons can the European-Parliament-matters 
expectation be substantiated.
The results of the comparative analysis of the negotiation processes are 
summarised in table 25. Based on these results a number of conclusions can 
be drawn. To begin with, the assumed link between discretion and policy 
area holds true for all three directive pairs. Hence, as expected, where legal 
and institutional influence of the EU still is in a rather early stage, more 
discretion is granted to Member States as exemplified by the two migra-
tion directives. This link also applies, albeit in the inverse way, to the con-
sumer protection and environmental directives – meaning that in case of 
more EU influence, less discretion is granted. Furthermore, and in line with 
the expectations, political sensitivity and lacking compatibility between 
EU and national rules are reasons for the incorporation of more discretion 
into directives where EU harmonisation is not yet as advanced. Equally 
important to note, and as previously assumed, building more discretion 
into the directive text appears to be the more likely solution to preference 
divergence among Member States in negotiation contexts characterised by a 
high diversity of national legal traditions. The negotiations on the Blue Card 
Directive and Return Directive make that clear. The two factors are rather 
irrelevant in respect of already progressively harmonised policy areas and 
issues of which the Toy Safety Directive, Waste Framework Directive, and 
finally, the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directives are cases in point.
Table 25: Comparative results EU negotiations
(+ holds true, – does not hold true, +/– holds partially true)










Blue Card + + + –
Pyrotechnic 
Articles 
+ +/– – –
Waste Framework + – – –
Toy Safety + – – –
Return + + + –
Stage II Petrol 
Vapour Recovery
+ – – –
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The Pyrotechnic Article Directive also largely fits into this picture. However, 
political sensitivity was a reason for why discretion was incorporated prior 
to the start of negotiations in the Council of Ministers. Since the case study 
findings make it evident that discretion decisively contributed to the final 
decision-making outcome, the link between discretion and political sensitiv-
ity was found to partially hold true. It is remarkable that additional discre-
tion, albeit by little degrees, was built into the text of the Pyrotechnic Arti-
cles Directive which, after all, entails a new approach to the standardisation 
and certification of products and therefore rather high levels of harmonisa-
tion. The reasons for this can be linked to the two objectives pursued by the 
Directive: harmonising national rules aiming to achieve an internal market 
for pyrotechnic articles and high public safety standards. But exactly for 
reasons of consumer safety as well as cultural and legal customs, negative 
effects from the free movement of these articles should be cushioned by giv-
ing permission to limit free circulation, resulting into the granting of discre-
tion. The figure finally shows that in none of the three paired comparisons 
evidence was found in support of the claim that the European Parliament 
seeks to minimise the scope of discretion being made available for Member 
State implementation. As suggested by the comparative results, to believe 
that it does may be a foregone conclusion. Despite its support of harmonis-
ing national laws and the proper implementation of EU law as shown, for 
instance, in the negotiations on the Blue Card Directive and Pyrotechnic 
Articles Directive, both cases reveal that the European Parliament was not 
totally against the granting of discretion if this encouraged subsidiarity and 
implementation. This being said, future research might benefit from a more 
detailed analysis. Such an analysis should take into account that the Euro-
pean Parliament is not necessarily acting as a unitary actor with homog-
enous preferences on particular issues (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Hix, 2005). 
After all, political groups in the European Parliament may share but also 
differ in their views concerning proposed EU rules. This may be brought to 
light through more profound case study research focusing on the work of 
the permanent committees involved in examining and amending directive 
proposals as well as by a more in-depth study of the plenary sessions where 
the European Parliament as a whole votes on these proposals. Furthermore, 
it may be interesting to analyse whether discretion can have a similar func-
tion within the European Parliament as it is expected to have, under cer-
tain conditions, in the Council of Ministers, namely to facilitate compromise 
between diverging positions on directive proposals.13
What about the role of discretion in the national transposition of the 
Directives analysed, if viewed from a comparative perspective? How did 
discretion play out, how was it used? The comparative analysis presented 
in the subsequent sections seeks to answer these questions.
13 This idea came up when analysing the role of discretion in the negotiations on the Waste 
Framework Directive (see section 11.4.3).
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15.4 National-level analysis
15.4.1 Background factors
Before moving on to the paired comparison analysis of the Dutch trans-
position processes and in order to shed light on the role of discretion, 
the research context of each of the three comparative cases needs to be 
addressed briefly. Recalling from the discussion of the case study design, 
the question of how discretion affects transposition can only be tackled 
properly by narrowing the focus on the relationship between discretion and 
transposition outcome (presumed cause and outcome). This was done with 
the aim of comparing the results of transposition in two cases where differ-
ent discretion margins of directives (small versus large) are considered to 
affect the process. Consequently, other so-called background factors, con-
ceived as alternative explanations for outcomes of transposition, have to 
be sufficiently similar between the cases compared, to minimise as much 
as possible their share in shaping the process outcomes (ceteris paribus 
clause). In reality, however, conditions are usually less than ideal. Hence, 
differences as regards the background conditions have to be taken into 
account to assess their influence on transposition.
BLUE CARD VERSUS PYROTECHNIC ARTICLES
Table 26: Background factors comparison 2009/50/EC vs. 2007/23/EC

































To start with, table 26 shows that the conditions under which the Blue Card 
Directive and Pyrotechnic Articles Directive had to be transposed differ in 
respect of the time allocated for transposition. For the transposition of the 
migration directive Member States had 24 months, and thus the amount of 
time which is on average available, whereas with 30 months more time was 
granted for transposing the consumer protection directive. Interestingly, 
while more transposition time has been associated with timely transposi-
tion (Kaeding, 2007b), delayed transposition of the Pyrotechnic Articles 
Directive in the Netherlands contradicts this claim. Therefore the question 
may be asked if the granting of more time for transposition contributed to 
this dealy. The case study findings do not suggest this. As for the transposi-
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tion of the Blue Card Directive, conditions of timing and correctness were 
met within the 24 months available. No particular implications of this time 
frame for the process of transposition were in evidence.
Furthermore, the two transposition cases slightly differ with respect to 
the sort and number of transposition measures. Both Directives were trans-
posed by means of delegated legislation. In case of the Blue Card Directive 
this pertained to two orders in council, whereas incorporating the Pyrotech-
nic Articles Directive into Dutch law required three measures, one order in 
council and two ministerial decisions. In the latter case, the empirical find-
ings do not indicate that the procedures for creating transposition measures 
caused the speed of transposition to slow down. As became evident from 
the descriptive analysis of the transposition process, delay was officially 
explained by the Minister by pointing to the Directive’s technical complex-
ity and lack of clarity, which apparently were not conducive to an easy and 
smooth incorporation of the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive into Dutch law.
WASTE FRAMEWORK VERSUS TOY SAFETY
Table 27: Background factors comparison 2008/98/EC vs. 2009/48/EC

































The ceteris paribus clause is also not entirely met with regard to the direc-
tive pair composed of the Waste Framework Directive and Toy Safety Direc-
tive (see table 27). Both Directives were transposed by one Ministry within 
the same amount of time (24 months). Contrary to the transposition of the 
consumer protection directive, transposing the environmental directive, 
however, required a statutory change and therefore a more active involve-
ment of the Dutch Parliament. In addition, differences between these trans-
position cases pertain to the number and sort of transposition measures: 
The Toy Safety Directive was transposed by means of an order in council. 
Transposing the Waste Framework Directive, by contrast, required five 
transposition measures, including primary and delegated legislation (one 
parliamentary act, two orders in Council, and two ministerial decisions). 
Delay in case of the consumer protection directive was negligible. As for 
the environmental directive, the high number of measures was not found to 
have caused the short-term delay in transposing it.
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RETURN VERSUS STAGE II PETROL VAPOUR RECOVERY
Finally, the ceteris paribus clause does not fully apply with respect to the 
third case as becomes obvious from table 28: the comparison between the 
Return Directive and the Stage II PVR Directive.
Table 28: Background factors comparison 2008/115/EC vs. 2009/126/EC 



































Also here differences relate to the number and sort of transposition mea-
sures as well as the number of transposition actors. While the transposition 
of the Return Directive involved next to the transposing Ministry also the 
Dutch Parliament, the Stage II PVR Directive was transposed by one Min-
istry and without the involvement of further domestic actors. In contrast 
to the Stage II PVR Directive which was properly transposed by delegated 
legislation (order in council and ministerial order), the transposition of the 
Return Directive required five measures including an amendment to statu-
tory law. The results of the case study analysis of the Dutch transposition 
of the Return Directive brought into view that the delay in transposition is 
linked to the transposition measures and number of transposition actors.
15.4.2 Discretion-in-national-law
BLUE CARD VERSUS PYROTECHNIC ARTICLES
Discretion-in-national-law matters – discretion-in-national-law does not matter
Putting a bright spotlight on discretion, it is expected to facilitate the incor-
poration of a European directive into national (Dutch) law, especially if 
more of it is made available to Member States. The underlying idea is that 
discretion provides actors in the process of transposition with a range of 
options as regards forms and methods of implementation which are all 
compatible with the directive.
Starting with the first directive pair, the Blue Card Directive and Pyro-
technic Articles Directive, the findings of the case study analyses substanti-
ate the discretion-in-national-law expectation to a great extent in the for-
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mer and to only a very little extent in the latter case. In both transposition 
cases discretion was used to integrate EU requirements into national legisla-
tion: the requirements of the Blue Card Directive were transposed into the 
Dutch Aliens Act and Aliens Decree and the requirements of the Pyrotech-
nic Articles Directive incorporated into the framework of the Dutch Fire-
works Decree. As regards the migration directive, the Ministry of Security 
and Justice benefitted from the wide scope of discretion, which made it 
possible to convert EU rules into national legislation while largely preserv-
ing the latter’s status quo. The Dutch admission scheme for labour-driven 
migration established by the Knowledge Migrant Regulation had proven 
its worth and hence should be left in place. With discretion being available 
this legal framework did not have to be fundamentally altered and, conse-
quently, transposition costs could be kept low. Discretionary EU rules that 
did not fit into it were not incorporated – no labour market test nor changes 
to the salary threshold or rules on ethical recruitment were introduced and 
the obligation to change existing ones or create new rules was avoided (e.g. 
mobility rights for Blue Card holders). Interestingly, the strict transposition 
of EU rules, being not always entirely in line with the Directive’s require-
ments, including the use of ‘illicit’ discretion (lying outside the Directive’s 
scope), was not challenged by the Commission.
Regarding the aspect of availability of discretion the picture changes, 
when turning to the transposition of the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive. 
Besides the discretionary choice as to the forms and methods of implemen-
tation, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment had only little 
additional discretion at its disposal to incorporate the latter’s requirements 
into Dutch law. Moreover, transposition was not on time but delayed for 
six months. Regarding the role of discretion, it was not found to have con-
tributed to delay. On the contrary, the case study findings show that even 
little discretion granted by the Directive facilitated transposition. Discretion 
served to iron out disparities between EU and national legal arrangements 
such as the differences in definitions and categories of pyrotechnic articles. 
Moreover, using discretionary freedom in limiting the free movement of 
pyrotechnic articles, the Dutch Ministry was able to continue the national 
practice to keep certain articles outside the reach of consumers, even though 
under the scope of the Directive these articles might have become available 
for private use. In this regard, the Ministry could preserve its own safety 
standards which, given the traditional problem of unsafe fireworks, was in 
the Dutch interest.
All things considered, the claim that more discretion facilitates trans-
position holds for the Blue Card Directive. It does not apply in the case of 
the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive. Yet, it is noteworthy to underline the 
fact that, as empirically shown in respect to the consumer protection direc-
tive, discretion being granted by little degrees can have a facilitating effect 
on transposition. Nonetheless, this effect did not suffice to achieve proper 
transposition.
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WASTE FRAMEWORK VERSUS TOY SAFETY
Discretion-in-national-law does not matter
What for effects did discretion have regarding the Waste Framework Direc-
tive and Toy Safety Directive? The findings of the comparison of the two 
transposition processes lead to similar results.
The Waste Framework Directive was transposed into the framework of 
the Dutch Environmental Management Act. While the Directive includes 
some discretionary provisions, they were for the most part not used. Mak-
ing use of discretion was not necessary because Dutch legislation closely 
matched the revised rules on waste treatment. The Dutch influence on the 
content of the Commission’s legislative proposal already prior to the offi-
cial negotiations contributed to the good match between the Directive and 
Dutch law. In this context, discretion was not of importance for converting 
EU rules into the national legal system.
The case of the Toy Safety Directive looks not so much different. A first 
point to make is that discretion was hardly available because the Directive 
implied a high level of harmonisation. Being in formal terms a new legis-
lative act, it revised previously introduced EU rules.14 Against the back-
ground of already harmonised national law in the area of toy safety, discre-
tion was not relevant in giving a ‘national twist’ to EU rules to keep changes 
to originally national legislation to a minimum. The use of transposition 
measures and techniques (direct and dynamic referencing) instead show 
that the Directive was transposed as it stands.
In a nutshell, discretion did not play a pertinent role in facilitating trans-
position – neither in the case of the environmental nor as regards the con-
sumer protection directive. Both Directives were not transposed on time. But 
while the facilitating effect of discretion did not materialise, discretion was 
also not found to have hampered the transposition of the two Directives.
RETURN VERSUS STAGE II PETROL VAPOUR RECOVERY
Discretion-in-national-law does not matter
Finally, whether or not more discretion contributed to better (timely and 
legally correct) transposition is discussed with a view to the Return Direc-
tive and Stage II PVR Directive.
The transposition analysis of the migration directive does not bear 
this out. A wider scope of discretion was made available to transpose the 
Directive into the Dutch law on aliens. Transposition, however, was only 
achieved with considerable delay resulting in an infringement proceeding. 
Furthermore, due to breaches of provisions with direct effect, cases were 
held in front of Dutch courts. The results of the empirical analysis further-
more show that discretion was not irrelevant because the Minister used it to 
14 These rules had been established by Council Directive 88/378/EEC.
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convert EU rules into the framework of the Dutch Alien Act. This way, EU 
requirements concerning the scope and operational provisions (e.g. return 
decision, entry ban, and detention) were incorporated without breaking 
down already existing legal structures. But preserving national legislation 
resulted in too little account being taken of the Directive’s objectives and 
spirit, above all the voluntary and non-coercive approach to the return of 
illegally staying third-country nationals. This was not only criticised by the 
national Parliament with a view to the Minister’s proposal for the criminali-
sation of the offence against the prohibition of re-entering the Netherlands 
but also more directly related to his use of discretion. The analysis of trans-
position legislation shows, for instance, that discretionary rules concerning 
the voluntary departure period were found to be stricter and disproportion-
ate compared to those of the Directive.
Moving on to the Stage II PVR Directive, there is no reason to speak of 
more discretion leading to better transposition. It is true that the Directive 
was transposed in a timely and legally correct fashion. But discretion did 
not play any role in the transposition of this Directive. This can be estab-
lished on the basis of the following facts. First, the Directive text implied 
virtually no discretion. As stated above, the technical nature of the Directive 
as well as its high compatibility with relevant Dutch law (Activities Decree 
and Regulation) precluded the necessity of discretion for the purpose of 
transposition. Second, empirical evidence is lacking that indicates the rel-
evance of discretion for transposition.
All in all, the comparison shows that in neither case do the results of 
the analyses provide justification of the expectation that more discretion led 
to better transposition. With regard to the Return Directive discretion had 
even opposite effects, the use of discretion seems to have contributed to dif-
ficulties in transposing the Directive. This latter aspect receives more atten-
tion below.
The comparative transposition analysis has so far focused on the effect 
of discretion on transposition. However, implementation research has 
shown that next to directive features, other factors come into play at the 
national level that together with discretion may affect Member States’ trans-
position performance.
15.4.3 Discretion and disagreement
BLUE CARD VERSUS PYROTECHNIC ARTICLES
The disagreement interaction expectation does not matter
One of these factors is disagreement with the content of the Directive 
expressed at the EU decision-making stage. It is expected that such a dis-
agreement raises the likelihood of deficient transposition which is further 
compounded if only little discretion is available to transpose the relevant 
EU requirement.
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The Blue Card Directive as well as the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive 
included requirements that did not completely match Dutch preferences. 
As to the former Directive, the requirement concerning unregulated profes-
sions was found by the Dutch Government to create unnecessary burdens 
for national authorities. Also the final rules on the validity of the Blue Card 
Directive were not in line with Dutch preferences. With respect to the Pyro-
technic Articles Directive, the absence of any provisions prohibiting certain 
articles within category 4 professional fireworks and especially the obliga-
tion to introduce an ex-ante approval system for pyrotechnic articles were 
contrary to Dutch wishes.
The analysis of the transposition of the Blue Card Directive into Dutch 
law does not provide any evidence that requirements which diverged from 
national preferences were not complied with. What’s more, contrary to the 
scenario described by the expectation, not little but considerable discretion 
was offered to Member States for the purpose of implementation. In other 
words, the expectation does not carry much relevance in the case of the Blue 
Card Directive.
Things are a little different as regards the Pyrotechnic Articles Direc-
tive which fulfils the condition mentioned in the expectation in that it only 
grants little discretion. And yet, no empirical evidence was found which 
shows that disagreement with certain EU requirements prompted actors 
to impede transposition deliberately. The introduction of the pre-market 
approval system, for instance, even though causing administrative costs 
and burdens for business and consumers, was not identified in the analysis 
as a reason for delay.
A comparative perspective on the two transposition cases leads to the 
conclusion that the claim cannot be substantiated. To put it in more concrete 
words: in neither case, evidence was found that previous disagreement with 
a directive requirement alongside little discretion available for implement-
ing this requirement caused delay. Hence, the conclusion that discretion did 
not have impeding effects on transposition.
WASTE FRAMEWORK VERSUS TOY SAFETY
The disagreement interaction expectation does not matter
The comparison between the two Directives of the second pair can be brief 
and concise. Satisfaction with the revised legal framework for the manage-
ment of waste on the part of the Dutch Government was high. The final 
Directive was in good harmony with the domestic legal system. Transposi-
tion was slightly delayed. But in the absence of any relevant points of dis-
satisfaction this delay cannot be traced back to a joint effect from both, dis-
agreement and little discretion, which is expected to impede transposition.
Likewise, as regards the Directive on the safety of toys and their free 
movement within the EU, the content of this Directive was largely in line 
with Dutch preferences besides a few exceptions (e.g. proposed warning 
requirements, obligations for economic operators). Nevertheless, the Dutch 
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Government highly approved of the final text of the Toy Safety Directive, 
and most importantly, transposition was only marginally delayed. Hence, 
in principle, compliance was achieved.
In short, any impediments to the process of transposition resulting from 
disagreement in combination with lacking discretion can be excluded for 
both cases.
RETURN VERSUS STAGE II PETROL VAPOUR RECOVERY
The disagreement interaction expectation does not matter
Finally, with respect to the last directive pair, is there any evidence proving 
the link between the negotiation and subsequent transposition stages show-
ing that discretion in interaction with disagreement contributed to deficient 
transposition?
The Dutch transposition of the Return Directive was delayed. And yet, 
with regard to discretion, this transposition case does not match the situa-
tion described by the expectation considered here. This can be derived from 
the fact that the Directive includes several flexible legislative arrangements 
and therefore grants a rather high instead of a low margin of discretion. 
From the negotiation analysis it is obvious that there were some require-
ments, of which the Dutch delegation did not fully approve, pertaining, 
amongst others, to the Directive’s scope, the provisions obliging Member 
States to issue a return decision and entry ban as well as to provide for legal 
remedies. But in most of these cases, some flexibility was made available for 
transposition and it was also used by the Dutch Minister. Moreover, the case 
study findings do not indicate that previous disagreement with EU require-
ments was amongst the causes for the considerable delay in transposition.
A relatively short analysis suffices in case of the Stage II PVR Directive. 
Clearly, the data does not square with the disagreement interaction expecta-
tion. As previously noted, the content of the Directive did not give relevant 
reasons for disagreement, in other words, it was met with large approval by 
the Dutch Government. Besides, transposition was carried out in a timely 
and legally correct manner.
Together with the other two comparative cases, also the third paired 
comparison leads to the conclusion that discretion did not contribute 
to transposition problems with EU requirements which diverged from 
national interests.
15.4.4 Discretion and compatibility
Legal compatibility between on the one hand the EU Directive analysed, 
and, on the other hand Member States’ laws, in particular Dutch law, were a 
focal point of the negotiation analyses. It was shown that lacking compatibil-
ity may provide grounds for building more discretion into the directive text. 
Whereas based on the Commission proposal and its evaluation by national 
ministries and local goverments by means of the BNC-fiche, a rather prelimi-
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nary assessment of the match between the relevant EU Directive and Dutch 
law was given in the negotiation analyses, a more concrete assessment was 
provided by looking into the transposition processes. Compatibility between 
EU and Dutch rules was assessed here by means of the concept of four types 
of misfit (high, moderate, limited, and small misfit), taking into account the 
number and content of national transposition measures. This concept was 
borrowed from previous transposition analysis (Steunenberg and Toshkov, 
2009). Bringing compatibility together with discretion, the following was 
assumed about the way these two factors are linked in the context of trans-
position: Compatibility between the EU directive and national rules raises 
the likelihood of proper transposition while at the same time this effect is 
expected to become stronger as the degree of discretion increases.
BLUE CARD VERSUS PYROTECHNIC ARTICLES
The compatibility interaction expectation matters – it does not matter
To be more precise, the compatibility interaction expectation implies that in 
case of a low match or high misfit, timely and legally correct transposition 
is rather unlikely. The negative effects from misfit cannot easily be compen-
sated for by discretion whereas in case of medium or high fit, discretion 
may strengthen the positive effects resulting from compatibility and there-
fore further facilitate the legal implementation of the directive. The latter 
scenario was found to apply regarding the transposition of the Blue Card 
Directive. Using the compatibility concept as a benchmark, a small mis-
fit between the Directive and Dutch law on aliens was established, based 
on the knowledge that only two instruments of delegated legislation were 
needed to transpose the Directive’s requirements. In other words, except 
for some minor issues (as mentioned before, the validity of the Blue Card, 
EU rules on unregulated professions and salary threshold), the compatibil-
ity between EU and Dutch legal arrangements was rather high. In addition 
to that, the Directive entailed a considerable amount of discretion for the 
interpretation and application of its provisions. All things considered, high 
compatibility in combination with a wide scope of discretion available for 
transposition contributed to achieving compliance.
What about the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive? In contrast to the Blue 
Card Directive, this consumer protection directive was not without any rele-
vant misfit for the Netherlands. But misfit was found to be largely related to 
the incongruence between the Directive and national arrangements in terms 
of policy, owing to the proposed pre-market approval system of pyrotech-
nic articles (conformity assessment procedure) which was missing on Dutch 
territory. Legal incompatibility, by contrast, was only limited as shown by 
the results of the compatibility check using the four-types-classification 
model and the fact that necessary changes for the purpose of transposition 
eventually left the Dutch Fireworks Decree largely unaltered. As for discre-
tion, only little of it was available for transposition, which does not match 
the expectation that more discretion enforces the positive effect of compat-
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ibility. It should nevertheless be noted that discretion, albeit being granted 
by little degrees, facilitated converting the Directive into the national legal 
framework. But this does not change the fact that transposition was delayed 
for six months. Hence, in contrast to the case of the Blue Card Directive, 
compatibility and discretion by interacting together could not produce a 
positive effect, at least not one that was strong enough to compensate for 
the negative effects resulting from, amongst others, the policy misfit that the 
Pyrotechnic Articles Directive entailed for the Netherlands.
Put in a nutshell, a joint effect from compatibility and discretion mate-
rialised and contributed to the proper transposition of the Blue Card Direc-
tive. Even if such an effect occurred in the case of the Pyrotechnic Articles 
Directive, the truth remains that transposition was hampered by another 
factor and the proper formal implementation of the Directive therefore not 
achieved.
WASTE FRAMEWORK VERSUS TOY SAFETY
The compatibility interaction expectation does not matter
Based on the results from the negotiation analysis, the Waste Framework 
Directive was considered to be compatible with relevant Dutch legislation. 
Transposition of the Directive in the Netherlands, however, required five 
transposition measures including, alongside delegated legislation, also one 
statutory amendment (amendment to the Dutch Environmental Manage-
ment Act). While this may have been indicative of a higher legal misfit, 
the large number of transposition measures was, instead, explained by the 
framework structure of the Dutch Environmental Management Act: modi-
fying the latter, which was necessary to transpose EU rules regarding the 
definition of key terms like ‘waste’ ‘hazardous waste’ and ‘prevention’, 
amongst others, required making corresponding adjustments to lower-level 
regulation within the framework of the Act. Furthermore, the case study 
findings obtained from the analysis of the transposition measure, and inter-
views with civil servants from the transposing Ministry of Infrastructure 
and the Environment, confirmed the initial assessment of high compatibil-
ity. In addition, the empirical results show that discretion, which is, in case 
of medium or high fit, expected to facilitate transposition, did not come into 
play. It was hardly used in transposing the Directive.
Similar to the Waste Framework Directive, legal misfit was small 
between the Toy Safety Directive and the Dutch Toys Commodities Act 
Decree into which the requirements of the revised legislative act were incor-
porated. Put differently, compatibility was rather high which certainly con-
tributed to the relatively smooth transposition of the Directive – leaving 
the very small delay out of consideration. As for discretion, it was hardly 
granted by the Directive and the empirical results do not suggest that it 
decisively enforced the positive effect of compatibility.
Summing up, comparing the national-level processes regarding the 
environmental and consumer protection directives shows that a possible 
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interaction effect from discretion and compatibility had no bearing on the 
transposition of EU rules into Dutch law. While it seems safe to assume that 
compatibility between EU and Dutch legal arrangements contributed to 
proper transposition in both cases, discretion did not decisively affect com-
patibility – neither as facilitating nor impeding factor.
RETURN VERSUS STAGE II PETROL VAPOUR RECOVERY
The compatibility interaction expectation does not matter
Last but not least, the comparison has to address the third directive pair con-
sisting of the Return Directive and Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive.
Compatibility between the migration directive and Dutch aliens law 
was not high, despite some achievements made during the EU decision-
making process to bring the Directive more in line with the domestic 
legal order (e.g. as regards rules on the Directive’s scope, return decision). 
Already further up, it was pointed out that effects leading to the delay in 
the transposition of the Return Directive can be linked to the number and 
sort of transposition measure (section 15.4.1). Based on the misfit model 
used, a moderate to high misfit was established. The Directive had to be 
transposed by means of two orders in council, which did not simply replace 
but amended existing legislation. The expectation concerning compat-
ibility and discretion implies that impeding effects from low compatibil-
ity are further strengthened by discretion if the latter is granted by larger 
degrees. As established by the transposition analysis, discretion was used 
by the Dutch Minister to preserve already existing national legislation, even 
though where this was not in line with the spirit of the Directive and, at 
least, doubtful as regards some of the Directive’s provisions.15 Discretion, in 
this context, was, thus, not conducive to but rather impeding, in interacting 
with low compatibility, the proper transposition of the Directive.
Whereas compatibility and discretion were relevant for the transposi-
tion of the Return Directive, albeit by affecting the process in a negative 
way, this is clearly not the conclusion that can be drawn from the findings 
of the analysis relating to the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive. 
First of all, compatibility between EU requirements aiming at the reduction 
of petrol vapour at service stations and relevant Dutch law was high. This 
was confirmed by means of the compatibility concept which pointed to a 
high fit. Second, being largely composed of provisions including technical 
requirements, discretion was practically absent from the Directive. Third, 
the empirical results do not prove the relevance of discretion for incorporat-
ing the Directive’s requirements into the Dutch legal framework provided 
for by the Environmental Management Act.
The above comparative considerations permit it to conclude, that in 
neither case the joint effect from discretion and compatibility between EU 
15 Such as in case of the transposition of Articles 7(3) and 11(3) of the Directive establishing 
conditions concerning the voluntary departure period and entry ban.
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and national legal arrangements did occur. It should be born in mind that 
discretion was used in the case of the Return Directive, and while arguably 
contributing to the preservation of national legislation did not, however, 
facilitate achieving timely and legally correct transposition.
15.4.5 Discretion and administrative capacity
The following expectation is considered: administrative capacity raises the 
likelihood of proper transposition, but this effect decreases as the degree of 
discretion increases. Referring back to the theoretical discussion, adminis-
trative capacity is understood in the dissertation as pertaining, for one, to 
transposition knowledge, that is to say the theoretical and practical under-
standing as well as the required skills national actors have to transpose the 
directive into national law. Second, it can also relate to ‘intra-ministerial 
coordination’ between the policy and legal units within the ministry or min-
istries involved in the negotiation and legal implementation of EU direc-
tives, respectively. If transposition knowledge is poor, and / or coordination 
between the policy and legal units insufficient, the process of legal imple-
mentation is expected to be hampered. The presence of available admin-
istrative capacity raises the likelihood of proper transposition. Discretion 
plays a negative role in this context if it is granted by larger degrees. It is 
expected to reduce the positive effect of administrative capacity in shaping 
proper (timely and legally correct) transposition.
BLUE CARD VERSUS PYROTECHNIC ARTICLES
The capacity interaction expectation does not matter
Considerable discretion was available for the national transposition of the 
Blue Card Directive. Administrative capacity due to insufficient transposi-
tion knowledge or coordination problems within the transposing Ministry 
of Security and Justice, however, did not play any role. The administrative 
capacity of the civil servants in charge rather contributed to the smooth 
transposition of the Directive which was also not hampered but rather facil-
itated by the wider discretion margin. The Netherlands complied with the 
Directive.
Turning to the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive, the expectation does not 
apply due to the fact that the Directive grants only little discretion. Further-
more, the case study findings do not suggest that administrative capacity 
was problematic for national transposition. On the contrary, they point out 
that the requirement of transposition knowledge was fulfilled. From the 
interviews it emerged that the civil servant of the Ministry of Infrastruc-
ture and the Environment in charge of the Directive dossier had profound 
knowledge of both negotiation and transposition processes in which he was 
closely involved. Due to his involvement at both stages, also no problems 
relating to intra-ministerial coordination were detected.
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To conclude, in none of the cases was there any evidence to prove the 
link between administrative capacity and discretion impacting transposi-
tion in a negative fashion.
WASTE FRAMEWORK VERSUS TOY SAFETY
The capacity interaction expectation does not matter
The Waste Framework Directive was transposed by the Ministry of Infra-
structure and the Environment. The case study results do not give reason to 
believe that knowledge of how to convert the rules of the European waste 
management system into Dutch law was lacking. All the same, the empiri-
cal analysis brought to light that intra-ministerial coordination was not opti-
mal due to the diverging views of the policy and legal units of the Min-
istry of Infrastructure and the Environment regarding the transposition of 
EU rules on the determination of the end-of-waste status.16 While this could 
have been a reason for the transposition delay, it was not confirmed as such 
by the interview partners that were chiefly responsible for the dossier on 
the Waste Framework Directive. Instead, their statements corroborated 
the idea that had emerged from the study of documents and literature: the 
slight delay was caused by the political circumstances, or more precisely, 
by a change of government occurring during the transposition process. 
Regarding discretion no proof was found that it came into play.
The expected link between administrative capacity and discretion was 
also not pertinent to the transposition of the Toy Safety Directive. To make it 
short: based on the case study findings it could be established that national 
transposition was carried out with sufficient administrative capacity pro-
vided by the policy unit of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environ-
ment, and in particular the legal civil servant in charge of incorporating the 
revised safety and market-related rules on toys into Dutch law. Discretion 
was hardly granted by the Directive and, as established earlier, did not neg-
atively affect transposition.
RETURN VERSUS STAGE II PETROL VAPOUR RECOVERY
The capacity interaction expectation does not matter
Finally, what about the Return Directive and the Stage II PVR Directive? 
While the two Directives are different in many respects, they share the 
absence of an interaction effect from discretion and administrative capacity.
The Return Directive was considerably delayed. But administrative 
capacity or rather the lack of it, in combination with the relatively high dis-
cretion margin of the Directive, was not identified in the analysis as having 
caused problems for national transposition.
Likewise, the applicability of the expectation can obviously be excluded 
in respect of the Stage II PVR Directive. The Directive includes practically
16 Cf. Article 6(4) of the Waste Framework Directive.
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no flexible arrangements and therefore discretion does not appear as a 
factor that reduced the positive effects from administrative capacity for 
national transposition performance. What’s more, based on the empirical 
results, it is reasonable to assume that administrative capacity rather con-
tributed to the timely and legally correct transposition of the Directive by 
the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment.
To sum up, all directive pairs have in common that administrative 
capacity and discretion, as two factors that can interact and affectnational 
transposition did not have any relevant impact on the process. In other 
words, the capacity interaction expectation has no explanatory power with 
respect to the comparative cases considered.
15.4.6 Discretion and transposition actors
The last factor with which discretion is expected to interact is the number of 
actors responsible for transposition. The central plank of the argument is that 
the more actors are involved, the more likely it is that transposition is defi-
cient and that this negative effect gets stronger the more discretion a direc-
tive grants. With regard to the Dutch transposition context actors are usually 
involved at the ministerial as well as political level. In the former case, prob-
lems causing deficient transposition can arise from difficulties with inter-
ministerial coordination, i.e. through poor communication, conflicts of inter-
est and therefore lacking consensus regarding the way the directive should 
be incorporated into national law, including the questions whether or not 
and how to make use of discretionary provisions. The same issues may arise 
at the political level, between the responsible ministry / ministries on the 
one hand, and on the other hand, national Parliament which plays an active 
role if the directive is transposed by means of statutory instruments.
BLUE CARD VERSUS PYROTECHNIC ARTICLES
The actor interaction expectation does not matter
As regards the Blue Card Directive, the facts are clear: The Directive grants 
considerable discretion which, however, and in conjunction with the num-
ber of transposition actors, had no impeding effect on transposition. Proper 
transposition was achieved by the Ministry of Security and Justice which 
transposed the Directive using delegated legislation. Being the sole actor in 
charge of legal implementation precluded the possibility of conflicts, result-
ing from inter-ministerial coordination problems or parliamentary debates, 
all of which could have delayed transposition or led to the inclusion of 
aspects into the transposition measure that go beyond the Directive’s scope.
Having only a small scope of discretion, the Pyrotechnic Articles Direc-
tive does not match with the expectation analysed here, which describes the 
impeding effect on transposition as resulting from the number of transposi-
tion actors interacting with a directive’s higher discretion margin. Retarding 
effects from the involvement of Parliament can furthermore be excluded, 
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since the Directive was transposed by the Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment by means of delegated legislation. However, while the Minis-
try remained mainly responsible for transposition at the ministerial level, 
the Dutch Public Prosecution Service got involved, too, as regards aspects 
of enforcement and the way corresponding rules should be incorporated 
into national law. This collaboration was found to have contributed to delay 
as emerged from the study of documents and interviews. From the analy-
sis it did not follow, however, that the Directive’s little discretion margin 
strengthened this negative effect. On the contrary, the case study findings 
pointed to a facilitating impact of discretion on transposition.
In short, the actor interaction expectation does not carry any relevance 
for the two transposition cases.
WASTE FRAMEWORK VERSUS TOY SAFETY
The actor interaction expectation does not matter
In the Netherlands, the transposition of the Waste Framework Direc-
tive made it necessary to amend the Environmental Management Act. As 
a result, the Directive was transposed by means of statute, amongst other 
measures, and hence, required the active involvement of the national Parlia-
ment. Based on the case study findings, it could be concluded that parlia-
mentary involvement did not contribute to delay. Likewise, any obstacles to 
transposition at the ministerial level can be ruled out, due to the fact that the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment acted alone in converting 
EU rules into Dutch environmental law.
The same applies to the Toy Safety Directive which was transposed by 
one national authority, the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport. This fact 
eliminates the possibility of problems resulting from deficient inter-minis-
terial coordination or parliamentary involvement obstructing the proper 
transposition of the Directive. The empirical analysis shows that national 
stakeholders gave feedback to the transposition measure without, how-
ever, delaying the process. In the absence of any difficulties being caused 
by diverging views and preferences regarding transposition among national 
actors, and only little discretion being granted by the Directive, the expecta-
tion under consideration carries no relevance in the present case.
The previous conclusion from the first paired comparison has to be reiter-
ated: the comparative analysis does not provide any evidence of the alleged 
effects of the two factors, transposition actors and discretion, on transposition.
RETURN VERSUS STAGE II PETROL VAPOUR RECOVERY
The actor interaction expectation partially matters – it does not matter
With regard to the expectation assessed here, the Return Directive repre-
sents an interesting case. For one, because it has a rather wide discretion 
margin, certainly if compared to the Stage II PVR Directive, and second, 
because the latter’s transposition required the active participation of the 
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national Parliament. To transpose the Directive into Dutch law on aliens, 
it was necessary to amend both Alien Act and Decree. Third, besides the 
fact that the Directive included discretionary provisions leaving options 
in transposition that needed to be discussed, it also concerned a politically 
sensitive issue. Fourth, transposition was considerably delayed. Given these 
circumstances, there seems to be enough potential for conflict between the 
Ministry of Security and Justice and national Parliament. Empirically, this 
is clearly shown by the fact that transposition and the choices made by 
the Minister in incorporating (discretionary) provisions triggered contro-
versy between the two transposing actors. On the other hand, the empirical 
results indicate that parliamentary treatment of the draft transposition mea-
sure went rather fast. In addition, other external causes were found to have 
contributed for the most part to the considerable delay of transposition. 
Against this background, the impeding joint effect of discretion and more 
actors being involved in transposition was found to only partially apply.
As to the Stage II PVR Directive, it can be concluded with certainty that 
such an interaction effect did not play a relevant role in the transposition 
of the Directive. First of all, the Directive granted virtually no discretion. 
What’s more, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment was the 
only actor in charge of transposition at the ministerial level. Being trans-
posed by means of delegated legislation, transposition furthermore did not 
require any involvement from Parliament. Hence, conflict hampering the 
proper incorporation of the Directive’s requirement did not arise. Besides, 
the Netherlands was in compliance with the Directive.
In a nutshell, in none of the three cases in which directive pairs are 
analysed, did Dutch transposition suffer from a negative joint effect of the 
number of transposition actors and higher levels of discretion being made 
available for the legal implementation of the Directive. With respect to the 
Return Directive the effect was present but found negligible.
Table 29 gives an overview of the comparative results of the national 
transposition analyses. It shows in which cases expectations 5 to 9 address-
ing the role of discretion in national transposition hold true and in which 
cases they do not or only partially hold true.
Starting with the most obvious case, discretion was pertinent to the 
transposition of the Blue Card Directive. It facilitated the incorporation of 
the Directive into Dutch legislation in the presence of a good match between 
EU and national rules. Interestingly, as regards the Return Directive, even 
though it was concluded that discretion facilitated the negotiations on the 
Directive, the case study findings do not show that it also had a positive 
impact on national transposition. On the contrary, it was observed to have 
affected the process in a negative way, amongst others, through interacting 
with the number of transposition actors. This effect was not identified as the 
main reason for the considerable delay of transposition but nevertheless it 
contributed to this transposition outcome. Furthermore, it becomes obvious 
from table 29 that none of the expectations was found to apply in the sec-
ond comparative case composed of the Waste Framework Directive and Toy 
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Safety Directive. In other words, discretion neither shows to have facilitated 
nor impeded transposition. That discretion apparently had no role to play is 
in line with the more general expectation that it is not of relevance in more 
harmonised EU areas such as consumer protection and the environment.
Table 29: Comparative results Dutch transposition processes















Blue Card + – + – –
Pyrotechnic 
Articles 
– – – – –
Waste 
Framework
– – – – –
Toy Safety – – – – –




– – – – –
In line with this expectation, the transposition analyses of the Pyrotechnic 
Articles Directive and Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive show the 
same results, discretion does not seem to have mattered. Finally, it should 
be noted that in none of the comparative cases examined there are find-
ings lending proof to interaction effects involving discretion as described 
by the expectations 6 and 9 including the two factors of disagreement with 
EU rules at the negotiation stage and administrative capacity of transposing 
actors. Administrative capacity defined in terms of transposition knowledge 
and inter-ministerial coordination, was not found to be lacking. In this par-
ticular respect, transposition in the Netherland was carried out without any 
hitches.17 The capacity interaction expectation (E9) did not have much explan-
atory power due to the absence of any interaction effect of administrative 
capacity and discretion. Discretion was also not found to have interacted at 
the national transposition stage with previous disagreement to EU require-
ments. But even if the disagreement interaction expectation (E6) was not sub-
stantiated by the empirical findings, it is interesting to note that the results 
displayed in table 29 above, indicate some consistency with regard to dis-
cretion and suggest that interrelatedness of the EU and national decision-
making stages plays a role in this regard. The cases of the Blue Card Direc-
tive and Return Directive indicate that if for a Member State discretion is a 
relevant factor at the negotiation stage, it also comes into play at the subse-
17 As regards the Waste Framework Directive, inter-ministerial coordination was not opti-
mal, but it did not lead to any impediments to transposition (see section 11.6.2).
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quent transposition stage. Granted, the empirical results are drawn from a 
single-country study and caution should be, as explained at an earlier stage, 
exercised with generalising conclusions. While this is not the intention here, 
the point is deemed worth mentioning and could be followed up by future 
(cross-country) research.
Opposite findings apply most clearly to the cases of the Waste Frame-
work Directive and Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive: discretion 
was not relevant for the negotiations and it also did not play any role during 
the transposition of these Directives. The Toy Safety Directive also seems to 
fit into this context. But there is more to say regarding this case, and it is felt 
that the role of discretion in this particular transposition process should be 
put a bit more into perspective. The discussion will therefore return to this 
case in the concluding chapter below. Finally, the Pyrotechnic Articles Direc-
tive stands a bit out from the other cases due to the fact that while discretion 
appeared to be a pertinent factor during the negotiations, it apparently was 
not relevant to the subsequent transposition of the Directive. Suffice it to 
point out here that discretion was nevertheless not found to be an entirely 
irrelevant factor but that, in fact, it facilitated transposition into Dutch law, 
though this positive effect was not enough on its own to secure Dutch com-
pliance with the Directive.
Table 30, 31 and 32: Comparative cases one to three
(+ holds true, – does not hold true, +/– partially holds true; 0/1 = small/large margin of discretion margin; 
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But what about the impact of different discretion margins on national trans-
position which takes centre stage in the analysis? After all, a major reason 
and aim of the paired comparisons was to find out how especially very dis-
cretionary directives affect legal implementation since different effects have 
been ascribed to them. To this end, tables 30, 31 and 32 provide a closer look 
at the case study results, this time including the factors of key interest, dis-
cretion (margin) and transposition outcome.18
It becomes immediately clear when zooming in on the relationship 
between discretion (margin) and transposition outcome that the results of 
the comparisons confirm the mixed record ascribed to the effects of dis-
cretion in implementation studies. The cases of the Blue Card Directive 
and Pyrotechnic Articles Directive displayed in table 30 may suggest that, 
with discretion being granted by larger instead of smaller degrees, proper 
national transposition is achieved. After all, the Netherlands achieved 
the proper transposition of the Blue Card Directive, with discretion being 
revealed as a factor which facilitated this process. This in contrast to the 
Pyrotechnic Articles Directive which, besides its inherent characteristic to 
provide Member States with the discretionary choice of implementation 
forms and methods, only grants little additional discretion based on its 
provisions. This Directive was not properly transposed and transposition 
delayed for several months. It was shown that facilitating effects of discre-
tion did not suffice to decisively contribute to compliance. In other words, 
the first paired comparison seems to highlight the positive effects that dis-
cretion can have on transposition, especially if more of it is available for 
transposition.
These results notwithstanding, and shifting the attention to the two 
other comparative cases displayed in tables 31 and 32, outcomes are shown 
that have different implications for the role of discretion. It becomes evi-
dent that with regard to the Waste Framework Directive and Return Direc-
tive granting higher levels of discretion compared to their counterparts (Toy 
Safety Directive, Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive), transposition 
was deficient, being reflected in a short-term and long-term delay in trans-
position, respectively.
What’s more, directives with a small discretion margin, such as the Toy 
Safety Directive, and especially the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Direc-
tive were properly transposed. The marginal delay regarding the former 
Directive can hardly be interpreted as non-compliance, particularly as the 
delay was not treated by the European Commission as an infringement of 
the Directive. However, like in the case of directives with larger margins of 
discretion, the findings of the case studies do not reflect any systematic pat-
tern regarding the effects of directives granting discretion by small degrees. 
It is true that compliance was achieved as regards the Toy Safety Directive, 
18 Since the potential impact from background factors (alternative explanations of trans-
position outcomes) was already discussed above, these factors are not included in the 
fi gures.
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and in particular, the Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive. The trans-
position of the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive, by contrast, was delayed. 
What’s more, it was shown that this Directive has a rather small margin of 
discretion.
15.5 Conclusion
This study seeks to shed light on the role of discretion in EU decision-mak-
ing and national transposition processes. To this end, the six individual case 
studies have been analysed in pairs, by adopting a comparative approach to 
show how different discretion margins of directives affect transposition in 
contexts that are in certain aspects relatively similar. Based on the compara-
tive results, empirically substantiated answers were given to key questions 
of this study. As regards EU decision-making, the veil has been lifted to 
some extent, revealing the circumstances under which discretion is granted, 
to what extent and with what effects. EU and directive features were found 
to matter: the policy area and issue the directive addresses, determines the 
scope of discretion. Especially in less Europeanised contexts such as migra-
tion where legal diversity among Member States is still high, additional 
discretion is granted as a result of political sensitivity and compatibility 
between EU and national law. Discretion then serves to facilitate compro-
mise. Regarding the results of the transposition analyses, they confirm the 
picture emerging from implementation research: discretion affects transpo-
sition differently, in other words, no consistent pattern could be established 
as regards the effects of discretion on transposition neither from directives 
with larger discretion margins nor from directives with smaller discretion 
margins. Discretion was found to facilitate transposition in case that it was 
granted by larger degrees and in the presence of high compatibility between 
EU and national rules (Blue Card Directive). In the presence of low com-
patibility and more actors being involved in transposition, more discretion 
being available to Member States was observed to contribute to deficient 
instead of proper transposition (Return Directive). Otherwise, discretion did 
not play a decisive role in transposition. This is most clearly evident in the 
transposition of the environmental directives (Waste Framework Directive 
and Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive).
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The first part of this concluding chapter continues to assess the results of 
the negotiation and transposition analyses with due respect to the role of 
discretion. In doing so, the key questions of this study are further discussed 
and answered. This includes, in the second part, a shift of focus towards the 
relationship between discretion and legitimacy. The remainder of this chap-
ter addresses the relevance of the dissertation’s findings for the study of dis-
cretion within the context of processes at the EU and national level with 
regard to directives, and puts forward a few suggestions for future lines of 
research.
16.2 Discretion and nothing else matters?
The aim of the dissertation was to shed light on the role of discretion in EU 
decision-making and the national transposition of EU directives, and to find 
out how discretion affects these processes. One of the conclusions of this 
study is that discretion does indeed matter. The empirical findings draw 
a picture of the different roles that discretion plays in the negotiation and 
transposition contexts addressed in the case studies. Furthermore, the case 
study findings made it possible to draw conclusions about the particular 
circumstances under which discretion facilitates processes at both the EU 
and national level regarding directives, but also revealed those conditions 
that lead to impeding effects of discretion on national transposition. To com-
plete the discussion of the empirical results some outstanding issues and 
additional aspects need to be addressed.
16.2.1 Circumstances and effects (negotiations)
First, the negotiation analyses brought to light that discretion either facili-
tated EU decision-making or that it had no effect on the progress of nego-
tiations. Facilitating effects occurred in connection with political sensitivity 
and / or incompatibility between the directive under negotiation and Mem-
ber States’ legal systems. Cases in point include the negotiations on the two 
migration directives as well as the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive. In fact, 
the empirical results from these cases confirm the argument of the previ-
ously mentioned consensus-building perspective on the delegation of dis-
cretionary decision-making competences to Member States (Dimitrova and 
Steunenberg, 2000; Thomson et al. 2007; Thomson, 2011). It proceeds from 
16 Conclusions and outlook
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the assumption that disagreements between Member States in the Council 
of Ministers are settled by building discretion into decision outcomes such 
as directives. What’s more, the case of the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive 
matches the observation that little discretion being made available to Mem-
ber States for implementation can already have such an effect. Little discre-
tion can suffice in bringing about consensus as long as Member States have 
the idea that discretion helps to implement EU rules by largely preserving 
their domestic legal systems (Thomson, 2011: 260; 262).
16.2.2 Circumstances and effects (transposition)
Second, and with regard to transposition in the Netherlands, it was shown 
that discretion facilitated or impeded this process. From the analyses it fol-
lows that discretion has facilitating or impeding effects by interacting with 
other factors. In other words, discretion unfolds its effects not alone. It has 
a bearing on transposition by affecting other factors that are assumed to 
impact transposition. This was shown in the case of the Blue Card Direc-
tive, where discretion strengthened the positive effects of high compatibility 
between EU directives and relevant Dutch legislation. It was also brought 
into view with regard to the Return Directive where discretion, by interact-
ing with these factors, increased the impeding effect of both legal incom-
patibility and transposition actors. But the retarding effect of discretion and 
national transposition actors did not have a big impact in further slowing 
down transposition.
Third, the fact that discretion is an intervening factor in transposition 
furthermore shows that it is not a sufficient condition for proper or defi-
cient transposition to occur. Other factors must be present in conjunction 
with which discretion unfolds its effects. Given the fact that transposition is 
found to be affected by a multitude of factors this may not be too surprising 
but it is nevertheless worth noting. Furthermore, discretion has a noticeable 
effect on transposition if larger amounts of it are available to incorporate EU 
rules into national law. The transposition of the two migration directives are 
clear illustrations of this result.
Fourth, where only little discretion is available for transposing a direc-
tive discretion has less impact on transposition. The transposition of the 
Pyrotechnic Articles Directive indicates that discretion facilitated fitting the 
Directive into the Dutch Fireworks Decree in the presence of good compat-
ibility. Nevertheless, due to policy misfit and the complexity of the Direc-
tive’s technical requirements, the positive effects of legal compatibility were 
outweighed and proper transposition was therefore not achieved.
16.2.3 Effects and role (negotiation and transposition)
The fifth point relates to the effects and role of discretion in transposition as 
well as, again, to its link with the compatibility (or goodness-of-fit, misfit) 
argument. Interestingly, as follows from the case studies, the link between 
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compatibility is of relevance in both the negotiation and transposition pro-
cesses.
First, as becomes evident from most of the negotiation processes, Mem-
ber State preferences were shaped by considerations about the compatibility 
between EU and national law – and hence related to the costs assumed to 
be incurred by implementation. Member States sought to keep these costs 
low by uploading own legal arrangements or seeking additional discre-
tion. Incorporating more discretion into directive proposals which guaran-
teed that EU requirements could be converted into national law as Member 
States saw fit, led to the latter’s final agreement on directive proposals. Sec-
ond, compatibility between EU and national law played a role in transposi-
tion. Together with discretion it either facilitated or impeded proper trans-
position, as mentioned above with respect to the two migration directives 
analysed. While the compatibility or goodness-of-fit argument has deliv-
ered mixed results as to its relevance in explaining transposition outcomes, 
the results of the present analyses show in any case that it mattered, with 
respect to both the negotiation and transposition processes.
A last finding is worth mentioning. The transposition analyses show 
that legal implementation of EU directives in the Netherlands is based on 
the strategy to implement a directive by taking over the legislative text in a 
national legal measure. This strategy follows from the discretionary choice 
of transposition forms and methods and is referred to as the ‘copy-out’ tech-
nique. By applying it, implementing actors stay as close as possible to the 
directive text and avoid the incorporation of any national extras1 with the 
aim of ensuring timely and legally correct transposition. At the same time, 
national transposition is focused on using already existing legislation as 
much as possible,2 which brings into play the aspect of preserving national 
legislation and again the role of discretion. After all, the transposition of the 
migration directives shows that discretion is used to retain existing national 
legislation. In fact, preserving own legislation is an approach which is not 
unique to the Netherlands. It is also applied by other Member States that 
take their national legal systems as a point of departure for transposition 
(Steunenberg and Voermans, 2006). But such an approach does not seem 
to guarantee compliance with EU law and it illustrates again the different 
effects that discretion can have. While preserving own national rules and 
practices by using discretion contributed to proper transposition regarding
the Blue Card Directive, it resulted in deficient transposition and non-
compliance as exemplified by the transposition of the Return Directive – 
not only in the Netherlands but apparently also in other Member States 
(Zwaan, 2011; 2013). This example shows that while the empirical analysis 
is country-specific, it indicates trends also found in other Member States.
1 This is refl ected in the ministries’ adherence to instructions for drafting legislation, no. 331.
2 This is done in accordance with no. 333 of the instructions for drafting legislation.
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16.3 Discretion under scrutiny
The positive effects of discretion attest to its potential to facilitate processes 
of EU law-making and national (legal) implementation – a potential which, 
as argued in the dissertation, is inherent in discretion. And yet, the case 
studies, in particular those centring on the migration directives, have also 
brought to light views that express dissatisfaction and criticism of discretion.
In the area of consumer protection and environmental law this aspect is 
reflected indirectly. Here it seems that harmonisation by directives has not 
been entirely successful in producing the intended results. As noted before 
with regard to consumer protection law, the European Commission pursues 
plans to advance more vigorously the harmonisation of national consumer 
laws. To this end it has started to introduce full harmonisation instruments 
such as the 2011 Consumer Rights Directive,3 seen by some scholars as dif-
ficult to reconcile with the principle of shared competences and subsidiar-
ity (Antoniolli, 2006; Reich, 2012a, 2012b; Weatherill, 2013). As regards EU 
environmental law, some believe that the Commission is ‘disadvantaged’ 
by directives and therefore advocate the use of directly applicable EU reg-
ulations (e.g. Jordan, 1999). Although recognising that flexibility makes it 
possible for Member States to take into account national peculiarities, direc-
tives are considered to contribute to the problem of implementation deficits 
across Member States due to the flexible arrangements they imply – i.e. due 
to discretion (Jordan, 1999: 78; Steunenberg et al., 2012).
These kinds of debates show the tension between supranational and 
national dimensions in the EU integration process reflected in debates about 
the distribution of decision-making competences. In the area of migra-
tion, this debate has led to more overt criticism of discretion which is con-
sidered by some as the ultimate expression of Member State attempts to 
retain national legal orders and practices at all costs. Discretion is explicitly 
addressed in debates about EU harmonisation of national migration law – 
and viewed critically as shown in the case studies regarding the migration 
directives. But also in respect of migration directives more generally, discre-
tion is seen with scepticism and is mentioned in one breath with problems 
of legitimacy and lacking high standards of EU migration law (Formisano 
and Carrera, 2005: 15).
3 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 
on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/
EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 304, 
22 November 2011, pp. 64-88. The Directive’s objective is to achieve a ‘high level of con-
sumer protection as well as to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market 
by approximating certain aspects of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
of the Member States concerning contracts concluded between consumers and traders’ 
(Article 1).
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Turning back to the cases of the Blue Card Directive and Return Direc-
tive, here the availability of considerable discretion was found to have chal-
lenged if not undermined the objectives of the initial Commission propos-
als (Baldaccini, 2009; 2010; Eisele, 2013). The proposal for the Blue Card 
Directive initially implied high standards concerning the equal treatment 
of EU Blue Card holders with nationals of the host Member State, includ-
ing appropriate rights for their family members. Through more discretion 
that was eventually built into the Directive, it was, nevertheless, possible for 
Member States to minimise these standards during the negotiations (Eisele, 
2013). Likewise, with regard to the Return Directive, it has been strongly 
doubted whether its discretionary provisions allowing for exceptions and 
differences in national practice will ensure equal and fair treatment of irreg-
ular migrants subjected to return procedures as actually being sought by the 
Directive (Baldaccini, 2009; 2010).
What can be said in response to this critique? To begin with, these critical 
voices on discretion cannot be simply rejected out of hand. Recent studies 
on the implementation of the Return Directive show, for instance, that dis-
cretion may indeed be used for restrictive migration policies at the national 
levels (Zwaan, 2011; 2013). And yet, it is doubted here if these negative 
perceptions do justice to the concept of legislative discretion as presented 
in this study. Again, my central argument is that the basic idea underlying 
the use of discretion is a positive one from the viewpoint of implementa-
tion. Discretion as a directive’s core feature provides alongside the efficiency 
benefits previously addressed, the relevant flexibility for Member States to 
fit EU rules into their traditionally grown legal systems. For those in charge 
of transposition, discretion makes it possible to take into account national 
peculiarities – the idea underlying its use being established by the EU trea-
ties: the preservation of national legal identities. It seems to me, however, 
that this potential of discretion is not recognised in the academic debate on 
EU migration law. Here, discretion is equated with, or at least treated as, a 
pars pro toto for national sovereignty. As noted by Guild: ‘Inherent in the con-
cept of state sovereignty is the right to exercise discretion in immigration 
policies’ (1999: 64). This is not to say that discretion is not an expression of 
Member States’ own decision-making power. But as illustrated by the previ-
ous examples, scholars seem to use this interpretation to argue against dis-
cretion. As a consequence, it is not understood as a tool facilitating decision-
making and the implementation of directives. On the contrary, it is first and 
foremost conceived as an instrument which allows Member States to take 
recourse to national rules and practices, and to preserve them at any price at 
the risk of undermining EU law.
Without intending to ignore the potentially negative effects that may 
result from the transposition of discretionary directives, I believe that there 
is another valuable aspect that needs to be mentioned. In my view, it is too 
short-sighted to conclude that discretion jeopardises harmonisation. Instead, 
I suggest another interpretation of discretion: seeing it as a tool that initially 
makes it possible to achieve harmonisation in areas that are politically very 
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sensitive – apparently relatively ‘young’ EU areas where the previously 
strong influence of Member States is still detectable. In these areas discretion 
reflected, for instance, by minimum harmonisation requirements, enables 
the EU to get ‘a foot in the door’ while, at the same time, the possibility 
still remains to open this door more fully to progressively adapt minimum 
requirements to become full harmonisation measures at a later moment. In 
other words, discretion opens up chances for ‘phased harmonisation’.
16.4 Uses of discretion
The latter observation relates to the use of discretion at the EU level. But 
how was discretion put to use in the national transposition of EU direc-
tives? The case study analyses benefitted in this regard from a closer look at 
the explanatory memoranda to the transposition measures and interviews 
with Dutch civil servants in charge of transposing the directives analysed. 
What is the picture that emerges from the case study findings?
16.4.1 Mixed picture
Starting with a cursory overview, the transposition analyses regarding the 
Blue Card Directive and Pyrotechnic Articles Directive show that discretion 
was used to slot EU requirements smoothly into already existing Dutch leg-
islation, leaving the latter largely intact. In the former case, the use of dis-
cretion contributed to compliance with EU law whereas in the latter case 
positive effects of discretion did not suffice to achieve the same outcome. 
With regard to the Toy Safety Directive, it could not be concluded that dis-
cretion served to preserve national legal structures. But also here, discretion 
reflected in the choice of forms and methods of (legal) implementation was 
shown to have a useful function. As established earlier, it did not have a 
decisive role to play but it seems to have had a supporting function. And in 
any case, it did not impede transposition. Discretion took this latter role in 
the transposition of the Return Directive which was only incorporated into 
Dutch law with considerable delay. What all of these examples have in com-
mon is that they illustrate how discretion was used by implementing actors 
to shape transposition and the resulting effects.
16.4.2 Facilitating effect
Taking a closer look at the transposition cases, with regard to both Blue 
Card Directive and Pyrotechnic Articles Directive discretion was used by 
the national authorities in charge in certain ways that made it unfold its 
potential to facilitate transposition. Basically, what did not fit was made to 
fit. This could also include the decision of transposition actors not to make 
use of discretionary directive provisions. As illustrated by the transposition 
of the Blue Card Directive, (discretionary) EU requirements that did not 
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match with those of the Dutch Knowledge Migrant Regulation and were 
supposed to have undesired effects were not transposed.4 At the same time, 
discretion was used to transpose directive requirements that were in line 
with national legislation.5
These latter examples show that discretion eased fitting the Directive 
into the national legal framework, exhibiting discretion’s ‘facilitating-fit-
function’. It also had a bearing on the transposition of the provisions defin-
ing and categorising pyrotechnic articles and EU enforcement requirements 
of the Pyrotechnic Articles Directive which were not in line with the national 
approach. Discretion, however, implied by the choice of implementation 
forms and methods as well as the directive text,6 made it possible to incor-
porate EU definitions and categories on pyrotechnic articles. This could be 
done by largely preserving national concepts already firmly established 
in own legislation (the categories of consumer fireworks and professional 
fireworks) as well as national practice aiming to keep certain pyrotechnic 
articles available under the Directive’s framework away from consumers. 
Using discretion also made it possible to continue with the application of 
national rules and practices with regard to aspects of enforcement.7
16.4.3 Impeding effect
The way discretion was used led in one case, alongside other factors, to 
non-compliance as illustrated by the transposition of the Return Directive. 
Also here, transposition was geared towards preserving the national legal 
framework. This point notwithstanding, in the presence of low compatibil-
ity of EU and national legislation, the overall approach by the Ministry of 
Security and Justice and the way discretionary provisions were transposed, 
rather emphasised than mitigated the differences between EU and national 
law. This was apparent in the transposition of the provisions on voluntary 
departure and detention which resulted in stricter outcomes than implied 
by the Directive. As a result, the use of discretion undermined instead of 
supported the main tenor and objective of the Directive as laid down in 
Article 1: ‘to promote voluntary instead of forced returns and to establish 
common standards and procedures for returning illegally residing third-
country nationals, in accordance with fundamental rights as general prin-
ciples of Community law as well as international law, including refugee 
protection and human rights obligations.’
4 This concerns Articles 2(g) of the Blue Card Directive and the requirement of applicant’s 
level of professional experience and Article 8(2) making admission for the purpose of 
highly qualifi ed employment conditional on the outcome of an examination of the Mem-
ber States’ labour markets.
5 Discretion granted by Article 6 on volumes of admission was used to ensure the exclusion 
of the third undesired category of workers resulting into Article 3.32 of the Foreigners 
Decree.
6 Article 6(2) limitation to free movement clause.
7 This becomes evident from the use of Article 6(2) regarding the storage of fi reworks.
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16.4.4 Supporting transposition
Finally, how discretion was used is a relevant aspect with regard to the 
transposition of the Toy Safety Directive. The case study findings led to 
the conclusion that it had no decisive role in transposition. But in fact it 
did have a positive influence on transposition – albeit in a different way 
as compared to the Blue Card Directive and Pyrotechnic Articles Directive. 
In the area of product safety regulations where national rules are already 
into close alignment with EU law, discretion did not carry any relevance 
by allowing for the incorporation of EU requirements by preserving previ-
ously established legislation. In fact, the discretionary choice of forms and 
methods rather reflects that transposition is already directed towards the 
fact that legislation is made in Brussels. First of all, the traditional trans-
position approach of the Ministry in charge (Ministry of Health, Welfare 
and Sport), towards EU law in general implies the use of delegated legisla-
tion, and administrative acts such as government decrees.8 Not only does 
this point to the possibility of relatively swift transposition in the absence 
of strong parliamentary involvement. It also points to the fact that, as was 
exemplified by the Toy Safety Directive, hardly any discretion is available 
that would require parliamentary debate on decisions to be taken regarding 
the interpretation and application of the directive’s requirement which, in 
turn, underlines the high harmonisation level national law has already been 
subjected to. To put the point differently, the application of certain trans-
position techniques makes it evident that discretion for shaping transposi-
tion in a national fashion (using as much as possible elements from own 
legislation) has ceased to be relevant in the considerations of implementing 
actors. With respect to the Toy Safety Directive in particular, this is shown 
by the fact that the first Toy Safety Directive was transposed by the copying 
technique9 which implies a transposition measure equivalent to the word-
ing of the directive and indicates the marginal role of national legal terms 
and concepts in transposing the Directive. Meanwhile, this technique has 
been replaced by the technique of direct and dynamic referencing as exem-
plified by the transposition analysis of the revised Toy Safety Directive. The 
use of this technique underlines even more that national legislation is no 
longer taken as a starting point in transposing directives. This was also con-
firmed by the senior civil servant of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Sport who pointed out that directives in areas such as EU product safety 
regulation, as well as EU pharmaceutical legislation and animal testing, 
are highly detailed leading to considerable changes in national legislation 
which nowadays largely refers to EU rules introduced in the Member States 
by means of directives.
8 Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 31498, no. 1-2, pp. 50-51.
9 By means of this technique a transposition measure is created which is equivalent to the 
wording of the directive.
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While additional discretion – flexible arrangements implied by the 
directive text – is lacking and does not play a pertinent role in preserving 
national law, in my view it may still have relevance for national transposi-
tion. The transposition of the Toy Safety Directive illustrates that discretion 
in the form of implementation forms and methods allowed for the relatively 
smooth transposition of the directive – as already noted, the delay was neg-
ligible. By using direct referencing in transposing the Directive, the likeli-
hood of misinterpretation and misapplication was largely reduced, and by 
means of direct referencing the future swift and efficient amendment to toy 
safety rules was guaranteed. National stakeholders were also involved by 
means of an established procedure10 and largely approved of the transpo-
sition measure. Against the transposition background just described and 
taking into consideration that, as previously noted, the Ministry of Health, 
Welfare and Sport is known to have one of the best compliance records with 
regard to EU directives, it is at least conceivable that discretion has been 
beneficial for the transposition of EU directives. It does not seem unreason-
able to assume that the way discretion has been used – in choosing trans-
position forms and methods – may have served the Ministry over time to 
establish a routine way of dealing with transposition in the area of product 
safety.
Up to this point, the empirical results have been assessed with the aim 
of answering the dissertation’s questions concerning the role and effects of 
discretion, the circumstances under which it comes into play, and how it is 
used within the context of transposition. All that is missing now is elaborat-
ing on the link between discretion and legitimacy. And in particular how 
does discretion link up with the three dimensions of input, throughput and 
output legitimacy?
16.5 Discretion and legitimacy
To someone like Weber (1864-1920), a lawyer and one of the founding fathers 
of sociology, it may not have been obvious why discretion should be of rel-
evance for modern legal systems and have certain implications for their 
legitimacies. In the academic world Weber is well known for his concept of 
legitimacy which has influenced contemporary debates about the rightful 
exercise of power but also triggered criticism (a case in point is Beetham, 
1991). In Weber’s view, it is primarily the rationality of the rule of law that 
makes people, in modern legal societies, accept and obey power exercised 
10 Regulier Overleg Warenwet’, ROW. See footnote 27, chapter 12.
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over them.11 Legal systems based on the rationality of the rule of law as an 
overarching principle have administrations that are rule-governed and work 
in a scientific and objective way. Hence, administrative actors exercise power 
rationally i.e. according to legal, rational principles (Galligan, 1990: 64-68). 
This prevalence of rules and principles precludes that any difficulties arise 
from having to choose among possible courses of action in the application 
of law: Hence the conclusion that ‘there would be no problem of administra-
tive discretion since the concern of the bureaucratic institutions would be to 
find the most rational and efficient means for implementing legislative poli-
cies’ as explained by Galligan who elaborates on the implications of Weber’s 
theory for the concept of discretion (Galligan, 1990: 68; see also Feldman, 
1992). And yet, later scholars of public administration have recognised that 
discretion is an inevitable part of administrative action (Feldman, 1992: 164).
In the present study this latter view is shared. In addition, it has acted 
on the assumption that discretion matters for the functioning of modern 
legal systems, including their administrations which are broadly involved 
in the application of law. What’s more, it sought to show that discretion can 
play a useful role in law-making and (legal) implementation processes. By 
looking into the role of discretion in EU decision-making and the national 
transposition of EU directives, its aim was to highlight the facilitating effects 
discretion may unfold in these processes and to show that it can contrib-
ute to their successful conclusion. Bu there is more to say to it. Taking this 
approach one step further, it is believed that discretion can contribute to the 
legitimacy of EU directives in national law. The central argument is that the 
legitimacy of EU directives may benefit from discretion in so far as discre-
tion can be used in transposition processes to enhance the input, through-
put and output legitimacy of these directives.
As explained in the introduction to this study, legitimacy can be 
described in terms of input (government by the people), throughput (gov-
ernment with the people), and output (government for the people). These 
three legitimacy dimensions can serve to assess legitimacy on a more 
abstract level, linking them to different principles of legitimacy which 
describe the content of the concept more directly. One way to conceive of 
legitimacy in the EU is to link it to principles of indirect, parliamentary, 
technocratic and procedural legitimacy which have elements of both input 
and output legitimacy.12 The principles function as vectors that alongside 
the output and input dimensions have served to pinpoint legitimacy issues 
11 Alongside the rationality of the rule of law, acceptance and obedience may be motivated 
by peoples’ belief in a charismatic leader or custom and tradition. While charisma and 
tradition are two sources of legitimacy in especially pre-modern societies, the rationality 
of the rule of law is the prevalent pattern in modern legal societies. See Galligan, 1990, 
pp. 64-65. Galligan bases his observations on his reading of, amongst others, Weber’s, M. 
Economy and Society edited by G. Roth and C. Wittick (1978) California UP: Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
12 The dimension of throughput legitimacy was only studied in more detail at a later stage. 
It largely corresponds with procedural principles of legitimacy.
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regarding different aspects of the European Union, its institutions, processes 
and legislation (Lord and Magnette, 2004; Georgiev, 2013; Stack, 2014).
But the aim here is not to strictly stick to the vector model. For pres-
ent purposes it shall rather be used to stimulate reflections about legitimacy 
that are of immediate relevance for the context at hand. Without necessarily 
combining them, both legitimacy principles (vectors) and input, throughout 
and output dimensions are considered useful in identifying and describing 
the main issues at stake with regard to the legitimacy of EU directives. To 
this end, the focus of the discussion alternates between EU decision-making 
and national transposition. Reference is made to transposition in the Neth-
erlands by using the case studies for the sake of illustration.
16.5.1 Discretion and output legitimacy
The case studies show several features of the Dutch transposition context 
that were previously pointed out. To start with, they illustrate the fact that 
the transposition of EU directives is largely an administrative process in 
the Netherlands which also applies to transposition in other Member States 
(Steunenberg and Voermans, 2006). Except for the Waste Framework Direc-
tive and Return Directive, in all other cases (Blue Card, Pyrotechnic Articles, 
Toy Safety, and Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery) transposition was carried 
out without a prominent role for the Dutch Parliament. From the viewpoint 
of democratic legitimacy, this should not be a reason for concern where 
directives imply technical requirements or adjustments to previously trans-
posed EU rules – and, in any case, where they do not have more fundamen-
tal implications for Member State citizens. It is true that in Member States 
such as the Netherlands, the principle of primacy of the legislature serves 
as a key guideline in the implementation of (EU) law. But this does not nec-
essarily imply that the national parliament is directly involved in the mak-
ing of each transposition measure.13 Where national law so provides, imple-
menting actors are encouraged to apply delegation mechanisms to achieve 
timely transposition. This is in line with the above-mentioned approach to 
make use of already existing legislative instruments with the aim of achiev-
ing compliance with EU directives. It is well known by now that these con-
sideration and choices can be made due to the presence and availability of 
discretion.
13 For instance, where elements of a directive are subject to delegation, it is not directly 
involved in transposition. See ‘Instructions for the drafting of legislation’, no. 22. In 
exceptional cases, The Dutch Parliament can, however, get involved by means of affi r-
mative resolution (‘voorhangprocedure’). See ‘Instructions’, no. 35. Generally, there also 
is the possibility for Parliament to scrutinise orders in council before they enter into force 
by means of a notifi cation procedure (‘nahangprocedure’). This may, however, be time-
consuming and therefore result in fewer applications of this specifi c kind of notifi cation 
procedure.
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While compliance with EU law was not reached in all transposition 
cases analysed, discretion was shown to have facilitated or at least sup-
ported legal implementation in three of them. Even though the process was 
eventually delayed, it facilitated to some extent the transposition of the 
Pyrotechnic Articles Directives. Most obviously, discretion facilitated and 
contributed to timely and legally correct transposition in the case of the Blue 
Card Directive. Finally, discretion had a supportive function, enabling trans-
position actors to integrate EU rules into the existing legal framework with 
ease, with regard to the Toy Safety Directive. Very importantly, the transpo-
sition of the latter two Directives on legal migration and toy safety respec-
tively, make clear that discretion contributed to compliance with EU law 
and therefore to the legitimacy of these Directives in national law. This con-
cerns the output dimension of legitimacy in particular: if national transposi-
tion meets both conditions of timeliness and legal correctness, a directive 
can be expected to be fully effective at the domestic level. It is assumed then 
to be able to unfold its problem-solving capacity at subsequent implementa-
tion stages i.e. during the directive’s practical application and enforcement. 
In a nutshell, the transposition examples from the case studies show that 
discretion facilitated good transposition performance, which being a sound 
basis for implementation, makes it more likely that long-term effectiveness 
of the directive within national law will be achieved. Discretion can, thus, 
contribute to the output legitimacy of directives in national law.
Where directives touch upon more fundamental issues that affect citi-
zens and more discretion is available for their transposition, it seems rea-
sonable, however, to wonder whether this does not require greater involve-
ment from parliament or other national stakeholders in discussions about 
how to transpose a directive into national law. This could limit or preclude 
any ‘democratic leakage’ (Vandamme and Prechal, 2007: 45; Vandamme, 
2008: 278). In line with these considerations, the view is taken here that by 
using discretion for the broader involvement of national actors, the input 
and throughput legitimacy of EU directives can be enhanced. In the absence 
of strong and direct influence by national actors on decision-making on 
directives at the EU level, this is deemed an aspect worth considering fur-
ther.
16.5.2 Legitimacy at the EU level
The EU adopts law in various fields. For several reasons already 
touched upon in the introduction to the dissertation, this has given rise 
to issues of legitimacy. Nevertheless, it would be exaggerated to believe 
that legitimacy is a pervasive problem. In fact, regarding areas of EU law-
making and policies it has been noted that legitimacy needs differ depend-
ing on the subject matter at stake (Scharpf, 1997: 21; Lord and Magnette, 
2004: 190). Problematic issues have emerged in the area of justice and home 
affairs. In the pre-Lisbon period, democratic legitimacy in the justice and 
home affairs area, including the sub-domain of migration, was found to 
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be largely absent. This was caused by a lack of input from parliament and 
stakeholders and missing mechanisms to ensure transparency and account-
ability (Carerra and Formisano, 2005; Lavenex and Wallace, 2005: 464). EU 
decision-making was therefore perceived to be carried out in a ‘culture of 
secrecy’ dominated by the involvement of national officials and prevalence 
of national interests (Kostakopoulou, 2007: 160); like in the case of the Blue 
Card Directive if only because of the applicable consultation procedure 
which implies the absence of a more vital role of the European Parliament.14 
It appears, thus, that the legitimacy of EU migration law rested for a long 
time mainly on indirect legitimacy, being justified by its output (Lord and 
Magnette, 2004, see also Lord and Beetham, 1998; 2001): the realisation of 
state preferences pertaining initially to border security matters and later to 
the regulation of influx of migrants.15
In the areas of environment and public health which are also addressed 
in the case studies, technocratic legitimacy plays an important role in the 
legitimation of EU decision-making: these directives often include numer-
ous technical requirements which have to be elaborated (Lord and Mag-
nette, 2004: 193). Corresponding tasks are then delegated to expert com-
mittees attached to the European Commission. This was partly illustrated 
by EU decision-making on the environmental and consumer protection 
directives analysed. On a more general level and as noted above, legitima-
tion of EU law and policies is gained from drawing on different legitimacy 
principles: indirect, parliamentary, technocratic and procedural (Lord and 
Magnette, 2004: 184-187). Accordingly, legitimacy of EU decision-making 
processes on directives can be gained from co-decisions by Member States’ 
governments and the European Parliament on EU directive proposals (indi-
rect and parliamentary legitimacy). In addition, legitimacy is created by 
involving experts and other stakeholders from different parts of society (e.g. 
civil society, business groupings and academics) already during the prepa-
ration of directives in which due consideration is also paid to procedural 
aspects, including the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (tech-
nocratic and procedural legitimacy).
16.5.3 Discretion, input and throughput legitimacy
From the above it becomes obvious that several sources contribute to the 
legitimacy of directives at the EU level. While legitimacy is hence not lack-
ing, it is argued that it should be enhanced when it comes to the transposi-
tion of directives at the national level; and this for good reasons. Discretion 
can be used to this end.
14 But in contrast to the Return Directive; in this case EU decision-making had already been 
brought out a bit of the shadow of secrecy given the applicability of the co-decision pro-
cedure.
15 This has become evident from mapping out the historical development of the area as 
part of the relevant case studies.
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In line with the basic principle of democracy, democratic processes and 
political decisions to be taken should be installed at the same level within a 
political system (Thomassen and Schmitt, 2004: 377). In other words, these 
decisions should be made as close as possible to its members, reflecting a 
strong connection between decision-maker and those affected by the for-
mer’s decisions. Naturally, EU decision-making does not sufficiently live 
up to this principle for it takes place remotely from national citizens with 
national parliaments being involved only to limited extent.16 Turning to the 
national implementation stage, the fact remains that here decision-making 
is mainly shaped by state administrations and not parliaments. Seen in 
this light, it seems to be useful to consider options for the participation of 
national-level actors beyond parliamentary involvement. The argument 
is that the availability of discretion in transposition should be understood 
as an opportunity to bring national-level actors back in. Granted, when 
it comes to implementing a directive, its requirements can no longer be 
changed. As rightly argued in the Dutch policy debate on greater public 
involvement in implementation processes, once EU directives have to be 
implemented at the national level, their potential deficiencies can no longer 
be repaired (Prechal and Vandamme, 2007).17 This, however, does not make 
broader involvement of national actors in subsequent decision-making on 
how to transpose a directive less relevant.
This brings the discussion back to the argument that where more discre-
tion is available, democratic leakage should be avoided by greater involve-
ment on the part of those affected by the EU directive’s requirements in 
decisive legislative discussions. The availability of more discretion should 
as Vandamme notes, justify ‘a full-fledged democratic transposition proce-
dure’ instead of ‘swift transposition’ (2008: 279). He considers discretion in 
transposition as ‘democracy discretion’ which supports the argument made 
here that discretion, if used, can enhance the overall democratic legitimacy 
of EU directives in national law (Vandamme, 2008). Viewed from this per-
spective, discretion functions not only as a factor which facilitates a legal 
16 This describes especially the situation of the pre-Lisbon period. With the Lisbon Treaty 
(2009) the situation may change since it aims to strengthen the role of national parlia-
ments in EU decision-making, providing them with a number of control mechanisms 
to review the application of subsidiarity in legislative proposals forwarded by the Com-
mission. See for instance Arribas, V. and D. Bourdin (2012) ‘What does the Lisbon Treaty 
change regarding subsidiarity within the EU institutional framework’, European Institute 
of Public Administraition 2, pp. 13-17. As rightly observed in the academic debate realis-
ing the better involvement of national parliaments is, however, also a responsibility of 
the Member States. See Steunenberg and Voermans, 2006 as well as Steunenberg (2008) 
‘De hartkwaal van de Nederlandse politiek: mythes over de invloed van Europa’, Regel-
Maat 5, pp. 169-179.
17 Translated from Dutch by myself; the original citation reads as follows: ‘Anders gezegd: 
mogelijke defecten en onvolkomenheden in het EU-wetgevingsproces kunnen niet meer 
worden ‘gerepareerd’ op het nationale niveau. Dergelijke reparatie is enkel mogelijk 
door grotere beïnvloeding van het Europese wetgevingsproces zelf.’ See Vandamme and 
Prechal, 2007, p. 44.
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match and, in so doing, enhances the output legitimacy of EU directives 
in national law – as was argued above. Discretion can also strengthen the 
input and throughput dimensions of the legitimacy of directives, meaning 
that it can contribute to fostering wider acceptance of EU requirements built 
into them by national stakeholders and other citizens and therefore among 
those who have to apply and obey these directives.
Tying in well with the idea of ‘democratic discretion’ regarding the 
transposition of EU directives, other ideas have been presented about dis-
cretion in administrative rule-making more in general. In this connection, 
the use of discretion by administrative actors is considered to strengthen 
public participation and deliberation and therefore democratic legitimacy of 
administrative rules and regulations (Hunold and Peters, 2004). According 
to such views, discretion should be used to shape administrative rule-mak-
ing along the lines of collaborative forms of governance, especially negoti-
ated rule-making, which are applied in administrative law procedures in the 
United States and Canada (Hunold and Peters, 2004). Hunold and Peters 
show how administrative discretion, if put to use, can render administra-
tive rule-making more democratic by making accountability, transparency 
and other mechanisms deemed relevant from the viewpoint of democratic 
legitimacy, integral parts of deliberation processes (Hunold and Peters, 
2004: 131-149). Put differently, discretion can be used to create these condi-
tions, thereby turning administrative rule-making into a ‘government pro-
cess by and with the people’, enhancing input and throughput legitimacy 
as a result. In more concrete terms, involving stakeholders and citizens in 
processes of administrative rule-making is believed to enhance commit-
ment to and compliance with the decisions taken by all actors involved. For 
instance, if discretion is used to bring administrative decision-making closer 
to citizens, accountability is enhanced because administrative actors are 
obliged to act upon public input. In the case of bureaucratic drift or insuf-
ficient consideration of public interests, administrative actors can be held 
accountable more immediately as a result of closer collaboration between 
the administration and citizens (Hunold and Peters, 2004: 140). In addi-
tion, citizens are assumed to be more willing to comply with administrative 
rules and regulations at the practical implementation stage based on the 
consideration that they themselves assisted in translating these measures 
into national legislation. As a result and as aptly put by Hunold and Peters: 
‘Decisions justified with a view to publicly revealed and accepted standards 
of fairness and equity are believed to enjoy greater legitimacy’ (2004: 141). 
In fact, ideas about deliberative democracy and the role of discretion therein 
meet here with the core idea of the procedural justice approach which acts 
on the assumption that people accept even unfavourable outcomes as long 
as they perceive the way these came into being as fair (Tyler, 1990).
To conclude, discretion has been presented here as a tool that, if put 
to good use, makes it possible to enhance the legitimacy of administrative 
rulemaking. In the present context, this means that discretion can be used to 
upgrade EU directives at the national level in terms of output, but especially 
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input and throughput legitimacy. In doing so, two important outcomes can 
be achieved with regard to the transposition of EU directives. The first out-
come is that input (expertise) and support can be ensured not only from 
those primarily in charge of transposition – ministerial civil servants – but 
also from relevant national stakeholders who are more immediately affected 
by EU directive requirements. This is considered important with a view to 
ensuring compliance at the actual application and enforcement stages.18 The 
second outcome relates to the idea that available discretionary room can be 
used by both political and administrative actors in charge of transposition 
to explain the purpose, content and implication of the directive to be trans-
posed to national citizens who make up ‘organised civil society represent-
ing a constituency’s interest’ (Curtin, 2009: 286-287).19 This may strengthen 
the understanding and therefore arguably the acceptance of EU law and 
policies by the wider public. Against this backdrop, it seems that discre-
tion turns out to be a blessing in disguise. While from the academic debate 
views have emerged which emphasise that discretion is problematic, if not 
disadvantageous for legal systems, it has been shown here that inherent in 
the concept of discretion is the potential to contribute to the proper imple-
mentation of EU directives and their legitimacy in national law.
16.6 Qualifying observations
It seemed to me that due to the alleged downsides of discretion emphasised 
in academic debates, discretion’s advantages had somewhat faded into 
the background. While discretion has certainly not slipped from scholarly 
attention, this study sought to make a contribution to highlight the positive 
features inherent in its concept which may not yet have been fully recog-
nised. In so doing, discretion’s potential for processes of law-making and 
implementation, with specific regard to the transposition of EU directives, 
was brought to light. Discretion, however, should not be considered merely 
in terms of a blessing or curse. This is why attention was paid in the disser-
tation to both the advantages and disadvantages of discretion. The effects 
of discretion on transposition, whether positive or negative, should not be 
overestimated. As noted above, national transposition is shaped by many 
factors and discretion unfolds its effects in interaction with a few of these. 
Having said this, it is finally considered useful to put some findings about 
discretion into perspective, especially regarding its role and implications in 
creating opportunities for stakeholder and citizen participation in transposi-
tion.
18 Mastenbroek elaborates on the link between deliberation, transposition and compliance. 
See Mastenrbroek, 2007, pp. 81-86.
19 Curtin, in fact, uses the term as defi ned by B. Kohler Koch and C. Quittkat (2009), ‘What 
is civil society and who represents civil society in the EU? Results of an online survey 
among civil society experts’, Policy and Society, 28(1), pp. 11-22.
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16.6.1 Discretion and deliberation
First, it is deemed justified to ask how processes of deliberation shaped by 
the use of discretion may be realised in transposition practice to enhance 
the democratic legitimacy of a process mainly shaped by administrative 
action. In order to make administrative rule-making more democratic, 
Hunold and Peters call for comprehensive public involvement to achieve 
authentic interest representation as well as continuous interaction between 
negotiating partners – administrative actors and public – in rule-making 
(Hunold and Peters, 2004: 140). From the knowledge obtained by analys-
ing the Dutch transposition context, it becomes evident that involving other 
national actors outside ministries and parliaments is organised in the form 
of ‘deliberation light’ or, probably more appropriately put, ‘dialogue’, in 
which ministry civil servants and stakeholders exchange views about the 
draft transposition measure(s). The involvement of national stakeholders in 
the transposition of the Toy Safety Directive has exemplified this. From the 
viewpoint of practicality, the question is if it is possible to intensify com-
munication between the transposing ministries and public along the lines 
proposed by Hunold and Peters. Given the time limits imposed by the 
transposition deadline and other possible constraints (e.g. human capac-
ity), it is difficult to see how this can be feasible. Different, more beneficial 
framework conditions could possibly be created if other fora are established 
to involve citizens in legislative and administrative decision-making pro-
cesses. This kind of citizen involvement has been noted to take place in 
the Netherlands (Bovens, 2005).20 Whether the transposition process could 
benefit from this development remains speculative. Besides the question of 
practicability, it should be born in mind that where transposition involves 
updating technical details or implies no substantial changes for the wider 
public, citizen involvement is far less relevant.
16.6.2 Discretion, deliberation and delay
In the Netherlands, the involvement of parliament in transposition has 
been discussed as a possible cause for delay, but was not found to be a deci-
sive reason for it (Clement, 2007; Parliamentary Papers II 2007-2008, 31498, 
no. 1-2). The same argument, that delay may occur, can be made regarding 
more participation of actors outside the transposing ministries in transposi-
20 With specifi c regard to decision-making in the Netherlands, Bovens makes concrete pro-
posals on how to improve the involvement of citizens in legislative and administrative 
decision-making processes. Amongst others, he suggests establishing corrective referen-
dums (‘corrective referenda’) and citizen juries (‘burgerjury’s’) that bring together all rele-
vant actors: politicians, experts and citizens. Deliberation then, and as argued by Bovens, 
does not remain confi ned to obtaining technically sound results, but also includes those 
parts of the population affected by EU law. Taking into account principles of ‘representa-
tion’, ‘majority’ and ‘transparency’ (‘afspiegelings -, meerderheids- en transparentiebe-
ginsel’) adds to the democratic legitimacy of these fora. See Bovens, 2005, pp. 124-126.
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tion processes. Delay at the transposition stage can increase deficient imple-
mentation at subsequent stages and therefore non-compliance with EU law 
(Mastenbroek, 2003: 391). Third party involvement (next to ministries and 
parliaments), on the other hand, could foreclose later problems, for exam-
ple, that deficient transposition will be challenged in court – in line with 
the idea that greater interference of citizens in administrative rule-making 
results in enhanced accuracy and appropriateness of administrative action 
(Carolan, 2009: 131). Besides, whether belated transposition is slightly or 
strongly problematic or something in between, may hinge on the extent of 
delay. For instance and with regard to the transposition of transport direc-
tives by several Member States, discretion was found to ‘merely’ have con-
tributed to short delays of a few months which make it certainly less dif-
ficult to catch up on implementation than longer delays (Kaeding, 2007a). 
Additionally, in case of short-term delays the European Commission may 
be less prompted to start an infringement proceeding. Short-term delay of 
the transposition of the Waste Framework Directive, for instance, did not 
have any such consequences.21 Finally, empirical findings of transposition 
analysis have led to the conclusion that delay in transposition does not 
automatically lead to problems at the practical application stage (Masten-
broek, 2007: 161; Carroll, 2014).
16.6.3 Discretion in different legal contexts
In the midst of all this, it should not be overlooked that discretion is no one-
size-fits-all solution to deficits of transposition or vulnerable legitimacy of 
EU law. This would also contradict its own raison d’être which is to enable 
compromise according to the motto of unity in diversity through which dis-
cretion facilitates not only decision-making on directives, but also the incor-
poration of EU directives into different legal systems. As mentioned further 
above in the theoretical discussion on discretion: whether or not and how 
discretion is used in transposition differs among Member States due to their 
very distinct legal frameworks in which the use of discretion for adminis-
trative rule-making may be encouraged or discouraged, depending on the 
interpretation that is given to the concept of separation of powers.
The latter aspect finally links up with another important issue which 
concerns generalising the findings of this study. It was noted earlier that 
case study analysis comes with limitations in this regard. The empirical 
analysis of this study is based on a single-country design and therefore pro-
vides insights into one specific transposition context. As illustrated by the 
point just made about discretion, context specificity precludes the ability to 
apply the results of the present analysis to other national transposition con-
texts, shaped by their own legal-administrative idiosyncrasies. Yet this does 
21 Apart from that, the Commission is known to take action selectively anyway, depending 
on the saliency it ascribes to the issue at stake and the resources available for enforce-
ment. See Steunenberg, 2010.
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not make it less legitimate to highlight discretion’s potential – particularly 
since in this dissertation this potential is not only demonstrated with regard 
to national transposition but also regarding EU decision-making processes. 
In addition, and as shown here, limitations related to generalising case 
study findings do not reduce the importance that these findings have for 
assessing the outcomes of previous research.
16.7 Contributions
Regardless of the apparent trade-off between depth and breadth in study-
ing discretion, this dissertation, having opted for the former (in-depth) 
approach, offers a number of relevant insights and ideas on the subject mat-
ters addressed: discretion in administrative rulemaking, EU decision-mak-
ing and the national transposition of EU directives and legitimacy in the 
European Union. Hence, it contributes theoretically, methodologically and 
empirically to the corresponding academic debates and opens up new per-
spectives for future research.
16.7.1 Theoretical part
From a theoretical point of view, this study contributes to a better under-
standing of how discretion helps in making decisions at the EU level and the 
way discretion is used in the national transposition process. By looking into 
processes at both the EU and national level, it complements other studies 
that have focused on discretion’s effects on Member State transposition and 
post-transposition implementation (e.g. Kaeding, 2007; Mastenbroek, 2007; 
Versluis, 2007; Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009; Carroll, 2014). The special 
feature of the dissertation is its multi-perspective approach to discretion by 
involving different strands of literature not only within one but across dis-
ciplines: law and political science which so far have had limited interaction. 
Literature on discretion in administrative and constitutional law as well 
as the socio-legal studies, legislative politics in the EU (and United States), 
implementation of EU directives and finally, legitimacy in the EU were 
shown to complement each other well in the study of discretion. Weaving 
together the various insights obtained has proved enriching for examining 
the place of discretion in modern legal systems. Light could thus be shed on 
different aspects of discretion, allowing for a more comprehensive under-
standing of the concept in the context of law-making and implementation. 
The legal science perspectives proved useful in addressing discretion in the 
light of the rule of law and separation of powers principles and to explain 
discretion’s potential effects and implications, negative as well as positive, 
for democratic legal systems. Insights from studies on legislative decision-
making and research on EU law implementation in political science and 
public administration served, on the other hand, to identify and add other 
valuable pieces to the research puzzle of discretion in EU decision-making 
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and national implementation: reasons for granting discretion as well as the 
circumstances under which it takes place were revealed, and it was shown 
how discretion affects the transposition of EU directives into national law. 
Taking into account relevant EU, national-level and directive characteristics, 
two sets of expectations were offered to describe and explain more system-
atically the role of discretion in EU decision-making and national transposi-
tion processes. In this connection it is worth mentioning that theoretically as 
well as later on empirically, discretion was analysed with regard to its link 
with three EU policy areas (consumer protection, environment and justice 
and home affairs / migration), yielding comparative insights into the role of 
discretion in different fields of EU law-making. This may add to the under-
standing of EU decision-making, integration dynamics and tensions, all of 
which are well illustrated by the use of directives to harmonise legal differ-
ences in the context of a unity in diversity.
Last but not least, the dissertation has sought to reduce the identified 
research gap regarding the link between discretion and legitimacy in the 
context of national transposition. By pointing out the potentials of discre-
tion, it made a contribution to the discussion on proper ways of democratic 
decision-making to enhance the legitimacy of EU law (Voermans, 2001; 
Interinstitutional agreement 2003; Stie, 2013).
16.7.2 Methodological part
Expanding and developing the knowledge of discretion entailed that the 
concept of discretion granted by EU directives (defined in the dissertation 
as legislative discretion) was elaborated on further. By means of literature 
review, and classification and interpretation of the content of directives 
in particular, various manifestations of discretion were introduced and 
explained. An interdisciplinary effort was made to offer a fine-grained, 
small-scale22 analysis of discretion in directives. For this purpose, the theory 
of legal norms and the social science research method of content analysis 
were combined, leading to a codebook being developed to assess the scope 
of discretion granted by individual directives. The aim pursued was not to 
provide exact measurements, but to indicate a tendency of discretion primar-
ily for the purpose of case selection. All in all, this boiled down to a more 
refined approach to measuring discretion than previously applied (Kaeding, 
2007, Thomson, 2007; 2010; Thomson et al., 2007, Steunenberg and Toshkov, 
2009). Due attention was paid to the complex structure that directives can 
have in order to better capture discretion. Hence, the merit of the codebook 
(and coding scheme) presented in detail in the Appendix to the dissertation 
is that it presents a way to identify and describe discretion in more detail, 
also regarding its implications for national law since legal concepts are used 
22 By focusing on discretion in a directive’s provision instead of directive article; provision 
being defi ned not, as usually done, ‘sub-division of an article’ but, instead, as a phrase, 
and therefore smaller unit.
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as indicators of discretion. It should, however, be underlined that measur-
ing discretion as proposed in the dissertation represents an initial, prelimi-
nary effort. Hence, the codebook offered here is not considered to be a fully-
fledged instrument of measurement. Rather, it is thought of as an attempt to 
assess discretion which does not pretend to be without flaws. At the same 
time, this implies the opportunity for future improvement.
16.7.3 Empirical part
Regarding the empirical contributions, the case study findings of the dis-
sertation resonate well with other studies in the sense that they offer con-
firmation of discretion’s mixed record with respect to its effects on national 
transposition. Next to the fact that the empirical results bear out both 
negative and positive effects of discretion, it is worth mentioning that the 
empirical results were used to explain the core idea of the concept of leg-
islative discretion within the context of EU law-making and national legal 
implementation. The contribution made in this regard consists of showing 
that discretion facilitates or at least supports the incorporation of direc-
tive requirements by ironing out differences between EU and national law. 
It was also shown that due to discretion, Member States are able to incor-
porate requirements of EU law into their national legal orders by leaving 
these intact to the greatest extent possible evidencing the EU legislature’s 
‘ingrained respect’ for Member States’ legal identities. The empirical results 
pointing to discretion’s facilitating role substantiated theoretical claims of 
the dissertation as well as the consensus-building approach, according to 
which the delegation of discretionary decision-making competences from 
the EU legislature to Member States is sought as a way out of conflict (Dimi-
trova and Steunenberg, 2000; Thomson et al., 2007; Thomson, 2011).
Furthermore confirmed was the view that discretion does not affect 
transposition individually but by interacting with other factors thereby 
contributing to both the deficient and proper legal implementation of EU 
directives (Thomson, 2007; Thomson et al., 2007; Zhelazykova and Tor-
renvliet, 2011). This relates to factors that have earlier been linked up with 
discretion and were conceptualised in the dissertation as ‘administrative 
capacity’ and ‘compatibility’ (Mastenbroek, 2007; Kaeding, 2007, Steunen-
berg and Toshkov, 2009). Empirically it was shown that by interacting with 
these factors, discretion strengthens the latter’s effects on transposition. 
Discretion was also identified as an interacting factor at post-transposition 
implementation stages which underlines the relevance of discretion beyond 
transposition (Carroll, 2014). In contrast to the present study, Carroll uses 
a different, dynamic concept of misfit with the notion of adaptation pres-
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sure as one of its core elements.23 Despite these differences, it is neverthe-
less interesting to note that he also addresses the link between misfit and 
discretion in the implementation of EU law. Carroll claims that discretion 
has a positive effect on implementation in the presence of high adaptation 
pressure implying higher misfit (or low fit): accordingly, he assumes that 
discretion decreases the likelihood of implementation difficulty in the pres-
ence of high adaptation pressure which was confirmed by the results of 
his quantitative analysis (Carroll, 2014: 222). In the present study it is also 
argued that discretion can positively affect transposition by increasing the 
positive effect of medium or high compatibility between EU and national 
rules. In the presence of low compatibility, however, and as evidenced by 
the case of the Return Directive, discretion was found to have contributed to 
deficient transposition. While the intention here is not to compare the two 
studies due to the obvious differences in terms of research design, research 
context and conceptualisation of the misfit factor, it is nevertheless inter-
esting to note that the link between discretion and misfit between EU and 
national law also comes into play at later implementation stages, and that it 
might be possible that discretion takes different roles at each of these stages. 
In any case, it is apparently worth elaborating further on the relationship 
between the two factors at all stages of implementation. This would allow 
for an even more comprehensive picture of discretion in the overall imple-
mentation process of EU directives.
16.8 Outlook
A research endeavour such as the latter would certainly benefit from the 
analysis of a larger number of cases for a more consistent picture of the 
role and effects of discretion. At the same time, looking into uses of discre-
tion at the various implementation stages requires an in-depth approach 
to the cases analysed. For future research on discretion, it would therefore 
be useful to combine quantitative and qualitative approaches into a ‘mixed 
method design’ which has already been applied in the study of national 
implementation (e.g. Mastenbroek, 2007, Kaeding, 2007; Carroll, 2014) to 
achieve a good compromise between depth and breadth in the study of dis-
cretion within the context of the implementation of EU directives. To this 
end, researchers with relevant expertise could be involved in an interdisci-
plinary research project on discretion on a wider scale.
23 In contrast to the one used in the dissertation, derived from Steunenberg and Toshkov 
(2009), Carroll complements his misfi t model with considerations about adaptation pres-
sure. In doing so, he shows how different sorts of requirements implied by EU directives 
or regulations create different degrees of adaptation pressure over time. See Carroll, 
2014, pp. 48-53.
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Earlier research has called for paying more attention to the exercise 
of discretion in the legal implementation of EU law (Carroll, 2014: 228) in 
order to more fully understand how discretion affects this process. The 
present dissertation took up this challenge with regard to uses of discre-
tion in national transposition. At the same time, it has proved itself to be in 
the good company of other studies which, while identifying and address-
ing key questions in their research puzzles, have discovered further issues 
of central importance along the way which can, at best be highlighted as 
potential avenues for future research.
Two such potential avenues have already been raised: further elabora-
tion of the codebook as an instrument for assessing the degree of legisla-
tive discretion granted by individual EU directives. In this regard, future 
approaches to assess or measure discretion could consider how to integrate 
interpretations based on EU primary legislation and case law into the analy-
sis of discretionary provisions and concepts used in directives. Since this 
adds to the complexity of an already complex matter – directives frequently 
lack consistency in terms of structure – this must be done with a view to the 
practical applicability of the measurement instrument that would emerge as 
a result. This presents a challenging endeavour for which this dissertation 
hopes to have given relevant input and impetus.
The second potential research area links up to what was noted when 
discussing the dissertation’s empirical contributions: to elaborate on the 
role of discretion in the national implementation of EU directives by sys-
tematically analysing how it is used and with what effects at all implemen-
tation stages including, besides transposition, the practical application and 
enforcement of directives. For instance, and to make it more concrete, it 
was briefly discussed above whether or not delayed transposition, possibly 
caused by discretion, amongst other factors, negatively affects subsequent 
implementation stages. Post-transposition implementation analysis has pro-
vided empirical evidence showing that such effects did not occur (Carroll, 
2014: 223-224). Against this background, it seems particularly interesting to 
look into how the different stages relate to each other with specific regard to 
the role of discretion, uses of it by implementing actors and resulting effects 
on implementation.
Finally, to further broaden the knowledge on discretion in transposi-
tion contexts, future research should study discretion using a cross-country 
comparative design. It could thereby benefit from comparative research that 
already exists on transposition approaches and legal contexts in various 
Member States as well as studies on EU decision-making and transposition 
in different policy areas (e.g. Steunenberg and Voermans, 2006; Müller et al., 
2010; Haverland et al., 2011). Even if implementation is carried out at the 
national level, this dissertation has demonstrated that the interrelatedness 
of processes at the EU and national level in making and implementing EU 
law matters when it comes to drawing a more complete picture of the role 
of discretion in a directive’s life cycle. The various ideas, insights and addi-
tional questions raised in this study indicate pathways for future research. 
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They show in any case that there is no shortage of new challenges when it 




  Directive* Policy content** Subject matter***
1 Pyrotechnic Articles 
Directive (2007/23/EC)
Industrial policy and 




consumers and health 
protection / Protection 
of health and safety 
Internal market – 
Principles
Consumer protection
Approximation of laws 




consumers and health 
protection / Consumers 
/ Protection of 
economic interests 
Approximation of laws
Products from third 
countries
Consumer protection 
3 Toy Safety Directive 
(2009/48/EC)
Industrial policy and 




consumers and health 
protection / Protection 
of health and safety 








consumers and health 
protection / 








consumers and health 
protection / Pollution 





List of directives subjected to 
content analysis
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  Directive* Policy content** Subject matter***




consumers and health 




Pollution and nuisances 
/ Water protection and 
management 
Environment




consumers and health 
protection / 
Environment / Space, 
environment and 
natural resources / 
Waste management and 
clean technology 
Environment




consumers and health 
protection / 




9 Insurance Directive 
(2009/20/EC)
Transport policy / 
Shipping / Safety at sea
Environment, 
consumers and health 
protection / Pollution 





10 Road Transport 
Vehicles Directive
(2009/33/EC)
Transport policy / 
General
Environment, 









consumers and health 
protection / 
Environment / 
Pollution and nuisances 
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  Directive* Policy content** Subject matter***
12 Stage II Petrol Vapour 
Recovery Directive 
(2009/126/EC)
Energy / Oil and gas
Environment, 
consumers and health 
protection / Pollution 




Internal market – 
Principles
Environment 




Approximation of laws 
and health measures / 
Plant health
Environment, 
consumers and health 
protection / 




Plant health legislation 
14 Return Directive 
(2008/115/EC)
Area of freedom, 
security and justice / 
Free movement of 
persons 
Justice and home affairs




15 Mediation Directive 
(2008/52/EC)
Area of freedom, 
security and justice / 
Programmes 
Justice and home affairs
16 Blue Card Directive 
(2009/50/EC)
Area of freedom, 
security and justice / 
Free movement of 
persons / Immigration 
and the right of 
nationals of third 
countries 
Free movement of 
persons
Justice and home affairs 
17 Employer Sanction 
Directive 
(2009/52/EC)
Area of freedom, 
security and justice / 
Free movement of 
persons / Immigration 
and the right of 
nationals of third 
countries 
Free movement of 
persons
Justice and home affairs 
*  In italics: directives and policy areas analysed in the case studies
**  Indicated by the directory code in the legal database EUR-Lex
*** Indicated in EUR-Lex

Return Directive (2008/115/EC)
Maykel Bouma – Migration Policy Department, Ministry of Security and 
Justice
Edwin Brijder – Legislation and Legal Affairs Department, Ministry of Secu-
rity and Justice
Blue Card Directive (2009/50/EC)
Jeroen Raukema – Legislation and Legal Affairs Department, Ministry of 
Security and Justice
Jan Verboom – Migration Policy Department, Ministry of Security and Jus-
tice
Waste Framework Directive (2008/98/EC)
Annemarieke Grinwis – Directorate-General for Spatial Development and 
Water Affairs, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Hans Spiegeler – Directorate-General for the Environment & International 
Affairs Department, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Maarten van het Bolscher – Directorate-General for the Environment & 
International Affairs, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive (2009/126/EC)
Michel Janssens – Climate, Air and Noise Department, Ministry of Infra-
structure and the Environment
Pyrotechnic Articles Directive (2007/23/EC)
Rob Duba – Safety and Risks Department, Ministry of Infrastructure and 
the Environment
Maik Schmahl – Directorate-General Enterprise, European Commission
Toy Safety Directive (2009/48/EC)
Bert Jan Clement – Legislation and Legal Affairs Department Ministry of 
Health, Welfare and Sports
Melanie van Vugt – Nutrition, Health Protection and Prevention Depart-
ment, Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports
Discretion in European directives
Ludwig Krämer – Head of Unit on Environmental Governance, European 
Commission (2001-2004); Professor of European and German environ-
mental law, University of Bremen
Annex 2: 
List of interview partners
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Josien Stoop – Legislative lawyer and senior advisor on EU law, Directorate 
for Administrative and Legal Affairs, Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment
Tineke Strik – Assistant Professor Migration Law, Centre for Migration Law, 
Radboud University Nijmegen; Member European Affairs Committee, 
Dutch Senate
Patrick van den Berghe – Jurisconsult / Legal Counsel to the Minister on 
European Law, Ministry of Economic Affairs
Thomas van Rijn – Director Business Law, Legal Service, European Com-
mission
Jonathan Verschuuren – Professor of European and International Public 
Law, Tilburg Law School
1. Introduction
The codebook was drawn up for the purpose of analysing European direc-
tives, and in particular for assessing their individual margins of discretion. 
The objectives and structure of the codebook are outlined in a first step. This 
is followed, in a second step, by a presentation of the coding scheme: main 
categories, sub-categories, indicators and examples, all of which are used to 
identify and describe discretion in directives.
1.2 Objectives
The codebook, first of all, has a pragmatic aim. Discretion margins are one 
of the criteria determining the selection of directives for the case studies of 
negotiation and transposition processes. Since directives do not come with 
a fact sheet listing their properties, including the margin of discretion they 
grant to Member States, they have to be further analysed to find out more 
about the discretionary leeway they offer for implementation. The code-
book, however, is not applied to achieve exact measurement results. Rather 
its objective is to make it possible to indicate a tendency regarding the direc-
tive’s scope of discretion: does the directive which is analysed confer rather 
more or less discretion upon Member States? Furthermore, the detailed 
approach to discretion pursues aims which are considered important for the 
study of discretion in the present context. It is used to show – without claim-
ing to be exhaustive – how diverse the forms are that discretion takes in 
directives and which specify the ‘range of options or alternatives’ Member 
States have in implementing them. The codebook therefore serves to pro-
vide for a better understanding of legislative discretion. At the same time, 
by capturing the various discretion manifestations, the aim is to illustrate 
the EU’s normative treaty commitment to respect deeply entrenched rules 
and practices in its Member States – a point which was highlighted as one 
of the motives underlying the use of discretion, and which sheds additional 
light on the conducive role that discretion can play in the (legal) implemen-
tation of directives. All in all, this codebook should be understood as a pre-
liminary attempt to describe discretion in directives more comprehensively 
and as an instrument to indicate a tendency towards larger or smaller mar-





The codebook lays down the coding rules in a so-called coding scheme also 
referred to as ‘coding frame’. Formal aspects are addressed first, including 
the definition of a directive provision which takes different forms hinging 
on the structure of the given (sub-)article. The second part introduces the 
types of provisions, standard and relevant provisions, as well as the main 
categories of permissive and obligatory language. The main categories are 
reflected in directives by discretionary and non-discretionary provisions, in 
other words, sub-categories which are further divided into several permis-
sion and obligation types. These sub-categories are usually indicated by 
may- and shall-clauses. All of these elements constitute the coding scheme. 
To keep explanations of definitions in a concise and accessible form, they are 
preceded by ‘information texts’ which provide brief descriptions of the key 
terms repeatedly used in defining discretion manifestations. To further facili-
tate the understanding of definitions, examples are derived from the direc-
tives examined in preparing the coding scheme. On the basis of this explor-
atory study, it was, however, not possible to offer examples for all definitions.
II. Formal aspects
The definitions provided throughout the codebook take a directive sub-arti-
cle (or sub-division) as a point of departure. Sub-article is another word for 
directive provision (see Joint Practical Guide, 2013: 35). A sub-article coin-
cides with a provision in the following example: ‘Member States may adopt 
a separate administrative or judicial decision or act ordering the removal.’1 
Taking a closer look at the syntax of a sub-article, however, shows that they 
can be more complex and comprise more than one provision:
Where Member States use – as a last resort – coercive measures to carry out the removal 
of a third-country national who resists removal, such measures shall be proportionate 
and shall not exceed reasonable force.||  They shall be implemented as provided for in 
national legislation in accordance with fundamental rights and with due respect for the 
dignity and physical integrity of the third-country national concerned.2
To clearly indicate the ending of one provision, and the beginning of the 
next, a symbol of two vertical bars (||  ) is used. With a view to the coding of 
directives it is important to properly define provision(s) within a sub-article. 
It guarantees that all provisions, and therefore also all permissions or obli-
gations within a sub-article are captured. Each provision is described by one 
code identifying the discretion instance it contains – in line with the ‘one-
to-one’ rule (the aforementioned criterion of strict differentiation). In other 
words, the code indicates whether the provision is discretionary (permis-
1 Cf. Article 8(3) of the EU’s Return Directive. 
2 Cf. Article 8(4).
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sion) or non-discretionary (obligation). Another code is ascribed, identify-
ing the addressee of the provision.
As just noted, directive provisions have different structures. This is not nec-
essarily due to their content but may result from the arbitrary nature of the 
structure and wording of directives. To make it more concrete, the follow-
ing examples show that obligations for Member States are laid down in one 
paragraph whereas, in another case, they are enumerated in sub-points:
Where a Member State is considering issuing a residence permit or other authorisation 
offering a right to stay to a third-country national who is the subject of an entry ban 
issued by another Member State, it shall first consult the Member State having issued 
the entry ban||  and shall take account of its interests in accordance with Article 25 of the 
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement.3
But
Manufacturers of pyrotechnic articles shall:
(a) submit the pyrotechnic article to a notified body as referred to in Article 10 which 
shall perform a conformity assessment in accordance with Article 9; and
(b) affix a CE marking to, and label the pyrotechnic article in accordance with Article 11, 
and Article 12 or 13.4
Information text
 Coding Unit: sentences and clauses.
Verb group: auxiliary (usually may or shall) + main verb, e.g. ‘shall 
ensure’ (the mode of conduct of a legal norm). 
Main clause: a group of words that contains a verb and makes sense on 
its own.
Simple sentence: If a sentence contains a subject, clause (including main 
verb) it is considered as a ‘simple sentence’.
Complex sentence: If a sentence is composed of several parts and contains 
next to a main clause a subordinate clause which depends 
on the main clause for its meaning, it is considered as a 
‘complex sentence’. 
Subordinate clause: is only meaningful in combination with a main clause. 
Compound sentence: If a sentence is composed of two main clauses which are 
linked by a conjunction such as ‘and’, ‘but’, or ‘so’, it is 
considered as a ‘compound sentence’. 
3 See Article 11(4) of the Return Directive.
4 See Article 4(4) of the Pyrotechnic Articles Directives.
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A.  Simple sentences
The following applies:
1.  If a directive article is a sub-article which is composed of a simple sen-
tence it is considered as one single provision.
Member States shall ensure that the national framework in place requires arrangements 
for education and training to be made by all parties for their staff having responsibilities 
relating to the nuclear safety of nuclear installations in order to maintain and to further 
develop expertise and skills in nuclear safety.
Article 6(2) of Directive 2009/71/EURATOM
2.  If a sub-article is composed of more than one simple sentence, each sim-
ple sentence is considered as one single provision.
Member States shall ensure that information in relation to the regulation of nuclear safety 
is made available to the workers and the general public.|| This obligation includes ensur-
ing that the competent regulatory authority informs the public in the fields of its com-
petence.||  Information shall be made available to the public in accordance with national 
legislation and international obligations, provided that this does not jeopardise other 
interests such as, inter alia, security, recognised in national legislation or international 
obligations.
Article 8 of Directive 2009/71/EURATOM
3.  If a sub-article is composed of a simple sentence and simple sentences 
which are enumerated in sub-points, the simple sentence and each enu-
meration are considered as provisions in their own right.
For the purposes of this paragraph, the following provisions shall apply:||  
(a) for the calculation of the denominator, that is the total amount of energy consumed 
in transport for the purposes of the first subparagraph, only petrol, diesel, biofuels con-
sumed in road and rail transport, and electricity shall be taken into account;||  
(b) for the calculation of the numerator, that is the amount of energy from renewable 
sources consumed in transport for the purposes of the first subparagraph, all types of 
energy from renewable sources consumed in all forms of transport shall be taken into 
account;||  
(c) for the calculation of the contribution from electricity produced from renewable 
sources and consumed in all types of electric vehicles for the purpose of points (a) and 
(b), Member States may choose to use either the average share of electricity from renew-
able energy sources in the Community or the share of electricity from renewable energy 
sources in their own country as measured two years before the year in question. 
Article 3(4) of Directive 2009/28/EC
Note that all provisions contain a main clause. The last main clause, how-
ever, contains a different verb group.
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4.  If a sub-article is composed of a simple sentence and enumerated 
nouns, the simple sentence and each enumerated noun are considered to-
gether as provisions in their own right.
1.  Pyrotechnic articles shall not be sold or otherwise made available to consumers below 
the following age limits:
(a)  Fireworks
Category 1: 12 years.
Category 2: 16 years.
Category 3: 18 years.||  
(b)  Other pyrotechnic articles and theatrical pyrotechnic articles
Category T1 and P1: 18 years
Article 7 of Directive 2007/23/EC
Note that enumerations (a) and (b), on their own, cannot be considered as a 
provision. Only together with the preceding main clause including the legal 
norm, they constitute a provision in its own right.
5.  If a sub-article is composed of a complete simple sentence and followed 
by enumerated nouns which are completed by enumerations listed in sub-
points, both the enumerated nouns and sub-points are considered, togeth-
er with the main clause of the complete sentence, as one single provision.
Member States sharing a marine region or subregion shall cooperate to ensure that, within 
each marine region or subregion, the measures required to achieve the objectives of 
this Directive, in particular the different elements of the marine strategies referred to in 
points (a) and (b), are coherent and coordinated across the marine region or subregion 
concerned, in accordance with the following plan of action for which Member States con-
cerned endeavour to follow a common approach:||  
(a)  preparation:
(i)  an initial assessment, to be completed by 15 July
2012 of the current environmental status of the waters
concerned and the environmental impact of human
activities thereon, in accordance with Article 8;
(ii)  a determination, to be established by 15 July 2012 of
good environmental status for the waters concerned, in
accordance with Article 9(1);
(iii)  establishment, by 15 July 2012, of a series of environ-
mental targets and associated indicators, in accordance
with Article 10(1);
(iv)  establishment and implementation, by 15 July 2014
except where otherwise specified in the relevant
Community legislation, of a monitoring programme
for ongoing assessment and regular updating of
targets, in accordance with Article 11(1);||  
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(b)  programme of measures:
(i)  development, by 2015 at the latest, of a programme of measures designed to 
achieve or maintain good environmental status, in accordance with Article 
13(1), (2) and (3);
(ii)  entry into operation of the programme provided for in point (i), by 2016 at the 
latest, in accordance with Article 13(10).
Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/56/EC
Note that, as mentioned in the previous example, the enumerations (a) and 
(b) can only be regarded as provisions in their own right when they are con-
sidered as supplementing part of the preceding simple sentence.
6.  If a sub-article is composed of one incomplete simple sentence which 
is completed by more than one enumeration, each match of incomplete 
simple sentence and enumeration is considered as one single provision. If 
an enumeration includes another simple sentence, this simple sentence is 
considered as another provision in its own right.
The national framework shall establish responsibilities for:
(a)  the adoption of national nuclear safety requirements.||  The determination on how 
they are adopted and through which instrument they are applied rests with the compe-
tence of the Member States;||  
(b)  the provision of a system of licensing and prohibition of operation of nuclear installa-
tions without a license;||  
(c)  the provision of a system of nuclear safety supervision;||  
(d)  enforcement actions, including suspension of operation and modification or revoca-
tion of a license.
Article 4(1) of Directive 2009/71/EURATOM
7.  If a sub-article is composed of an incomplete sentence and followed by 
simple sentences which are enumerated in sub-points, it is considered as 
comprising two provisions in their own right.
Subject to requirements relating to the maintenance of the reliability and safety of the 
grid, based on transparent and non-discriminatory criteria defined by the competent 
national authorities:
(a)  Member States shall ensure that transmission system operators and distribution sys-
tem operators in their territory guarantee the transmission and distribution of electricity 
produced from renewable energy sources;||  
(b)  Member States shall also provide for either priority access or guaranteed access to the 
grid-system of electricity produced from renewable energy sources;
Article 16(2) of Directive 2009/28/EC
Note that the incomplete sentence and first enumeration are considered 
together as one single provision, followed by another single provision 
(main clause).
425Annex 3: Codebook 
B.  Complex sentences
The following applies:
8.  If a sub-article is composed of a complex sentence it is considered as one 
single provision.
Where the market surveillance authorities of one Member State have taken action pursu-
ant to Article 20 of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008, or where they have sufficient reason 
to believe that a toy covered by this Directive presents a risk to the health or safety of 
persons, they shall carry out an evaluation in relation to the toy concerned covering all the 
requirements laid down in this Directive.
Article 42 of Directive 2009/48/EC
9.  If a sub-article is composed of a complex sentence which contains verb 
groups with different auxiliaries, it is considered as one single provision.
Where, in the course of that evaluation, the market surveillance authorities find that the 
toy does not comply with the requirements laid down in this Directive, they shall with-
out delay require the relevant economic operator to take appropriate corrective action 
to bring the toy into compliance with those requirements, to withdraw the toy from the 
market, or to recall it within a reasonable period, commensurate with the nature of the 
risk, as they may prescribe.
Article 42(1) of Directive 2009/48/EC
10.  If a sub-article is composed of a complex sentence and the subordi-
nated clauses are enumerated as exceptions, it is considered as one single 
provision.
Given that mediation is intended to take place in a manner which respects confidential-
ity, Member States shall ensure that, unless the parties agree otherwise, neither mediators 
nor those involved in the administration of the mediation process shall be compelled to 
give evidence in civil and commercial judicial proceedings or arbitration regarding infor-
mation arising out of or in connection with a mediation process, except:
(a)  where this is necessary for overriding considerations of public policy of the Member 
State concerned, in particular when required to ensure the protection of the best interests 
of children or to prevent harm to the physical or psychological integrity of a person; or
b)  where disclosure of the content of the agreement resulting from mediation is neces-
sary in order to implement or enforce that agreement.
Article 7(1) of Directive 2008/52/EC
C.  Compound sentences
The following applies:
11.  If a sub-article is composed of a compound sentence, it is considered as 
comprising two provisions.
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Member States shall lay down rules on penalties for economic operators, which may 
include criminal sanctions for serious infringements, applicable to infringements of the 
national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive,||  and shall take all measures nec-
essary to ensure that they are implemented.
Article 51 of Directive 2009/48/EC
12.  If a sub-article is composed of a compound sentence and the main 
clauses are enumerated, it is considered as comprising two provisions.
Manufacturers of pyrotechnic articles shall:
(a)  submit the pyrotechnic article to a notified body as referred to in Article 10 which 
shall perform a conformity assessment in accordance with Article 9;||  and
(b)  affix a CE marking to, and label the pyrotechnic article in accordance with Article 11, 
and Article 12 or 13.
Article 4(4) of Directive 2007/23/EC
Note that the preceding shall-clause is also part of the second provision and 
that both provisions contain a different verb group (‘shall submit’, ‘shall affix’).
III. Content-related aspects
This part introduces the types of provisions that are distinguished in the 
analysis and coding of directives. First, a distinction is made between 
standard provisions and relevant provisions. Standard provisions are pro-
visions that, as a rule, are part of every directive: these are the initial and 
final provisions but also provisions concerning standard procedures (e.g. 
comitology procedures) or relating to the applicability of specific directive 
requirements. The other group of provisions are those which are relevant to 
Member States, grant or reduce their discretion and are therefore considered 
when discretion is measured. They are further divided into sub-categories 
that describe the permissive and obligatory language categories, and hence 
those provisions granting discretion by larger or smaller degrees (discre-
tionary and non-discretionary provisions). Additionally, a third category is 
established for those provisions that cannot be assigned to either of the two 
main categories but represent a combination of both and are therefore clas-
sified as ‘hybrid provisions’. The various sub-categories of both permissive 
and obligatory language categories, i.e. the different discretion manifesta-
tions, are illustrated and, where applicable, the legal concepts they pertain 
to are identified. Regarding the degree of detail, the sub-categories capture 
up to three different aspects which are considered to make part of a dis-
cretion manifestation: First, permissions and obligations are coded with-
out further conditions being attached to them (e.g. ‘Member States may or 
shall do something’) and are therefore referred to as simple permissions’ 
and ‘simple obligations’. Permissions and obligations can, however, be sub-
jected to further conditions. In this case they are coded as permissions or 
obligations that apply under certain conditions (e.g. ‘Member States may 
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or shall do something if…’). Finally, a third aspect that a discretion mani-
festation can include is taken into account. It is referred to as ‘reference to 
the national legal order’. It indicates that a directive requirement takes as a 
reference point Member States’ legal situation:
If the EU Blue Card issued by the first Member State expires during the procedure, Mem-
ber States may issue, if required by national law, national temporary residence permits, or 
equivalent authorisations, allowing the applicant to continue to stay legally on its terri-
tory until a decision on the application has been taken by the competent authorities.
Article 18(5) of the EU’s Blue Card Directive
Information text
Addressees of a provision are immediate addressees:
a) Member States or national authority acting on their behalf
b) European Commission, Council of Ministers (CoM) or European Parliament (EP)
c) Member States and European Commission
d) European Commission and / or EU-level institutions other than CoM or EP 
(e.g. European Central Bank, European Standards Organisations like CEN, 
CENELEC etc.)
Addressees of a provision are intermediate addressees (not liable for 
infringements of directives):
e) third parties (e.g. economic operators, third-country nationals)
Discretionary discretion manifestation (permission): indicated by variants of 
may-clauses, or other expressions, in a few cases shall-clauses.
Non-discretionary discretion manifestation (obligation): indicated by variants of 
shall-clauses, or other expressions.
Hybrid discretion manifestation (combination of permission and obligation): 
indicated by may-clause and shall-clause.
I.  Standard provision
The following applies:
13.  If a sub-article contains an addressee and makes part of the initial or 
fi nal provisions including rules that are part of every directive it is consid-
ered as a standard provision.
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
necessary to comply with this Directive by 15 July 2010 at the latest. They shall forthwith 
communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions.
Article 26(1) of Directive 2008/56/EC
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14.  If a sub-article concerns standard procedures (e.g. comitology proce-
dures) or the applicability of specifi c parts of the directive, it is also consid-
ered as a standard provision.
The period laid down in Article 5(6) of Decision 1999/468/EC shall be set at three 
months.
Article 29(2) of Directive 2008/50/EC
This paragraph is applicable from 19 December 2011.
Article 15(6) of Directive 2009/50/EC
Note that the first example is a provision that relates to rules on the com-
mittee procedure which involves the European Commission as well as the 
Member States. Therefore this provision is coded as a standard provision 
addressing both. The second provision is understood as being addressed to 
Member States.
II.  Relevant provision
The following applies:
15.  If a sub-article contains an addressee and an indicator of a discretion-
ary, non-discretionary or hybrid discretion manifestation, it is considered 
as a relevant provision.
a) Member States may decide not to apply this Directive to third-country nationals (…).
Article 2(2) of Directive 2008/115/EC
The EU Blue Card shall be issued by the competent authorities of the Member State.
Article 7(3) of Directive 2009/50/EC
b)  The Commission shall publish in the Official Journal of the European Union the refer-
ences of such harmonised standards.
Article 8(2) of Directive 2007/23/EC
c) Where a Member State or the Commission considers that the harmonised standards 
referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article do not fully satisfy the essential safety require-
ments set out in Annex I, the Commission or the Member State concerned shall refer the 
matter to the Standing Committee set up by Directive 98/34/EC, giving its reasons.
Article 8(4) of Directive 2007/23/EC
d) Where the national measure is considered to be justified and the non-compliance of 
the toy is attributed to shortcomings in the harmonised standards referred to in Article 
42(5)(b), the Commission […]shall bring the matter before the Committee set up by Arti-
cle 5 of Directive 98/34/EC. That Committee shall consult the relevant European standardi-
sation body or bodies and deliver its opinion without delay.
Article 43(3) of Directive 2009/48/EC
(e) Manufacturers shall ensure that pyrotechnic articles placed on the market comply with 
the essential safety requirements set out in Annex I.
Article 4(1) of Directive 2007/23/EC
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Note that sometimes the addressee is not mentioned in a provision. In such 
a case the addressee can usually be derived from the context of the whole 
article.
Information text 
Certain conditions: Conditions under which a permission or obligation 
applies, indicated by grammatical structures, e.g. 
‘where’, ‘if’, ‘only’, ‘unless’, ‘may only’, ‘may only…
provided that’. 
Conditions referring to 
the national legal order: 
Certain conditions under which a permission or 
obligation applies, including a so-called ‘reference to 
the national legal order’.
Reference to the 
national legal order: 
mentioned in a discretionary or non-discretionary 
provision together as part of the permission or 
obligation and indicated by expressions like e.g. ‘in 
conformity with national law’, ‘in accordance with 
national law’, ‘if required by national law’, and 
‘defined by national law’.
II.1  Discretionary provision (permission)
The following applies:
16.  If a relevant provision contains an indicator of a discretionary discre-
tion manifestation, it is considered as a discretionary provision (permission).
Member States may increase the age limits under paragraph 1 where justified on grounds 
of public order, security or safety. Member States may also lower the age limits for persons 
vocationally trained or undergoing such training.
Article 7(2) of Directive 2007/23/EC
II.1.1 Sub-categories
PERMISSION TO DO SOMETHING (SIMPLE PERMISSION)
17.  If a discretionary provision allows Member States to do something, it 
is considered as permission to do something (simple permission).
Member States may require the applicant to provide his address in the territory of the 
Member State concerned.
Article 5(2) of Directive 2009/50/EC
The determination on how they are adopted and through which instrument they are 
applied rests with the competence of the Member States.
Article 4(1) of Directive 2009/71/EURATOM
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PERMISSION TO DO SOMETHING WITH REFERENCE TO THE NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
18.  If a discretionary provision allows Member States to do something and 
contains a reference to the national legal order it is considered as permission 
to do something with reference to the national legal order.
The information on reasons in fact may be limited where national law allows for the right to 
information to be restricted, in particular in order to safeguard national security, defence, 
public security and for the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of crimi-
nal offences.
Article 12(1) of Directive 2009/50/EC
PERMISSION UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
19.  If a discretionary provision allows Member States to do something and 
contains certain conditions under which the permission applies, it is con-
sidered as permission to do something under certain conditions.
The body concerned may perform the activities of a notified body only where no objections 
are raised by the Commission or the other Member States within two weeks of a noti-
fication where an accreditation certificate is used or within two months of a notification 
where accreditation is not used.
Article 31(5) of Directive 2009/48/EC
PERMISSION UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS REFERRING TO THE NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
20.  If a discretionary provision allows Member States to do something and 
contains certain conditions under which the permission applies and a ref-
erence to the national legal order, it is considered as permission to do some-
thing under certain conditions referring to the national legal order.
Member States may retain restrictions on access to employment, provided such employ-
ment activities entail occasional involvement in the exercise of public authority and the 
responsibility for safeguarding the general interest of the State and where, in accordance 
with existing national or Community law, these activities are reserved to nationals.
Article 12(3) of Directive 2009/50/EC
PERMISSION TO GO BEYOND WHAT IS PRESCRIBED
21.  If a discretionary provision allows Member States to take more far-
reaching measures than established by the directive, it is considered as per-
mission to go beyond what is prescribed.
Member States may introduce stricter protective measures than those provided for under 
the Directive.
Article 14 of Directive 2009/147/EC
Note that this discretionary provision gives expression to the legal concept 
of minimum harmonisation which implies a higher discretion margin for 
Member States for the purpose of implementation. It is usually expressed 
by the sentence (or variant of it): ‘Member States may introduce (or take) 
stricter (or more favourable) measures.’
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PERMISSION TO GO BEYOND WHAT IS PRESCRIBED WITH REFERENCE TO THE 
NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
22.  If a discretionary provision allows Member States to take more far-
reaching measures than established by the directive and contains a refer-
ence to the national legal order, it is considered as permission to go beyond 
what is prescribed with reference to the national legal order.
Note that, as pointed out earlier, not all definitions are illustrated by an 
example.
PERMISSION TO GO BEYOND WHAT IS PRESCRIBED UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
23.  If a discretionary provision allows Member States to take more far-
reaching measures than established by the directive and contains certain 
conditions under which the permission applies, it is considered as permis-
sion to go beyond what is prescribed under certain conditions.
This Directive shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States to adopt or main-
tain provisions that are more favourable to third-country nationals to whom it applies 
in relation with Articles 6 and 13, provided that such provisions are compatible with this 
Directive.
Article 15 of Directive 2009/52/EC
PERMISSION TO GO BEYOND WHAT IS PRESCRIBED UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS 
REFERRING TO THE NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
24.  If a discretionary provision allows Member States to take more far-
reaching measures than established by the directive as well as a reference 
to the national legal order, it is considered as permission to go beyond what is 
prescribed under certain conditions referring to the national legal order.
PERMISSION TO CHOOSE BETWEEN RULES
25.  If a discretionary provision allows Member States to choose between 
application and non-application of directive standards, criteria or other op-
tions, it is considered as permission to choose between rules.
The Member State may require the person concerned to report his / her presence within 
its territory within a reasonable and non-discriminatory period of time.
Article 5(5) of Directive 2004/38/EC
End-of-waste specific criteria should be considered, among others, at least for aggregates, 
paper, glass, metal, tyres and textiles.
Article 6(2) of Directive 2008/98/EC
The permission to choose between rules can be expressed by a shall-clause:
The requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be fulfilled in accordance with the following 
options:
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(a)  by setting technical specifications for energy and environmental performance in the 
documentation for the purchase of road transport vehicles on each of the impacts consid-
ered, as well as any additional environmental impacts; or
(b)  by including energy and environmental impacts in the purchasing decision, whereby:
– in cases where a procurement procedure is applied, this shall be done by using 
these impacts as award criteria, and
– in cases where these impacts are monetised for inclusion in the purchasing deci-
sion, the methodology set out in Article 6 shall be used.
Article 5(3) of Directive 2009/33/EC
Note that the first example gives expression to the legal concept of optional 
harmonisation. The Member States can decide whether or not they would 
like to implement certain rules which are established by the directive. More-
over, optimal harmonisation can also refer to the fact that Member States or 
economic operators may choose between the application of national stan-
dards or harmonised EU standards. Optional harmonisation implies that 
discretion is granted by larger degrees to Member States or producers of 
goods. They can decide whether or not they apply EU rules.
PERMISSION TO CHOOSE BETWEEN RULES WITH REFERENCE TO THE NATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER
26.  If a discretionary provision allows Member States to choose between 
application and non-application of directive standards or criteria, or among 
options more generally, and refers to the national legal order, it is consid-
ered as permission to choose between rules referring to the national legal order.
PERMISSION TO CHOOSE BETWEEN RULES UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
27.  If a discretionary provision allows Member States to choose be-
tween application and non-application of directive standards or criteria, 
or among options more generally, and contains certain conditions under 
which the permission applies, it is considered as permission to choose be-
tween rules under certain conditions.
Member States may decide not to undertake the preliminary flood risk assessment referred 
to in Article 4 for those river basins, sub-basins or coastal areas where they have either:
(a) already undertaken a risk assessment to conclude, before 22 December 2010, that a 
potential significant flood risk exists or might be considered likely to occur leading to the 
identification of the area among those referred to in Article 5(1)
or
(b) decided, before 22 December 2010, to prepare flood hazard maps and flood risk maps 
and to establish flood risk management plans in accordance with the relevant provisions 
of this Directive.
Article 13(1) of Directive 2007/60/EC
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PERMISSION TO CHOOSE BETWEEN RULES UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS REFERRING 
TO THE NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
28.  If a discretionary provision allows Member States to choose between 
application and non-application of directive standards or criteria, or among 
options more generally, contains certain conditions under which the per-
mission applies and a reference to the national legal order, it is considered 
as permission to choose between rules under certain conditions referring to the na-
tional legal order.
Member States may not extend the period referred to in paragraph 5 except for a limited 
period not exceeding a further twelve months in accordance with national law in cases where 
regardless of all their reasonable efforts the removal operation is likely to last longer 
owing to:
(a)  a lack of cooperation by the third-country national concerned, or
(b)  delays in obtaining the necessary documentation from third countries.
Article 15(6) of Directive 2008/115/EC
PERMISSION TO DEVIATE FROM EU RULES
29.  If a discretionary provision allows Member States to do something dif-
ferent from a directive requirement, it is considered as permission to devi-
ate from EU rules.
Until 15 March 2009, each Member State may postpone application of this Directive to 
the retention of communications data relating to Internet Access, Internet telephony and 
Internet e-mail.
Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24/EC
Member States may exempt from the requirement laid down in Article 23(1) establish-
ments or undertakings for the following operations:
(a) disposal of their own non-hazardous waste at the place of production; or
(b) recovery of waste.
Article 24 of Directive 2009/128/EC
Note that deviation from EU rules is linked to the legal concepts of dero-
gation and exemption which release Member States from the obligation to 
apply specific directive requirements or, if justified, exempt them from the 
application of larger parts or the directive as a whole.
PERMISSION TO DEVIATE FROM EU RULES WITH REFERENCE TO THE NATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER
30.  If a discretionary provision allows Member States to do something dif-
ferent from a directive requirement and refers to the national legal order, 
it is considered as permission to deviate from EU rules with reference to the na-
tional legal order.
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PERMISSION TO DEVIATE FROM EU RULES UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
31.  If a discretionary provision allows Member States to do something dif-
ferent from a directive requirement and applies under certain conditions, it 
is considered as permission to deviate under certain conditions.
Member States may decide not to apply paragraph 1 where the employers are natural per-
sons and the employment is for their private purposes.
Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/52/EC
PERMISSION TO DEVIATE FROM EU RULES UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS REFERRING 
TO THE NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
32.  If a discretionary provision allows Member States to do something dif-
ferent from a directive requirement, applies under certain conditions and 
refers to the national legal order, it is considered as permission to deviate 
under certain conditions referring to the national legal order.
The information on reasons in fact may be limited where national law allows for the right to 
information to be restricted, in particular in order to safeguard national security, defense, 
public security and for the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of crimi-
nal offences.
Article 12(1) of Directive 2008/115/EC
PERMISSION TO DELEGATE
33.  If a discretionary provision allows Member States to assign implement-
ing tasks to national authorities, expressed by a may-clause or shall-clause, 
it is considered as permission to delegate.
Member States shall designate a notifying authority that shall be responsible for setting 
up and carrying out the necessary procedures for the assessment and notification of con-
formity assessment bodies for the purposes of this Directive, and for the monitoring of 
notified bodies, including compliance with Article 29.
Article 23(1) of Directive 2009/48/EC
Member States may confer upon the courts, or administrative authorities, powers 
enabling them, with a view to eliminating the continuing effects of misleading advertis-
ing or unlawful comparative advertising, the cessation of which has been ordered by a 
final decision.
Article 5(4) of Directive 2006/114/EC
Note that the permission to delegate relates to the legal concept of delega-
tion. Indicators can be both shall- and may clauses. While Member States 
have the duty to implement EU law, they may delegate rule-making powers 
to public authorities they consider the most suitable in line with the prin-
ciple of institutional autonomy. The permission to delegate is usually not 
linked to any other conditions or references to the national legal order.
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II.2  Non-discretionary provision (obligation)
The following applies:
34.  If a relevant provision contains an indicator of a non-discretionary dis-
cretion manifestation, it is considered as non-discretionary provision (obliga-
tion).
If the Commission considers that the national measures are not justified, the Member 
State concerned shall withdraw them.
Article 16(1) of Directive 2007/23/EC
II.2.1  Sub-categories
OBLIGATION TO DO SOMETHING (SIMPLE OBLIGATION)
35.  If a non-discretionary provision requires from Member States to do 
something, it is considered as an obligation to do something (simple obligation).
Member States shall ensure that creditors and, where applicable, credit intermediaries 
provide adequate explanations to the consumer (…).
Article 5(6) of Directive 2008/48/EC
OBLIGATION TO DO SOMETHING WITH REFERENCE TO THE NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
36.  If a non-discretionary provision requires from Member States to do 
something and contains a reference to the national legal order, it is consid-
ered as an obligation to do something with reference to the national legal order.
Member States shall ensure that the necessary legal assistance and / or representation is 
granted on request free of charge in accordance with relevant national legislation or rules 
regarding legal aid (…)
Article 13(4) of Directive 2008/115/EC
OBLIGATION TO DO SOMETHING UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
37.  If a non-discretionary provision requires from Member States to do 
something and contains certain conditions under which the obligation ap-
plies, it is considered as an obligation to do something under certain conditions.
Member States shall ensure that, if the parties agree to change the total amount of credit 
after the conclusion of the credit agreement, the creditor updates the financial informa-
tion at his disposal concerning the consumer and assesses the consumer’s creditworthi-
ness before any significant increase in the total amount of credit.
Article 8(2) of Directive 2008/48/EC
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OBLIGATION TO DO SOMETHING UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS REFERRING TO THE 
NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
38.  If a non-discretionary provision requires from Member States to do 
something and contains certain conditions under which the obligation ap-
plies and refers to the national legal order, it is considered as obligation to do 
something under certain conditions referring to the national legal order.
Information shall be made available to the public in accordance with national legislation 
and international obligations, provided that this does not jeopardise other interests such 
as, inter alia, security, recognised in national legislation or international obligations.
Article 8 Directive 2009/71/EURATOM
OBLIGATION NOT TO DEVIATE FROM THE DIRECTIVE
39.  If a non-discretionary provision does not allow Member States to make 
rules, other than those laid down by the directive, it is considered as an 
obligation not to deviate from the directive.
For the products defined in Annex I, Member States shall not adopt national provisions not 
provided for by this Directive.
Article 4 of Directive 2000/36/EC
Insofar as this Directive contains harmonised provisions, Member States may not maintain 
or introduce in their national law provisions diverging from those laid down in this Directive.
Article 22(1) of Directive 2008/48/EC
Note that this obligation gives expression to the legal concept of total har-
monisation which precludes any discretion for Member State implemen-
tation. A total harmonisation requirement is indicated by a may-clause or 
shall-clause in combination with the verbs ‘impede, prohibit, restrict’ or 
by similar expressions. In the absence of any discretion being available to 
Member State implementation, it does not include any reference to national 
legal orders.
OBLIGATION NOT TO DEVIATE FROM THE DIRECTIVE UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
40.  If a non-discretionary provision does not allow Member State to make 
rules other than those the directive lays down and contains certain condi-
tions under which the obligation applies, it is considered as an obligation 
not to deviate from the directive under certain conditions.
OBLIGATION TO AVOID MARKET RESTRICTIONS
41.  If a non-discretionary provision requires from Member States to en-
sure that a product is not prevented from being placed on the market if it 
complies with a directive requirement, it is considered as an obligation to 
avoid market restrictions.
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Member States shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that equipment is placed on 
the market and / or put into service only if it complies with the requirements of this Directive 
when properly installed, maintained and used for its intended purpose.
Article 3 of Directive 2004/108/EC
Note that this obligation relates to the legal concept of mutual recognition. 
Even though it does not prescribe European standards, mutual recognition 
does have harmonising effects regarding the national legal-administrative 
procedures concerning market access for goods. The concept is indicated by 
a shall-clause like e.g. ‘shall take appropriate measures’, ‘shall not impede’. 
The concept does not imply any reference to the national legal order.
OBLIGATION TO AVOID MARKET RESTRICTIONS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
42.  If a non-discretionary provision requires from Member States to avoid 
market restrictions and contains certain conditions under which this ob-
ligation applies, it is considered as an obligation to avoid market restrictions 
under certain conditions.
At trade fairs, exhibitions and demonstrations for the marketing of pyrotechnic articles, 
Member States shall not prevent the showing and use of pyrotechnic articles not in con-
formity with the provisions of this Directive, provided that a visible sign clearly indicates 
the name and date of the trade fair, exhibition or demonstration in question and the non-
conformity and non-availability for sale of the articles until brought into conformity by 
the manufacturer, where such manufacturer is established within the Community, or by 
the importer.
Article 6(3) of Directive 2007/23/EC
OBLIGATION TO SHARE IMPLEMENTING POWERS
43.  If a non-discretionary provision implies that the European Commis-
sion shall be assisted by a committee of national representatives in areas 
where implementing power are conferred upon the Commission, it is con-
sidered, from a Member State point of view as an obligation to share imple-
menting powers.
Committee procedure – The Commission shall be assisted by a committee.
Article 47 of Directive 2009/48/EC
Note that the obligation refers to both the European Commission and the 
Member States. Even though it implies that Member States can control the 
Commission in exercising implementing powers, the very fact that these 
powers have to be shared means that Member States’ discretion is reduced. 
This obligation precludes any additional conditions or references to national 
legal orders.
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II.3  Hybrid provisions
Alongside discretionary (permissive) and non-discretionary (obligatory) 
provisions there is the sub-category of hybrid provisions that contain both 
permission and obligation. Hybrid provisions can be further divided into 
‘permission hybrids’ and ‘obligation hybrids’.
The following applies:
44.  If a relevant provision contains both discretionary discretion manifes-
tation and non-discretionary discretion manifestation, in other words per-
missive as well as obligatory language, it is considered as a hybrid provision.
II.3.1  Sub-categories: Permission hybrids
PERMISSION WITH RESTRICTION
45.  If a hybrid provision allows Member States to do something but im-
poses restrictive conditions, it is considered as permission with restriction.
When a market surveillance authority requests the technical documentation or a transla-
tion of parts thereof from a manufacturer, it may fix a deadline for receipt of such file or 
translation, which shall be 30 days (…).
Article 21(3) of Directive 2009/48/EC
II.3.2  Sub-categories Obligation hybrids
OBLIGATION WITH LEEWAY UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
46.  If a hybrid provision contains an obligation which is further described 
by a may-clause and contains certain conditions under which it applies, it 
is considered as an obligation with leeway under certain conditions.
Where, in the course of that evaluation, the market surveillance authorities find that the 
toy does not comply with the requirements laid down in this Directive, they shall with-
out delay require the relevant economic operator to take appropriate corrective action 
to bring the toy into compliance with those requirements, to withdraw the toy from the 
market, or to recall it within a reasonable period, commensurate with the nature of the 
risk, as they may prescribe.
Article 42(1) of Directive 2009/48/EC
OBLIGATION WITH EXCEPTIONS
47.  If a hybrid provision contains an obligation and conditions under which 
the obligation does not apply (exceptions), it is considered as an obligation 
with exceptions.
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Given that mediation is intended to take place in a manner which respects confidential-
ity, Member States shall ensure that, unless the parties agree otherwise, neither mediators 
nor those involved in the administration of the mediation process shall be compelled to 
give evidence in civil and commercial judicial proceedings or arbitration regarding infor-
mation arising out of or in connection with a mediation process, except:
(a)  where this is necessary for overriding considerations of public policy of the Member 
State concerned, in particular when required to ensure the protection of the best interests 
of children or to prevent harm to the physical or psychological integrity of a person; or
b)  where disclosure of the content of the agreement resulting from mediation is neces-
sary in order to implement or enforce that agreement.
Article 7(1) of Directive 2008/52/EC
48.  If a hybrid provision contains an obligation and conditions under 
which the obligation does not apply (exceptions) and a reference to the na-
tional legal order, it is considered as an obligation with exceptions with refer-
ence to the national legal order.
Member States may not extend the period referred to in paragraph 5 except for a limited 
period not exceeding a further twelve months in accordance with national law in cases 
where regardless of all their reasonable efforts the removal operation is likely to last lon-
ger owing to:
(a)  a lack of cooperation by the third-country national concerned, or
(b)  delays in obtaining the necessary documentation from third countries.
Article 15(6) of Directive 2008/115/EC
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Types of directive provisions at one glance
Standard povision Relevant provision
– Requirement
– Addressee
– Rules of general or final provisions, 
rules concerning standard procedures, 
applicability of parts of directive
– Requirement
– Addressee
– Discretionary, non-discretionary 
discretion manifestation (e.g. may-, 
shall-clauses)
Relevant discretionary and relevant non-discretionary provisions
Permission (discretionary provision):
simple, with certain conditions and/or 
reference to the national legal order
Obligation (non-discretionary provision):
simple, with certain conditions and/or 
reference to the national legal order
– To do something (simple permission)
– To go beyond what is prescribed
– To choose between rules
– To deviate from EU rules
– To delegate 
– To do something (simple obligation)
– Not to deviate from the directive
– To avoid market restrictions
– To share implementing powers




obligation with leeway, obligation with 
exception
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CODES AND VALUES
Variable (V) 1 = Addressee
Code = 1-5
Immediate addressees
1  Member State or other national authorities
2 European Commission, and / or the EU Council of Ministers (CoM) or 
the European Parliament (EP)
3  Member State and the European Commission
4  European Commission and / or EU-level institutions other than CoM or 
EP such as the European Standards Organisation (CEN, CENELEC etc.), 
the European Central Bank or others
Intermediate addressees
5  Third parties such as economic operators, citizens or others
V 2 = Permissive / discretionary (relevant) provision
Code = 6-10
6  Permission to do something
61  Permission to do something and reference to the national legal order
62  Permission to do sth. and certain condition
621 Permission to do sth. and certain condition with reference to 
the national legal order
7  Permission to go beyond what is prescribed
71  Permission to go beyond what is prescribed and reference to the na-
tional legal order
72  Permission to go beyond what is prescribed and certain condition
721  Permission to do more than is prescribed and certain condition 
with reference to the national legal order
8  Permission to choose between rules
81  Permission to choose between rules and reference to the national 
legal order
82  Permission to choose between rules and certain condition
821  Permission to choose between standards and certain condition 
with reference to the national legal order
9  Permission to deviate from EU rules
91  Permission to deviate from EU rules and reference to the national 
legal order
92  Permission to deviate from EU rules and certain condition
921  Permission to deviate and certain condition with reference to 
the national legal order
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10  Permission to delegate
V3 = Obligatory/non-discretionary (relevant) provision
Code = 11-14
11  Obligation to do something
111  Obligation to do something and reference to the national legal order
112  Obligation to do sth. and certain condition
1121 Obligation to do sth. and certain condition with reference to 
the national legal order
12  Obligation not to deviate from the directive
121  Obligation not to deviate from the directive and reference to the na-
tional legal order
122  Obligation not to deviate from the directive and certain condition
1221 Obligation not to deviate from the directive and certain condi-
tion with reference to the national legal order
13  Obligation to avoid market restrictions
132  Obligation to avoid market restrictions and certain condition
1321 Obligation to avoid market restrictions and certain condition 
with reference to the national legal order
14  Obligation to share implementing powers
V4 = Hybrid provision
Code = 15-17
15  Permission hybrids: Permission with restriction
16  Obligation hybrids: Obligation with leeway under certain conditions
17  Obligation with exceptions
171  Obligation with exceptions with reference to the national legal order
V5 = Standard provision
Code = 18
As noted earlier, the codebook is primarily used for case selection purposes. 
The analysis of individual directives, and the role and relevance of discre-
tion in particular cases, follows at later stages in this study. Having coded 
the directives under consideration here (3 consumer protection directives, 
10 environmental directives and 4 migration directives), a few outcomes are 
striking, however, and therefore worth mentioning. These outcomes relate to 
one focal point which was mentioned in the theoretical discussion and con-
cerns the empirical analysis of EU decision-making processes regarding direc-
tives: the link between a directive’s margin of discretion and the policy area 
and subject matter addressed by the directive. In a nutshell, where the EU 
has not (yet) gained a strong foothold in legal and institutional terms, more 
discretion is available for Member States to transpose a directive into national 
law as they see fit. The coding results seem to point into the same direction 
when considering the distribution of discretion manifestations in the three 
areas addressed: consumer protection, environmental and migration law.
Distribution of permissions
– All directives analysed by means of content analysis include more oblig-
atory requirements than permissive ones. At the same time, however, 
nearly all directives also include permissions. It is interesting to note that 
migration directives show much greater variety regarding the sorts of 
permissions identified in the codebook than directives from the areas of 
consumer protection and environmental law. Most directives of the latter 
two EU areas lack two particular sorts of permissions: the permission to 
go beyond what is prescribed – usually reflected in minimum harmoni-
sation requirements and the permission to choose between rules (nation-
al standards or harmonised EU standards) as expressed by the concept of 
optional harmonisation.
References to the national legal order
– Furthermore, consumer protection and environmental directives hardly 
include any discretion manifestations with reference to the national legal 
order (neither in case of permissions nor obligations). References to the 
national legal order are, on the other hand, prevalent in discretion mani-
festations of migration directives.
Obligation hybrids
– Migration directives also include obligation hybrids: EU requirements 
that in spite of their obligatory nature leave a bit of discretionary room. 
These hybrid provisions are less frequent in environmental directives 




– The obligation to avoid market restrictions shows in consumer protec-
tion directives but not in directives of the other two areas. Both consumer 
protection directives and nearly all environmental directives include the 
obligation to share implementing powers, which, however, is absent 
from all migration directives.
All in all, this cursory look at the coding outcomes shows that the distribu-
tion of discretionary and non-discretionary discretion manifestations can be 
used to illustrate and, at least, speculate about the scope of the EU’s influ-
ence in a policy area, and thus also about the overall relevance of discretion 
in that very area. To make it more concrete: the absence of specific sorts of 
permissions (reflecting minimum harmonisation, optional harmonisation) 
and references to the national legal order as well as the presence of delega-
tion of implementing powers to the European Commission in the field of 
consumer protection and environmental law suggests strong EU leverage 
and therefore points to a minor role of discretion. To render speculations 
into findings, however, an empirical analysis is required. For this purpose, 
the dissertation includes a (comparative) case study approach which exam-
ines in-depth a set of European directives from the three areas addressed, 
with the aim of shedding light on the role and relevance of discretion in EU 
negotiations and national transposition processes regarding directives.
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Context en onderzoeksvragen
Het boek ‘A blessing in disguise?! Discretion in the context of EU decision-
making, national transposition and legitimacy regarding EU directi-
ves’ analyseert de rol van beleidsvrijheid bij de EU onderhandelingen en 
nationale omzettingsprocessen betreffende Europese richtlijnen. Onder 
welke omstandigheden wordt beleidsvrijheid gelaten aan de lidstaten en 
wat voor effect heeft dit op de onderhandelingen in de EU-ministerraad? 
En met betrekking tot het nationale omzettingsproces, heeft beleidsvrij-
heid een bevorderende of een belemmerende rol hierin? Door de analyse 
van de processen betreffende richtlijnen op zowel EU niveau als nationaal 
niveau wordt in het proefschrift rekening gehouden met het levenscyclus 
van richtlijnen die op het EU vlak worden voorbereid en aangenomen en 
aansluitend door de lidstaten, vooral hun bestuur, worden geïmplemen-
teerd. Bovendien poogt deze studie de vertaalslag te maken van enerzijds 
de effecten van beleidsvrijheid op de formele implementatie van richtlijnen 
naar anderzijds de legitimiteit van richtlijnen in nationale wetgeving. Met 
andere woorden, naast de rol van beleidsvrijheid, wordt ook de relatie tus-
sen beleidsvrijheid en legitimiteit nader onderzocht in de context van de 
omzetting van richtlijnen. De centrale onderzoeksvragen zijn:
Centrale onderzoeksvragen
1)  Wat is de rol van beleidsvrijheid in het EU besluitvormingsproces en het 
nationale omzettingsproces betreffende Europese richtlijnen?
2)  Wat is de relatie tussen beleidsvrijheid en legitimiteit in het nationale 
omzettingsproces van EU richtlijnen?
Subonderzoeksvragen
EU-niveau
a)  Onder welke omstandigheden wordt beleidsvrijheid door de EU wetge-
ver toegekend aan de lidstaten voor de omzetting van richtlijnen?
b)  Welke uitwerking heeft beleidsvrijheid op de onderhandelingen betref-
fende richtlijnen?
Nationaal niveau
a)  Hoe wordt beleidsvrijheid gebruikt in het nationale omzettingsproces?




De omzetting of formele implementatie van EU richtlijnen in nationale 
wetgeving is de eerste stap in het gehele implementatieproces dat voor-
afgaat aan de feitelijke implementatie en handhaving. EU richtlijnen zijn 
naast verordeningen een van de meest gebruikte instrumenten van EU 
wetgeving. Het hoofddoel van richtlijnen is de harmonisatie van nationale 
wet- en regelgeving in de inmiddels 28 lidstaten van de Europese Unie. In 
tegenstelling tot verordeningen die rechtstreekse werking hebben, moeten 
richtlijnen in de nationale rechtsorde worden geïncorporeerd waarbij lid-
staten discretionaire ruimte of beleidsvrijheid ter beschikking hebben. Deze 
beleidsvrijheid, in het Engels ‘discretion’ genoemd, is een fundamenteel 
kenmerk van richtlijnen. Beleidsvrijheid vloeit enerzijds voort uit Artikel 
288 van het EU Werkingsverdrag: terwijl de richtlijn een bepaald resultaat 
voorschrijft, beschikken de lidstaten in grote mate over de vrijheid vormen 
en middelen te kiezen waarmee de richtlijn in nationale wetgeving wordt 
geïmplementeerd. Anderzijds, kan beleidsvrijheid worden afgeleid van de 
bepalingen van een richtlijn en de manier waarop deze geformuleerd zijn. 
Een richtlijn kan bijvoorbeeld inhouden dat nationale wetgeving meer of 
minder aan Europese regels aangepast, wordt, en dus min of meer beleids-
vrijheid aan de lidstaten overlaat. Daarnaast zijn er zogenaamde ‘may’ en 
‘shall’ bepalingen die aangeven dat een lidstaat een optie of geen optie heeft 
bij de implementatie van de bepalingen van een richtlijn.
Inhoud in vogelvlucht
Het proefschrift is ingedeeld in vier delen. Het eerste deel introduceert de 
context van het proefschrift en de centrale onderwerpen en concepten van 
beleidsvrijheid, omzetting en legitimiteit. Hierna volgen drie hoofdstuk-
ken die een theoretische behandeling van beleidsvrijheid omvatten. Hierin 
worden, in lijn met de multi- en interdisciplinaire karakter van het onder-
zoek, verschillende benaderingen en perspectieven op beleidsvrijheid van-
uit de rechtswetenschappen en de politieke wetenschappen gepresenteerd. 
Op basis hiervan wordt een theoretisch toetsingskader ontwikkelt voor de 
empirische analyse, bestaande uit een aantal verwachtingen over de rol van 
beleidsvrijheid in het EU onderhandelings- en nationale omzettingsproces 
betreffende richtlijnen. De presentatie van een klein aantal factoren waar-
van wordt aangenomen dat ze, naast en in interactie met beleidsvrijheid, 
invloed kunnen hebben op het nationale omzettingsproces gaat hiermee 
gepaard. In het tweede deel van het boek wordt de methodologische bena-
dering van de onderzoeksvragen toegelicht. De methoden en technieken 
waarvan gebruik wordt gemaakt omvatten de inhoudsanalyse (van teksten 
van richtlijnen), de case studie analyse (betreffende zes richtlijnen), inclu-
sief een vergelijkende analyse, de literatuurstudie en expert interviews 
(vooral met bij de onderhandeling en omzetting betrokkene Nederlandse 
ambtenaren). Met andere woorden, in de methodologische hoofdstukken 
wordt het gereedschap gepresenteerd waarmee de empirische analyse uit-
gevoerd wordt. Verder wordt de selectie van de case studies onderbouwd 
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en de manier van dataverzameling, -bespreking en -beoordeling uitgelegd. 
Bovendien wordt ingegaan op het kernconcept van beleidsvrijheid, de con-
ceptualisering en operationalisering ervan en de methodologische aanpak 
van andere, voor de omzetting relevante factoren, besproken. In het vierde 
en afsluitende deel worden de empirische bevindingen bij elkaar gebracht 
en beoordeeld in het licht van het theoretische toetsingskader en met betrek-
king op de verwachtingen over de rol van beleidsvrijheid. Naast het beant-
woorden van de hoofd- en subvragen werpt het proefschriftonderzoek 
ook vragen op die als toekomstige onderzoekspaden worden uitgewezen. 
Bovendien worden de bijdragen die het proefschrift in theoretische, metho-
dologische en empirische opzicht levert, gesignaleerd.
Inhoud in meer detail
Terwijl het Nederlandse recht wat betreft discretionaire ruimte voor nati-
onale regelgeving een verdere specificatie kent,1 wordt ‘discretion’ toege-
kend door een EU richtlijn, gewoonlijk verstaan als ‘beleidsvrijheid’. In het 
proefschrift wordt echter wel de aanname geuit dat dat er een verschil kan 
zijn tussen enerzijds de omvang van beleidsvrijheid gebaseerd op alleen de 
richtlijn (tekst) en anderzijds de omvang van beleidsvrijheid die nationale 
omzettingsactoren (ambtenaren) uiteindelijk ter beschikking hebben. Om 
die reden wordt het onderscheidt tussen ‘legislative discretion’ en ‘execu-
tive discretion’ gemaakt. Desalniettemin wordt in het boek met name de 
term ‘beleidsvrijheid’ gebezigd.
Nederland is gekozen als land dat nader wordt onderzocht ten aanzien 
van de omzetting van EU richtlijnen en het gebruik van beleidsvrijheid hier-
bij. Dat heeft meerdere redenen. Ten eerste biedt Nederland een interessante 
omgeving voor een dieper gaande analyse: ondanks het feit dat Nederland 
algemeen bekend staat als een van de koplopers onder de EU lidstaten wat 
betreft haar invloed op de wetgeving van de EU en de toepassing ervan, 
heeft Nederland sinds eind jaren 70 problemen ondervonden, vooral wat 
betreft de tijdige omzetting van EU richtlijnen maar ook naleving van ver-
ordeningen. Daar komt bij dat Nederland een van de EU lidstaten is waar 
1 Zoals in het proefschrift toegelicht wordt in het Nederlandse bestuursrecht het onder-
scheid gemaakt tussen beleidsvrijheid of beleidsruimte en beoordelingsvrijheid of 
beoordelingsruimte. Kort samengevat komt het erop dat een bestuurorgaan dat beleids-
vrijheid of beleidsruimte (‘(free) discretion’) heeft de vrijheid heeft om te kiezen welk 
beleid / welke beleidsmaatregelen zullen worden genomen om een bepaald doel te 
bereiken dat door wetgeving wordt nagestreeft. Bij beoordelingsruimte en beoordelings-
vrijheid (‘scope for appraisal’, ‘freedom of assessment’) gaat het erom dat een bestuurs-
orgaan een beslissing moet nemen maar de vrijheid heeft om te beoordelen of aan de 
voorwaarden waaronder dit geschiedt en die zijn vastgesteld in de relevante wetgeving, 
is voldaan. Met andere woorden, beleidsvrijheid gaat over keuzes betreffende de inhoud 
van beleid terwijl beoordelingsruimte / beoordelingsvrijheid gaat over keuzes betref-
fende de toepassing van een beslissing, afhankelijk van het voldoen aan bepaalde voor-
waarden. Zie ook paragraaf 2.2.1.1.
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naast het bestuur ook het nationale parlement betrokken kan zijn bij de 
omzetting van richtlijnen, een gegeven dat zeker met oog op de omgang 
met beleidsvrijheid en het standpunt van legitimiteit een belangwekkend 
gegeven is. Maar nog belangrijker voor het onderzoek naar beleidsvrijheid 
is dat het Nederlandse bestuurs- en wetgevingsstelsel relatief open is ten 
opzichte van de uitvoering van discretionaire bevoegdheden door bestuurs-
organen in vergelijking met bijvoorbeeld Duitsland waar dit niet het geval 
is, vooral vanwege de invloed die het bestuurs- en wetteljke stelsel in het 
verleden door het totalitaire nazi-regime heeft ondergaan met als gevolg het 
streven om administratieve beleidsvrijheid beperkt te houden.
Deel 1: Achtergrond en theorie (hoofdstukken 1 t/m 5)
De rol van beleidsvrijheid wordt in de omzettingsliteratuur verschillend 
beoordeeld. Vooral wat betreft de effecten van richtlijnen met grotere mar-
ges van beleidsvrijheid op de tijdigheid van de omzetting gaan de menin-
gen uit elkaar. De theoretische en empirische bevindingen laten zien dat 
beleidsvrijheid, in de vorm van discretionaire bevoegdheden die door 
de EU wetgever gedelegeerd worden naar de lidstaten (en hun nationale 
instanties), kan bijdragen aan een tijdige omzetting maar deze ook kan ver-
tragen. Studies die de link tussen beleidsvrijheid en wettelijke correctheid 
nader onderzoeken zijn er minder. Hierin wordt de conclusie getrokken dat 
beleidsvrijheid een positieve rol kan vervullen. Het belangrijkste argument 
met betrekking tot zowel tijdigheid als wettelijke correctheid is dat een gro-
tere marge van beleidsvrijheid de lidstaten de benodigde ruimte geeft om 
de richtlijn op een manier om te zetten die past bij hun nationale wettelijke 
kader. Anderzijds wordt beweerd en aangetoond dat beleidsvrijheid, juist 
door ruimte te laten voor verschillende omzettingsopties, tot vertraging van 
dit proces kan leiden. Tegen de achtergrond van de verschillende beoorde-
lingen van de effecten van beleidsvrijheid op de omzetting van richtlijnen 
is het interessant dat beleidsvrijheid ook verschillende reacties oproept in 
het academisch debat die niet voortkomen uit het onderzoek naar de imple-
mentatie van EU wetgeving maar die raken aan juridische aspecten van de 
uitoefening van (discretionaire) bevoegdheden bij de implementatie van 
wetgeving in het algemeen. Vanuit het perspectief van bijvoorbeeld het con-
stitutionele recht en het bestuursrecht kan op nadelen worden gewezen die 
discretionaire bevoegdheden in handen van het bestuur voor wettelijke stel-
sels kunnen hebben. Discretionaire ruimte wordt geassocieerd met rechts-
onzekerheid, onrechtvaardige regelgeving en het ondermijnen van een 
duidelijke machtenscheiding, vooral wat betreft de scheiding tussen wetge-
vende en uitvoerende (bestuurlijke) macht.
Ondanks deze negatieve zichtwijze van beleidsvrijheid, worden met 
name vanuit de rechtssociologie argumenten aangevoerd die beleidsvrij-
heid in een positief licht zetten. Zo wordt bijvoorbeeld betoogd dat beleids-
vrijheid tot rechtvaardige regelgeving kan bijdragen. De beschikbaarheid 
van discretionaire ruimte voor verdere uitwerking van wetgeving maakt het 
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mogelijk dat abstracte, algemene wetten op een manier worden toegepast 
die past bij de bijzonderheden van individuele gevallen in de rechtspraktijk. 
De redenering dat beleidsvrijheid ondanks vermeende nadelen vooral ook 
voordelen voor de implementatie van wetgeving kan hebben wordt in het 
proefschrift gedeeld. Sterker nog: de intentie is om deze voordelen in de 
context van de omzetting van EU richtlijnen beter tot uitdrukking te bren-
gen omdat deze overschaduwd lijken te worden door de negatieve gevol-
gen die worden toegeschreven aan bestuurlijke beleidsvrijheid.
Ook in de politieke wetenschappen wordt beleidsvrijheid als problema-
tisch beschouwd, zoals in het concept van ‘bureaucratic drift’ tot uitdruk-
king komt. Toegepast op de context van het proefschrift houdt dit concept 
in dat het nationale bestuur de ruimte die de EU wetgever laat om een richt-
lijn om te zetten gebruikt voor andere doeleinden dan beoogd door de richt-
lijn. In tegenstelling tot de rechtswetenschappen wordt in het wetgevings- 
maar ook Europeaniseringsonderzoek – waarvan het omzettingsonderzoek 
deel uitmaakt – echter meer naar de context gekeken waarin beleidsvrij-
heid voorkomt. Er wordt dus sterker rekening gehouden met kenmerken 
van processen en actoren en hoe deze gerelateerd zijn aan beleidsvrijheid. 
Met behulp van dit onderzoek wordt in het proefschrift nader onderzocht 
in welke omstandigheden en om welke redenen beleidsvrijheid aan de lid-
staten wordt toegekend en wat de effecten ervan zijn voor de onderhande-
lingen en omzetting betreffende richtlijnen. Op basis hiervan en correspon-
derend met een exploratieve, kwalitatieve benadering van beleidsvrijheid 
worden een reeks verwachtingen geformuleerd waarmee de rol van beleids-
vrijheid in de empirische analyse verder belicht zal worden.
EU-onderhandelingen
Een viertal verwachtingen heeft betrekking op het EU onderhandelings-
proces en de omstandigheden die invloed kunnen hebben op de marge 
van beleidsvrijheid die de wetgever aan de lidstaten voor de omzetting ter 
beschikking stelt. Dienovereenkomstig geeft een richtlijn meer beleidsvrij-
heid wanneer hiermee een onderwerp van een beleidsdomain wordt gere-
guleerd dat op het vlak van wetgeving en institutionele ontwikkeling nog 
niet veel invloed door de EU heeft ondergaan (policy area expectation), wan-
neer het onderwerp politiek gevoelig is en daardoor tot controversies en 
onenigheid leidt onder de lidstaten (political sensitivity expectation) of wan-
neer de voorgestelde richtlijn niet goed verenigbaar is met de administra-
tief-wettelijke stelsels in de lidstaten (compatibility expectation). Tot slot en 
in tegenstelling tot de voorafgaande aannames, is de verwachting dat het 
Europees Parlement, als voorstander van EU integratie van nationale wet-
geving en met name in de functie van medewetgever, de marge van beleids-
vrijheid zal beperken om wettelijke diversiteit te voorkomen die moeilijk 
verenigbaar is met het doel van vergaande harmonisatie (European Parlia-
ment matters expectation). De verwachtingen betreffende de politieke gevoe-
ligheid enerzijds en anderzijds de comaptibiliteit tussen een EU richtlijn en 
het nationale wetgevingskader zijn gebaseerd op een specifieke benadering 
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van EU onderhandelinsgprocessen: de consensus-building approach. Deze 
gaat ervan uit dat het toekennen van beleidsvrijheid ertoe leidt dat conflic-
ten tussen de lidstaten kunnen worden bijgelegd. Een richtlijn die flexibi-
liteit in de vorm van discretionaire ruimte in het vooruitzicht stelt lijkt de 
bereidwilligheid van lidstaten tot compromissen te stimuleren, met name 
wanneer EU regels moeten worden ingepast in de nationale rechtsorde die 
minder goed hierop aansluiten. Kortom, beleidsvrijheid kan een facilite-
rende rol hebben in omstandigheden van onenigheid en (juridische) incom-
patibilteit.
Nationale omzetting
Ook met het oog op het nationale omzettingsproces wordt van de mogelijk-
heid van een faciliterende rol van beleidsvrijheid uitgegaan. Ten eerste, hoe 
meer beleidsvrijheid lidstaten ter beschikking hebben voor de omzetting, 
des te beter wordt de EU richtlijn omgezet (invidiual discretion effect expec-
tation or discretion-in-national-law expectation). Uit de literatuur blijkt echter 
dat beleidsvrijheid vooral in samenwerking met andere factoren het omzet-
tingsproces beïnvloedt. Wanneer weinig beleidsvrijheid wordt gegeven 
voor een richtlijnbepaling die reeds op het EU vlak tot kritiek of afkeer heeft 
geleid, kan dit in een gebrekkige omzetting van die bepaling resulteren 
(disagreement interaction expectation). Verder wordt aangenomen dat beleids-
vrijheid het positieve effect van een bestaande goede compatibiliteit tussen 
EU richtlijn en nationale wetgevingskader nog verder bevordert (compati-
bility interaction expectation). Hetzelfde geldt met betrekking tot de admi-
nistratieve capaciteit van een lidstaat. Dus wanneer de omzettingsactoren 
(doorgaans nationale ministeries) voldoende kennis hebben over hoe een 
richtlijn omgezet moet worden en er tussen de departementen die gewoon-
lijk betrokken zijn bij de onderhandelingen respectievelijk de omzetting 
(beleids- en juridische afdelingen) geen meningsverschil of miscommuni-
catie bestaat over de interpretatie en toepassing van EU regels, kan beleids-
vrijheid de positieve werking van administratieve capaciteit versterken. Dit 
geldt vooral bij een grotere marge van beleidsvrijheid (capacity interaction 
expectation). Echter, hoe meer actoren betrokken zijn bij de omzetting en hoe 
meer beleidsvrijheid er is, des te groter de kans dat de omzetting gebrek-
kig zal zijn: de redenering daarachter is dat meer discretionaire ruimte ook 
meer kans laat voor conflicten tussen omzettingsactoren die verschillende 
voorkeuren hebben voor wat betreft de manier waarop de richtlijn moet 
worden omgezet (actor interaction expectation). Kortom, op het nationale vlak 
kan beleidsvrijheid een faciliterende of belemmerende impact hebben. Het 
lijkt in beide gevallen op te treden als een interveniërende of bemiddelende 
factor, dat wil zeggen dat beleidsvrijheid het positieve of negatieve effect 
van andere relevante factoren versterkt.
Verder wordt in het proefschrift aangenomen dat beleidsvrijheid niet 
zomaar in werking treedt. Doordat het al dan niet door de verantwoordelijke 
nationale autoriteiten bij de omzetting van richtlijnen wordt gebruikt heeft 
het een effect (of geen effect). Er lijken nog maar weinig studies in te gaan 
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op het gebruik van beleidsvrijheid bij de omzetting van richtlijnen maar een 
nadere kijk op de hierin besproken voorbeelden bevestigt de faciliterende 
werking van beleidsvrijheid. Blijkbaar helpt beleidsvrijheid om onverenig-
baarheden tussen de Europese en nationale regels weg te nemen waarbij de 
omzetting zo kan worden uitgevoerd dat het nationale wetgevingskader zo 
veel mogelijk intact blijft. Dit blijkt uit onderzoek naar de implementatie van 
EU-milieuwetgeving in Nederland. Daarnaast maakt ook de analyse van 
de algemene Nederlandse implementatiecontext aanneembaar dat beleids-
vrijheid in de vorm van discretionaire keuze van vormen en middelen van 
omzetting ertoe bijdraagt dat EU wetgeving wordt nageleefd.
Dit kan worden opgemaakt uit het feit dat nationale ministeries, zoals 
het Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, een omzettingsrou-
tine lijken te hebben ontwikkeld – door de keuze van bepaalde instrumen-
ten en technieken van omzetting – die doorgaans uitmondt in tijdige en 
wettelijk correcte omzetting van EU richtlijnen die onder de portefeuille van 
dit ministerie vallen. De functies waarvan wordt aangenomen dat beleids-
vrijheid deze kan hebben bij de EU onderhandelingen en nationale omzet-
ting van richtlijnen worden in figuur 1 samengevat.
Figuur 1: Functies van beleidsvrijheid
Beleidsvrijheid
EU-onderhandelingen Verzoent verschillende belangen → Bevordert besluit-
vorming & compromis betreffende een richtlijn
Nationale omzetting Nemt onverenigbaarheden weg tussen EU en nationale 
wetgeving → Bevordert de tijdige en wettelijk correcte 
omzetting
‘Facilitating-fit-function’ en opname van EU regels in 
de nationale rechtsorde onder behoud van het nationale 
wegevingskader
Deel 2: Methodologie (hoofdstukken 6 t/m 8)
De onderzoeksopzet en de onderzoeksmethodes- en technieken worden in 
het tweede methodologische deel van het proefschrift besproken. Dit deel 
begint met een conceptualisering en operationalisering van beleidsvrijheid 
in EU richtlijnen. Dit is een belangrijke stap in de selectie van richtlijnen 
voor de latere empirische analyse. Conform de aannames dat kleinere en 
grotere marges van beleidsvrijheid verschillende effecten hebben op de 
omzetting van richtlijnen, worden in de case studie analyses richtlijnen 
geanalyseerd die minder én meer beleidsvrijheid aan de lidstaten toestaan. 
Omdat van individuele richtlijnen echter niet bekend is hoeveel beleids-
vrijheid ze geven, moet vooraf een manier bedacht worden waarmee de 
omvang van beleidsvrijheid van richtlijnen kan worden bepaald.
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Voor dit doel wordt ten eerste de structuur van een richtlijn behandeld 
om te laten zien welke bepalingen discretionair zijn, dat wil zeggen beleids-
vrijheid aan de lidstaten geven. De bespreking van de structuur en types 
van rechtsnormen (gedrags- en bevoegdheidsnormen) laat vervolgens zien 
dat discretionaire en non-discretionaire bepalingen geïdentificeerd kunnen 
worden met behulp van de normoperatoren ‘kunnen’ en ‘moeten’ (‘may’ 
and ‘shall’ clauses) die in de richtlijn tekst aangeven of een lidstaat al dan 
niet beleidsvrijheid ter beschikking heeft. Op basis van deze discretionaire 
en non-discretionaire verschijnselen wordt het onderscheid aangebracht 
tussen ‘permissive language’ en ‘obligatory language’ dat verder wordt uit-
gewerkt in een zogenaamd codeboek. Deze benadering van beleidsvrijheid 
in richtlijnen gaat terug op de zogenaamde inhoudsanalyse. De manier 
waarop deze in het proefschrift wordt toegepast houdt een systematische 
en kwantitatieve beschrijving van de inhoud van richtlijnen in. Kwantita-
tief slaat hier op het feit dat codes worden gedefinieerd en toegepast om 
een bepaling van de richtlijn te beschrijven. Op die manier wordt aange-
geven aan wie een bepaling zich richt (bv. de lidstaten of Europese Com-
missie) en of deze bepaling beleidsvrijheid aan de lidstaten geeft, of juist 
niet geeft (discretionaire of non-discretionair is). Het codeboek is het kern-
instrument van de inhoudsanalyse en legt in een coding scheme (codering-
splan) enerzijds de regels voor de codering vast. Anderzijds worden met 
behulp van sub-categorieën, indicatoren en voorbeelden verschillende vor-
men van discretionaire en non-discretionaire bepalingen geïntroduceerd 
die in de tekst van een richtlijn kunnen worden aangetroffen en de twee 
hoofdcategorieën van permissive en obligatory language nader beschri-
jven. Met behulp van een formule uit het implementatieonderzoek en de 
resultaten van het coderingsproces wordt vervolgens de marge van beleids-
vrijheid van de richtlijnen bepaald die tot de onderzoeksgroep (directive 
sample) behoren. Het codeboek wordt in de bijlage van het proefschrift in 
z’n geheel geïntroduceerd maar reeds in het methodologische deel wordt er 
een beknopte samenvatting van de opzet en inhoud ervan gegeven. Hierbij 
wordt ook ingegaan op het feit dat enkele van de sub-categorieën (vormen 
van (non-)discretionaire bepalingen) uitdrukking geven aan bepaalde juri-
dische begrippen die nader worden toegelicht (bv. minimum en maximum 
harmonisatie, delegatie e.a.).
Voor een belangrijk deel is bij de ontwikkeling van het codeboek 
gebruik gemaakt van inzichten die zijn gewonnen door een voorafgaande 
exploratieve analyse van een willekeurige groep van nieuwe richtlijnen 
(dus geen modificaties) uit verschillende beleidsdomeinen. Het codeboek 
wordt beschouwd als een voorstel om beleidsvrijheid te beoordelen op een 
manier die meer rekening houdt met het complexe karakter van de teksten 
van richtlijnen en een benadering toepast die gedetailleerder is in vergeli-
jking met eerder gedane pogingen om marges van beleidsvrijheid te bep-
alen. Tegelijkertijd wordt hiermee gepoogd om de verschillende vormen 
van beleidsvrijheid in een richtlijn in kaart te brengen. Het codeboek wordt 
echter niet aangezien als een instrument waarmee marges van beleidsvri-
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jheid precies worden berekend maar waarmee op basis van alleen de tekst 
van een richtlijn louter een inschatting wordt gegeven of een richtlijn eerder 
meer of minder beleidsvrijheid aan de lidstaten toekent. Tevens wordt het 
codeboek aangezien als een voorlopige (zij het rudimentaire) poging om de 
marge van beleidsvrijheid van een richtlijn te beoordelen.
Op basis van drie criteria worden de richtlijnen voor de inhoudsanal-
yse geselecteerd: nieuwe richtlijnen (conform de toepasbaarheid van het 
codeboek), richtlijnen die zijn aangenomen in de periode 1 januari 2007 tot 
1 december 2009 (voor een vergelijkbare juridische context) en richtlijnen 
uit de beleidsdomeinen consumentenbescherming, milieu en migratie. Dat 
levert een groep van in totaal zeventien richtlijnen op waaruit uiteindelijk, 
in aansluiting aan de inhoudsanalyse en het coderingsproces, zes worden 
gekozen voor een diepgaande empirische analyse. Aangezien de analyse 
van individuele richtlijnen gecompleteerd zal worden met een gepaarde 
vergelijking worden de zes richtlijnen in drie cases ingedeeld. Elk van die 
cases omvat twee richtlijnen die verschillen met betrekking tot hun marges 
van beleidsvrijheid: de een geeft eerder minder, de ander meer beleidsvri-
jheid. Een hoofddoel van de case studie analyse is om inzicht te geven in 
de relatie tussen de vermeende oorzaak of in kwantitatief onderzoek ‘onaf-
hankelijke variabel’, dat is beleidsvrijheid, en het verondersteld effect of de 
‘afhankelijke variabele’, dat is het resultaat van de omzetting. Overeenk-
omstig de kerngedachte van het proefschrift dat beleidsvrijheid een belan-
grijke rol bij de omzetting van richtlijnen kan spelen, is de achterliggende 
gedachte van de comparatieve analyse dat de beschikbaarheid van (meer) 
beleidsvrijheid (en het gebruik ervan) zal leiden tot tijdige en wettelijke cor-
recte omzetting (naleving). Naast de link tussen de beleidsvrijheid van de 
richtlijn en het omzettingsresultaat, wordt volgens het most similar systems 
design, met andere zogenaamde achtergrondfactoren rekening gehouden 
waarvan wordt aangenomen dat ze de omzetting van een richtlijnen beïn-
vloeden: de soort van richtlijn, het aantal omzettingsactoren, het aantal en 
de aard van de omzettingsinstrumenten. Om zo goed mogelijk te kunnen 
uitsluiten dat deze factoren een cruciale invloed hebben op de omzetting 
en om in te zoomen op de link tussen beleidsvrijheid en omzettingsresul-
taat wordt ernaar gestreefd dat deze factoren ongeveer gelijk zijn ten aan-
zien van de twee richlijnen die worden vergeleken. Hetzelfde geldt voor 
het omzettingstermijn. Ter aflsuiting van het methodologische deel van het 
proefschrift wordt een overzicht gegeven van een aantal aspecten van de 
empirische analyse: doeleinden en structuur, alsmede de dataverzamel-
ing. Aangezien, zoals uit de reeks van verwachtingen valt af te leiden, het 
concept van de (juridische) compatibiliteit tussen EU richtlijn en nationale 
rechtsorde een belangrijke rol speelt in verband met het onderzoek naar de 
rol van beleidsvrijheid, wordt tot slot de methodologische benadering van 
dit concept nader toegelicht.
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Deel 3: Empirische analyse (hoofdstukken 9 t/m 15)
Het empirische deel van het proefschrift is het omvangrijkst: het omvat de 
analyse van zes richtlijnen alsmede een hoofdstuk waarin de drie vegelij-
kende analyses worden gepresenteerd. De bespreking van de individuele 
richtlijnen houdt telkens in dat een beschrijvende en toelichtende analyse 
(descriptive and exploratory analysis) van zowel het onderhandelings- als 
het nationale omzettingsproces in Nederland wordt gegeven. Het empi-
risch onderzoek is achtereenvolgend gericht op: de EU Blue Card Richtlijn 
(migratie), de Pyrorichtlijn (consumentenbescherming), de Kaderrichtlijn 
Afvalstoffen (milieu), de Speelgoedrichtlijn (consumentenbescherming), de 
Terugkeerrichtlijn (migratie) en de Richtlijn inzake Fase II-benzinedamp-
terugwinning (consumentenbescherming). Vervolgens worden met elkaar 
vergeleken: de twee eerstgenoemde richtlijnen, de derde en vierde richtlijn, 
en tenslotte de vijfde en zesde richtlijn.
Deze analyse levert het volgende beeld op: Beide migratierichtlijnen 
laten een grotere marges van beleidsvrijheid zien maar naleving in Neder-
land werd echter alleen in het geval van de Blue Card Richtlijn bereikt. De 
omzetting van de Terugkeerrichtlijn blijkt daarentegen gebrekkig waardoor 
er een inbreukprocedure door de Europese Commissie werd ingeleid en 
naleving pas na meer dan een jaar na het verstrijken van het omzettingster-
mijn gerealiseerd was. Ook de Pyrorichtlijn die maar weinig beleidsvrijheid 
aan de lidstaten toekent werd met enige vertraging omgezet. De Kader-
richtlijn Afvalstoffen die een aantal discretionaire bepalingen bevat maar, 
zoals uit de interviews blijkt, strikt geïnterpreteerd werd, is ook niet tijdig 
omgezet maar met een lichte vertraging van twee maanden. Met een ger-
inge vertraging werd tenslotte de Speelgoedrichtlijn in Nederland omgezet. 
Deze Richtlijn bevat nauwelijks discretionaire bepalingen.
Uit de individuele analyses blijkt dat beleidsvrijheid een rol heeft 
gespeeld bij de onderhandelingen en omzetting van de twee migratierichtli-
jnen alsmede de Pyrorichtlijn. De bevindingen van de analyse van de Kad-
errichtlijn Afvalstoffen laten een dergelijke conclusie niet toe voor wat bet-
reft de EU onderhandelingen. Ofschoon de richtlijn een aantal discretionaire 
bepalingen bevat, wijzen de inzichten in het onderhandelingsproces echter 
niet duidelijk uit dat beleidsvrijheid van enige betekenis is geweest tijdens 
het totstandkomingsproces van de richtlijn. Beleidsvrijheid blijkt helemaal 
geen rol te hebben gespeeld bij de omzetting van de Richtlijn waarbij nau-
welijks gebruik werd gemaakt van beleidsvrijheid. Ook de bevindingen 
omtrent de onderhandelingen over de Speelgoedrichtlijn laten niet zien dat 
beleidsvrijheid relevant is geweest. Vanuit het perspectief van Nederland 
was er, zoals in het geval van de Kaderrichtlijn Afvalstoffen, sprake van een 
goede match tussen de voorgestelde herziening van de Speelgoedrichtlijn 
en reeds bestaande nationale wetgeving waardoor er geen aanleiding was 
voor de Nederlandse delegatie om te streven naar meer beleidsvrijheid voor 
de nationale omzetting. Voor de omzetting was er dus nauwelijks beleids-
vrijheid (op basis van de tekst van de richtlijn) beschikbaar en blijkbaar was 
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er voor beleidsvrijheid geen cruciale rol weggelegd tijdens de omzetting. 
Door de goede match tussen de Richtlijn en de reeds bestaande Neder-
landse wetgeving, bestond er kennelijk geen noodzaak voor het wegnemen 
van onverenigbaarheden tussen EU en nationale regelgeving. Hierbij dient 
echter opgemerkt te worden dat de wijze van omzetting laat zien dat de 
discretonaire ruimte in de keuze van vormen en technieken van omzetting 
een ondersteunende werking lijkt te hebben gehad. De omzettingsanalyse 
toont aan dat zowel het instrument (secundaire wetgeving in vorm van een 
algemene maatregel van bestuur) als de techniek (copy-out techniek, en 
dynamische verwijzing) die zijn gebruikt, voor een probleemloze omzetting 
hebben gezorgd en dus in ieder geval niet tot een belemmering hebben 
geleid. Ten aanzien van de migratierichtlijnen valt op te merken dat beleids-
vrijheid een faciliterende werking op beide onderhandelingsprocessen heeft 
gehad. Zowel in het geval van de Blue Card Richtlijn als de Terugkeerrich-
tlijn werd door de analyse van de EU-onderhandelingen duidelijk dat de 
voorgestelde EU regels afweken van de reeds bestaande wet- en regelgev-
ing in de lidstaten. Bovendien kwamen in de debatten over de ontwerp-
richtlijnen politieke gevoeligheden en controversies naar voren die getrig-
gered werden door de beoogde mate van EU- harmonisatie. In beide 
gevallen blijkt het toekennen van beleidsvrijheid in dienst te hebben gestaan 
van het bereiken van een compromis en tot de aanname van de definitieve 
versies van de richtlijnen te hebben bijgedragen. In tegenstelling tot de Ter-
ugkeerrichtlijn is de match tussen de Blue Card Richtlijn en de Nederlandse 
wetgeving uiteindelijk echter vrij goed geweest en is door de aanwezigheid 
en het gebruik van beleidsvrijheid de hieruit resulterende positieve werking 
kennelijk versterkt. Het verschil tussen de Terugkeerrichtlijn en Neder-
landse wetgeving was daarentegen groter. De beschikbaarheid van meer 
beleidsvrijheid leidde in dit geval niet tot het versterken van de positieve 
effecten van compatibilieit. De analyse laat eerder zien dat door de manier 
waarop beleidsvrijheid bij de omzetting werd gebruikt de incompatibiliteit 
tussen de Richtlijn en reeds bestaande nationale wetgeving werd benad-
rukt. Daar komt bij dat beleidsvrijheid een belemmerende werking had en 
tot vertraging van de omzetting van de Terugkeerrichtlijn heeft bijgedragen 
– dit in samenspel met het aantal omzettingsactoren want naast het ministe-
rie was ook het Nederlandse parlement betrokken bij de omzetting. De 
Pyrorichtlijn, tenslotte, is een interessant geval. De ontwerp-richtlijn maakt 
reeds duidelijk dat het een marktwerkingsrichtlijn betreft die de nieuwe 
aanpak naar technische harmonisatie impliceert en ook door haar beoogde 
doelstellingen (consumentenbescherming en vrij verkeer van pyrotech-
nische artikelen) een grotere mate van harmonisatie met zich meebrengt en 
dus minder beleidsvrijheid bevat. Ondanks dit feit laat het onderhandeling-
sproces zien hoe belangrijk het toekennen van beleidsvrijheid is geweest en 
dat het een faciliterend impact op de onderhandelingen heeft gehad. Hierbij 
moet echter de kanttekening worden gemaakt dat de relevante discretion-
aire bepaling (uitzondering op het vrije verkeer om o.a. veiligheidsredenen) 
reeds deel uitmaakte van de ontwerp-richtlijn, voortkomend uit de overwe-
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gingen van de Europese Commissie dat politieke gevoeligheden tot contro-
versies zouden hebben geleid. Die bepaling kwam dus niet tijdens de 
onderhandelingen maar daarvoor, dus in de fase dat de tekst van het Rich-
tlijnvoorstel door de Commissie werd voorbereidt, tot stand. De analyse 
van het omzettingsproces laat zien dat beleidsvrijheid een ondersteunende 
factor is geweest die echter de negatieve impact van de incompatibiliteit op 
het vlak van EU en nationaal beleid (‘policy misfit’), niet heeft kunnen com-
penseren. Tegen de achtergrond van de analyse van al deze voorbeelden 
kan geconcludeerd worden dat de empirische bevindingen de centrale aan-
name van het proefschrift ondersteunen: beleidsvrijheid kan een belangrijke 
rol bij de onderhandelings- en omzettingsprocessen betreffende EU richtli-
jnen spelen. Daarnaast wordt het beeld van de verschillende effecten die 
beleidsvrijheid op de omzetting van richtlijnen zou hebben, bevestigd. Dit 
komt nog eens duidelijk naar voren in het aansluitende comparatieve 
hoofdstuk. Hierin wordt benadrukt om te onderzoeken welke effecten ener-
zijds richtlijnen met weinig beleidsvrijheid en anderzijds richtlijnen met 
meer beleidsvrijheid hebben op het omzettingsproces en of er, op basis van 
de uitkomsten van die analyse, een patroon waar te nemen valt. Dit, zo kan 
worden opgemaakt, is echter niet het geval. Uit de vergelijking van het 
eerste paar richtlijnen (Blue Card Richtlijn en Pyrorichtlijn) blijkt dat meer 
beleidsvrijheid tot naleving leidt, terwijl, wanneer er minder beleidsvrijheid 
wordt toegekend aan de lidstaten, dit resultaat niet wordt bereikt. In tegen-
deel, de omzetting was duidelijk vertraagd. Terwijl deze vergelijking de 
kerngedachte van de nuttige rol van beleidsvrijheid onderstreept, laten de 
andere analyses geen soortgelijke conclusies toe. Met de eerste vergelijking 
contrasteert de derde vergelijking tussen de Terugkeerrichtlijn en de Rich-
tlijn inzake fase II-benzinedampterugwinning: zoals boven genoemd draagt 
veel beleidsvrijheid bij tot vertraging en wettelijke incorrectheid van de 
omzetting van de migratierichtlijn, terwijl de milieurichtlijn die in nagenoeg 
geen beleidsvrijheid voorziet, door de lidstaten correct en tijdig werd 
omgezet. De vergelijking van het tweede paar laat tenslotte zien dat de 
omvang van beleidsvrijheid niet uitmaakt bij de omzetting aangezien 
beleidsvrijheid in geen van beide gevallen een cruciale rol speelt: Voor de 
omzetting van de Kaderrichtlijn Afvalstoffen was beleidsvrijheid helemaal 
niet relevant en hetzelfde geldt voor de incorporatie van de herziene Speel-
goedrichtijn, een richtlijn die nauwelijks discretionaire ruimte toekent aan 
de lidstaten. Wat de EU- onderhandelingsprocessen betreft, kan op basis 
van de empirische inzichten met enige zekerheid geconcludeerd worden 
dat beleidsvrijheid in de helft van de gevallen een belangrijke rol heeft 
gespeeld: zoals eerder genoemd is dit van toepassing op de onderhandelin-
gen van de twee migratierichtlijnen en de Pyrorichtlijn. Bij de onderhan-
delingen van zowel de Speelgoedrichtlijn als de Richtlijn inzake fase II-ben-
zinedampterugwinning was beleidsvrijheid irrelevant en ook de 
bevindingen van de analyse van de Kaderrichtlijn Afvalstoffen wijzen in 
dezelfde richting – ondanks het feit dat de Richtlijn een aantal discretionaire 
bepalingen bevat.
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Deel 4: Conclusie en vooruitzichten (hoofdstuk 16)
In het laatste deel worden de bevindingen uit de empirische analyse bij 
elkaar gebracht en beoordeeld. De case studies maken duidelijk dat, 
wat betreft de onderhandelingen, beleidsvrijheid een faciliterende (Blue 
Card Richtlijn, Terugkeerrichtlijn, Pyrorichtlijn) of helemaal geen actieve 
rol heeft gehad (Kaderrichtlijn Afvalstoffen, Speelgoedrichtlijn, Richt-
lijn inzake fase II-benzinedampterugwinning). De empirische resultaten 
bevestigen gedeeltelijk de verwachtingen betreffende de omstandigheden 
waaronder beleidsvrijheid wordt toegestaan. Allereerst is de link tussen de 
beleidsvrijheid van een richtlijn en het politieke beleidsdomein relevant. 
Inderdaad wordt meer beleidsvrijheid toegestaan wanneer de invloed van 
de EU in termen van wettelijke en institutionele ontwikkeling minder groot 
is: migratie is relatief beschouwd een beleidsdomein waar de EU veel later 
dan op het gebied van consumentenbescherming en milieu vaste voet aan 
de grond heeft gekregen. De twee onderzochte migratierichtlijnen zijn dan 
ook discretionaire richtlijnen die meer beleidsvrijheid laten dan de andere 
richtlijnen die betrekking hebben op het gebied van consumentenbescher-
ming en milieu. De de policy area expectation is dus van toepassing zowel 
in haar oorspronkelijke betekenis (minder EU invloed, dus meer beleid-
vrijheid) als in omgekeerde zin (meer EU invloed, dus minder beleidsvrij-
heid). De andere verwachtingen sluiten hier grotendeels op aan. Zowel de 
political sensitivity expectation als de compatibility expectation zijn van toepas-
sing in gevallen waar de lidstaten nog meer invloed hebben dan de EU en 
ze dus (nog) niet snel bereid zijn om macht en bevoegdheden af te staan 
en trachten hun eigen regelgeving in stand te houden (migratierichtlijnen 
maar ook Pyrorichtlijn zoals eerder hierboven besproken). Indien deze 
aspecten allemaal irrelevant zijn, zijn de verwachtingen dan ook niet van 
toepassing (Kaderrichtlijn Afvalstoffen, Speelgoedrichtlijn, Richtlijn inzake 
fase II-benzinedampterugwinning). De verwachting van de invloed van 
het Europees Parliament (met name in de rol van medewetgever) op de 
mate van beleidsvrijheid die wordt toegekend aan de lidstaten, kan door 
de empirische bevindingen van de analyses in geen van de onderzochte 
gevallen worden bevestigd. Uit een deel van de analyses blijkt dat het 
Europees Parlement, anders dan verwacht, het verlenen van beleidsvrij-
heid in het algemeen niet afwijst, maar juist aanbeveelt wanneer beleids-
vrijheid de naleving van het subsidiariteitsbeginsel en de nationale imple-
mentatie volgens het Parlement zou kunnen bevorderen (bv. Kaderrichtlijn 
Afvalstoffen, Speelgoedrichtlijn).
Het ontbreken van een duidelijk beeld omtrent de invloed van het 
Europees Parlement op de marge van beleidsvrijheid leidt tot de aanname 
dat een dergelijk vraagstuk, een gedetailleerde analyse van de positie van 
het Europees Parlement vereist. Dit zou toekomstig onderzoek kunnen uit-
wijzen. Een bijdrage van het proefschrift is dat de empirische resultaten 
de centrale aanname van de consensus-building benadering bevestigen: 
beleidsvrijheid faciliteert het bereiken van een compromis in de Minister-
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raad. De empirische analyses maken daarbij duidelijk dat beleidsvrijheid 
vooral een oplossing is voor meningsverschillen tussen de lidstaten, niet 
alleen wanneer hun posities van elkaar verwijderd zijn maar ook indien 
de verscheidenheid van hun wettelijke stelsels het overhevelen van eigen 
nationale beleid, wet- en regelgeving naar het EU-niveau (door zogenaamd 
‘uploaden’) geen grote kans heeft (Blue Card Richtlijn, Terugkeerrichtlijn, 
Pyrorichtlijn). Een ander belangrijk en wellicht vernieuwend inzicht is dat, 
zoals blijkt uit de onderhandelingen over de Pyrorichtlijn, beleidsvrijheid 
conflictoplossend kan werken, ook wanneer het niet in grote hoeveelheden 
voorkomt maar wel wordt toegekend ten opzichte van een voor de lidstaten 
cruciaal aspect (hier: om veiligheidsredenen).
Uit de analyse van de omzettingsprocessen blijkt dat beleidsvrijheid 
verschillende rollen inneemt: naast een faciliterende (Blue Card Richtlijn) en 
ondersteunende rol (Pyrorichtlijn, Speelgoedrichtlijn), heeft het echter ook 
een belemmerende (Terugkeerrichtlijn) of juist geen relevante rol (Kader-
richtlijn Afvalstoffen, Richtlijn inzake fase II-benzinedampterugwinning). 
Welke rol beleidsvrijheid speelt is met name afhankelijk van de omzetting-
scontext. Opgemerkt dient te worden dat de empirische bevindingen niet 
voor alle verwachtingen sluitend bewijsmateriaal leveren. Wat betreft de 
verwachting van een faciliterend effect van beleidsvrijheid op de omzetting 
(discretion-in-national-law expectation) zijn er weliswaar bevindingen die deze 
verwachting ondersteunen. Maar dat is niet alles. Gedurende de omzett-
ing komt beleidsvrijheid, zoals eerder aangestipt, naar voren als een inter-
veniërende factor die in samenspel met andere factoren een faciliterende 
of belemmerende werking heeft. Terwijl de case studie analyses het belang 
van de interactie van beleidsvrijheid met de factor van wettelijke compat-
ibiliteit (met name in het geval van de Blue Card Richtlijn) en het aantal 
omzettingsactoren (Terugkeerrichtlijn) bevestigen, wijzen de empirische 
resultaten niet op een interactie van (weinig) beleidsvrijheid en vooraf-
gaande onenigheid die tot gebrekkige omzetting van een richtlijn bepaling 
zou kunnen leiden. Daarnaast levert geen van de case studies bewijs voor 
een gezamenlijk (belemmerend) effect van beleidsvrijheid en administra-
tieve capaciteit. Maar het gebrek aan empirisch bewijs gaat wel gepaard 
met enkele inzichten. Bijvoorbeeld, naar voren komt dat de vertraging van 
de omzetting van een richtlijn niet te maken heeft met beleidsvrijheid (en 
andere factoren) maar vooral met externe factoren, zoals veranderingen 
van politieke omstandigheden in het geval van de Kaderrichtlijn Afvalstof-
fen en de Terugkeerrichtlijnis, of meer triviale redenen (menselijke fouten) 
zoals blijkt uit de analyse van de Speelgoedrichtlijn. Daarnaast wordt ook 
de relevantie van een factor zoals compatibiliteit (ook bekend als goodness-
of-fit argument) duidelijk aangetoond, een gegeven waarover in het imple-
mentatieonderzoek de meningen nogal verschillen. Feit is dat hier wordt 
aangetoond dat deze factor zowel in de onderhandelingen als ook bij de 
omzetting van richtlijnen relevant is en gebruikt kan worden om meer hel-
derheid te verkrijgen in de rol van beleidsvrijheid in deze processen.
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Met de vooraf genoemde theoretische, methodologisch en empirische 
inzichten tracht het proefschriftonderzoek een belangrijke bijdrage te 
leveren aan het onderzoek naar beleidsvrijheid. Hiertoe hoort ook de 
poging met behulp van de kwalitatieve case studie analyses de ‘black box’ 
te openen en daarmee niet alleen te volstaan met de vaststelling of beleids-
vrijheid al dan niet een effect heeft op de omzetting van richtlijnen maar te 
achterhalen hoe de discretionaire bevoegdheden die door de EU wetgever 
zijn verleend aan de lidstaten door de Nederlandse autoriteiten gedurende 
de omzetting worden uitgeoefend. Geconcludeerd kan worden, zoals de 
analyses van de Blue Card Richtlijn, Pyrorichtlijn en Speelgoedrichtlijn laten 
zien dat, wanneer ervan gebruik wordt gemaakt, beleidsvrijheid het proces 
van de inpassing van Europese richtlijnen kan bevorderen, dusdanig dat 
het nationale wetgevingskader hierdoor nauwelijks wordt aangetast.
Tot slot beantwoordt dit onderzoek niet alleen vragen, maar roept het 
ook vragen op. Dit biedt mogelijkheden voor toekomstig onderzoek naar 
beleidsvrijheid en hieraan gerelateerde aspecten. Zo rijst bijvoorbeeld de 
vraag naar de rol van beleidsvrijheid bij niet alleen de omzetting maar ook 
de praktische toepassing en naleving van EU richtlijnen. Met andere woor-
den welke rol heeft beleidsvrijheid in de fases aansluitend op de formele 
implementatie? En, voor het verkrijgen van een meer systematisch beeld 
van de effecten van beleidsvrijheid op de fases van omzetting (en daaropvol-
gende fases), zou onderzoek naar meer cases (richtlijnen) uitkomst bieden. 
Met behulp van een mixed method onderzoeksdesign (combinatie van groot-
schalig en kleinschalig onderzoek) kan zowel op een diepgaande manier 
naar het gebruik van beleidsvrijheid bij de omzetting worden gekeken als 
ook – met behulp van statistische analyse(s) – een grotere groep richtlijnen 
worden onderzocht om, zo mogelijk, patronen te identificeren ten opzichte 
van de effecten van beleidsvrijheid op de nationale implementatie van rich-
tlijnen.
Beleidsvrijheid en legitimiteit
De primaire focus van het proefschriftonderzoek is de rol van beleidsvrij-
heid bij de onderhandelingen en omzetting van richtlijnen. Een tweede 
aandachtspunt van het proefschrift is de link tussen beleidsvrijheid en legi-
timiteit. De voordelen die beleidsvrijheid kan hebben voor de onderhan-
delingen en omzetting betreffende richtlijnen zijn boven water gebracht. 
Aangezien in het rechtswetenschappelijk debat met name de nadelen van 
beleidsvrijheid worden belicht en aangezien ook politicologen op de moge-
lijke problemen wijzen die gepaard gaan met de delegatie van discretionaire 
bevoegdheden naar het nationale bestuur, komt beleidsvrijheid zoals in het 
proefschrift wordt aangetoond, in beeld als a blessing in disguise. Die con-
clusie wordt ook getrokken met het oog op de werking die beleidsvrijheid 
kan hebben op de legitimiteit van richtlijnen in het nationale recht. Ook hier, 
zo blijkt uit de bespreking van dit onderwerp, kan beleidsvrijheid bevorde-
rende werking hebben. Het onderzoek naar de link tussen beleidsvrijheid 
en legitimiteit maakt echter geen deel uit van de empirische analyse naar 
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de rol van beleidsvrijheid in EU onderhandelings- en nationale omzettings-
processen. Dat neemt echter niet weg dat de case studies worden gebruikt 
om bepaalde aspecten in de bespreking over de relatie tussen legitimiteit 
en beleidsvrijheid te illustreren. De aanpak van een complex concept zoals 
legitimiteit is bescheiden: het doel is niet om de legitimiteit van de omzet-
tingsprocessen te beoordelen die in de case studies worden besproken maar 
om stil te staan, meer in het algemeen, bij de legitimiteit van EU richtlijnen 
in het nationale recht. Er wordt dus gereflecteerd op de legimiteit van het 
omzettingsproces en het bereikte resultaat alsmede de link tussen beleids-
vrijheid en legitimiteit hierbij.
Te dien einde wordt in een eerste stap uiteengezet hoe het concept 
van legitimiteit in het proefschrift wordt opgevat. Heel in het algemeen 
wordt politieke legitimiteit aangezien als een soort containerbegrip voor 
diverse aspecten die te maken hebben met de uitoefening van beslissings-
bevoegdheid en de reactie hierop van degenen die worden geraakt door de 
genomen besluiten. In die zin behandelt legitimiteit substantiële en proce-
durele aspecten. Legitimiteit wordt bijvoorbeeld geassocieerd met begrip-
pen zoals rechtvaardigheid, verantwoording, erkenning en ondersteuning 
van politieke beslissingen. In de rechtswetenschappen wordt de uitoefen-
ing van politieke macht en de wetten waarop deze gebaseerd is als legitiem 
beschouwd – en als een plicht voor de burger om deze na te leven – wan-
neer wetten en machtsuitoefening terdege rekening houden met onder 
ander de beginselen van de rechtsstaat (legaliteit, rechtszekerheid) alsmede 
het beginsel van de machtenscheiding. Bovendien moeten de grondrechten 
worden geëerbiedigd en de mogelijkheid van rechterlijke toetsing van wet-
ten en hun bestuurlijke uitvoering bestaan. In het politiekwetenschappelijk 
debat wordt legitimiteit kwalitatief benaderd, dat wil zeggen dat het wordt 
beschreven in termen van elementen, vectoren en dimensies en ook in dit 
proefschrift is voor deze benadering gekozen. In lijn hiermee wordt benad-
rukt dat politieke legitimiteit substantiële en procedurele aspecten kent en 
dat het wordt opgevat als een multidimensionaal concept.
Multidimensioneel concept
De veelzijdigheid van het concept wordt bijvoorbeeld benadrukt door 
Beetham and Lord (1998) die nagaan wat het concept van legitimiteit, met 
name in de context van de EU, inhoudt. Volgens deze auteurs is legitimiteit 
gebaseerd op legaliteit, normatieve rechtvaardigheid en legitimatie. Kort 
samengevat moet de uitvoering van politieke macht op (democratisch) vast-
gestelde regels berusten en deze moeten te rechtvaardigen zijn in termen 
van wat burgers beschouwen als een rechtmatige bron van autoriteit, de 
daarbij passende doelen alsmede de manier van bestuurlijke uitvoering van 
bevoegdheden ter bereiking van die doelen. Legitimatie houdt tenslotte in 
dat het beslissingsbevoegde gezag aanvaard wordt door middel van de uit-
drukkelijke toestemming en bevestiging van degenen die ondergeschikt zijn 
aan de politieke macht en de wetten waarop deze gebaseerd is. Daarnaast 
introduceren Beetham en Lord drie dimensies van legitimiteit: democratie, 
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identificatie en performance. Democratie slaat op de structurele aspecten 
van de uitvoering van beslissingsbevoegdheid (bv. vertegenwoordiging 
van de bevolking bij besluitvormingsprocessen of het beginsel van mach-
tenscheiding). Identificatie heeft met de publieke aanvaarding van politieke 
autoriteit te maken maar gaat ook over onderwerpen zoals Europese iden-
titeit en burgerschap. Tenslotte heeft performance betrekking op de vraag 
of in een politiek systeem beslissingsbevoegdheden zo worden uitgevoerd 
dat ze de plannen en doelen van dit systeem ten goede komen (en hiermee 
de burgers die het hebben erkend). Met andere woorden is de vraag of de 
effectiviteit van de politieke maatregelen wordt gerealiseerd.
Nog belangrijker voor de context van dit proefschrift is echter de drie-
dimensionale benadering van legitimiteit door Scharpf (1999) en Schmidt 
(2012). Volgens hen kan legitimiteit worden beschreven en beoordeeld in 
termen van input, throughput en output legitimiteit. Output legitimiteit 
kan gerelateerd worden aan de notie van performance van Beetham en 
Lord. Het gaat hierbij om de effectiviteit van wetgeving: hoe goed wordt 
een gemeenschappelijk (op Unie niveau) vastgesteld probleem opgelost 
door de aangenomen EU wetgeving? Hoe zeer richt zich deze wetgeving 
op het belang en de behoeftes van de burgers van de Unie (samengevat in 
de door Abraham Lincoln bekende slagzin: ‘government for the people’)? 
Input legitimiteit gaat over de vraag in welke mate de aangenomen wet-
geving het belang van het publiek weerspiegelt (Scharpf, 1999) en betreft 
dus het aspect van publieke betrokkenheid bij besluitvormingsprocessen 
(‘government by the people’). Input legitimiteit is nauw verbonden met 
procedurele aspecten van deze processen waarop throughput legitimiteit 
gebaseerd is (‘government with the people’). Lord en Magnette (2004) laten 
bovendien zien dat de input en output dimensies van legitimiteit gebruikt 
kunnen worden om beginselen nader te beschrijven die EU besluitvorm-
ing en hieruit resulterende wetgeving legitimeren. Het voordeel van deze 
benadering is dat voor specifieke gevallen kan worden toegelicht wat de 
legitimiteit van EU besluitvorming precies inhoudt. Deze beginselen noe-
men ze ook ‘vectors’ (‘vectoren’) waarmee ze bedoelen de indirecte (door 
democratisch gelegitimeerde lidstaten), parlementaire (door betrokkenheid 
van het Europese Parlement), technocratische (door de input van deskundi-
gen) en procedurele (door bv. de naleving van beginselen van subsidiariteit 
en proportionaliteit) legitimiteit van besluitvormingsprocessen.
De vraag die vervolgens behandeld wordt, is hoe beleidsvrijheid 
aansluit op de input, throughput en output legitimiteit van wetgeving en 
hoe bovendien de net genoemde legitimerende beginselen in het gehele 
plaatje passen. Het centrale argument waarop vooral in het laatste deel 
van het proefschrift wordt ingegaan, is dat beleidsvrijheid ten goede kan 
komen aan de legitimiteit van Europese richtlijnen omdat beleidsvrijheid 
bij de omzetting in het nationale wetgevingskader kan worden gebruikt om 
de input, throuhghput en output legitimiteit van die richtlijnen te verho-
gen. Rekening houdend met de gehele levenscyclus van een richtlijn en dus 
hetaan de omzetting voorafgaande EU besluitvormingsproces, wordt de 
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stelling gepresenteerd en besproken dat sommige Europese richtlijnen die 
moeten worden omgezet een gebrek hebben aan (bepaalde beginselen van) 
legitimiteit.
Beleidsvrijheid en output legitimiteit
In de analyse van die stelling wordt ten eerste de samenhang uitgewerkt 
tussen de beleidsvrijheid die door EU richtlijnen aan lidstaten wordt toe-
gekend en de output legitimiteit van deze richtlijnen in de nationale rechts-
orde. Met behulp van beleidsvrijheid zijn lidstaten in staat aan de verplich-
tingen van een richtlijn te voldoen op een wijze die de lidstaten het meest 
gepast lijkt. Met andere woorden, kunnen de lidstaten de meest geschikte 
vormen en middelen kiezen en zodoende de richtlijn laten omzetten door 
actoren met kennis van de omzettingspraktijk en de omzetting op een 
manier laten uitvoeren die naar hun mening het beste past bij hun natio-
nale, wettelijke context. Alles samengenomen vergroot dit de kans dat door 
de flexibiliteit die een richtlijn beschikbaar stelt de Europese regels op een 
doelmatige manier in de nationale rechtsorde worden geïncorporeerd. Dat 
draagt ertoe bij dat de richtlijn haar probleemoplossende werking volledig 
kan ontplooien. Hierdoor wordt ook de kans groter op duurzame effectivi-
teit want een goede omzetting kan een garant zijn voor de probleemoplos-
sende werking van een richtlijn in de verdere uitvoeringsfases.
Beleidsvrijheid en input, throughput legitimiteit
Betrokkenheid bij en deelname aan besluitvormingsprocessen zijn nauw 
verbonden met zowel input als throughput legitimiteit. Met oog op de 
omzetting van richtlijnen en hieraan gerelateerde regelgevingsproces-
sen, kan beleidsvrijheid een waardevol instrument zijn. De discretionaire 
ruimte kan bijvoorbeeld worden gebruikt om vorm te geven aan een dia-
loog tussen het bestuur (dat een richtlijn omzet) en de belanghebbenden 
waardoor de kwaliteit (juistheid) van de omzettingswetgeving kan worden 
bevorderd. Beleidsvrijheid kan worden benut om een dergelijk dialoog tus-
sen de overheid (bestuur) enerzijds en belanghebbenden en breder publiek 
anderzijds zo vorm te geven dat er ingegaan kan worden op de betekenis 
en de gevolgen van specifieke EU wetgeving en de toepassing ervan voor 
nationale wetssystemen. In de functie van een nationale ‘communicatieve 
discours’ (Schmidt, 2004) waarin EU wetgeving door de overheid aan het 
publiek wordt toegelicht en op vragen en behoeftes van burgers wordt 
ingaan, kan beleidsvrijheid bijdragen aan het legitimeren van EU wet- en 
regelgeving in het nationale recht. Op die manier kan onder burgers begrip 
worden gekweekt en, met name onder belanghebbenden, steun worden 
gegenereerd voor de feitelijke toepassing en naleving van een EU richt-
lijn. De bevorderende rol die beleidsvrijheid voor de input en throughput 
legitimiteit kan spelen, lijkt vooral in het licht van het rechtswetenschap-
pelijk onderzoek naar ‘procedurele rechtvaardigheid’ (Tyler, 1988; 1990) 
van belang. Hieruit blijkt dat burgers zelfs voor hen ongunstige beslissin-
gen aanvaarden en naleven aangezien ze deze als ‘rechtvaardig totstand-
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gekomen’ beschouwen. Procedurele rechtvaardigheid wordt onder andere 
gerealiseerd doordat besluitvormingsprocessen aan bepaalde criteria vol-
doen die onder ander te maken hebben met een toereikende vertegenwoor-
ding van belanghebbenden en onpartijdigheid van het beslissingsbevoegde 
gezag. In het proefschrift wordt het idee geuit dat beleidsvrijheid kan wor-
den benut om zo vorm te geven aan een bestuurlijk regelgevingsproces in 
het kader van de omzetting van richtlijnen dat aan deze criteria kan worden 
voldaan. Figuur 2 vat de bespreking van de link tussen beleidsvrijheid en 
de drie legitimiteitdimensies in een overzicht samen:
Figuur 2: Legitimiteit en beleidsvrijheid bij de omzetting van EU richtlijnen
Legitimiteit Beleidsvrijheid
Output legitimiteit: besluitvorming 
voor burgers
Draagt bij tot de effectiviteit en het 
probleem oplossend vermogen van 
EU richtlijnen in de lidstaten
Input en output legitimiteit: besluit-
vorming door burgers en rechtvaardige 
procedures met burgers
Draagt bij tot de aanvaarding en onder-
steuning van de formele en praktische 
implementatie van EU richtlijnen in de 
lidstaten
In het proefschrift wordt vervolgens ingegaan op de aanname dat het EU 
wetgevingsproces soms legitimiteit aan richtlijnen verleent die een tekort 
laat zien aan bepaalde maar belangrijke wetgeving-legitimerende beginse-
len die boven werden genoemd (met name procedurele legitimiteit).
Legitimiteit van EU besluitvorming
Het blijkt dus dat beleidsvrijheid bij de omzetting gebruikt kan worden 
om naast de output legitimiteit zowel de input als throughput legitimiteit 
van richtlijnen in het nationale recht te verhogen. Kennelijk kan dat nodig 
zijn waar de legitimiteit van de EU besluitvorming omtrent richtlijnen 
gebrekkigheden lijkt te vertonen. Deze gebrekkigheden komen echter in 
eerste instantie niet onmiddelijk voort uit het feit dat de omzetting, zoals 
in Nederland maar ook in andere lidstaten, grotendeels door het bestuur 
wordt uitgevoerd. De redenering is dat voor een beter begrip van gebrek-
kige (maar niet per se ontoereikende) legitimiteit van richtlijnen naar het EU 
wetgevingsproces moet worden gekeken. Aangaande de beleidsdomeinen 
die in de case studies worden behandeld, wordt op basis van de relevante 
literatuur het volgende geconstateerd. Wat betreft het gebied van justitie 
en binnenlandse zaken, migratie inbegrepen, wordt in de literatuur gewe-
zen op een gebrek aan legitimiteit door een ‘cultuur van geheimhouding’, 
onvoldoende transparantie en verantwoording van besluitvorming alsmede 
te weinig input van het Europees Parlement of belanghebbenden. Het blijkt 
dus dat de legitimiteit van EU migratiewetgeving toen vooral gebaseerd 
was op indirecte legitimiteit: de realisering van politieke voorkeuren in 
de betrokken lidstaten (grensbeveiligingsaangelegenheden en regulering 
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van het toestroom van migranten). Dit aspect komt duidelijk naar voren 
in het geval van de Blue Card Richtlijn waar het Europees Parlement door 
de geldende consultatieprocedure een slechts marginale invloed had op de 
besluitvorming die vooral in handen lag van de lidstaten.
Met betrekking tot de EU milieuwetgeving en wetgeving betreffende 
consumentenbescherming is de bevinding dat deze vooral berusten op 
technocratische legitimiteit en dus de input van deskundigen. Dat komt 
door de vele technische eisen van de relevante richtlijnen die door deskun-
digen moeten worden uitgewerkt waardoor uitvoeringsbevoegdheden vaak 
gedelegeerd worden aan de relevante commissies van de Europese Com-
missie. In de case studie analyses over de milieu- en consumentenbescher-
mingsrichtlijnen komt dit aspect gedeeltelijk naar voren. Door de veelal 
toegepaste codecisie- of medebeslissingsprocedure in de periode voor het 
verdrag van Lissabon tonen de richtlijnen op het gebied van die beleidsdo-
meinen, naast technocratische echter ook parlementaire legitimiteit.
Legitimiteit van nationale omzetting
Wanneer de aandacht gericht wordt op het nationale vlak, kan dus met oog 
op de hier besproken richtlijnen en beleidsdomeinen worden vastgesteld 
dat naast het bestaan van parlementaire legitimiteit, door de betrokken-
heid van het Europees Parlement, met name de indirecte en technocrati-
sche beginselen legitimiteit verlenen aan een in nationaal recht om te zetten 
richtlijn. Hieruit kan worden opgemerkt dat er behoefte kan bestaan om de 
procedurele legitimiteit van richtlijnen, dus de througput dimensie, te ver-
sterken. Bovendien, aangezien het feit dat in Nederland, naast andere EU 
lidstaten, de omzetting van richtlijnen grotendeels door het bestuur (nati-
onale ministeries) wordt uitgevoerd, lijkt het ook belangrijk om de input 
van belanghebbenden te waarborgen. Deze input in besluitvormingsproces-
sen is niet noodzakelijk wanneer de omzetting louter technische details of 
een niet-essentiële herziening van EU wetgeving betreft. Maar het wordt als 
belangrijk geacht indien de omzetting van een richtlijn meer fundamentele 
kwesties inhoudt die, wanneer het nationale parlement niet intensief betrok-
ken is,2 het raadplegen van de relevante belanghebbenden bij de omzetting 
door het bestuur essentieel maakt. Dit aspect is in lijn met een basisprincipe 
van democratie, namelijk dat politieke besluitvorming zo dicht mogelijk 
bij degenen dient plaats te vinden die hierdoor beïnvloedt worden. In dit 
verband wordt, in de context van de omzetting van richtlijnen, op het idee 
gewezen dat betrokkenen des te meer moeten kunnen participeren aan nati-
onale besluitvormingsprocessen betreffende de omzetting van richtlijnen, 
hoe meer beleidsvrijheid voor lidstaten ter beschikking staat. In lijn hier-
mee is de gedachte dat de verplichting om een richtlijn tijdig om te zetten 
weliswaar belangrijk is maar niet ten koste zal gaan van de betrokkenheid 
van belanghebbenden. Want anders ontstaat er een ‘democratische lekkage’ 
2 Dit zal het slechts zijn indien de omzetting de aanname van een wet in formele zin zal 
vereisen.
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(Vandamme and Prechal, 2007; Vandamme, 2008). In het voorkomen van 
die lekkage kan een sleutelrol weggelegd zijn dat om die reden beschouwd 
wordt als ‘democracy discretion’ (Vandamme, 2008). Tot slot wordt in dit 
verband in het proefschrift ingegaan op de vraag hoe de participatie van 
derde partijen (naast het bestuur en het parlement) in bestuurlijke besluit-
vormingsprocessen tijdens de omzetting – die tot een verhoging van zowel 
input als throughput legitimiteit kan leiden – kan worden vormen gegeven. 
Suggesties hieromtrent betreffen vormen van democratisch en op samen-
werking gebaseerde governance (‘collaborative governance’), met name 
het zogenaamde ‘negotiated rule-making’ (‘onderhandelend regelgeven’). 
In dit soort processen kan beleidsvrijheid, zoals reeds eerder is uiteenge-
zet, de voorwaarden scheppen voor een proces dat de input en throughput 
legitimiteit van besluitvorrming en hierdoor het democratisch gehalte van 
bestuurlijke besluitvorming verhoogd. In dit verband wordt beleidsvrij-
heid aan processen van deliberatie en participatie gelinkt (Hunold & Peters, 
2004).
Samenvattend kan geconcludeerd worden dat beleidsvrijheid in de con-
text van de omzetting van Europese richtlijnen beschouwd moet worden als 
een kans om de relevante nationale actoren terug te brengen in een proces 
dat in de eerste plaats vooral vorm wordt gegeven op het EU-niveau. Tegen 
die achtergrond komt beleidsvrijheid naar voren als een belangrijk middel 
om de (vooral bestuurlijke) omzetting van richlijnen op een effectief maar 
ook democratische manier te laten plaatsvinden.

Josephine Marna-Rose Hartmann was born on 31 March 1982 in Berlin, Ger-
many. She attended the Freiherr-vom-Stein Gymnasium in Berlin Spandau 
from which she graduated, receiving the higher education entrance certifi-
cate (Abitur) in 2001. From 2001 to 2007 she studied Dutch Philology, Mod-
ern History and Education at the Freie Universität Berlin for which she 
received the Magister degree in 2007. Obtaining a direct exchange scholar-
ship, Josephine completed part of her studies at the University of Amster-
dam where she took classes in Dutch language and culture. With another 
scholarship from the German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Aka-
demischer Austausch Dienst, DAAD), Josephine returned to Amsterdam, 
following the interdisciplinary Master program European Studies: Identity 
and Integration at the University of Amsterdam, passing it with distinction 
in 2010. In her master thesis Josephine focused on a political and judicial 
subject matter: ‘The Europeanisation of national environmental policies in 
Germany, Spain and the Czech Republic’ analysing, in other words, the EU’s 
impact on environmental policy-making in a few EU Member States. Being 
aware of the importance to gain practical skills and insights into working 
fields of her interest, Josephine completed internships at the Dutch Embassy 
and German Embassy, both in Berlin as well as at the European Cultural 
Foundation (ECF) in Amsterdam. She also worked as a staff member at the 
Dutch Embassy in Berlin and later on as a research assistant at the Amster-
dam School of Communication Research (ASCoR), University of Amster-
dam. Her academic and professional background reflects her interest in the 
study of cornerstones of European society: language, history, culture, politics 
and law. Alongside that, she perceives living and working in multicultural 
environments as having decisively contributed to her educational and social 
development.
Josephine’s PhD research at the University of Leiden, department of 
Constitutional and Public Law, is part of the interdisciplinary profile area 
Political Legitimacy. Her dissertation has focused on the role of discretion 
in EU legislative and administrative decision-making as well as the link 
between discretion and legitimacy regarding EU directives in national law. 
During her PhD-programme, Josephine participated in a research project of 
Leiden Law School and the Leiden Institute of Public Administration which 
was commissioned by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Rela-
tions, dealing with the effects of European directives within frontier areas. 
Josephine was furthermore involved in the department’s project on legiti-
macy and the separation of powers resulting into the volume The Powers that 
Be. Rethinking the Separation of Powers. A Leiden Response to Möllers (2016) as 
well as in international conferences, organising and presenting in workshops 
Curriculum Vitae
486 Curriculum Vitae
on issues related to her research (‘legitimacy issues of Post-Lisbon second-
ary EU legislation’ and ‘EU and domestic politics’). Additionally, Josephine 
followed postgraduate training at the ECPR Winter and Summer Schools in 
Research Methods and Techniques including courses on qualitative and quan-
titative research designs, expert interviews, Nvivo9 for qualitative data 
management and analysis, process tracing, content analysis as well as com-
parative research designs. Josephine was involved as a teacher in the depart-
ment’s bachelor programme Dutch Constitutional and Administrative law, 
teaching the courses ‘Introduction to Dutch constitutional law’ and ‘Princi-
ples of the democratic constitutional state’. In addition to that, she co-super-
vised BA students in the writing of their theses. During her time at Leiden 
Law School she also obtained the University Teaching Qualification (BKO).

In the range of books published by the Meijers Research Institute and Graduate School of Leiden Law 
School, Leiden University, the following titles were published in 2015 and 2016:
MI-246 C. Vernooij, Levenslang en de strafrechter. Een onderzoek naar de invloed van het Nederlandse gratie-
beleid op de oplegging van de levenslange gevangenisstraf door de strafrechter (Jongbloed scriptieprijs 
2014), Den Haag: Jongbloed 2015, ISBN 979 70 9001 563 2
MI-247 N. Tezcan, Legal constraints on EU member states as primary law makers. A Case Study of the 
Proposed Permanent Safeguard Clause on Free Movement of Persons in the EU Negotiating Framework 
for Turkey’s Accession, (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2015, ISBN 978 94 6203 828 8
MI-248 S. Thewissen, Growing apart. The comparative political economy of income inequality and social policy 
development in affluent countries, (diss. Leiden), Enschede: Gildeprint 2015, ISBN 978 94 6233 031 3
MI-249 W.H. van Boom, ‘Door meten tot weten’. Over rechtswetenschap als kruispunt, (oratie Leiden), Den 
Haag: BJu 2015, ISBN 978 94 6290 132 2
MI-250 G.G.B. Boelens, Het legaat, de wisselwerking tussen civiel en fiscaal recht (diss. Leiden), ’s Hertogen-
bosch: BoxPress 2015, ISBN 978 94 6295 285 0
MI-251 S.C. Huis, Islamic Courts and Women’s Divorce Rights in Indonesia. The Cases of Cianjur and 
Bulukumba, (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2015, ISBN 978 94 6203 865 3
MI-252 A.E.M. Leijten, Core Rights and the Protection of Socio-Economic Interests by the European Court of 
Human Rights, (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2015, ISBN 978 94 6203 864 6
MI-253 O.A. Haazen, Between a Right and a Wrong. Ordinary Cases, Civil Procedure, and Democracy, 
(oratie Leiden), Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2015, ISBN 978 90 8555 099 0
MI-254 A. Marrone, The Governance of Complementary Global Regimes and the Pursuit of Human Security.
The inter -action between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, (diss. Leiden), 
Zutphen: Wöhrmann  2015
MI-255 Marieke Dubelaar, Rick van Leusden, Jeroen ten Voorde, Sigrid van Wingerden, Alleen voor 
de vorm? Frequentie, organisatie en praktijk van pro-formazittingen, Den Haag: Boom Juridische 
uitgevers 2015, ISBN 978 94 6290 156 8
MI-256 Y. Li, Inter-creditor Equity in Sovereign Debt Restructuring. Towards the Establishment of a Multi-
lateral Legal Framework (diss. Leiden), Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2015, ISBN 
978 90 8555 103 4
MI-257 M.A.K. Klaassen, The right to family unification. Between migration control and human rights (diss. 
Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2015, ISBN 978 94 6203 945 2
MI-258 J.C.W. Gooren, Een overheid op drift (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2015, ISBN 978 94 6203 973 5
MI-259 S. Tjandra, Labour Law and Development in Indonesia (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2016, 
ISBN 978 94 6203 981 0
MI-260 R.H.C. van Kleef, Liability of football clubs for supporters’ misconduct. A study into the interaction 
between disciplinary regulations of sports organisations and civil law (diss. Leiden), Den Haag: Eleven
International Publishing (BJu) 2016, ISBN 978 94 6236 670 1
MI-261 C.G. Breedveld-de Voogd, A.G. Castermans, M.W. Knigge, T. van der Linden & H.A. ten Oever 
(red.), Core Concepts in the Dutch Civil Code. Continuously in Motion, BWKJ nr. 30, Deventer: 
Kluwer 2016, ISBN 978 90 1313 725 5
MI-262 P.W. den Hollander, De relativiteit van wettelijke normen, (diss. Leiden)
MI-263 W. Wels, Dead body management in armed conflict: paradoxes in trying to do justice to the dead, (Jong-
bloed scriptieprijs 2015), Den Haag: Jongbloed 2015, ISBN 979 70 9003 825 9
MI-264 Fredericks, E.A., Contractual Capacity in Private International Law, (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: 
Wöhrmann 2016
MI-265 J.H. Crijns, B.J.G. Leeuw & H.T. Wermink, Pre-trial detention in the Netherlands: legal principles 
versus practical reality, Research Report, Den Haag: Eleven International Publishing (BJu) 2016, 
ISBN 978 94 6236 687 9
MI-266 B.E.E.M. Cooreman, Addressing global environmental concerns through trade measures: Extraterri-
toriality under WTO law from a comparative perspective, (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2016
MI-267 J.E. van de Bunt, Het rampenfonds, (diss. Leiden), Meppel: PrintSupport4U, 2016.
MI-268 J.G.H. Altena, Het legaliteitsbeginsel en de doorwerking van Europees recht in het Nederlandse mate-
riële strafrecht, (diss. Leiden), Deventer: Kluwer 2016, ISBN 978 90 1313 885 6
MI-269 D. van der Blom, De verhouding van staat en religie in een veranderende Nederlandse samenleving, 
(diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2016, ISBN 978 94 6328 032 7
For the complete list of titles (in Dutch), see: www.law.leidenuniv.nl/onderzoek/publiceren
